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International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)

INCAF Facts and Figures Series: ODA final data and trends for 2022 in relation to fragile and conflict-related contexts

This INCAF Facts and Figures brief presents a short overview of the main trends displayed by the OECD's final ODA data for 2022 in relation to fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

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INCAF Facts and Figures Series

Final ODA data for 2022

This *INCAF Facts and Figures* brief presents a short overview of the main trends displayed by the OECD's final ODA data for 2022 focusing on four main thematic areas: (i) the impact of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine on ODA; (ii) ODA towards fragile contexts as defined in the [OECD 2022 multidimensional fragility framework](#) (iii) principal trends in peace ODA as defined in the [Peace ODA](#) publication, and (iv) the evolution of humanitarian assistance. Section (i) focuses on ODA to Ukraine and the broader impacts of Russian aggression on Ukraine with regard to other forms of ODA. Section (ii) focuses on ODA to the [60 fragile contexts](#) identified in the [States of Fragility 2022 report](#). Section (iii) and (iv) focus on overall peace and humanitarian ODA respectively, going beyond the remit of fragile contexts.

Data used in this paper is expressed in USD Billion (2021 constant prices), gross disbursements except for the DAC Countries' net ODA [bilateral and imputed multilateral shares] to fragile contexts section, to allow for comparisons across years and can be accessed through the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) on the [OECD website](#).

Key takeaways

- **ODA to Ukraine amounted to USD 29.4 billion in 2022**, 99% of which was provided by DAC members. This ODA was primarily allocated for **development (60%) followed by peace (30%) and humanitarian (10%)** purposes, with **over 33% of the total delivered as general budget support**.
- **In-donor refugee costs (IDRCs) increased more than 2.5 times from 2021 to 2022**, largely due to support for Ukrainian refugees in DAC countries. IDRCs now account for over 17% of DAC countries' ODA.
- **ODA to fragile contexts decreased by over 10% from 2020 to 2022**. Trends from 2021 to 2022 were driven by: (i) lower allocations from DAC members and non-DAC countries; (ii) lower allocations to extremely fragile contexts and (iii) important decreases in humanitarian ODA to fragile contexts.
- **DAC net ODA to fragile contexts (USD 60.4 billion)** accounted for 48.8% of DAC country-allocable ODA in 2022, the lowest share in the past decade. **Russian aggression in Ukraine has altered DAC net ODA flows to fragile contexts**. If Ukraine were a fragile context, DAC net ODA to these contexts would account for 68.5% of their country-allocable ODA in 2022.
- **Peace ODA from All Official Donors reached a peak of USD 28.1 billion in 2022**, largely due to the USD 8.8 billion allocated to Ukraine. DAC members accounted for 82.3% of peace ODA in 2022, but their peace ODA to contexts other than Ukraine decreased from 2020 to 2022.
- **Total Humanitarian ODA was flat from 2021 to 2022 despite ever increasing needs**. This is largely due to decreases in humanitarian ODA from non-DAC countries (- USD 2.1 billion), while DAC members provided a record USD 26.9 billion in 2022.
- Nevertheless, **DAC members' humanitarian ODA as a proportion of their total ODA declined** from 14.9% in 2021 to 12.4% in 2022, **representing the lowest share since 2015**.
- **The Ukraine crisis has altered humanitarian ODA allocation priorities** as the proportion going towards Europe increased from 3% to 12% from 2021 to 2022 while the proportions going towards Asia (from 51% to 41%) and Africa (29% to 27%) decreased.

Table 1. Key Definitions for ODA


- **DAC Members' Bilateral ODA:** this includes bilateral ODA flows from all DAC members including multilateral outflows from EU institutions. This excludes core contributions to multilateral organisations. This category uses gross disbursements from the [Creditor Reporting System](#). Unless specified to the contrary, DAC members' ODA is used throughout this brief including in the section: DAC Members' Bilateral ODA [DAC Countries & EU Institutions] to fragile contexts section.
- **DAC Countries' Net ODA:** this includes net ODA from all DAC countries (excluding outflows from EU institutions) and includes estimates of [DAC members' core contributions to multilateral organisations](#). This is only analysed in the DAC Countries' net ODA [bilateral and imputed multilateral shares] to fragile contexts section. This is the only section which does not use gross disbursements.
- **All Official Donors** corresponds to the sum of DAC members' bilateral ODA (including EU), multilaterals (excluding EU) and Non-DAC countries that report through the [Creditor Reporting System](#).
- **Country-allocable ODA:** country-allocable ODA refers to all ODA allocated to specific recipients. In practice, this excludes regional flows as well as "bilateral, unspecified" flows. This category is used to ensure comparability when looking at the proportion of DAC members bilateral ODA allocated to fragile contexts.

