General Distribution **OCDE/GD(96)170**

BEYOND 2000: THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY AGENDA

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE AND SOCIAL POLICY
ISSUES PAPER BY THE SECRETARIAT

**High-level Conference to be held at the Château de la Muette, Paris,
12-13th November 1996**

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Paris

44844

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SUMMARY

The slowdown in the growth of OECD economies over the past twenty-five years has been accompanied by fears about the sustainability of current systems of social protection. These concerns are increasingly focused on the growth in cash transfers: transfers to the elderly have increased, as have those to people not in employment, including not only unemployment benefits, but also (and increasingly) social assistance, invalidity and early retirement benefits. The relative gap between households at the top and bottom of the income distribution has widened in many countries. Maintaining lone parents and the long-term unemployed on benefits is seen as a problem rather than a solution.

Policies have been influenced by a feeling that the strains on the social protection system are the result of economic disequilibria. The evidence does not support this view. *Per capita* economic growth has continued steadily over the last quarter century and, although the structure of employment has changed, the proportion of the population in employment has not altered dramatically. Working time has been re-arranged amongst the population and labour markets show every sign of having successfully capitalised on the talents of the most educated and highly skilled parts of the population. However, a number of factors -- education, employment, race, housing, family structure and benefit rule -- are acting together to marginalise some groups. The policy objective is to break the cycle of dependency by "making work pay". The strategy must be to move from passive income support to active support of those in, or attempting to enter, work.

Social policy systems are based on securing families against interruptions to regular earnings. The social basis of these systems is eroding: employment is shifting from one-earner to two-earner families and the latter are paying two premiums with a reduced risk of being without any earnings; low-skilled job opportunities are restricted by the cost of social insurance charges payable by the employer; and low wage rates can make income in work lower than income support payments. The result is that the system is providing insurance to those who fund it which they do not really need, but is failing to provide employment to those who desperately need. it.

Policies which will be successful "Beyond 2000" must take account of new realities. Families are adjusting to changes in society and the labour market. Policies should ensure that those responsible for children are able to combine family and career responsibilities. Parents need access to child care and educational facilities which are consistent with their employment patterns.

Old age no longer implies low incomes. Current pension arrangements and asset accumulation have significantly reduced old-age poverty in most countries, but the burden on the working population of supporting the elderly is becoming painfully high. A majority of the elderly will continue to depend on public pensions, but reform is required in countries where even those with high earnings are provided with pensions in excess of their contributions.

The need to provide long-term care for dependent elderly people has increased public expenditure on the elderly. Even adequate pensions are not sufficient to finance intensive care costs,

and countries are turning to social insurance arrangements to spread the burden away from social security. Financing social transfers from a broad tax base is an option which should be considered -- provided the tax system does not itself exempt the incomes of particular age groups.

Further policy initiatives which take account of social, demographic and labour market trends might include: moving toward income support arrangements which encourage beneficiaries to be flexible and to take risks, including experimenting with case management, training and unpaid trial employment for those who would otherwise be reliant on benefit income; the repayment of income-support benefit when income rises above a certain floor; the support of those who care for elderly and infirm relatives; and policy interventions which are earlier in life, and which are preventive, not remedial.

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ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES OF WELFARE SYSTEMS

a) The past twenty-five years

In 1980, the OECD held a conference whose proceedings were published the next year under the title *The Welfare State in Crisis*. As Esping-Anderson observes, that conference identified a number of challenges facing the welfare state largely associated with the consequences of the slowdown in economic growth and the rise in unemployment at the time. Many of these concerns were generated by the slowdown in growth which had been experienced over the previous decade. The initial response to the slowdown had been for nominal growth to continue at the same or even an accelerating rate, leading to "stagflation": slow growth and high inflation rates. Slower growth has meant that it has not been possible to increase transfers and public provision of services at the same real rate as in the past without committing increasingly larger proportions of national income. In some OECD countries public expenditure did in fact continue to increase as a proportion of trend GDP throughout the decade which followed, and the recession of the early 1990's caused a further cyclical increase.

Nonetheless, over the past twenty five years, continued if occasionally halting growth has continued in the OECD area[1]. By 1994, *per capita* GDP was 55 per cent higher in the OECD area than in 1970: 104 per cent in Japan, 62 per cent in the 12 countries comprising the European union until 1994, and 47 per cent in the United States.[2] On the whole the OECD economies have grown enough to allow aggregate household incomes to grow[3]. However, it is true that the rate of growth has been slower than that which characterised the first quarter century after the second world war -- the period during which the main building blocks of the social policy frameworks in OECD countries were laid down

(Chart 1. GDP per head, at price levels and exchange rates of 1990 (1970 = 100))

In spite of its economic growth, the OECD area has witnessed mounting problems with sustaining its welfare systems. In most countries these systems have become unstable for reasons

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1 In this account, "the OECD area" omits, unless otherwise stated, the countries which became members in 1995-96, as data for them have not as yet been incorporated in the data bases, or else are not available retrospectively.

2 As a result, GDP per capita has converged; in 1970, US GDP per capita, when compared using Purchasing Power Parities for that year, was 45 per cent greater than the rest of the OECD: in 1994, this had fallen to 35 per cent. Japan, which had been at 85 per cent of the OECD average, had risen to 11 per cent above the average by 1994.

3 In those countries in which the dispersion of incomes between households has grown, this aggregate growth has nonetheless left many households worse off. Also, some of this growth represents the use of resources to alleviate damage (pollution control, health care). However, even supposing that the increases in environmental and health spending were all damage limitation (implying none of the observed reductions in morbidity or mortality were due to health care provision) they only involve a very small proportion of overall GDP per capita growth -- total health expenditure has only risen by 2.5 percentage points of GDP since 1970].

ranging from purely demographic changes to changes in the composition of employment. The economic interests of the households which finance transfers are diverging more from those of the beneficiaries, leading to a loss of social cohesion and even, in some countries, of consensus on the desirability of the systems themselves. Growing tensions of unsustainability are most apparent in disputes about how to fund social expenditures -- and even about whether they should be funded publicly. At the time of the 1980 conference, it was feared that the lower growth which was already evident would doom the welfare state by eliminating the growth in resources on which it relied. These fears have proved to be exaggerated. Thinking on these issues was at the time explicitly or implicitly influenced by the "Baumol paradox": (Baumol, 1967): market economies were composed of a capital intensive primary and secondary sector characterised by high rates of productivity growth, and a labour intensive service sector characterised by stagnant productivity. Relative demand for the output of the two sectors was believed to be price inelastic, so that a future exponential increase in the aggregate labour intensity of the economy could be projected: with the health care sector the classic illustration of these pressures. In fact, it has proved possible to control the rate of increase of such expenditures (although they have risen as a proportion of GDP), both by increasing productivity[4] in the provision of health care and by controlling usage [OECD (1996c)].

The proportion of productivity growth attributable to employment in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors (the last being those capital intensive services in which productivity gains can be realised) has been falling for twenty years, due to the fact that the proportion of the labour force engaged in these sectors is secularly declining as a result of the growth in productivity. The work force freed by this process either finds itself unemployed or moves towards the quaternary sector (that is, those labour intensive services for which productivity is stagnant). The result is low overall productivity – in spite of the growth of new technologies. The capital intensive sector is also increasingly using inputs from the quaternary sector, which means that either earnings fall in the latter sector (resulting in growing dispersion in earnings) or the costs faced by the former sector increase – a burden which is additional to that resulting from direct transfers to those not in employment. The growth or persistence of subsidies and of other forms of protection (notably in the form of agricultural supports) is one symptom of these strains, and means that the public finances face adjustment pressures from items other than the burden of social transfers as such.

Current concerns about future health care costs are often concentrated on the implications of ageing populations for such expenditures. Health care expenditures are higher for elderly people than for younger age groups, and so a simple extrapolation of this ratio into the future suggests that health care expenditures will rise in *per capita* terms for this reason alone. However, if countries can control health care expenditures so that, as populations age, the ratio between expenditures on the elderly and the young is reduced[5], it may be possible to avoid this occurring. Also, to the extent that health care expenditures are concentrated in the final years of life, ageing of the existing population may not result in higher expenditures in the future, but of course this will not compensate for a rise in the ratio of old people due to a past fall in the birth rate.

Comparisons across OECD countries are encouraging in this regard. If health care expenditures were systematically higher when populations are older, one would expect that countries which have more elderly populations would have a systematic tendency to have higher health care expenditures

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4 The slowdown in productivity growth elsewhere in the economy has itself contributed to slowing the relative productivity deficiency of the health care sector.

5 For example, by avoiding the unnecessary use of acute care hospitals to provide long term care. Health insurance arrangements tend to encourage inappropriate use of acute care facilities in a number of OECD countries, in particular Japan.

per capita than those with younger populations. This does not appear to be the case: across OECD countries there does not appear to be any relationship between the extent of ageing and aggregate health care expenditures. It is real *per capita* GDP, and not the proportion of the population who are elderly, which is closely correlated with the proportion of national income devoted to health care [Scherer (1996)].

(Chart 2.a Health expenditure (public and private) and extent of ageing, 1994)
(Chart 2.b Health expenditure (public and private) and domestic expenditure, 1994)

This said, it is clearly important to understand more thoroughly the likely implications of future demographic trends on health care burdens: is healthy life expectancy increasing at least in line with life expectancy itself with expensive care concentrated in a smaller part of the population, or can demand for health care in the future be estimated by extrapolating current age specific expenditures? [For a preliminary discussion of this issue, see OECD (1996*e*)].

b) Current Policy Preoccupations

Fears about the viability of social commitments have now shifted to cash transfers. Publicly funded provision of various forms of care ("in-kind" benefits) - of which health care is the major item - represent a direct use of resources which would otherwise be available to households to spend (although they would often have to meet the same costs themselves, so that the effect on net household incomes is indeterminate, and varies with the economic situation of individual households and their usage of such services). In contrast, cash transfers re-assign incomes between households, and do not change national expenditures in a national accounting sense. They may effect aggregate incomes (apart from the administrative costs of the transfers) due to the distortions in the price mechanism of the economy because of the taxes used to finance the transfers, and the dissuasive effects which transfers can induce in their recipients [OECD (1996*b*)].

(Chart 3. In-kind benefits and cash transfers, by type, 1980/85 and 1992/93, as per cent of GDP)

Some of these increases were planned, or at least largely foreseeable. Expenditures on public transfers to the elderly in the form of old age pensions have increased as pension systems based on social insurance principles have matured [OECD (1988*b*)], and as the life expectancy of retired people has increased. The high levels of expenditures now being experienced were implicit in many European countries in the benefit entitlement formulae in their pension systems.

(Table 1. Net income replacement ratios (net retirement pension / net earnings) for pensioner without dependent spouse, in 1990)

In all OECD countries, public pension systems have, either explicitly or implicitly, a flat rate component (often with adjustments for household size) and an earnings related component. The increase in life expectancy and future demographic changes in the proportion of elderly people in the population is putting pressure on the financing of even the flat rate component, and in many countries

this is now subject to reduction if other income (either earnings related pension entitlements or aggregate income) is high[6].

But it is the earnings related component of public systems which is under the greatest strain. Currently, the formulae for determining pension entitlements often imply that all contributors will receive a yield on the contributions which are made on their behalf which is greater than the sum of the growth rates of employment and of individual earnings. While it is always possible to achieve this for some contributors, (and most public pension systems are biased towards higher replacement rates for those with low lifetime earnings -- this is in fact the way the flat rate component is instituted in many instances), this cannot be the case for the pension system as a whole -- unless it receives a subsidy from the general tax system[7].

As a result, earnings related pension systems have been reformed or are under reform in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Sweden, Japan and other countries. In many cases, this reform has been initially oriented to changing the formulae for pension accrual so that, in the future, pension rights will be based on lifetime contributions rather than on final salaries. In some cases, the reforms have introduced an element of capitalised funding of future provision, in order to ensure that, at least for the proportion of the pension which is funded in this way, pension entitlements will be based on accumulated capital and the revenue from investing it.[8] Unfortunately, these reforms, while bringing the growth of pension expenditures under control, seem likely to leave the systems with severe strains [OECD (1996e Ch. 2)]. This is because the ageing of OECD populations and the changing patterns of lifetime labour force participation will both lead, for the foreseeable future, to a shrinkage of the base of pension contributors by comparison with beneficiaries.

(Table 2. Population aged 65 and over as a per cent of the population 15-64, 1960-2030)

For those countries which continue to rely on currently financed pension systems, the nature of the pension promise needs to be recalled. These pension systems were designed to ensure that those who had retired would be able to share in economic growth and prosperity -- and in their initial years they frequently were implemented to allow those who had recently retired to do so, although their own contributions had been for a short duration[9]. It is necessary now to ensure that sight is not lost of this basic design principle. Most public pension systems have an element of redistribution to those with low earnings, or to those with dependents. However, it is impossible for a pension system to redistribute towards all contributors and still remain viable once it is mature. Hence where the design of pension systems is such that those with high earnings receive a yield on the contributions which are

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6 Flat rate benefits are sometimes only paid as last resort assistance benefits.

7 It is possible also for each generation to receive a pension higher in value than the contributions paid in a pay-as-you-go system if the number of contributors and the earnings on which they pay contributions are growing. This is the famous “Aaron condition” for a high rate of return to contributors from pay-as-you-go schemes.

8 All OECD countries which have introduced such provisions (the UK, Sweden and Australia, so far) as part of compulsory public provision have a flat rate basic pension as a basis of their system, to which the capitalised funds will be added -- though in the case of the latter two, the flat rate pension is reduced when either total pension entitlements (Sweden) or total income and assets are high (Australia). In addition, most OECD countries (New Zealand is an exception) offer tax advantages for capitalised pension funds which supplement public provision: these are generally used most by those with high incomes for whom the public pension systems offer a low pension in relation to their income.

9 For an extensive discussion of the extent to which initial generations were favoured as the US Old Age and Disability Insurance (OASI) was implemented, see Steuerle and Bakija (1995).

made on their behalf greater than the sum of the growth rates of employment and of individual earnings, immediate reform is called for. Clearly, the overall relation between pension recipients and other citizens involves much wider issues than pensions alone. This involves the consideration of life-cycle issues, to which this paper returns below.

The other source of increase in the transfer burden has been the growth in the expenditures devoted to unemployment compensation. The specific issue of unemployment will be discussed below, but in addition to unemployment benefits the change in the structure of employment has resulted in a spill of income maintenance payments into other categories. Invalidity benefits and early retirement benefits (in many countries these are interchangeable terms) have added to the pensions burden. Since such benefits are often funded in the same way as the old-age pension system, they represent a "premature ageing" of the population which has the same implications for expenditure as demographic ageing itself. Growth in the proportion of the population in receipt of invalidity benefits has been experienced in a number of OECD countries, and is one of the main contributors to increases in total outlays. Their use as a substitute for unemployment benefits may be far more important as a source of "welfare dependence" than social assistance to the most disadvantaged[10].

c) The welfare state and family incomes

There has been a strong growth since 1980 in the dispersion of household incomes in a number of OECD countries, although by no means in all. This change has been greatest in absolute terms in Anglo-Saxon countries, and has on the whole been less pronounced in continental Europe and in the Nordic countries[11].

(Chart 4. Changes in GINI coefficients (1980-81 = 100)

The causes of this change are not fully understood. Two important factors have been the broadening of the distribution of hourly earnings amongst individuals [OECD (1996a); Gottschalk and Danziger (1993); Picot and Myles (1995)] and changes in household composition -- though the latter have, overall, reduced the extent of the change. In the United States, where the rate of growth of *per capita* GDP has been slower than in most other OECD countries and the initial dispersion between households was wider than elsewhere, the growth in dispersion between households has been greatest [U.S. Government (1995) and U.S. Department of Labor (1996)].

This change in income distribution and the growth of concern about its implications is new. Around the time of the 1981 OECD Conference, there was a consensus that one of the empirical economic constants for the US was the inter household distribution of income [Danziger and Gottschalk (1993)]. Perhaps as a result, concern about the distributional consequences of changes in tax and transfer systems was not high on the agenda, and is not raised in the discussion in *The Welfare*

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[10] In 14 out of 23 OECD countries in 1992, the number in receipt of invalidity or early retirement benefits equalled or exceeded the total number of unemployed (Blondal and Pearson, 1996, Table 1). In 11 out of 23 countries in 1993 expenditure on disability benefits alone exceeded expenditure on unemployment and early retirement benefits combined (OECD 1996f, Table 3).

[11] The rise in Sweden is from a low initial degree of inequality, and that country still has one of the most compressed income distributions in the OECD.

State in Crisis, other than in the context of suggesting that the egalitarian goals of the welfare state were inhibiting economic adjustment and growth.

In the United Sates, the broadening of the inter household income distribution in a context of relatively slow real *per capita* GDP growth has led to a growth in absolute poverty (measured against a line with a fixed real value) amongst households at the lower end of the distribution. It is unclear how much of this represents growth in persistent poverty for the individuals in particular households, and how much of it represents transient low incomes in the course of life cycles with greater variation in incomes over time.[12] In most other OECD countries, real incomes at the bottom of the income distribution have not, on average, fallen in real terms, and in particular not after the effects of the tax transfer system are taken into account. However, the relative gap between households at the top and bottom of the income distribution has widened in many countries -- and is likely to do so further in the future, as labour markets become more market responsive and as access to labour market opportunities becomes more dispersed amongst households.

It is a matter of debate whether a broadening in income distribution in itself -- provided it is not accompanied by an absolute fall in the incomes of poorer households -- is a matter of policy concern. In a sense, concern about this has been superseded in Europe by a debate about "social exclusion" -- broadly the notion that a number of factors are acting together to marginalise some groups. These factors include some combination of education, employment, race, housing, family structure and benefit rules. Isolation from the mainstream of society can lead to a total loss of economic and social adhesion for those affected, made worse by cultural isolation. Whether or not the benefits system prevents absolute income poverty is, in this view, only part of the story. Maintaining someone just above the poverty "line" (e.g., lone parents, long-term unemployed) but only on benefits is seen as a problem rather than a solution. The problem from a public policy perspective is that the proper boundaries of public concern are unclear: how is isolation resulting from individual choice to be distinguished from isolation imposed by lack of opportunity?

Related concerns underlie the desire to end "welfare dependency" in countries with means tested systems[13]. In a major reform intended to achieve this aim, the United States has just legislated to transfer most authority for provision of aid to families with dependent children to the states, providing for a limit of two years in the duration of income support for a non-exempt[14] parent without undertaking paid work. No adult may receive more than five years' assistance in all.

Accompanying this growth in income disparities has been a growth in geographical disparity. Particularly in countries in which a majority of households are owner occupiers, the stock of housing available for rental at affordable rents to those on low incomes has come to be concentrated in particular areas. Social housing, when access is confined to those on low incomes, also contributes to this concentration, particularly when it is provided in geographically concentrated estates. Employment opportunities are more likely to be found in areas in which average households incomes (and hence consumer expenditures) are higher, and so geographically concentrated lack of employment opportunities compounds and worsens the income disparities associated with housing

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12 In Mexico, where inter-household income distribution is wide compared to the rest of the OECD, the economic crisis of 1995 increased considerably the number of households in poverty.

13 The New Zealand Department of Social Welfare is holding a major international conference on 16 to 19 March 1997 on this issue, under the title *Beyond Dependency: a Watershed for Welfare.*

14 Exempt parents include single parents with children under the age of 6 years.

concentration. It has become clear that any policy to lessen income disparities needs to address geographical disparities as well.[15]

[15] The Territorial Development Service of the OECD has been developing programmes on social distress in urban areas and in isolated rural communities.

THE CHALLENGES TO SOCIAL PROTECTION

Social protection has come under severe stress due to changes in the composition and nature of employment. While initially devised as an economic stabiliser, its function has gradually changed. But this is not due to any fall in overall employment levels. Over the past 25 years, the proportion of the population in employment has been more or less stable in the OECD area: for the twelve countries for which data are available continuously since 1972, 63 per cent of the working age population was engaged in paid employment in 1972, and 66 per cent in 1995. In the eight European countries included in this total, there was a slight fall: from 61 to 58 per cent. Hence, in terms of a simplistic count of numbers employed, if the OECD area was fully employed in 1972, it still is today.

The overall stability in the employment rate masks massive changes in the composition of employment. One is age related. Those aged 25-54 accounted for 75 per cent of employment in 1995, as against 65 per cent in 1972: the proportion of that age group in employment grew from 70 to 76 per cent. This represented a shift in employment away from youth,[16] and also away from older men. The growth in employment share amongst adults[17] was itself the product of two contradictory trends. There has been a fall in the proportion of adult men in employment, but this has been on average balanced by the increase in this age group as a proportion of the population, and a strong increase in the employment rate of adult women.

(Table 3. Employment, unemployment and population, 1972 to 1995)

There has also been a growth in the proportion of employment which is classified as part time[18]. While part-time workers are actively involved in the world of work, they earn less than full time workers, so the distributional effects of the growth in the share of part-time employment are significant. As women also generally earn less than men (even when working fill time) the shift in employment share from men to women has also had a distributional effect – as has the growth (in

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16 Even if employment rates have remained unchanged, demographic changes would have led to a fall in the employment share of young people in any case. But this has been compounded by a dramatic fall in the proportion of this age group in employment from one cohort to the next.

17 To avoid verbosity, this account uses “adults” as a shorthand for persons aged 25-54, “youth” for those 15-24, and “Older workers” for those aged 55-64.

18 From 1975 to 1995, the proportion of total employment classified as part time in 15 OECD countries rose from 26.8 to 31.7 per cent. (Table 4a) This has largely been due to the increase in the proportion of both men and of women who are working part time: if this had not increased between 1975 and 1995, the increase in the proportion of employment held by women would have only resulted in a quarter of the increase in the part time proportion which did in fact occur. Although the proportion of men working part time increased less than in the case of women, their still greater overall employment share means that this increase (2.7 percentage points for men) has the same effect on the overall average as the 5.0 percentage point increase for women. In many countries, a growing proportion of the labour force consists of involuntary part time workers(OECD, 1995*d*).

some countries) in the share of full-time employment (amongst both sexes) with low earnings (OECD, 1996*c*).

(Table 4 Number of persons in total and part-time employment in 15 OECD countries, in 1975 and 1995, in millions)

Unemployment[19] grew in the OECD area in spite of the stability in employment rates. Nor was it linked in a simple manner to the falls in employment which did occur. Amongst youth, the rise of unemployment was not nearly as great as the fall in employment, which in the majority of European countries (where it was most pronounced), was accompanied by a growth in full-time educational participation [Table 5]**.** Because the unemployment rate is influenced by employment rates (which are low where simultaneous schooling and employment are rare, as in France, and high in "dual" education systems such as those of Germany and Austria), and because it is possible (and in some countries common) to combine educational participation with jobseeking, the unemployment rate is a particularly misleading indicator of social distress amongst young people. It is the large proportion of young people who are neither at school nor at work which is the clearest sign of social distress: in many countries it is as high or higher for young men as for young women, Those engaged full time in child raising will also be found in this category, but the proportion of young people neither in school nor in work has not fallen as the birth-rate has fallen.

(Table 5. Proportion of youth in education and in employment, by sex, for 15-19 and 20-24 year-olds)

Countries have varied in their response to this problem. Some have emphasised increasing flexibility in the youth labour market and the removal of entitlements to income support which seemed to encourage young people to quit school and look for work[20]. Others have concentrated on increasing school participation, and have experienced both a fall in the proportion of young people in employment and a fall in the proportion neither in school nor in work.[21]

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[19] By unemployment is meant, of course, those counted as satisfying the ILO criteria (not in paid employment, taking active steps to find employment, available to take up employment). The "non employed" include those not in employment who do not satisfy these criteria, who are classified as outside the labour force.

[20] The United Kingdom has abolished entitlement to unemployment benefits for teenagers under 18, and have made income support conditional on participation in youth training schemes, while in Australia the Youth Training Allowance has replaced the Jobsearch allowance for this age group, to emphasise the priority attached to participation in education and training.

[21] France instituted a strong drive to increase the proportion of young people completing the *baccalaureate* in the 1980's, and succeeded in reducing the proportion of teenagers neither in school nor in work from 17 per cent in 1985 to 5 per cent in 1995. The proportion of teenagers looking for work fell, but as the proportion in employment fell even faster, the unemployment rate rose. In Germany, where the proportion neither in work nor at school, and the proportion looking for work, is now similar to France, the unemployment rate is lower because those enrolled in the dual system are counted as employed, and the denominator of the unemployment rate is larger. In Sweden, responsibility for integrating young people was transferred from national labour market authorities to local authorities responsible for schools and children's' services, while in Japan for fifty years schools have had the responsibility for integrating their pupils into either the world of work or higher education.

(Chart 5. Proportion of youth in education and in employment, by sex, for 15-19 and 20-24 year-olds)

Amongst older men, most of the fall in employment rates was accompanied by withdrawal from the labour force (encouraged by reductions in the standard retirement age, and by the subsidisation of early retirement which lowered the effective retirement age) [OECD (1995b) and (1995c)]. Amongst adult men participation did not decline appreciably in the face of employment falls, so that the rise in unemployment roughly matched the fall in employment. However, amongst adult women unemployment rose strongly throughout the period, in spite of the strong growth in employment, and now accounts for over a quarter of all unemployment in the OECD area.

Unemployment is not randomly distributed. As detailed reviews of social insurance systems have shown [Government of Canada (1994); Swedish Department of Finance (1993)], even systems which are, in principal, based on social insurance principles do not have any of the features of an insurance market. Those who are repeated claimants are easily identifiable, and would not be insurable in any insurance market, even if insurance were compulsory. Social insurance against unemployment always represents the transfer of resources to bad risks. As the Swedish authorities observe, the distinction between social insurance and targeted assistance can be, for this reason, formal rather than substantive in countries in which most persons losing a job and willing to work receive some form of income support.

The change in female employment has not been uniform in its impact. In all OECD countries for which data are available, employment growth has been concentrated in married couple households, so that the two-earner households have grown as a proportion of all households: female employment growth has not reduced the proportion of households with no person receiving an earned income, though nor is there any clear evidence of that proportion increasing over the decade. [Gregg and Wadsworth (1996a*)* and (1996b)] In the US, analysis of census year data over four decades shows that, at least since 1970, it has been households in which the male earner has high wages that male participation and earnings have increased, and it is in such households that female participation and earnings had increased most as well. [Juhn and Murphy (1996)]. While the increase in female participation has the overall effect of increasing equality of incomes amongst households due to the movement of households from one earner to two, dispersion of incomes amongst households with two earners has increased.

Social policy systems in OECD countries are generally based on securing families against fluctuations in their income, whose base is regular earnings from a “regular” job. Interruptions to regular earnings -- from unemployment, illness, family responsibilities or invalidity -- are regarded as “risks” against which insurance is necessary. This idea is behind the international conventions on social security (including those sponsored by the ILO and the Council of Europe).

To the extent that the industrialised societies are adjusting to the changing patterns of labour demand in the ways described above, the social basis of this system is eroding. If most households have a single earner, then the risk to that household of the loss of income from interruption of employment is considerable, and the conjectural nature of the events make private insurance impractical. Social insurance fills a need which is difficult to satisfy in other ways.

However, once employment shifts from the young to two-earner families, the system is eroded at both ends. Two-earner families are better able to accumulate cash reserves and other resources which provide a cushion against income fluctuations. Hence, to the extent that social insurance (and in particular insurance for non-employment related services such as health care) is funded by specific

levies (rather than from the general tax system), they may (if they each receive an adequate income in work) find themselves paying two premiums for a coverage neither of them really needs[22]. At the same time, those trying to enter the labour market with low qualifications or few marketable skills can find that the cost of social insurance charges payable by the employer makes job opportunities hard to find. Furthermore, low rates of wages on offer can make income in work lower than income support payments, particularly for part time work. Hence the system as a whole provides an insurance which they do not really need for those who fund it, while failing to provide employment opportunities to those who desperately need them. In addition to the labour market distortions caused by financing and paying cash transfers to those without employment, there is a growing divergence of economic interests between those who fund them and those who receive them.

This is not the result of any "failure" in the labour market. The labour market is changing its nature in response to technological change -- and in response to the feedback into the derived demand for labour from these processes themselves: twin income households have different patterns of demand to single-earner ones.[23] Nor is there any evidence of "moral" failure on the part of those who have been excluded from employment and still seek it: the growth in the number of job seekers is a sign of the desire to participate economically.

Hence the challenge social policy makers must face is twofold. First, there are a number of people who are unable to support themselves and their families through work. Second, an increasing number of families may perceive that they will receive less out of the state than they contribute to it. The divergence of interests between gainers and losers has always been there, but in the past it was blurred by trying to ensure that all citizens shared in the benefits conferred by the system[24]. The middle classes supported welfare to get health, education, better pensions, family support; the working classes mainly for greater economic security in times of sickness, unemployment and old age. Now there is a greater divide between those in regular employment (of any "class") and those in casual or non-employment.

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22 As a result, in Spain and other countries with relaxed administrative controls, families try to arrange matters so that only one member is recorded as being in the formal economy and liable to social insurance taxes.(de la Rica and Lemieux, 1994).

23 For example, the sports and leisure industry is changing: low-priced sports events and gymnasiums with spartan facilities are being displaced by more highly capitalised facilities which do not cater for those with time to spare but little income to spend.

24 For example, in Sweden, sickness insurance became a means for financing extra days off for a large proportion of the work force.