1. The impact of ODA to Ukraine in 2022

The 2022 data reflects the important impact on ODA allocations of Russia's aggression on Ukraine starting in February 2022.

- **In 2022, Ukraine received USD 29.4 billion in gross disbursements or 10.2% of total ODA** (Figure 1), 99% of which was provided by DAC members.

Figure 1: Allocations to Ukraine from 2012-2022, Humanitarian-Development-Peace



- **ODA allocations from All Official Donors to Ukraine in 2022 were mostly in support of development (60%) followed by peace (30%) and humanitarian action (10%).** (Figure 1)
 - **Development:** USD 17.6 billion was allocated for development, **primarily in the form of budget support (55.5%)** with USD 9.8 billion. The largest allocations for budget support are from the EU institutions (91.1%) followed by Japan (7.3%).

- **Peace:** USD 8.8 billion was allocated for peace, 92.7% of which for public sector policy and administrative management (USD 8.2 billion). Many allocations were delivered through multi-donor trust funds.
- **Humanitarian:** USD 2.9 billion was allocated for humanitarian action, principally for material relief assistance and services (63.4%), relief co-ordination and support services (16%) and emergency food assistance (11.7%). This figure is to be compared with the UN flash appeal for Ukraine (March to December 2022) amounting to USD 4.3 billion.¹
- **DAC members provided USD 29.1 billion in ODA to Ukraine in 2022.** The spike in ODA allocation to Ukraine in 2022 represented 13.5% of DAC members' bilateral ODA in 2022 and 23.4% of their country-allocable ODA.
- **DAC members' bilateral ODA was particularly concentrated with four DAC members** together providing 84% of DAC support: EU institutions (39.4%), United States (29.7%), Germany (7.5%) and Canada (7.3%).

Broader ODA impacts of Russian aggression on Ukraine

- **In-donor refugee costs (IDRC),** a subset of development ODA designated for supporting refugees and asylum seekers during the first twelve months after their arrival,² **increased sharply from USD 13 billion in 2021 to USD 33.3 billion in 2022.** The increase was mainly related to the large-scale influx of 7.9 million Ukrainian refugees into countries across Europe by the end of 2022.³ **IDRC figures in 2022 represent 17.3% of total DAC countries' ODA** with a total value of USD 31.8 billion.
- The Russian aggression in Ukraine and associated sanction regimes also triggered trade disruptions leading to increases in prices for energy, agricultural commodities and fertilizers which have had **significant implications for fragile and conflict-affected contexts. However, development food assistance and emergency food assistance have not significantly increased** between 2021 (USD 8.2 billion) and 2022 (USD 9.1 billion).
- **Evidence on whether ODA to Ukraine is additional remains inconclusive.**⁴ DAC member bilateral ODA for development to recipients other than Ukraine increased in parallel to large development allocations to Ukraine. Conversely, DAC member bilateral peace and humanitarian ODA for recipients other than Ukraine decreased despite large increases allocated to Ukraine.
 - **Development:** DAC members increased their bilateral ODA to recipients other than Ukraine by USD 23.4 billion from 2021 to 2022 while increasing allocations to Ukraine by USD 15.9 billion. At the same time, IDRCs provided by DAC countries increased by USD 18.9 billion (these are counted as development ODA and the increase is likely related to the Ukrainian refugee influx in Europe). Nevertheless, the increase in DAC development ODA is larger than the increase in IDRCs. This suggests that development ODA to Ukraine was largely additional.
 - **Peace:** DAC members' bilateral peace ODA to recipients other than Ukraine decreased from 2021 to 2022 while peace ODA to Ukraine increased rapidly (see section 3. ODA for peace and conflict prevention).