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE LIFE-CYCLE

a) Family Formation and Family Policy

Family formation patterns have adjusted in the light of these pressures. First, educational attainment has been growing in almost all OECD countries over the past fifty years, so that successive cohorts have higher rates of educational attainment (Table 6**).** However, with current institutional arrangements this can be a slow process: if educational attainment is determined for life at an early age, increased skill requirements will not be attainable by the current labour force. Early retirement from the labour force is no solution to this lack of adaptiveness as OECD populations age. This has led to a shift to lifelong learning (OECD, 1996f): adult participation in continuing education is expanding [Table 7].

(Table 6. Proportion of the population in four age groups, that had attained at least upper secondary education, 1992)

(Table 7. Proportion of population aged 25-34, attending school or in training, by sex and labour force status, in 1984 (or 1989) and 1994)

Age at first marriage and age at first childbirth are increasing: family formation is being deferred until education and integration into the labour market has been completed. The deferment of marriage and childbirth means that when families are formed the parents are better educated and more likely to be established in their careers – which increasingly are dual careers. This reduces poverty rates amongst families with children[25], to some extent through a "stretching out" of the passage from one generation to the next: the proportion of young people in their 20's living with their parents has ceased to fall and is rising in many OECD countries.

(Table 8: Age at first childbirth)

Even after marriage or first childbirth, completion of family formation is further deferred in the light of employment and child care opportunities. It can even be deferred indefinitely, so that completed family size falls. However, it is not yet clear how general this is: fertility has fallen amongst younger women in all OECD countries, but is rising amongst older women: completed fertility has not yet fallen in most OECD countries. In countries with parental leave entitlements and comprehensive childcare facilities for young children, such as Sweden and France, or in which child care is available in a deregulated private market, such as the UK, completed fertility seems not to have fallen below about two, but it has clearly done so in some other countries, including Germany.

[25] Although, to the extent that young people have left their parental home, poverty rates amongst single people and childless couples would be correspondingly higher.

Nonetheless, even deferment of family formation, when generalised across a community, will have wide social and economic consequences: it means that there will be a small cohort moving through the education system and a further fall in the future ratio of working age to retirement age adults.

(Table 9. Completed fertility by year of birth of the mother, 1930-1960)

In some countries, very early family formation has also been evident, suggesting fading confidence in career opportunities: some young women despair of finding a place in the labour market or finding a steady partner, and bear children without either, often without completing their secondary education. These young women are the counterpart of the young men who "drop out" and leave school with no qualifications: by 25 they have 10 years non-employment, no skills, perhaps a "record". [Freeman (1995)].

(Table 10.*a* Percentage of births attributable to young women, 1960-1994)
(Table 10.*b* Age specific birth rates per 1000 (within and outside marriage), 1960-1994)
(Table 11. Proportion of adults in prison, by sex, in 1990, per million of the total population)

Even in the United States, where this tendency has been most pronounced, it does not outweigh the general tendency to defer family formation in its effect on the overall growth of poverty (so that, overall, demographic change has had a positive effect on the poverty rate). Nonetheless, it remains a tragic path to family formation in a modern economy, and the current US reform of welfare support for the children born in these circumstances has been inspired by a public perception that the support system has contributed to this tendency (although whether this perception is correct is a hotly disputed issue).

Support for families, through family allowances and child care provision, is modest compared to other items of social expenditure in all OECD countries: Sweden, with the highest effort, devotes 5.3 per cent of GDP (this largely accounts for the higher overall level of Swedish social expenditure, once the double counting through the taxation of benefits is taken into account) **[Chart 3].** [Bradshaw *et al* (1996)]. Such subsidies cannot be sufficient to compensate families fully for the cost of child raising [Davies and Joshi, 1994]-- and would be perceived as inequitable if they did, as children are of greatest value to their own parents. A more fruitful path for policy -- one which experience in a number of OECD countries suggests is effective -- is to ensure that public policy ensures that those responsible for children are able to combine their careers with their responsibilities for their children. This in particular means that parents need access to child care and educational facilities which are consistent with a full working life. It also involves availability of full time care for pre school children, and also schooling hours and arrangements which do not suppose the continuous availability of one parent.

In Japan and in many European countries, support for family formation has been structured on different lines. The emphasis of support has been on enabling the one-earner family to prosper, through insurance arrangements designed to assure the income security of the principal earner, both during working life and after retirement. Where unemployment has grown, this has been interpreted as resulting from an overall shortage of jobs, and early retirement and late entry into the work force have both been encouraged in order to ration out the jobs amongst those who “really” need them. While the right of women to pursue careers has been recognised, it has not been seen as a major goal of public policy to facilitate this, and schooling systems have continued to rely on the active

availability of a parent. Early childhood education services are often offered widely, but these to do necessarily meet the needs of working mothers[26]. In these countries, family formation has declined, and completed family sizes continue to fall.

b) Support for the elderly

The maturation of pension systems in OECD countries has significantly reduced, and in some countries eliminated, old-age poverty (except for groups left out of this system, such as women left without adequate pension coverage through divorce or other breakdown in family related income security provision). However, this was not the primary goal of earnings related pension systems, in which entitlements are positively related to past earnings. Such pension systems are designed to prevent sharp changes in standards of living at retirement, and they therefore perpetuate into retirement the earnings differentials of working life. Frequently, public systems are supplemented by tax-encouraged occupational pensions which have similar goals, and which frequently are "integrated" with public systems in a way which counteracts any redistributive elements in the public pension formula. Finally, those who have had a successful lifetime career are likely to have accumulated wealth in the form of owner occupied dwellings and other property. The extent to which these systems have over-provided for the consumption needs of the elderly can be observed in the high savings rates which typify the elderly in many OECD countries.

Public pension transfers are thus increasingly flowing to a sector of the population which, on average, has considerable other incomes and assets. There can be no question of reneging on the pension promise: incomes and asset holdings are skewed, and situated below that average there are a majority whose life situation is structured around their pension income. However, it may now be time to reconsider the favoured fiscal treatment which the elderly often receive: they are often exempt from social charges (which are levied on earned income in many countries) and also often receive favoured treatment in the general tax system. Those with extensive capital assets in the form of housing stock are often unable to access this to fund income needs, or are encouraged not to do so by exemption of such assets from tax assessment and (at least in Australia) from the criteria which determine entitlement to means tested support. Similarly, general publicly subsidised concessions to the elderly represent further "in-kind" benefits (which are not generally captured in the data) -- benefits which are often not available to younger low income families. Old age is no longer a useful "proxy" for income distress, although many tax systems do still reflect that assumption[27].

(Table 12. Average tax rates for persons of working age and at pensionable age, 1995)

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[26] For example, in Austria, amongst existing kindergartens for children aged between three and six, only 54 per cent are open throughout the day: of the remainder, half require children to return home for lunch, and the other half only open half a day. If the wishes of parents were fulfilled, 85 per cent of Austrian children would attend kindergarten: to achieve this it would be necessary to increase the number of places by 40 per cent. (Austria. Ministre federal a la condition feminine, 1995).

[27] One indicator of the extent to which pension flows are "overcompensating" is the volume of transfers between generations between families: INSEE has estimated (de Barry *et al*, 1996) that in France these approximate half of bequests each year. Such flows have been studied extensively in the U.S. as well, although the longitudinal data sets on which these studies are based do not appear to readily yield estimates of the total volume of such flows These transfers are between generations but within families. To a large extent they replace bequests, and to the extent this is true they have no redistributional effect in life cycle terms. However, if included in survey data they may reduce the measured "income poverty" amongst young people starting out in their careers.

This issue has come to a head in many countries as a result of the need to provide for long term care for dependent elderly people [OECD (1996*d*)]. Even adequate pensions are not sufficient to finance intensive care costs, and so countries are turning to social insurance arrangements to spread the burden away from the estates of those who are stricken with senile dementia and other afflictions requiring intensive care [Hennessy and Wiener (1996)]. To avoid institutionalisation, the families of frail elderly people frequently provide care themselves, and often do so for cost reasons even where institutional care has become appropriate. Social insurance can spread this burden by providing income support to those who provide this care, and by financing the costs of institutionalisation when this is essential. However, if this new branch of social insurance is financed in the traditional way (through levies paid by, or on behalf of, those in paid employment)[28] a fresh burden is placed on working age people as a whole. Even if social charges are extended to public pension receipts, the rate of charge has to be kept low, since many pensioners are totally reliant on their pension incomes. France, with her *Contribution Sociale Generalisée*, has taken the first step to extending the financing of social benefits to a wider tax base. Financing of social transfers by the general tax system (which is policy in Australia, New Zealand and Denmark-- countries with very divergent benefit systems) is another way to achieve this -- provided the tax system does not itself exempt the incomes of particular age groups.

The issue of pension burdens is often formalised in analyses of the net tax burden on succeeding generations. Perhaps a more immediate issue is the question of the extent to which the financing of current pension systems (including disability and early retirement benefits -- many of which have come to finance "premature ageing") is in a sense "crowding out" arrangements which enable parents to combine child raising and careers. These arrangements might be in the form of direct public service provision, or through modification of relative wage levels and relief from taxation and charges so that households can be confident of being able to afford their own arrangements.

[28] The "fourth arm" of the German social insurance system, instituted in 1995, is financed in this way. The current debate in Japan on how to finance long term care insurance raises this issue. France has suspended instituting long term care benefits announced in 1995 because of financing issues.

BALANCING SUSTAINABILITY AND SECURITY IN SOCIAL POLICY

As it has developed to date, the welfare state has been successful in providing income security for those already established in the labour force[29], both during their working life and after retirement. However, the main risk that families face today is that their children will not be able to establish themselves in careers. As a result, they are deferring childbirth and, if they can, pouring resources into their children's education in a bid to ensure that their children do have the educational attainment necessary for entry into working life.

Traditional social insurance arrangements are powerless against these risks. They are predicated on the assumption that each generation will make its own way into working life, and will both establish their own career and, through income transfers, support those who have retired or who are temporarily unemployed.

Substituting targeted income support for those out of work while avoiding the problem of leaving those not integrated into the labour force without coverage, raises its own problems: for those with low earnings potential in the current labour market, the differential between earnings in an (often unappealing) low wage job and basic income support payments can be low, and the gains from working are small as a result of the abatement of income support as earned income increases (the poverty trap).

A growth in the proportion of the population in receipt of income support also saps public confidence. Where recipients of such support are regionally concentrated, severe political pressures can result: some of the recent strains concerning regional policy in Belgium, Canada and Italy have reflected this. Geographic or social concentration of receipt of benefits, particularly when it is associated with a feeling on the part of recipients that they have to manipulate the system in order to make ends meet, can also jeopardise their legitimacy: the fact that the very word "welfare" has become "politically incorrect" in the U.S. illustrates this sharply. It is therefore very important that social protection systems are administered fairly but firmly: lax administration can place in jeopardy the very existence of the protection itself.

Policy in the face of these trends had often been influenced by a feeling that the apparent shortage of jobs, as evidenced by the high levels of unemployment, are the result of economic disequilibria: either a lack of aggregate demand (the Keynesian view) or distortions in the economic system though wage rigidities and the benefits system. Thus the only possible role for social policy is to paper over the cracks in the social fabric and wait for *la crise* to come to an end.

The evidence does not support this view. *Per capita* economic growth has continued steadily over the last quarter century, and has been, if anything, faster in the European region than in North

[29] Although where insurance coverage is dependent on a settled earnings record, some of those in precarious employment may not benefit. Optional employer provided benefits – even if they are encouraged by tax concessions – are often not available to low income employees: this is a particular issue in the United States, where many low income employees do not receive health insurance coverage from their employers.

America, where unemployment has remained lower. Although the structure of employment has changed extensively, the proportion of the population in employment has not altered dramatically, in spite of social developments (early retirement, increases in initial schooling) which might have been predicted to reduce it. There has of course been a shift to part-time employment: working time as well as employment itself has been re-arranged amongst the population. Labour markets in OECD countries show every sign of having successfully capitalising on the talents of the most educated and highly skilled parts of their populations.

The success in these economies in generating opportunities is illustrated by the immigration pressures which OECD countries are experiencing. The willingness of immigrants to work at low wages –in some countries without social protection coverage – requires a new approach to the labour market difficulties facing existing residents if xenophobic responses are to be countered. This is particularly the case for existing disadvantaged ethnic minorities, who can find themselves squeezed between their own educational and geographic marginalisation from current opportunities, and the ability of immigrants to draw on social capital from their home communities to establish themselves in a new home.

Perhaps it is time to see current labour market trends as the basis on which social policy should be built, rather than as the scapegoat for its failures. As the above description has suggested, labour market and other economic processes have certainly generated social strains and distress, and there is no room for complacency. The challenge is to find ways to reform social policy and protection against distress in ways which will enhance growth without increasing disparity in access to its fruits: if economic growth is accompanied by stagnation in the incomes of the majority of the population or absolute falls for the most disadvantaged, its very desirability can come into question. This almost certainly will involve moving away from income transfers as the main means of providing for distress to measures which positively enhance the social and labour market circumstances of those in need. The short run budgetary costs of such measures are unlikely to be less than those of the transfer payments they are intended to supersede[30]: which is why it is essential that new approaches be piloted before implementation and evaluated afterwards.

It is also necessary to move away from the idea that social policy is implemented solely by formal governmental institutions. As Table 13 shows, the non profit sector is a significant part of OECD market economies. While non profit institutions receive government funding, which is in turn included in government expenditure totals, in many countries such institutions are largely funded from outside the government sector (though tax concessions undoubtedly help also). These non-government bodies carrying governmental functions are particularly important in countries (such as the U.S. and the UK) where direct governmental expenditures are a lower proportion of GDP.

(Table 13. Annual non-profit sector operating expenditures by ICNPO group, and annual revenue by source, by country, per cent of GDP, 1990)

In any assessment of the feasibility of new approaches to social policy, it is important to bear in mind that many expenditures in the form of cash transfers are in part recuperated from the taxes paid by recipients, and that this effect is higher in countries with high rates of benefit and therefore with

[30] The US administration recognises that providing job opportunities is essential to reforming welfare and has proposed a three pronged $3.4 billion initiative to create job opportunities for the hardest to employ welfare recipients. This proposal includes a targeted jobs tax credit to create new job opportunities for long term welfare recipients and tax incentives to increase investment in distressed areas.

high tax rates. When these effects are taken into account, the differences between the gross magnitudes of public expenditures are diminished. Another important reason for differences in public outlays is health care, which when it is primarily financed through employer-provided private insurance (as is the case for the US) removes one of the main sources of public expenditure.

(Table 14. Gross to net expenditure adjustment as a percentage of GDP, 1993)

Such an approach might have features such as the following:

- Employment opportunities are likely increasingly to favour those with the ability to be flexible, whether through being from a household with other earners (so that weekly fluctuations in income are supportable) or because of their own adaptability. Hence income support arrangements should be structured to encourage those in receipt of support to be flexible and to take risks in finding new opportunities. This implies a greater degree of medium-term stability in income support, particularly for those with family commitments[31].

- There is a likely to be, for the foreseeable future, an excess potential supply of labour, and it makes no sense to require those needing income support to confine their main activity to looking for work. However, other activities attracting income support should be based on improving employment prospects, although that might include various forms of training, community work, and unpaid trial employment.