¹ UN, Ukraine Flash Appeal (March – December 2022).

² Some Non-DAC countries also report IDRCs. IDRCs are not only related to Ukraine as they concern all refugees regardless of nationality.

³ UNHCR, Refugee Response Plan (March – December 2022).

⁴ This paragraph compares flows from DAC members exclusively to Ukraine versus flows from DAC members to other recipients (including bilateral, unspecified and regional flows). The latter flows could possibly contain DAC member ODA to Ukraine which is delivered through bilateral, unspecified or Europe, regional flows.

- **Humanitarian:** DAC members' bilateral humanitarian ODA to recipients other than Ukraine decreased from 2021 to 2022 while humanitarian ODA to Ukraine increased rapidly (see section 4. Humanitarian funding in 2022)


2. ODA to fragile contexts in 2022

Ukraine is not included in the most recent version of the OECD's multidimensional fragility framework which is based on 2021 data. Therefore, ODA to fragile contexts in this analysis does not include ODA to Ukraine, allowing better comparability across years.⁵ A full list of fragile contexts according to the latest States of Fragility 2022 report is available on the [States of Fragility Platform](#).

All Official Donors' ODA to fragile contexts, gross disbursements

- **Overall ODA to fragile contexts⁶ (gross disbursements) has decreased in volume.** ODA provided by All Official Donors to fragile contexts has experienced a year-on-year decrease from a peak of USD 103.5 billion in 2020 to USD 95.7 billion in 2021 and USD 93.1 billion in 2022. This represents a 10% decrease over a two-year timeframe. (Figure 2)

Figure 2: ODA (gross disbursements) towards fragile contexts by type of donor, 2012-2022⁷



- **DAC members bilateral ODA toward fragile contexts⁸ has decreased as a proportion of total ODA.** In 2022, 52.6% of ODA to fragile contexts was provided by DAC members followed by

⁵ The upcoming States of Fragility report will be based on 2023 data, possibly altering the distribution of fragility across contexts.

⁶ See OECD's multidimensional fragility framework.

⁷ All Official Donors corresponds to the sum of DAC members' bilateral ODA (including EU), multilaterals (excluding EU) and Non-DAC countries.

⁸ See OECD's multidimensional fragility framework.

multilaterals (38.3%) and non-DAC countries (9.2%). This is the lowest proportion provided by DAC members over the last decade except for 2020 (49.7%).

- **Humanitarian assistance bears the brunt of the decrease.** From 2021 to 2022, the largest decreases are for humanitarian ODA (from USD 24.3 billion to USD 20.8 billion) and peace ODA (USD 8.7 billion to USD 8.3 billion). Conversely, development ODA to fragile contexts experienced a small increase (USD 62.7 billion in 2021 to USD 64 billion in 2022).
- **ODA decreased in the most challenging contexts.** ODA to extremely fragile contexts decreased from USD 37.2 billion in 2021 to USD 31.2 billion in 2022 while ODA to other fragile contexts increased between 2021 and 2022 from USD 58.5 billion to USD 62 billion.
 - Among the 15 extremely fragile contexts, four faced important decreases in the amount of ODA they received including **Sudan** (USD 3.3 billion decrease), **Syria** (USD 1.46 billion decrease), **Afghanistan** (USD 676 million decrease) and **Somalia** (USD 623 million decrease). Only the **Republic of Congo** (DRC) received a significant increase in ODA from 2021 (USD 222.6 million) to 2022 (USD 765.8 million).
 - The decrease in ODA to Sudan from 2021 to 2022 should not necessarily be seen as an anomaly as the amount of ODA allocated to Sudan in 2022 is still higher than in all individual years from 2014-2018. Rather, the fact that USD 5 billion were provided to Sudan in 2021 represents an outlier. The amount was high largely due to IMF budget support (USD 1.4 billion) and a World Bank reengagement and reform development policy package (USD 1.3 billion). This can be interpreted as being disbursed in light of Sudan’s revolution and temporary move towards more democratic governance. Setbacks in 2023 with the eruption of a civil war suggest that disbursements are likely to further dwindle. This is likely to be reflected in ODA figures for upcoming years.
 - Syria and Yemen both experienced declines in overall ODA due to decreasing humanitarian ODA. Conversely, they both experienced increases in development-related ODA in 2022. The increase in development ODA to Syria from 2021 to 2022 is principally due to in-donor refugee costs (USD 1.1 billion increase) mostly provided by Türkiye. The increase in development ODA to Yemen from 2021 to 2022 is principally due to general budget support, support to the health sector by Saudi Arabia, and to other social infrastructure and services mostly supported by the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA).
 - Afghanistan received similar amounts of humanitarian ODA between 2021 and 2022 (USD 2.2 billion versus USD 2.1 billion). However, there were important decreases in the amounts of peace ODA, while development ODA also decreased to a lesser extent. 2022 marks the first year of Taliban rule, which has made aid delivery significantly more challenging.


DAC Countries’ net ODA [bilateral and imputed multilateral shares] to fragile contexts

DAC Countries’ Net ODA: this includes net ODA from all DAC countries (excluding outflows from EU institutions) and includes estimates of DAC members’ core contributions to multilateral organisations.

- **DAC countries’ ODA to fragile contexts was at its lowest in the 10-year period analysed.** As a share, their aid to fragile contexts in 2022 declined by 10.8 percentage points from 2021. Total DAC net ODA to fragile contexts amounted to USD 60.4 billion in 2022 (in real terms), or 48.8% of DAC country-allocable ODA. This volume is a 6% decline from 2021.
- These figures include USD 41.1 billion of bilateral ODA and USD 19.3 billion of imputed multilateral ODA. Both categories experienced a decrease compared to previous years.

- **Russian aggression in Ukraine has created a disruption.** If Ukraine were counted as a fragile context, net ODA to fragile contexts from DAC countries would have amounted to USD 85 billion in 2022 representing 68.5% of DAC country-allocable ODA. In other words, it is probable that a significant amount of DAC country ODA was allocated to Ukraine to the likely detriment of other contexts experiencing crisis.
- Among DAC countries, the largest allocations towards fragile contexts are from the **United States** (USD 18 billion; 29.8%) followed by **Japan** (USD 7.6 billion; 12.7%), **Germany** (USD 7.55 billion; 12.5%), **France** (USD 5.6 billion; 9.3%), the **United Kingdom** (USD 3.4 billion; 5.6%), **Canada** (USD 2.7 billion; 4.4%) and **Sweden** (USD 2.5 billion; 4.1%).
- The largest allocations to fragile contexts by DAC countries as a share of their country-allocable ODA are from **Sweden** (66.7%) followed by **Luxembourg** (63%), **Denmark** (59.6%), the **United Kingdom** (58.2%), **Switzerland** (56.7%), **Ireland** (55.7%) and the **Netherlands** (55.5%).
- The largest recipients of net DAC ODA towards fragile contexts in 2022 were **Bangladesh** (USD 4.9 billion) followed by **Ethiopia** (USD 3.8 billion), **Afghanistan** (USD 3.4 billion), **Nigeria** (USD 3 billion), the **Democratic Republic of the Congo** (USD 2.5 billion), **Syria** (USD 2.3 billion), **Yemen** (USD 2.3 billion), **Kenya** (USD 2.1 billion), **Mozambique** (USD 2 billion) and **Tanzania** (USD 2 billion) (Figure 3)

Figure 3: Largest 10 recipients of net DAC ODA towards fragile contexts in 2022⁹



DAC Members' Bilateral ODA [DAC Countries & EU Institutions] to fragile contexts¹⁰


- DAC members bilateral ODA to fragile contexts amounted to USD 48.96 billion in 2022 compared to USD 51.4 billion in 2021 representing 39.3% of country-allocable DAC ODA. This is the lowest share in the last decade.
- **ODA to Ukraine was potentially not entirely additional** (Figure 4). If Ukraine were classified as a fragile context in 2022, DAC members' bilateral ODA towards fragile contexts would amount to USD 78 billion which represents 62.7% of their country-allocable ODA. While a significant part of

⁹ DRC stands for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

¹⁰ ODA from DAC countries and the EU institutions.