- The principle of capitalisation of income security, which had been advocated (World Bank, 1995) as a very long-term solution to financing old age income security, might be more immediately applied to income support during working life. Those in receipt of income support (apart from the supplements payable for children and other dependants) should be expected to repay a certain part of their receipts when and if their income is above a certain floor.[32] On average, the disadvantaged would still be net recipients and the advantaged net contributors, but by giving all individuals an interest in improving their circumstances, and providing a basis for support of those who currently have no insurance-based record, the split between "insurance" and "assistance" clients could be narrowed.

- "Case management" procedures need to be developed in an active rather than a passive way: rather than carefully controlling income support entitlements on the basis of past entitlements, the emphasis for working-age people should be on ensuring that income support (whether or not on a "capitalised" basis) is used to support activities which are likely to lead to re-entry into employment.

- Caring for others, including children and elderly or infirm relatives, should be recognised as "active" participation and supported in its own right [Bradbury (1996)].

Such measures could be components of a new approach which would look at inter-relationship of policy interventions (whether education, health or social security) at different stages of the life course.

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[31] The twelve month period used when determining family payment in Australia and the six month period for family credit in the UK are examples of such provisions.

[32] The Australian arrangements for income support for tertiary students have some of these features. In order to avoid disincentive effects, the extra marginal tax on earned income in any one year is low, and this would be necessary in any capitalised benefit system.

It would have a stronger emphasis on policies that impact on the transition points in life, with more interventions earlier in life and more preventive (and less remedial) measures. The goal would be to re-define equity and security in terms of barriers towards life-course flexibility, and to avoid definitions which suggest that the goal of social policy is to provide protection against flexibility If it is not developed purposively, a new approach may well be imposed by the reduction in the abilities of governments to act autonomously through the process of globalisation of economic and social life. An approach imposed solely by these constraints could fail to provide either protection or flexibility,

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STATISTICAL ANNEX

Chart 1. **GDP per head, at price levels and exchange rates of 1990 (1970 = 100)**



Source: OECD National Accounts Database (1996).

Chart 2.a **Health expenditure (Public and Private) and Extent of ageing, 1994.**



Source: OECD Health Database (1996).

Chart 2.b **Health Expenditure (Public and Private) and Domestic expenditure, 1994.**



Source: OECD Health Database (1996).

Chart 3. **In-kind benefits and cash transfers, by type, 1980/85 and 1992/93, as per cent of GDP**



Chart 3. **In-kind benefits and cash transfers, by type, 1980/85 and 1992/93, as per cent of GDP**
(continued)



Chart 3. **In-kind benefits and cash transfers, by type, 1980/85 and 1992/93, as per cent of GDP**
(continued)



Chart 3. **In-kind benefits and cash transfers, by type, 1980/85 and 1992/93, as per cent of GDP**
(continued)



Chart 3. **In-kind benefits and cash transfers, by type, 1980/85 and 1992/93, as per cent of GDP**
(end)



a) For 1980 expenditure on ALMP, an estimate was calculated by taking the ratio between ALMP and unemployment for the most recent year available, and applying this ratio to the unemployment figure for 1980.
b) The figures for Family services are included in Other contingencies in 1993. In 1990 Family services was .08% of GDP.
c) The 1980 figures are for western Germany, 1993 figures are for Unified Germany.

Sources: OECD Social Expenditure Data Base as at June 1996 for GDP OECD's Analytical Data Base as at June 1996.

Table 1. **Net income replacement ratios (net retirement pension / net earnings) for pensioner without dependent spouse, in 1990[a]**

	Qualifying years	Average Income Level		
		2/3	1	2
Australia[b]	n/a	45	33	19
Belgium	45	81	73	53
	20	34	39	34
Czech Republic	40	84	75	53
	25	66	59	41
Denmark	40	83	60	37
	20	82	59	36
France	37.5	96	88	75
	20	52	50	49
Germany	45	72	77	63
	20	32	34	28
Greece	35	125	107	97
	20	118	81	68
Ireland	40	57	42	26
	20	57	42	26
Italy	35	91	89	94
	20	56	56	56
Luxembourg	40	86	78	69
	20	48	48	44
Netherlands	40	66	49	27
	20	66	49	27
Portugal	37	89	94	102
	20	56	53	58
Spain	35	98	97	97
	20	70	73	71
United Kingdom	45	53	44	30
	20	31	28	23

a) The replacement rates presented here are based on the design features of the pension systems and do not show actual average replacement rates for the population. In particular for Italy, they reflect the inclusion of an estimation of pension value of severance allowances (See Source).

b) Data refers to July 1990. Qualifying years is not applicable.

Source:

Australia: Department of Social Security.

Czech Republic: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

EU members: EUROSTAT (1993), Old age replacement ratios, Volume 1.

Table 2. **Population aged 65 and over as a per cent of the population 15-64, 1960-2030**

	1960	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
United States	15.4	19.1	19.0	20.4	27.6	36.8
Japan	9.5	17.1	24.3	33.0	43.0	44.5
Germany	16.0	21.7	23.8	30.3	35.4	49.2
France	18.8	20.8	23.6	24.6	32.3	39.1
Italy	13.3	21.6	26.5	31.2	37.5	48.3
United Kingdom	17.9	24.0	24.4	25.8	31.2	38.7
Canada	13.0	16.7	18.2	20.4	28.4	39.1
Australia	13.9	16.0	16.7	18.6	25.1	33.0
Austria	18.6	22.4	23.3	27.7	32.6	44.0
Belgium	18.5	22.4	25.1	25.6	31.9	41.1
Czech Republic	11.9	19.1	19.9	22.1	31.6	..
Denmark	16.5	22.7	21.6	24.9	31.7	37.7
Finland	11.7	19.7	21.5	24.3	34.7	41.1
Greece	12.3	21.2	25.5	28.8	33.3	40.9
Iceland	14.1	16.6	17.3	18.1	24.1	32.1
Ireland	18.6	18.4	16.7	18.0	21.7	25.3
Luxembourg	15.9	19.9	21.9	25.9	33.2	44.2
Mexico	..	6.4	7.0	8.0	10.4	14.8
Netherlands	14.7	19.1	20.8	24.2	33.9	45.1
New Zealand	..	16.7	17.1	18.9	24.6	30.5
Norway	17.3	25.2	23.9	24.0	31.2	38.7
Portugal	12.7	19.5	20.9	22.0	25.3	33.5
Spain	12.7	19.8	23.5	25.9	30.7	41.0
Sweden	17.8	27.6	26.9	29.1	35.6	39.4
Switzerland	15.5	22.0	23.6	29.4	37.8	48.6
Turkey	6.7	7.1	8.9	9.4	11.7	16.2
OECD Total (except Czech Republic)	14.9	19.3	20.9	23.5	29.8	37.7
OECD Europe	15.3	20.6	22.1	24.7	30.8	39.2

Source: Bos, E., M. T. VU, E. MASSIAH and R. BULATAO (1994), World Population Projections, 1994-95, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.
Czech Republic: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Chart 4. **Changes in GINI coefficients (1980-81 = 100)**



Gini coefficients in 1984-87

	Year	Gini coefficient
Finland	1987	20.7
Sweden	1987	22.0
Norway	1986	23.4
Belgium	1988	23.5
Germany	1984	25.0
Netherlands	1987	26.8
Canada	1987	28.9
Australia	1985	29.5
France	1984	29.6
United Kingdom	1986	30.4
Italy	1986	31.0
Ireland	1987	33.0
United States	1986	34.1

Source: OECD (1995), Income distribution in OECD countries.

Table 3. Employment, Unemployment and Population, 1972 to 1995

12 OECD Countries[a]

	Employment				Unemployment				Population			
	1972	1979	1989	1995	1972	1979	1989	1995	1972	1979	1989	1995
	(Millions)											
Men 15-24	27.6	27.5	25.1	22.3	2.2	3.2	3.5	3.8	45.9	48.8	48.1	46.4
Men 25-54	99.4	109.9	122.2	130.4	2.0	3.2	5.5	7.8	105.5	118.5	135.2	148.9
Men 55-64	20.4	20.1	21.4	21.0	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.3	26.4	28.1	33.9	34.6
Women 15-24	21.9	23.0	22.0	19.5	1.7	3.2	3.5	3.5	46.3	48.5	47.2	45.0
Women 25-54	50.8	65.3	86.5	97.7	1.5	3.1	5.8	7.5	109.7	121.0	136.7	150.1
Women 55-64	10.2	11.4	12.7	13.6	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.7	30.5	32.9	36.9	37.0
Persons 15-24	49.4	50.5	47.2	41.9	3.9	6.5	7.0	7.2	92.2	97.3	95.4	91.4
Persons 25-54	150.2	175.2	208.7	228.1	3.5	6.3	11.4	15.3	215.2	239.5	272.0	299.0
Persons 55-64	30.5	31.5	34.1	34.6	0.7	1.1	1.6	2.0	57.0	61.0	70.7	71.6
Persons 15-65	230.2	257.2	289.9	304.6	8.1	13.8	20.0	24.5	364.4	397.7	438.1	462.0
	(Percent Distribution)											
Men 15-24	12.0	10.7	8.7	7.3	27.2	23.3	17.4	15.4	12.6	12.3	11.0	10.0
Men 25-54	43.2	42.7	42.1	42.8	24.5	23.4	27.7	31.9	28.9	29.8	30.9	32.2
Men 55-64	8.9	7.8	7.4	6.9	6.4	5.0	5.3	5.2	7.2	7.1	7.7	7.5
Women 15-24	9.5	8.9	7.6	6.4	20.8	23.5	17.7	14.1	12.7	12.2	10.8	9.7
Women 25-54	22.1	25.4	29.8	32.1	18.4	22.1	29.2	30.6	30.1	30.4	31.2	32.5
Women 55-64	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.5	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.8	8.4	8.3	8.4	8.0
Persons 15-24	21.5	19.6	16.3	13.7	48.1	46.7	35.1	29.5	25.3	24.5	21.8	19.8
Persons 25-54	65.3	68.1	72.0	74.9	42.8	45.5	56.9	62.5	59.1	60.2	62.1	64.7
Persons 55-64	13.3	12.3	11.7	11.4	9.1	7.8	8.0	8.0	15.6	15.3	16.1	15.5
Persons 15-65	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Ratio to Population (Percent)								Unemployment Rate (Percent)			
Men 15-24	60.0	56.3	52.3	48.2	4.8	6.6	7.2	8.1	7.4	10.5	12.1	14.4
Men 25-54	94.2	92.8	90.4	87.5	1.9	2.7	4.1	5.2	2.0	2.9	4.3	5.7
Men 55-64	77.2	71.7	63.2	60.6	2.0	2.5	3.1	3.6	2.5	3.3	4.7	5.7
Women 15-24	47.3	47.4	46.6	43.4	3.7	6.7	7.5	7.7	7.2	12.4	13.8	15.1
Women 25-54	46.3	54.0	63.2	65.1	1.4	2.5	4.3	5.0	2.9	4.5	6.3	7.1
Women 55-64	33.2	34.6	34.3	36.8	0.7	1.2	1.5	1.9	2.1	3.2	4.1	4.8
Persons 15-24	53.6	51.9	49.5	45.8	4.2	6.6	7.3	7.9	7.3	11.4	12.9	14.8
Persons 25-54	69.8	73.2	76.7	76.3	1.6	2.6	4.2	5.1	2.3	3.5	5.2	6.3
Persons 55-64	53.6	51.7	48.1	48.3	1.3	1.8	2.3	2.7	2.4	3.3	4.5	5.4
Persons 15-65	63.2	64.7	66.2	65.9	2.2	3.5	4.6	5.3	3.4	5.1	6.4	7.5

[a]USA, Japan, West Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Spain, Australia, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway,Finland

Table 3. Employment, Unemployment and Population, 1972 to 1995 (continued)

8 European OECD Countries[a]

	Employment				Unemployment				Population			
	1972	1979	1989	1995	1972	1979	1989	1995	1972	1979	1989	1995
	(Millions)											
Men 15-24	10.3	9.6	8.8	6.2	0.5	1.2	1.7	1.7	17.3	18.8	19.2	17.3
Men 25-54	40.0	41.5	43.1	47.1	0.5	1.2	2.7	4.2	42.2	44.7	48.7	55.7
Men 55-64	9.0	8.5	8.3	7.6	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	12.2	12.3	15.1	15.3
Women 15-24	7.8	7.4	6.7	4.8	0.4	1.4	2.0	1.7	16.8	18.2	18.4	16.5
Women 25-54	17.8	21.8	26.8	32.0	0.3	1.1	3.3	4.4	42.8	44.7	48.2	55.1
Women 55-64	3.6	3.9	3.9	4.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	14.4	14.4	16.3	16.2
Persons 15-24	18.1	17.0	15.5	11.0	0.9	2.6	3.7	3.5	34.1	37.0	37.6	33.8
Persons 25-54	57.8	63.3	69.8	79.1	0.8	2.4	6.1	8.7	85.0	89.4	96.9	110.8
Persons 55-64	12.7	12.4	12.2	11.7	0.2	0.5	0.8	1.0	26.6	26.7	31.4	31.6
Persons 15-65	88.5	92.6	97.5	101.8	2.0	5.4	10.6	13.1	145.7	153.1	166.0	176.2
	(Percent Distribution)											
Men 15-24	11.6	10.4	9.0	6.1	26.5	22.1	15.8	13.0	11.9	12.3	11.6	9.8
Men 25-54	45.2	44.8	44.2	46.3	26.2	22.7	25.8	32.3	28.9	29.2	29.4	31.6
Men 55-64	10.2	9.2	8.5	7.5	9.0	5.3	5.0	4.7	8.4	8.0	9.1	8.7
Women 15-24	8.8	8.0	6.9	4.7	19.0	25.9	19.2	13.3	11.5	11.9	11.1	9.4
Women 25-54	20.1	23.5	27.4	31.4	16.4	20.6	31.2	33.7	29.4	29.2	29.0	31.3
Women 55-64	4.1	4.2	4.0	4.0	2.8	3.3	2.9	2.9	9.9	9.4	9.8	9.2
Persons 15-24	20.4	18.3	15.9	10.8	45.5	48.0	35.0	26.4	23.4	24.2	22.7	19.2
Persons 25-54	65.3	68.3	71.6	77.7	42.6	43.3	57.1	66.0	58.4	58.4	58.4	62.9
Persons 55-64	14.3	13.4	12.5	11.5	11.9	8.7	7.9	7.6	18.3	17.4	18.9	17.9
Persons 15-65	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Ratio to Population (Percent)								Unemployment Rate (Percent)			
Men 15-24	59.2	51.0	45.6	35.8	3.0	6.4	8.7	9.9	4.9	11.2	16.0	21.7
Men 25-54	94.9	92.8	88.4	84.5	1.2	2.8	5.6	7.6	1.3	2.9	6.0	8.3
Men 55-64	73.9	69.1	55.1	49.8	1.5	2.4	3.6	4.0	1.9	3.3	6.1	7.5
Women 15-24	46.5	40.5	36.5	29.1	2.3	7.7	11.1	10.6	4.6	16.1	23.3	26.6
Women 25-54	41.4	48.7	55.5	58.0	0.8	2.5	6.9	8.0	1.8	4.9	11.0	12.2
Women 55-64	25.3	27.0	23.6	25.2	0.4	1.3	1.9	2.3	1.5	4.5	7.3	8.4
Persons 15-24	53.0	45.9	41.2	32.6	2.7	7.1	9.9	10.2	4.8	13.4	19.3	23.9
Persons 25-54	68.0	70.8	72.1	71.3	1.0	2.6	6.2	7.8	1.4	3.6	8.0	9.9
Persons 55-64	47.6	46.4	38.7	37.1	0.9	1.8	2.7	3.2	1.8	3.7	6.5	7.8
Persons 15-65	60.7	60.5	58.7	57.8	1.4	3.6	6.4	7.4	2.2	5.5	9.8	11.4