DAC members' bilateral allocations to Ukraine (USD 29.1 billion in 2022) appear to be additional, the decrease in allocations to other fragile contexts suggests otherwise.

Figure 4: ODA (gross disbursements) towards fragile contexts & Ukraine by type of donor, 2012-2022




- **DAC members' bilateral ODA in fragile contexts was primarily channelled through multilateral organisations** (USD 12.3 billion) followed by the recipient government (USD 12 billion), NGOs and civil society (USD 10.8 billion), other (USD 6.7 billion), donor governments (USD 4.4 billion) and the private sector (USD 2.7 billion) (Figure 5)

Figure 5: Largest channels of delivery for DAC members' bilateral ODA towards fragile contexts in 2022



- DAC members' bilateral ODA in fragile contexts was primarily allocated to social infrastructure & services (USD 20.2 billion) followed by humanitarian aid (USD 13 billion) and economic infrastructure and services (USD 6.7 billion) (Figure 6)

Figure 6: Largest sectors for DAC members' bilateral ODA towards fragile contexts in 2022



- In 2022, DAC members' bilateral ODA towards fragile contexts was mostly allocated for development purposes (USD 31.1 billion; 63.5%) followed by humanitarian (USD 13 billion; 26.6%) and peace (USD 4.9 billion; 9.9%). This represents the lowest share of peace ODA towards fragile contexts since 2006. While the amount disbursed for development purposes slightly decreased from 2021 to 2022 (by approximately USD 400 million), the share of DAC member bilateral development ODA towards fragile contexts increased from 61.2% to 63.5%. Conversely, humanitarian DAC ODA decreased in volume (by USD 1.3 billion) and in share from 27.8% to 26.6% of total DAC members' ODA to fragile contexts.

Multilaterals & Non-DAC countries' ODA to fragile contexts


- **Multilateral ODA to fragile contexts increased slightly** from USD 34.3 billion in 2021 to USD 35.7 billion in 2022. The increase is due in large part to increases from the World Bank IDA (USD 3.4 billion) and the Inter-American Development Bank (USD 799 million). This benefited several recipients including Nigeria (USD 1.3 billion increase), Zambia (USD 763 million increase) and Nicaragua (USD 728 million increase).
- **Non-DAC countries' ODA to fragile contexts decreased by 14%** from USD 10 billion to USD 8.5 billion. This is due principally to the decrease in ODA provided by Türkiye between 2021 and 2022 (- USD 1.2 billion) and Saudi Arabia (- USD 453 million). Most of the decrease in Türkiye's ODA affected Syria while most of Saudi Arabia's decrease affected Yemen.¹¹

¹¹ Overall Saudi ODA increased towards recipients except for Yemen.

Total ODA compared to external financial flows

- **Remittances to fragile contexts are larger than ODA.** The below figure situates Official Development Assistance in relation to other types of flows towards fragile contexts including foreign direct investment (FDI) and remittances.¹² (Figure 7)

Figure 7: ODA, Remittances and FDI to fragile contexts in 2022



Source: ODA data for All Official Donors comes from the Creditor Reporting System. Remittances and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) were taken from the [World Bank's Data Portal](#).

3. ODA for peace and conflict prevention in 2022

This section looks at peace ODA across all recipients, not just fragile contexts.


- **The volume of peace ODA from All Official Donors¹³ reached a peak** of USD 28.1 billion in 2022, the highest amount allocated for this purpose in the last decade (Figure 8). Most peace ODA in 2022 is provided by DAC members (USD 23.2 billion; 82.3%) followed by multilaterals (USD 4.8 billion; 17%) and non-DAC countries (USD 0.2 billion).
- **DAC members' bilateral peace ODA** increased from USD 16.3 billion in 2021 to USD 23.2 billion. This is mostly due to DAC members' bilateral peace ODA to Ukraine, increasing by USD 8.3 billion from 2021 to 2022. Meanwhile, DAC members' bilateral peace ODA to other recipients decreased from USD 15.9 billion in 2021 to USD 14.4 billion in 2022 reaching its lowest level since 2015.¹⁴ This suggests that DAC members' bilateral peace ODA to Ukraine was not entirely additional.

¹² Out of 60 contexts classified as fragile by the OECD multidimensional fragility framework, there is data on 56 of these regarding Foreign Direct Investment and 49 on remittances.

¹³ Peace ODA comprises eighteen purpose codes: (i) all six purpose codes under the conflict, peace & security sector (core peacebuilding) as well as (ii) 12 out of 16 purpose codes under the governance & civil society general sector (secondary peacebuilding).

¹⁴ This includes regional flows and bilateral, unspecified flows.

Figure 8: Peace ODA by DAC members, Non-DAC countries & multilaterals, 2012-2022




- **Most peace ODA by All Official Donors is allocated for activities in the governance & civil society sector (secondary peacebuilding)**, which accounts for most of the increase in peace ODA between 2021 (USD 20.7 billion) and 2022 (USD 28.1 billion). The **United States** provided the largest increase to secondary peacebuilding purpose codes (+ USD 7.4 billion). These are mostly for Ukraine which received USD 8.1 billion in 2022 from the United States compared to USD 0.1 billion in 2021.¹⁵
- The CRS purpose codes which account for the largest increase, from 2021 to 2022, are *public sector policy and administration management* (+ USD 6.6 billion), and *public finance management* (+ USD 1 billion). Almost two thirds of ODA provided under these purpose codes was allocated to Ukraine in 2022 (61%).
- **Conversely, ODA allocated to the *conflict, peace & security* (core peacebuilding) sector decreased** from USD 4.8 billion in 2021 to USD 4.3 billion in 2022.
- **The purpose codes with the largest funding decrease in this period are *security system management and reform*** (- USD 387 million), ***legal and judicial development*** (- USD 317 million), ***participation in international peacekeeping operations*** (- USD 209 million) and ***democratic participation and civil society*** (- USD 94 million).

¹⁵ United States' peace ODA allocations to several other recipients including Jordan and Afghanistan decreased from 2021 to 2022.

4. Humanitarian funding in 2022

Figure 9: Humanitarian ODA by type of donor, 2012-2022¹⁶



- **Overall humanitarian ODA from All Official Donors stayed relatively flat in volume** between 2021 (USD 36 billion) and 2022 (USD 36.7 billion). The plateauing is principally due to a decline in humanitarian aid provided by non-DAC countries from USD 8.2 billion in 2021 to USD 6.1 billion in 2022 (- USD 2.1 billion), that was compensated by the continued increase from DAC members from USD 25 billion in 2021 to 26.9 billion in 2022 (+ USD 1.9 billion) and multilateral engagement from USD 2.9 billion in 2021 to USD 3.7 billion in 2022 (+ USD 865 million). (Figure 9)
- **The share of DAC members' bilateral ODA to humanitarian assistance significantly declined.**¹⁷ In 2021, humanitarian ODA represented 14.9% of total DAC members' bilateral ODA, decreasing to 12.4% of total DAC members' bilateral ODA in 2022, roughly the share of humanitarian support in 2015, even though 274 million people – the highest number in decades – were in need of humanitarian assistance and protection in 2022.¹⁸

Humanitarian ODA by DAC members

- **The DAC as a group remained the main humanitarian provider in 2022** accounting for 73.2% of total humanitarian ODA, the highest share since 2016. This confirms that global humanitarian response remains primarily a DAC matter with humanitarian ODA by DAC members reaching an all-time high of USD 26.9 billion in 2022. This represents an important increase of 7.7% compared to 2021 in terms of volume and an even more substantial increase compared to 2020 (+27.8%).
- The largest DAC donors of humanitarian assistance in 2022 remained the same as in previous years: the **United States** (42.9%) followed by **Germany** (13.5%) and **EU institutions** (11.8%).

¹⁶ All Official Donors is equal to the sum of the three other categories (DAC members, Non-DAC Countries and Multilaterals).

¹⁷ The share of ODA for humanitarian assistance out of total ODA from All Official Donors also significantly decreased from 2021 to 2022.

¹⁸ UN OCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2022.

Compared to 2021, Germany has become the second largest donor of humanitarian ODA among DAC members (overtaking the EU institutions). Taken together, these three donors provide around 68.2% of all humanitarian assistance provided by DAC members.