[a]West Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Finland

Table 3. Employment, Unemployment and Population, 1972 to 1995 (continued)

United States, Canada and Australia

	Employment				Unemployment				Population			
	1972	1979	1989	1995	1972	1979	1989	1995	1972	1979	1989	1995
	(Millions)											
Men 15-24	11.8	14.4	12.5	11.9	1.5	1.9	1.6	1.8	18.9	21.8	19.3	19.6
Men 25-54	38.0	43.4	53.9	57.9	1.2	1.6	2.4	3.0	41.2	47.7	60.1	66.5
Men 55-64	8.1	8.2	7.7	7.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	10.3	11.5	12.0	11.8
Women 15-24	9.4	12.3	11.5	10.7	1.2	1.7	1.3	1.5	20.0	22.4	19.7	19.4
Women 25-54	20.9	29.1	43.5	49.1	1.0	1.7	2.2	2.6	43.9	50.1	62.3	68.6
Women 55-64	4.5	5.0	5.5	5.8	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	11.6	13.0	13.3	12.9
Persons 15-24	21.2	26.7	24.0	22.5	2.8	3.6	2.9	3.2	38.9	44.3	39.0	39.0
Persons 25-54	58.9	72.5	97.3	107.0	2.3	3.2	4.6	5.6	85.1	97.7	122.4	135.1
Persons 55-64	12.6	13.2	13.2	13.1	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	21.9	24.6	25.2	24.7
Persons 15-65	92.6	112.4	134.5	142.6	5.5	7.3	8.0	9.4	145.9	166.6	186.6	198.8
	(Percent Distribution)											
Men 15-24	12.8	12.8	9.3	8.3	28.2	25.9	20.1	19.0	13.0	13.1	10.3	9.8
Men 25-54	41.0	38.6	40.0	40.6	22.7	21.9	30.1	32.0	28.2	28.6	32.2	33.5
Men 55-64	8.7	7.3	5.7	5.1	5.0	3.3	3.9	3.7	7.1	6.9	6.4	6.0
Women 15-24	10.1	10.9	8.5	7.5	22.3	23.7	16.6	15.6	13.7	13.5	10.5	9.8
Women 25-54	22.5	25.8	32.3	34.4	19.0	22.8	27.1	27.3	30.1	30.0	33.4	34.5
Women 55-64	4.9	4.5	4.1	4.1	2.8	2.3	2.2	2.5	7.9	7.8	7.1	6.5
Persons 15-24	22.9	23.7	17.8	15.8	50.5	49.7	36.7	34.5	26.7	26.6	20.9	19.6
Persons 25-54	63.6	64.5	72.4	75.0	41.7	44.7	57.2	59.3	58.3	58.7	65.6	67.9
Persons 55-64	13.6	11.8	9.8	9.2	7.8	5.7	6.1	6.2	15.0	14.8	13.5	12.4
Persons 15-65	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Ratio to Population (Percent)								Unemployment Rate (Percent)			
Men 15-24	62.6	66.1	64.8	60.6	8.2	8.6	8.3	9.1	11.5	11.6	11.4	13.1
Men 25-54	92.3	91.1	89.6	87.0	3.0	3.3	4.0	4.5	3.2	3.5	4.3	4.9
Men 55-64	78.2	70.8	64.2	62.0	2.6	2.1	2.6	2.9	3.3	2.9	3.9	4.5
Women 15-24	46.8	54.7	58.2	55.0	6.1	7.7	6.7	7.5	11.5	12.4	10.4	12.0
Women 25-54	47.6	58.0	69.8	71.5	2.4	3.3	3.5	3.7	4.7	5.4	4.7	5.0
Women 55-64	39.0	38.7	41.5	44.9	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.8	3.3	3.3	3.1	4.0
Persons 15-24	54.4	60.3	61.5	57.8	7.1	8.2	7.5	8.3	11.5	11.9	10.9	12.6
Persons 25-54	69.2	74.2	79.5	79.2	2.7	3.3	3.7	4.1	3.7	4.3	4.5	5.0
Persons 55-64	57.4	53.8	52.3	53.1	1.9	1.7	1.9	2.4	3.3	3.0	3.5	4.2
Persons 15-65	63.5	67.5	72.1	71.7	3.7	4.4	4.3	4.7	5.6	6.1	5.6	6.2

Table 3. Employment, Unemployment and Population, 1972 to 1995 (continued)

Japan

	Employment				Unemployment				Population			
	1972	1979	1989	1995	1972	1979	1989	1995	1972	1979	1989	1995
	(Millions)											
Men 15-24	5.5	3.5	3.9	4.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3	9.7	8.2	9.6	9.5
Men 25-54	21.4	25.0	25.3	25.4	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.6	22.2	26.1	26.4	26.7
Men 55-64	3.3	3.5	5.4	6.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	3.9	4.3	6.8	7.5
Women 15-24	4.7	3.4	3.9	4.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	9.5	7.9	9.1	9.1
Women 25-54	12.2	14.5	16.3	16.7	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.5	23.0	26.2	26.3	26.4
Women 55-64	2.0	2.4	3.3	3.7	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	4.6	5.4	7.3	7.9
Persons 15-24	10.2	6.8	7.7	8.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5	19.3	16.0	18.7	18.6
Persons 25-54	33.6	39.4	41.5	42.1	0.4	0.7	0.7	1.1	45.2	52.3	52.7	53.1
Persons 55-64	5.3	5.9	8.7	9.8	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	8.5	9.7	14.1	15.3
Persons 15-65	49.1	52.2	57.9	60.2	0.7	1.1	1.4	2.0	72.9	78.0	85.5	87.0
	(Percent Distribution)											
Men 15-24	11.2	6.6	6.7	7.1	21.7	11.6	13.8	13.8	13.3	10.5	11.2	11.0
Men 25-54	43.5	47.9	43.6	42.2	33.3	36.6	27.5	28.6	30.4	33.5	30.9	30.6
Men 55-64	6.7	6.7	9.3	10.0	10.1	14.3	15.9	14.8	5.3	5.5	8.0	8.6
Women 15-24	9.7	6.5	6.6	6.7	14.5	9.8	12.3	12.8	13.1	10.1	10.7	10.4
Women 25-54	24.9	27.7	28.1	27.8	18.8	25.0	26.1	26.1	31.6	33.6	30.7	30.4
Women 55-64	4.1	4.7	5.7	6.2	1.4	2.7	4.3	3.9	6.3	6.9	8.5	9.0
Persons 15-24	20.8	13.1	13.3	13.8	36.2	21.4	26.1	26.6	26.4	20.6	21.9	21.4
Persons 25-54	68.4	75.6	71.7	70.0	52.2	61.6	53.6	54.7	61.9	67.0	61.6	61.0
Persons 55-64	10.8	11.3	15.0	16.2	11.6	17.0	20.3	18.7	11.6	12.4	16.5	17.6
Persons 15-65	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Ratio to Population (Percent)								Unemployment Rate (Percent)			
Men 15-24	56.2	42.3	40.3	45.1	1.5	1.6	2.0	2.9	2.7	3.6	4.7	6.1
Men 25-54	96.4	95.7	95.5	95.3	1.0	1.6	1.4	2.2	1.1	1.6	1.5	2.2
Men 55-64	84.8	81.5	79.2	80.8	1.8	3.8	3.2	4.0	2.1	4.4	3.9	4.7
Women 15-24	49.7	42.9	42.1	44.4	1.0	1.4	1.9	2.9	2.1	3.2	4.2	6.1
Women 25-54	53.0	55.2	61.9	63.2	0.6	1.1	1.4	2.0	1.1	1.9	2.2	3.1
Women 55-64	43.6	44.8	45.3	47.5	0.2	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.5	1.2	1.8	2.1
Persons 15-24	53.0	42.6	41.2	44.7	1.3	1.5	1.9	2.9	2.4	3.4	4.5	6.1
Persons 25-54	74.3	75.4	78.7	79.3	0.8	1.3	1.4	2.1	1.1	1.7	1.8	2.6
Persons 55-64	62.5	61.0	61.7	63.7	0.9	2.0	2.0	2.5	1.5	3.1	3.1	3.7
Persons 15-65	67.3	66.8	67.7	69.2	0.9	1.4	1.6	2.3	1.4	2.1	2.3	3.3

Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics Database (1996).

Table 4 **Number of persons in Total and Part-time employment in 15 OECD countries[a], in 1975 and 1995, in millions.**

	Employment classified as						Proportion part-time / total	
	Total			Part-time[b]				
	1975	1995	change	1975	1995	change	1975	1955
Males	162.6	186.3	23.7	9.9	16.4	6.5	6.1%	8.8%
Females	96.2	142.6	46.4	25.7	45.2	19.5	26.7%	31.7%
Persons	258.8	328.9	70.1	35.6	61.6	26.0	13.8%	18.7%

a) Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Western Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, United Kingdom, United States.

b) Definitions of part-time work differ accross countries.

Source: OECD full-time/part-time data base.

Table 5. **Proportion of youth in education and in employment, by sex, for 15-19 and 20-24 year-olds**

Men 15-19

		Percent of Age Cohort										Total in age cohort				
		At work		At school			Jobseeking		Neither at school nor at work							
		At work only		At school and at work		At school only	Jobseeking while at school		Looking for work	Not looking for work		Percent	Thousands			
Country	Year		Total at work		Total at school			Total jobseeking			Total			Labour Force Particip-ation Rate	Unemploy-ment rate	School Attendance Rate
Australia	1984	28.5	49.3	20.8	59.9	35.4	3.7	13.4	9.7	1.9	11.6	100.0	643.6	62.7	21.3	59.9
Australia	1994	18.2	42.3	24.1	71.5	42.6	4.8	13.1	8.3	2.0	10.3	100.0	650.0	55.4	23.7	71.5
Canada	1985	14.4	36.7	22.2	73.8	46.3	5.3	12.8	7.5	4.2	11.7	100.0	1,028.8	49.5	25.9	73.8
Canada	1995	10.7	35.3	24.6	80.3	51.0	4.8	9.2	4.4	4.6	9.0	100.0	992.4	44.4	20.6	80.3
Japan	1982	15.3	18.1	2.9	81.6	78.7	-	-	-	3.2	3.2	100.0	4,277.0	-	-	81.6
Japan	1992	13.8	18.2	4.4	81.1	76.6	-	-	1.2	4.0	5.2	100.0	4,990.0	-	-	81.1
Switzerland	1980	15.8	56.3	40.6	83.3	42.7	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.5	1.0	100.0	262.0	56.7	0.7	83.3
Switzerland	1990	10.6	55.4	44.8	88.3	43.4	0.1	0.6	0.5	0.6	1.1	100.0	218.1	56.0	1.0	88.3
United States	1983	20.0	36.9	16.9	68.4	44.9	6.6	13.6	7.1	4.6	11.6	100.0	7,732.0	50.5	26.9	68.4
United States	1993	20.0	38.4	18.5	70.6	46.1	6.1	10.7	4.7	4.7	9.4	100.0	6,640.5	49.2	21.8	70.6
Belgium	1984	10.0	13.2	3.2	82.2	78.3	0.7	4.7	4.1	3.8	7.8	100.0	383.6	17.9	26.5	82.2
Belgium	1994	4.2	6.3	2.1	84.5	82.1	0.3	3.0	2.8	8.6	11.3	100.0	311.5	9.4	32.5	84.5
Denmark	1984	17.7	60.9	43.1	77.2	30.3	3.8	7.2	3.4	1.7	5.1	100.0	199.0	68.0	10.6	77.2
Denmark	1994	9.5	63.6	54.1	88.5	29.6	4.9	5.9	1.0	0.9	1.9	100.0	166.5	69.5	8.5	88.5
Germany	1984	11.1	39.7	28.6	85.9	55.4	2.0	4.3	2.3	0.7	3.0	100.0	2,532.6	44.0	9.7	85.9
Germany	1994	4.8	33.5	28.7	92.8	63.3	0.9	2.2	1.3	1.1	2.4	100.0	2,157.2	35.7	6.2	92.8
Greece	1984	23.2	25.3	2.1	68.7	65.4	1.2	5.1	3.8	4.2	8.1	100.0	346.0	30.4	16.7	68.7
Greece	1994	13.3	14.2	0.9	80.1	78.7	0.5	3.7	3.2	3.5	6.7	100.0	350.5	17.8	20.5	80.1
France	1984	12.7	20.2	7.5	71.5	63.8	0.2	8.7	8.5	7.3	15.8	100.0	1,792.8	28.9	30.0	71.5
France	1994	2.3	8.3	6.0	92.5	85.8	0.6	4.1	3.5	1.7	5.2	100.0	1,762.9	12.5	33.1	92.5
Ireland	1984	18.7	27.9	9.2	68.0	56.9	2.0	14.0	12.0	1.3	13.2	100.0	166.1	41.8	33.4	68.0
Ireland	1994	11.0	17.0	6.0	80.0	72.8	1.2	7.7	6.4	2.5	8.9	100.0	160.2	24.7	31.1	80.0
Italy	1984	22.2	23.5	1.4	63.2	60.7	1.1	11.2	10.1	4.6	14.6	100.0	2,197.4	34.7	32.2	63.2
Italy	1994	14.7	15.6	0.8	71.4	69.9	0.7	8.1	7.4	6.4	13.9	100.0	1,932.5	23.7	34.3	71.4
Luxembourg	1984	21.2	37.2	16.1	73.0	56.2	0.7	4.4	3.6	2.2	5.8	100.0	13.7	41.6	10.5	73.0
Luxembourg	1994	10.2	15.7	5.6	81.5	75.9	0.0	1.9	1.9	6.5	8.3	100.0	10.8	17.6	10.5	81.5
Netherlands	1989	7.8	33.1	25.3	89.5	59.8	4.3	5.8	1.5	1.3	2.8	100.0	562.1	38.9	15.0	89.5
Netherlands	1994	7.0	37.3	30.2	89.0	53.8	5.0	7.1	2.1	1.9	4.0	100.0	462.3	44.4	16.0	89.0
Portugal	1989	44.6	48.9	4.3	49.0	43.9	0.8	4.3	3.5	2.9	6.4	100.0	457.9	53.2	8.0	49.0
Portugal	1994	22.7	26.5	3.8	70.6	65.7	1.0	3.5	2.5	4.2	6.7	100.0	440.1	30.1	11.7	70.6
Spain	1989	18.6	20.3	1.7	69.7	66.6	1.5	9.2	7.7	3.9	11.7	100.0	1,652.4	29.5	31.1	69.7
Spain	1994	11.6	13.2	1.6	75.0	70.8	2.6	12.1	9.4	4.0	13.4	100.0	1,624.1	25.3	47.7	75.0
United Kingdom	1984	21.9	41.9	19.9	63.8	42.0	1.8	13.0	11.2	3.1	14.3	100.0	2,328.7	54.9	23.7	63.8
United Kingdom	1994	17.5	39.8	22.3	67.1	42.9	1.9	10.5	8.6	6.8	15.4	100.0	1,686.7	50.3	20.9	67.1

Table 5. **Proportion of youth in education and in employment, by sex, for 15-19 and 20-24 year-olds (continued)**

Women 15-19

		Percent of Age Cohort										Total in age cohort				
		At work		At school			Jobseeking		Neither at school nor at work							
Country	Year	At work only	Total at work	At school and at work	Total at school	At school only	Jobseeking while at school	Total jobseeking	Looking for work	Not looking for work	Total	Percent	Thousands	Labour Force Participation Rate	Unemployment rate	School Attendance Rate
Australia	1984	30.9	47.6	16.8	55.6	35.4	3.3	11.6	8.3	5.3	13.6	100.0	626.2	59.3	19.6	55.6
Australia	1994	15.4	42.7	27.3	74.3	40.6	6.4	12.5	6.2	4.1	10.3	100.0	621.2	55.3	22.7	74.3
Canada	1985	14.9	39.4	24.5	73.5	45.2	3.8	9.1	5.3	6.3	11.6	100.0	977.5	48.5	18.8	73.5
Canada	1995	8.7	36.3	27.6	81.2	49.5	4.1	7.7	3.6	6.5	10.1	100.0	946.1	44.0	17.5	81.2
Japan	1982	15.5	18.1	2.7	81.4	78.7	-	-	-	3.2	3.2	100.0	4,102.0	-	-	81.4
Japan	1992	12.0	17.2	5.3	84.7	79.4	-	-	1.3	2.1	3.3	100.0	4,702.0	-	-	84.7
Switzerland	1980	24.7	50.5	25.8	73.0	47.3	0.0	0.6	0.6	1.6	2.2	100.0	249.7	51.1	1.3	73.0
Switzerland	1990	14.8	48.4	33.5	83.3	49.6	0.1	0.9	0.7	1.2	1.9	100.0	205.0	49.2	1.7	83.3
United States	1983	19.1	36.0	16.8	65.9	44.0	5.1	10.1	5.0	10.0	15.0	100.0	7,696.9	46.1	21.9	65.9
United States	1993	17.8	36.4	18.6	68.6	45.6	4.4	8.3	3.9	9.7	13.6	100.0	6,510.7	44.7	18.6	68.6
Belgium	1984	7.0	8.7	1.7	84.0	81.4	0.9	5.8	4.9	4.1	9.0	100.0	376.5	14.5	40.0	84.0
Belgium	1994	3.2	3.9	0.7	83.6	82.4	0.4	2.4	2.0	11.3	13.3	100.0	299.6	6.3	37.8	83.6
Denmark	1984	16.5	53.1	36.6	77.3	36.9	3.7	7.8	4.1	2.2	6.2	100.0	198.7	60.9	12.8	77.3
Denmark	1994	10.7	58.2	47.6	85.4	35.4	2.4	3.2	0.7	3.2	3.9	100.0	147.4	61.4	5.2	85.4
Germany	1984	11.5	33.9	22.4	83.8	58.9	2.5	5.4	2.9	1.9	4.7	100.0	2,465.0	39.2	13.7	83.8
Germany	1994	4.5	27.6	23.1	92.8	69.1	0.6	1.6	1.0	1.7	2.7	100.0	1,942.1	29.2	5.5	92.8
Greece	1984	13.6	14.4	0.8	61.5	59.1	1.6	8.2	6.6	18.3	24.9	100.0	376.8	22.6	36.4	61.5
Greece	1994	7.3	7.9	0.6	78.5	76.8	1.1	7.1	6.1	8.2	14.2	100.0	377.9	15.0	47.6	78.5
France	1984	9.9	12.6	2.7	71.1	68.1	0.2	11.2	11.0	8.0	19.1	100.0	1,851.6	23.8	47.2	71.1
France	1994	2.2	5.0	2.8	92.6	89.4	0.4	3.6	3.2	2.0	5.2	100.0	1,754.6	8.6	41.7	92.6
Ireland	1984	18.6	23.9	5.3	70.7	62.5	3.0	11.6	8.6	2.1	10.7	100.0	158.8	35.5	32.7	70.7
Ireland	1994	7.4	12.1	4.7	85.1	79.1	1.3	6.0	4.7	2.8	7.5	100.0	153.1	18.1	33.2	85.1
Italy	1984	14.4	15.0	0.6	61.3	59.5	1.2	13.5	12.3	12.0	24.3	100.0	2,286.8	28.5	47.4	61.3
Italy	1994	9.0	9.9	0.9	72.5	70.9	0.6	6.6	6.0	12.5	18.5	100.0	1,947.9	16.6	40.0	72.5
Luxembourg	1984	26.7	34.1	7.4	66.7	59.3	0.0	3.7	3.7	3.0	6.7	100.0	13.5	37.8	9.8	66.7
Luxembourg	1994	11.4	16.2	4.8	79.0	74.3	0.0	3.8	3.8	5.7	9.5	100.0	10.5	20.0	19.0	79.0
Netherlands	1989	10.4	30.4	20.0	84.9	59.1	5.8	7.9	2.0	2.7	4.7	100.0	554.7	38.2	20.6	84.9
Netherlands	1994	7.7	34.4	26.7	88.3	58.6	3.0	4.7	1.7	2.3	4.0	100.0	450.0	39.0	12.0	88.3
Portugal	1989	31.0	33.2	2.2	54.5	51.1	1.3	6.4	5.2	9.3	14.5	100.0	436.0	39.6	16.2	54.5
Portugal	1994	18.6	21.5	2.9	71.8	67.7	1.2	5.3	4.1	5.5	9.6	100.0	441.7	26.8	19.6	71.8
Spain	1989	12.7	14.0	1.3	70.5	67.2	2.0	11.7	9.7	7.1	16.8	100.0	1,624.8	25.7	45.5	70.5
Spain	1994	7.0	8.3	1.3	79.9	75.7	2.9	11.4	8.5	4.6	13.1	100.0	1,626.9	19.7	58.1	79.9
United Kingdom	1984	25.4	40.0	14.6	58.3	41.8	1.9	10.4	8.5	7.7	16.3	100.0	2,227.9	50.4	20.6	58.3
United Kingdom	1994	20.1	39.6	19.5	64.0	42.4	2.0	7.6	5.6	10.3	15.9	100.0	1,591.8	47.3	16.1	64.0

Table 5. **Proportion of youth in education and in employment, by sex, for 15-19 and 20-24 year-olds (continued)**

Men 20-24

		Percent of Age Cohort										Total in age cohort				
		At work		At school			Jobseeking		Neither at school nor at work							
Country	Year	At work only	Total at work	At school and at work	Total at school	At school only	Jobseeking while at school	Total jobseeking	Looking for work	Not looking for work	Total	Percent	Thousands	Labour Force Particip-ation Rate	Unemploy-ment rate	School Attendance Rate
Australia	1984	63.8	77.6	13.8	22.4	7.1	1.5	13.0	11.5	2.4	13.8	100.0	656.9	90.6	14.3	22.4
Australia	1994	57.8	72.8	15.0	27.3	10.2	2.1	14.0	11.9	3.1	15.0	100.0	718.7	86.7	16.1	27.3
Canada	1985	54.0	63.7	9.6	24.3	13.6	1.1	17.8	16.8	4.9	21.7	100.0	1,258.2	81.5	21.9	24.3
Canada	1995	47.1	62.6	15.5	36.5	19.1	1.9	12.9	11.0	5.4	16.4	100.0	1,012.1	75.5	17.0	36.5
Japan	1982	67.1	71.7	4.7	29.0	24.3	-	-	-	4.0	4.0	100.0	3,934.0	-	-	29.0
Japan	1992	65.5	73.4	8.0	29.6	21.6	-	-	2.4	2.5	4.9	100.0	4,858.0	-	-	29.6
Switzerland	1980	77.0	83.3	6.3	20.5	14.2	0.0	1.6	1.6	0.8	2.5	100.0	245.8	84.9	1.9	20.5
Switzerland	1990	71.1	80.2	9.0	23.9	14.7	0.2	3.6	3.4	1.5	4.9	100.0	277.0	83.8	4.3	23.9
United States	1983	63.0	68.5	5.4	18.1	11.1	1.6	15.3	13.7	5.2	18.9	100.0	12,209.5	83.7	18.2	18.1
United States	1993	66.1	72.9	6.8	19.1	11.4	0.9	10.2	9.3	5.5	14.8	100.0	10,472.6	83.1	12.3	19.1
Belgium	1984	51.0	55.7	4.8	34.3	28.7	0.8	13.0	12.3	2.5	14.7	100.0	393.4	68.8	19.0	34.3
Belgium	1994	48.4	50.2	1.8	33.8	31.5	0.5	11.7	11.3	6.6	17.8	100.0	354.2	61.9	19.0	33.8
Denmark	1984	57.3	74.8	17.5	28.6	9.3	1.9	12.1	10.3	3.8	14.1	100.0	194.1	86.9	13.9	28.6
Denmark	1994	43.0	69.5	26.5	47.3	18.7	2.0	9.0	7.0	2.7	9.7	100.0	186.5	78.6	11.5	47.3
Germany	1984	61.7	69.9	8.2	29.0	20.4	0.4	7.4	6.9	2.4	9.3	100.0	2,348.9	77.2	9.5	29.0
Germany	1994	52.0	66.5	14.5	38.1	23.3	0.3	7.4	7.2	2.7	9.9	100.0	2,134.4	73.9	10.1	38.1
Greece	1984	60.4	62.9	2.5	24.0	19.5	1.9	13.6	11.7	3.9	15.6	100.0	248.6	76.5	17.8	24.0
Greece	1994	53.1	55.0	2.0	29.9	26.9	1.0	13.4	12.4	4.7	17.0	100.0	315.5	68.4	19.6	29.9
France	1984	66.8	68.6	1.8	13.9	11.9	0.2	14.7	14.5	4.8	19.3	100.0	1,836.6	83.3	17.6	13.9
France	1994	41.7	47.0	5.3	39.4	33.1	1.0	16.6	15.6	3.3	18.9	100.0	1,860.7	63.7	26.1	39.4
Ireland	1984	60.7	68.9	8.2	19.1	9.9	1.0	19.5	18.5	1.7	20.2	100.0	142.9	88.4	22.1	19.1
Ireland	1994	50.4	59.0	8.6	29.2	19.3	1.2	17.5	16.2	4.2	20.4	100.0	145.3	76.5	22.9	29.2
Italy	1984	57.3	58.8	1.4	23.5	20.3	1.7	17.6	15.9	3.3	19.2	100.0	1,938.8	76.3	23.0	23.5
Italy	1994	44.5	45.9	1.3	29.7	27.1	1.3	16.7	15.4	10.3	25.8	100.0	2,127.1	62.6	26.7	29.7
Luxembourg	1984	73.8	78.0	4.3	22.0	17.7	0.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	4.3	100.0	14.1	80.1	2.7	22.0
Luxembourg	1994	60.4	66.4	6.0	31.3	25.4	0.0	5.2	5.2	3.0	8.2	100.0	13.4	71.6	7.3	31.3
Netherlands	1989	43.7	67.0	23.3	48.4	22.4	2.6	8.5	5.8	2.1	7.9	100.0	602.2	75.5	11.2	48.4
Netherlands	1994	42.4	65.8	23.4	46.5	20.5	2.6	9.3	6.7	4.4	11.1	100.0	585.7	75.1	12.4	46.5
Portugal	1989	69.9	75.9	6.0	20.9	13.5	1.4	7.0	5.5	3.6	9.2	100.0	337.4	82.9	8.4	20.9
Portugal	1994	56.0	62.6	6.6	32.2	24.0	1.5	9.4	7.8	4.0	11.8	100.0	376.5	72.0	13.0	32.2
Spain	1989	53.1	55.7	2.6	26.1	20.9	2.6	19.6	17.0	3.8	20.8	100.0	1,577.3	75.3	26.0	26.1
Spain	1994	39.2	42.2	3.0	34.2	26.8	4.5	27.0	22.6	4.0	26.6	100.0	1,612.3	69.2	39.1	34.2
United Kingdom	1984	61.8	72.6	10.8	17.8	6.4	0.6	17.1	16.4	3.9	20.3	100.0	2,280.8	89.7	19.0	17.8
United Kingdom	1994	57.9	70.0	12.1	19.8	6.6	1.1	15.7	14.6	7.7	22.2	100.0	2,040.5	85.7	18.3	19.8

Table 5. **Proportion of youth in education and in employment, by sex, for 15-19 and 20-24 year-olds (end)**

Women 20-24

		Percent of Age Cohort										Total in age cohort				
		At work		At school			Jobseeking		Neither at school nor at work							
Country	Year	At work only	Total at work	At school and at work	Total at school	At school only	Jobseeking while at school	Total jobseeking	Looking for work	Not looking for work	Total	Percent	Thousands	Labour Force Participation Rate	Unemployment rate	School Attendance Rate
Australia	1984	56.0	65.2	9.2	15.6	5.1	1.3	8.9	7.6	20.9	28.4	100.0	662.9	74.1	12.0	15.6
Australia	1994	52.7	68.6	15.8	25.8	8.3	1.7	8.9	7.2	14.2	21.4	100.0	708.7	77.4	11.4	25.8
Canada	1985	53.6	63.5	9.8	22.7	12.1	0.8	9.9	9.1	14.5	23.7	100.0	1,224.2	73.4	13.5	22.7
Canada	1995	43.2	60.8	17.6	37.3	18.6	1.2	9.0	7.8	11.6	19.4	100.0	995.5	69.8	12.9	37.3
Japan	1982	67.7	69.6	1.9	12.6	10.7	-	-	-	19.8	19.8	100.0	3,883.0	-	-	12.6
Japan	1992	69.2	73.4	4.2	17.0	12.9	-	-	4.9	8.8	13.7	100.0	4,695.0	-	-	17.0
Switzerland	1980	69.9	74.8	4.9	13.6	8.7	0.0	1.4	1.4	15.1	16.5	100.0	237.7	76.2	1.9	13.6
Switzerland	1990	70.1	77.1	7.0	18.3	11.1	0.2	3.3	3.1	8.5	11.6	100.0	258.9	80.4	4.0	18.3
United States	1983	55.4	59.9	4.6	14.0	8.5	1.0	9.2	8.2	22.4	30.6	100.0	12,708.3	69.1	13.2	14.0
United States	1993	57.5	64.2	6.7	17.8	10.4	0.8	5.9	5.2	19.4	24.6	100.0	10,855.9	70.2	8.5	17.8
Belgium	1984	43.8	47.5	3.7	29.0	23.9	1.3	18.7	17.4	9.9	27.3	100.0	390.1	66.2	28.3	29.0
Belgium	1994	42.5	43.8	1.4	33.4	31.5	0.5	12.4	11.8	12.3	24.2	100.0	344.5	56.2	22.0	33.4
Denmark	1984	49.3	69.1	19.8	29.8	8.9	1.2	14.9	13.8	7.1	20.9	100.0	185.3	84.0	17.8	29.8
Denmark	1994	36.1	64.6	28.5	49.3	17.0	3.8	10.1	6.3	8.3	14.6	100.0	172.1	74.7	13.5	49.3
Germany	1984	55.7	63.3	7.6	23.8	15.8	0.4	6.7	6.4	14.2	20.5	100.0	2,374.8	70.0	9.6	23.8
Germany	1994	50.5	64.4	13.9	33.9	19.8	0.3	6.4	6.2	9.4	15.6	100.0	2,164.3	70.8	9.1	33.9
Greece	1984	32.8	34.2	1.4	14.5	11.5	1.6	14.3	12.6	40.1	52.7	100.0	328.8	48.4	29.4	14.5
Greece	1994	32.7	33.9	1.3	30.1	27.3	1.6	17.2	15.6	21.5	37.2	100.0	357.9	51.2	33.6	30.1
France	1984	53.1	55.4	2.3	13.7	11.0	0.4	16.6	16.3	17.0	33.2	100.0	2,029.0	72.0	23.1	13.7
France	1994	34.3	40.5	6.2	42.4	34.4	1.8	16.6	14.8	8.6	23.3	100.0	2,034.4	57.1	29.0	42.4
Ireland	1984	60.0	66.1	6.1	14.8	7.8	0.9	10.2	9.3	15.9	25.1	100.0	139.4	76.3	13.3	14.8
Ireland	1994	50.6	58.9	8.3	27.5	17.8	1.4	12.2	10.8	11.2	22.0	100.0	140.6	71.1	17.1	27.5
Italy	1984	38.4	39.6	1.2	20.5	17.2	2.1	19.3	17.2	23.9	41.0	100.0	2,047.0	58.9	32.8	20.5
Italy	1994	31.5	33.1	1.6	32.9	29.3	1.9	17.1	15.1	20.5	35.6	100.0	2,169.8	50.1	34.0	32.9
Luxembourg	1984	67.6	70.3	2.8	14.5	11.7	0.0	2.1	2.1	15.9	17.9	100.0	14.5	72.4	2.9	14.5
Luxembourg	1994	57.3	61.8	4.6	24.4	19.8	0.0	3.1	3.1	15.3	18.3	100.0	13.1	64.9	4.7	24.4
Netherlands	1989	48.6	66.7	18.1	35.4	15.1	2.2	8.0	5.8	10.2	16.0	100.0	610.2	74.6	10.7	35.4
Netherlands	1994	49.5	69.5	19.9	36.8	15.5	1.3	5.9	4.6	9.1	13.7	100.0	588.7	75.4	7.8	36.8
Portugal	1989	52.3	58.2	5.9	24.8	17.1	1.7	10.8	9.1	13.9	22.9	100.0	380.7	69.0	15.6	24.8
Portugal	1994	43.2	50.2	7.0	40.6	31.6	2.0	9.0	6.9	9.2	16.1	100.0	380.2	59.2	15.1	40.6
Spain	1989	33.4	36.2	2.8	30.6	23.1	4.7	25.5	20.9	15.2	36.1	100.0	1,554.6	61.7	41.3	30.6
Spain	1994	27.3	31.1	3.8	42.3	31.7	6.7	27.3	20.6	9.9	30.5	100.0	1,562.6	58.4	46.8	42.3
United Kingdom	1984	53.6	59.8	6.2	11.4	4.8	0.5	10.0	9.5	25.4	35.0	100.0	2,235.9	69.8	14.3	11.4
United Kingdom	1994	53.4	63.5	10.0	16.9	6.2	0.7	7.8	7.2	22.5	29.7	100.0	1,953.3	71.3	11.0	16.9

Source:
Australia Bureau of Statistics.
Statistics Canada.
Japan: Statistics Bureau , Employment Status Survey, 1982 and 1992.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
EU Members: Unpublished data supplied by EUROSTAT.

Chart 5. **Proportion of youth in education and in employment, by sex, for 15-19 and 20-24 year-olds**

Men 15-19





Chart 5. **Proportion of youth in education and in employment, by sex, for 15-19 and 20-24 year-olds (continued)**

Men 20-24





Chart 5. **Proportion of youth in education and in employment, by sex, for 15-19 and 20-24 year-olds (continued)**

Women 15-19



Chart 5. **Proportion of youth in education and in employment, by sex, for 15-19 and 20-24 year-olds (continued)**

Women 20-24



Table 6. **Proportion of the population in four age groups, that had attained at least upper secondary education, 1992.**

	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 54	55 to 64
North America				
Canada	81	78	65	49
United States	86	88	83	73
Pacific Area				
Australia[1]	57	56	51	42
New Zealand	60	58	55	49
European Community				
Belgium	60	51	38	24
Denmark[2]	67	61	58	44
France	67	57	47	29
Germany	89	87	81	69
Ireland	56	44	35	25
Italy	42	34	21	12
Netherlands	68	61	52	42
Portugal[3]	21	17	10	7
Spain	41	24	14	8
United Kingdom	81	71	62	51
Other Europe - OECD				
Austria	79	71	65	50
Czech Republic[3]	43	36	34	26 [4]
Fnland	82	69	52	31
Norway	88	83	75	61
Sweden	85	78	63	46
Switzerland	87	84	77	70
Turkey	21	14	9	5
Weighted mean OECD (except Czech Republic)	*72*	*69*	*60*	*48*

1. 1993.
2. Of the 25 to 34-year olds, a relatively large number are still enrolled in education. Data may therefore understate the true values.
3. 1991.
4. Refers to 55-59.

Source: OECD (1996), Lifelong learning for all.

Czech Republic: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Table 7. **Proportion of population aged 25-34, attending school or in training, by sex and labour force status, in 1984 (or 1989) and 1994**

		Men & Women	Men				Women			
		Total	Total	of which			Total	of which		
				Employed	Unemployed	Not in the Labour Force		Employed	Unemployed	Not in the Labour Force
Australia	1984	9.3	10.5	9.0	0.5	1.0	8.1	4.8	0.4	2.8
	1994	10.6	11.0	8.3	0.9	1.8	10.2	6.6	0.6	2.9
Canada	1984	5.2	5.4	3.1	0.3	2.0	5.1	3.0	0.3	1.8
	1994	7.4	6.9	3.5	0.4	3.0	7.8	3.6	0.4	3.9
Japan	1984									
	1994									
New Zealand	1984									
	1994									
United States	1984									
	1994									
Germany	1984	6.7	9.0	2.0	0.3	6.7	4.4	1.1	0.1	3.2
	1994	9.9	12.4	5.0	0.4	7.0	7.2	3.0	0.2	3.9
France	1984	1.7	2.0	1.1	0.1	0.9	1.4	0.8	0.0	0.5
	1994	6.3	6.3	3.8	0.7	1.8	6.4	3.4	0.8	2.2
Italy	1984	4.1	4.8	1.6	0.4	2.8	3.4	1.0	0.5	1.8
	1994	7.6	8.2	1.9	0.4	5.9	7.0	1.6	0.6	4.8
Luxembourg	1984	2.4	3.4	0.9	0.0	2.2	1.3	0.7	0.0	0.7
	1994	6.1	7.8	4.1	0.3	3.6	4.3	2.1	0.3	1.9
United Kingdom	1984	5.5	6.5	5.1	0.2	1.2	4.5	3.3	0.2	1.0
	1994	10.6	11.2	9.4	0.6	1.3	10.1	8.0	0.4	1.6
Ireland	1984	3.2	4.0	3.2	0.2	0.7	2.3	1.6	0.1	0.6
	1994	6.4	6.6	5.0	0.4	1.2	6.3	4.8	0.3	1.2
Denmark	1984	11.4	11.8	8.3	0.9	2.5	10.9	7.7	0.8	2.5
	1994	22.2	20.4	14.8	1.3	4.3	24.1	15.3	1.6	7.2
Greece	1984	1.7	2.1	1.0	0.1	0.9	1.4	0.5	0.3	0.6
	1994	2.6	3.1	0.9	0.3	1.9	2.2	0.6	0.3	1.3
Spain	1989	5.4	5.3	2.0	0.9	2.4	5.5	1.8	1.5	2.1
	1994	7.8	7.1	2.6	1.6	3.0	8.5	2.4	2.7	3.3
Portugal	1989	4.7	4.9	3.2	0.3	1.4	4.4	2.5	0.4	1.5
	1994	8.5	8.4	5.7	0.5	2.2	8.7	4.9	0.8	3.0

Source:

EU Members: Unpublished data supplied by EUROSTAT for EU members.

Australia: ABS, Surveys of Transition from Education to Work, May 1984 and 1994.

Canada: Labour Force Survey.

Table 8: **Age at first childbirth**

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1993
Australia[a]	23.2	24.2	25.3	26.3	27.6	28.3
Austria						25.0
Belgium					26.0	
Canada	23.1	23.8	24.6	25.5	26.4	26.8
Czech Republic	22.5	22.5	22.4	22.4	22.4	22.3
Denmark	23.2	23.5	24.1			26.7
Finland					26.3	26.7
France	23.8	24.5	25.0	25.9	27.0	27.6
Germany						
Greece						25.7
Iceland						24.3
Ireland						
Italy			24.4	25.1	26.2	26.9
Japan	25.6	25.7	26.4	26.7	27.0	27.2
Luxembourg						
Mexico						
Netherlands			27.5	28.2	29.2	27.8
New Zealand[b]		23.9	24.9	26.3	27.6	28.7
Norway						25.5
Portugal	24.4	24.0	23.6	23.8	24.7	25.2
Spain				24.9	26.0	27.1
Sweden	24.8	24.1	25.0	23.5	25.8	26.5
Switzerland[c]	25.1	25.7	26.4	27.0	27.6	28.1
Turkey						
United Kingdom		24.1	24.6	25.4	26.6	27.5
United States[d]	25.4	25.3	25.7	26.1	26.3	26.4

a) Median Age of mothers at nuptial first confinement. Data are for 1971, 1976 and 1981.

b) Figures relate to live nuptial first birhts of the current union only.
Data are for 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1995.

c) Data for Switzerland are for married women only.

d) Median Age of mothers at first child birth.

Source:

EU members, EUROSTAT (1996), NEWCRONOS.

Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics (1995), Social Trends.

Canada: Statistics Canada.

Czech Republic: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Japan: Ministry of Health and Welfare (1994), Vital Statistics of Japan.

Netherlands: Statistics Netherlands (1994), Statistical Yearbook.

Portugal: Ministerio para a Qualificaçao e o Emprego.

New Zealand: Statistics New Zealand, Population and Demography Division.

United States: National Center for Health Statistics (1995), Annual Report on Vital Statistics, forthcoming.

Table 9. **Completed fertility by year of birth of the mother, 1930-1960**[a]

Country	1930	1935	1940	1945	1950	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Australia	3.07	3.09	2.87	2.49	2.36	2.26	2.23	2.23	2.22	2.18	2.16
Austria	2.32	2.45	2.17	1.77	1.89	1.70	1.73	1.71	1.68	1.69	1.66
Belgium	2.30	2.27	2.17	1.94	1.84	1.83	1.83	1.84	1.84	1.83	1.85
Canada											
Czech Republic	2.15	1.68	..	2.67	2.83	2.58	2.56	2.48	2.28	2.09	2.09
Denmark	2.36	2.38	2.24	2.06	1.90	1.84	1.84	1.85	1.85	1.86	1.87
Finland	2.51	2.30	2.03	1.87	1.85	1.88	1.90	1.92	1.93	1.93	1.93
France	2.64	2.58	2.41	2.22	2.11	2.13	2.13	2.12	2.11	2.09	2.07
Germany	2.17	2.16	1.98	1.79	1.72	1.67	1.67	1.65	1.65	1.64	1.63
Greece	2.21	2.02	2.01	2.00	2.07	2.03	1.99	1.92	1.90	1.93	1.93
Iceland	3.50	..	..	..	2.7	2.5	2.43	2.49	2.48	2.46	2.49
Ireland	3.50	3.44	3.27	3.27	3.00	2.67	2.57	2.53	2.47	2.42	2.37
Italy	2.29	2.29	2.14	2.07	1.90	1.79	1.76	1.73	1.69	1.67	1.63
Japan											
Luxembourg	1.97	2.00	..	1.82	1.72	1.68	1.69	1.68	1.66	1.70	1.71
Mexico											
Netherlands	2.65	2.50	2.21	1.99	1.90	1.87	1.87	1.86	1.86	1.83	1.84
New Zealand											
Norway	2.49	2.57	2.45	2.21	2.09	2.05	2.05	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06
Portugal	2.95	2.85	2.61	2.31	2.12	1.97	1.95	1.93	1.94	1.90	1.86
Spain	2.59	2.67	2.59	2.43	2.19	1.90	1.87	1.85	1.80	1.75	1.69
Sweden	2.11	2.14	2.05	1.96	2.00	2.03	2.04	2.05	2.06	2.05	2.06
Switzerland	2.17	2.17	2.08	1.86	1.80	1.75	1.75	1.73	1.74	1.76	1.75
Turkey											
United Kingdom	2.35	2.41	2.36	2.17	2.03	2.02	2.02	2.00	1.98	1.96	1.94
United States											

a) For EUROSTAT countries, estimates for generations which have not yet completed their productive carer are based upon the ceteris paribus asumption that future rates will be the same as the most recent observations.

Source:

EU Members: EUROSTAT (1996), Demographic statistics 1996.

Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Czech Republic: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Switzerland: Office Fédéral des assurances sociales.

Table 10.a **Percentage of births attributable to young women, 1960-1994**

	Age of females	1960	1970	1980	1990	1994
Australia[a]	15-19	-	11.0	7.6	5.7	4.9
	20-24	-	35.6	29.2	20.1	18.9
Austria	15-19	7.6	9.8	9.5	4.5	3.4
	20-24	29.6	35.1	37.3	28.0	23.3
Belgium	15-19	3.0	5.7	4.7	2.2	-
	20-24	25.7	35.6	32.7	19.9	-
Canada	15-19	8.4	11.8	8.7	5.9	6.1
	20-24	28.8	35.4	31.2	20.5	18.9
Czech Republic	15-19	12.2	11.6	11.5	14.1	13.5
	20-24	40.0	48.3	44.6	44.8	44.4
Denmark	15-19	7.8	6.3	3.9	2.6	1.6
	20-24	32.6	34.9	29.7	22.2	14.6
Finland	15-19	4.6	7.7	4.2	1.9	1.7
	20-24	29.0	38.7	25.2	16.7	14.4
France	15-19	3.9	6.5	4.7	2.5	1.9
	20-24	27.9	39.3	31.8	20.7	17.2
Germany	15-19	5.6	9.3	7.5	3.4	2.7
	20-24	33.0	31.0	35.0	24.0	17.4
Greece	15-19	-	-	9.9	5.4	3.8
	20-24	-	-	35.5	30.0	23.1
Ireland	15-19	-	-	3.7	3.9	3.9
	20-24	-	-	20.7	14.6	14.0
Iceland	15-19	-	-	11.3	6.6	4.2
	20-24	-	-	32.7	25.5	21.2
Italy	15-19	2.8	4.4	5.0	2.4	-
	20-24	21.8	27.7	28.9	19.4	-
Japan	15-19	-	1.0	0.9	1.4	1.4
	20-24	-	26.5	18.8	15.7	16.5
Luxembourg	15-19	-	5.4	4.0	3.0	1.7
	20-24	-	32.7	27.4	19.4	15.3
Netherlands	15-19	2.3	3.9	2.3	1.6	1.2
	20-24	17.8	30.7	22.8	13.1	10.5
New Zealand[b]	15-19	-	-	10.9	7.9	7.4
	20-24	-	-	32.5	23.1	20.7
Norway	15-19	5.4	7.7	5.8	3.1	2.3
	20-24	27.0	37.8	30.2	23.0	18.7
Portugal	15-19	4.2	6.4	11.4	8.6	7.8
	20-24	26.0	27.5	34.8	29.4	25.4
Spain	15-19	-	-	5.6	3.7	-
	20-24	-	-	27.3	18.0	-
Sweden	15-19	7.6	6.4	3.2	2.1	1.5
	20-24	27.5	32.9	24.4	20.9	16.5
Switzerland	15-19	2.4	3.6	2.4	1.2	0.9
	20-24	23.2	29.5	22.7	15.3	12.0
United Kingdom	15-19	-	-	7.0	6.2	5.0
	20-24	-	-	29.2	24.2	19.8
United States	15-19	13.8	17.3	15.3	12.6	12.8
	20-24	33.5	38.0	33.9	26.3	25.3

Table 10.b **Age specific birth rates per 1000 (within and outside marriage), 1960-1994**

	15-19					Age of female	20-24				
	1960	1970	1980	1990	1994	Year	1960	1970	1980	1990	1994
Australia[a]				4.3	2.4	In marriage				50.0	36.8
				17.7	18.3	Out of marriage				29.6	32.4
	47.4	55.5	28.2	22.0	20.7	Total	225.8	181.9	107.5	79.6	69.2
Austria		27.4	13.3	6.1	4.9	In marriage		137.1	90.3	51.1	44.2
		17.4	13.4	9.6	9.1	Out of marriage		25.8	26.6	28.0	28.1
	33.7	44.9	26.7	15.7	14.0	Total	168.5	162.9	116.9	79.1	72.3
Canada			11.7	4.6	2.9	In marriage			80.9	49.9	35.9
			15.3	20.9	22.1	Out of marriage			14.3	31.2	36.3
			29.0	25.5	25.1	Total			95.2	79.2	72.2
Czech Republic						In marriage					
						Out of marriage					
	44.0	49.0	53.1	44.7	32.6	Total	184.6	174.4	196.2	174.3	121.8
Belgium				4.9		In marriage					56.6
				3.4		Out of marriage					11.0
	17.6	23.0	15.0	8.3		Total		138.1	145.3	105.3	67.6
Denmark				2.6	1.3	In marriage				25.9	18.6
				6.6	5.2	Out of marriage				46.1	36.8
	32.6	24.6	11.6	9.2	6.6	Total	167.6	121.0	94.1	72.0	55.4
Finland					1.3	In marriage					30.2
					5.7	Out of marriage					32.6
	22.8	23.8	14.0	8.7	7.0	Total	154.7	114.6	84.1	63.2	62.8
France						In marriage					
						Out of marriage					
	23.6	26.7	17.8	8.9	7.0	Total	160.0	168.1	121.6	74.5	56.8
Germany					4.6	In marriage					37.5
					5.5	Out of marriage					13.4
	25.8	37.4	20.4	13.7	10.1	Total	139.8	143.5	106.1	68.5	51.0
Greece					9.1	In marriage					60.0
					1.4	Out of marriage					2.2
				14.8	10.5	Total				80.0	62.2
Ireland						In marriage					
						Out of marriage					
				12.8	12.0	Total				59.1	46.8
Iceland					0.1	In marriage					11.4
					18.5	Out of marriage					82.7
			51.3	31.5	18.6	Total			148.1	121.4	94.1
Italy				3.9		In marriage				45.2	
				2.4		Out of marriage				3.3	
	13.6	20.7	14.5	6.4		Total	100.1	126.1	93.4	48.5	
Japan						In marriage					
						Out of marriage					
	4.3	4.5	3.6	3.6	4.0	Total	107.2	96.5	77.1	44.8	42.4

Table 10.b **Age specific birth rates per 1000 (within and outside marriage), 1960-1994 (continued)**

	15-19					Age of female	20-24				
	1960	1970	1980	1990	1994	Year	1960	1970	1980	1990	1994
Luxembourg				8.2	5.3	In marriage				51.7	47.1
				5.4	3.7	Out of marriage				12.1	12.6
		24.0	11.0	13.5	9.0	Total		144.2	76.1	63.8	59.7
Netherlands				3.6	2.6	In marriage				33.0	25.1
				2.4	2.4	Out of marriage				9.0	9.5
	12.2	17.1	6.9	5.9	5.0	Total	107.8	129.4	70.8	42.0	34.6
New Zealand						In marriage					
						Out of marriage					
		130.5	95.6	73.3		Total		333.4	177.9	141.2	
Norway				1.2	0.6	In marriage				32.0	19.5
				10.7	9.4	Out of marriage				52.8	49.8
	27.2	34.2	19.4	11.9	10.1	Total	166.8	160.4	102.0	84.9	69.3
Portugal	10.1	12.8		7.5	5.5	In marriage	69.1	73.2		37.7	27.3
	3.3	3.2		4.4	5.0	Out of marriage	9.4	6.3		6.7	6.6
	13.4	16.0		11.9	10.5	Total	78.5	79.5		44.4	33.9
Spain				5.8		In marriage				38.1	
				3.6		Out of marriage				6.8	
			20.7	9.4		Total			106.7	44.9	
Sweden		6.2	1.8	1.3	1.1	In marriage		81.4	34.1	28.1	19.3
		19.7	9.7	8.3	5.5	Out of marriage		29.9	52.6	58.6	46.0
	28.4	25.9	11.5	9.6	6.5	Total	125.0	111.2	86.7	86.7	65.3
Switzerland					2.8	In marriage					37.9
					1.3	Out of marriage					4.4
	11.0	16.0	7.2	4.6	4.0	Total	111.9	114.0		50.4	42.3
United Kingdom						In marriage					
						Out of marriage					
			23.1	25.6	22.6	Total			109.0	85.2	72.5
United States		48.5	28.2	20.6		In marriage		152.8	92.8	73.5	
		19.8	24.8	39.3		Out of marriage		15.0	22.3	43.0	
	89.1	68.3	53.0	59.9	58.9	Total	258.1	167.8	115.1	116.5	111.1

a) Data for Australia are for 1971, 1981, 1991. Births 15-19 represent under 20.
b) Data for New Zealand are for 1971, 1981, 1991 and 1995.

Source:
EU members, NEWCRONOS (1996).
NON EU members, UNITED NATIONS (1994), World population prospects
Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Canada: Statistics Canada.
Czech Republic: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
Japan: Ministry of Health and Welfare (1994), Vital Statistics of Japan.
New Zealand: New Zealand Statistics.
Portugal: Ministerio para a Qualificaçao e o Emprego.
United States: Statistical Abstract of the United States (1995).

Table 11. **Proportion of adults in prison, by sex, in 1990, per million of the total population.**

	Men	Women	Men & Women
Australia	1 058	61	1 119
Austria	541	20	562
Belgium	603	32	635
Canada	-	-	1 051
Czech Republic	775	22	792
Finland	534	18	552
France	743	35	778
Greece	705	33	739
Italy	180	10	190
Japan	308	13	322
Netherlands	283	13	295
New Zealand	1 017	51	1 068
Portugal	588	30	618
Spain	417	27	444
Sweden	414	20	434
Switzerland	542	29	570
Turkey	480	10	490
UK	566	21	587
US[a]	**5 236**		

a) 1993 data.

Source: UN fourth crime survey, 1990.
Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Canada: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics.
Czech Republic: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
US Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Bulletin Prisoners in 1993, Bulletin Jail Inmates 1991.

Table 12. **Average tax rates for persons of working age and at pensionable age, 1995**

Panel a. **At the Average Production Worker level of income**

Age	Income Source	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	UK	US
40	earnings	26.9%	26.7%	38.3%	26.7%	15.5%	26.5%	25.9%
70	earnings	24.0%	26.7%	38.3%	26.7%	11.0%	26.4%	16.2%
70	pensions	0.0%	5.1%	0.0%	19.7%	0.0%	18.0%	7.2%

Panel b. **At the 2/3 of Average Production Worker level of income**

Age	Income Source	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	UK	US
40	earnings	22.9%	23.1%	33.8%	22.9%	13.7%	22.2%	23.9%
70	earnings	18.6%	17.3%	33.8%	22.9%	9.6%	20.7%	14.2%
70	pensions	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	15.7%	0.0%	13.1%	6.6%

Note:

1. The following assumptions have been made for each panel (at APW level, and at 2/3 APW level):
   - the first row displays average tax rates on earned income for a 40 years old single worker without children
   - the second row gives average tax rates on earned income for a 70 years old single worker without children
   - the third row represents average tax rates on state age pensions at a level equal to earned income for a 70 years old single pensioner without children.
2. A state pension at the gross level equal to earned income may not be attainable, these cases are used nevertheless to facilitate comparison.
3. Private pensions or investment/savings income to older people are not considered.

Source: OECD Secretariat calculations.

Table 13. **Annual Non-profit Sector Operating Expenditures by ICNPO[a] Group, and Annual Revenue by Source, by Country, per cent of GDP, 1990**

	FRANCE	GERMANY	HUNGARY	ITALY (1991)	JAPAN	SWEDEN (1992)	UNITED KINGDOM	UNITED STATES
				EXPENDITURE				
Total Operating Expenditure								
- in millions of national currency	FF 216 649	DM 86 808	HUF 25 922	L 26 606 932	¥ 13 716 653	SKr 56 800	£ 26 352	$ 346 355
- as a per cent of GDP	3.34%	3.58%	1.25%	1.99%	3.22%	3.95%	4.80%	6.42%
Major ICNPO Group (as a per cent of GDP)								
Culture, Recreation	0.59%	0.26%	0.70%	0.23%	0.04%	1.09%	0.98%	0.20%
Education, Research	0.83%	0.42%	0.05%	0.43%	1.27%	0.57%	2.04%	1.46%
Health	0.48%	1.24%	0.01%	0.33%	0.89%	0.11%	0.17%	3.38%
Social Services	0.97%	0.83%	0.31%	0.45%	0.44%	0.39%	0.55%	0.64%
Environment	0.02%	0.01%	0.02%	0.00%	0.01%	0.06%	0.10%	0.04%
Development & Housing	0.21%	0.53%	0.02%	0.03%	0.01%	0.36%	0.37%	0.20%
Civic & Advocacy	0.10%	0.04%	0.01%	0.05%	0.03%	0.15%	0.03%	0.02%
Philanthropy	0.00%	0.01%	0.01%	0.02%	0.00%	0.08%	0.03%	0.02%
Intern'l Activities	0.04%	0.05%	0.00%	0.03%	0.02%	0.17%	0.18%	0.08%
Business Associations	0.10%	0.19%	0.12%	0.46%	0.37%	0.90%	0.34%	0.33%
Other	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.15%	0.08%	0.00%	0.06%
				REVENUE				
Total Revenue								
- in millions of national currency	FF 218 001	DM 93 412	HUF 30 865	L 28 180 382	¥ 19 508 519	SKr 63 538	£ 29 993	$ 423 519
- as a per cent of GDP	3.36%	3.85%	1.48%	2.16%	4.58%	4.42%	5.46%	7.85%
Source of Revenue (as a proportion of total revenue):								
Public Sector Payments	59.45%	68.19%	23.31%	40.73%	38.31%	26.57%	39.80%	29.59%
Private Donations	7.07%	3.88%	19.72%	4.94%	1.30%	9.38%	12.05%	18.65%
Private Fees and Payments	33.48%	27.92%	56.97%	55.67%	60.39%	64.07%	48.15%	51.78%

a) International Classification of NonProfit Organisations.

Source: Salamon, Lester M., Helmut K. Anheier, Wojciech Sokolowski, and associates, *The Emerging Sector: A Statistical Supplement*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies, 1996.

Table 14. **Gross to net expenditure adjustment as a percentage of GDP, 1993**

Item (1)	Denmark	Germany	Netherlands (2)	Sweden	United Kingdom	United States
Gross direct public social expenditure (as presently in SOCX)	30.51	28.66	30.64	38.25	23.41	15.04
Mandatory private social expenditures	0.43	1.60	-	0.62	0.24	0.47
Total publicly mandated gross direct social expenditure	30.94	30.26	30.64	38.87	23.65	15.51
Direct taxes and social contributions paid on transfers	4.03	3.08	5.86	5.50	0.20	0.08
Net cash direct public social expenditure	26.91	27.18	24.78	33.37	23.45	15.43
Indirect taxes	3.71	2.95	2.36	3.45	2.33	0.50
Net direct public social expenditure	23.20	24.23	22.42	29.92	21.12	14.93
Social/fiscal measures on public and private social expenditure	0.08	0.78	0.08	0.00	0.62	1.16
Net current public social expenditure	23.28	25.01	22.50	29.92	21.74	16.09
Memorandum adjustments:						
For information: Non-public health expenditure (5)	1.12	2.51	1.98	1.29	1.08	7.36

1. All data presented in percentage of GDP at market prices.
2. Values of social-fiscal measures for the Netherlands concern 1994.
3. N/A: information not available.
4. Net current public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP adjusted for indirect taxes,
5. Source: OECD (1996), Health Data 1996, Paris. Non-public health expenditure is defined as the difference between total health expenditure and public health expenditure.

Source: Adema *et al,*, 1996.