- The largest increases in volume of humanitarian ODA from 2021 to 2022 provided by DAC members are from **Germany** (+ USD 753 million), the **United Kingdom** (+ USD 445 million), **France** (+ USD 248 million), **Poland** (+ USD 208 million) and **Italy** (+ USD 204 million).
- Conversely, the largest decreases have occurred for the **United States** (- USD 714 million) and **Japan** (- USD 286 million).
- **Several DAC countries located in Eastern and Central Europe have significantly increased their humanitarian ODA allocations** from 2021 to 2022 including Poland (from USD 24.4 to 232 million), Lithuania (from USD 1.6 to 48.2 million) and Hungary (from USD 4.8 to 57.3 million). Portugal is another DAC member whose humanitarian ODA has increased massively, from USD 4.1 million to USD 38.9 million in 2022. Most of this increase was allocated to the Ukraine humanitarian response in 2022.

Humanitarian ODA by Non-DAC countries

- **Overall, humanitarian ODA provided by non-DAC countries decreased** from USD 8.2 billion in 2021 to USD 6.1 billion in 2022, a first decrease after several years of relative stability (2018-2021). Non-DAC countries reporting to the DAC provided 16.6% of humanitarian ODA in 2022, which represents the lowest proportion since 2015. For instance, non-DAC countries provided 22.8% of humanitarian ODA in 2021.
- This decrease is mostly due to Türkiye whose humanitarian ODA decreased from USD 6.8 billion in 2021 to USD 5.2 billion in 2022. This coincides with the decrease in overall humanitarian ODA to Syria (from USD 6.7 billion in 2021 to USD 4.5 billion in 2022), most of which is provided by Türkiye (72.6% in 2022).
- Nevertheless, Türkiye alone still provides 84.6% of non-DAC countries' humanitarian ODA followed by Qatar (7.2%), the UAE (4.7%) and Saudi Arabia (1.5%). Taken together, these four countries provide 98% of humanitarian ODA by non-DAC countries.
- The UAE and Saudi Arabia both decreased the amounts of humanitarian ODA they provided in 2022 compared to 2021 by 49.1% and 79.1% respectively. Qatar, the second largest non-DAC country in terms of 2022 humanitarian aid allocations, increased their humanitarian ODA from USD 367 million in 2021 to USD 443 million in 2022.
- Apart from Bulgaria (-54.1%), many other European non-DAC countries increased their humanitarian assistance, including Cyprus (+2103.1%)¹⁹, Latvia (+482.3%), Romania (+446.3%), Croatia (+359.7%), Monaco (+123.4%) and Liechtenstein (+58.8%) although these remain modest increases in terms of volume.
- **Non-DAC countries' regional allocations of humanitarian ODA are still largely provided to neighbouring countries** especially Syria (73.9%), Middle East, regional (7.2%), and West Bank & Gaza Strip (6.2%). One of the largest trends in recipient-level allocations includes the important

¹⁹ Note by the Republic of Türkiye. The information in this document with reference to "Cyprus" relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Türkiye recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Türkiye shall preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus issue".

Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union. The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Türkiye. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

decrease provided to Yemen from USD 661.7 million in 2021 to USD 100.9 million in 2022. Conversely the amount to Ukraine reached USD 90.1 million in 2022.

Humanitarian ODA by Multilaterals²⁰

- **The World Bank's IDA emerges as the largest multilateral donor for humanitarian ODA** in 2022 reporting USD 1.4 billion against 824 million in 2021. As a result, the IDA now provide 37.4% of multilateral humanitarian ODA alone in 2022. This finding is particularly significant as it showcases the increased involvement of multilateral development banks and international financial institutions in humanitarian affairs. A closer look at some of the largest projects shows that interventions focus on climate-related disasters (e.g., in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh) as well as growth and reconstruction/recovery in conflict-affected areas (e.g., North-eastern Nigeria and Ethiopia).
- The World Bank IDA's engagement is followed by the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF, USD 760.6 million; 20.4% of total) and several traditional UN entities in crisis settings including UNHCR (17.5%), WFP (9.4%), UNICEF (6.6%), WHO (2.5%) and UNFPA (2%). These UN entities continue to provide a large amount of humanitarian ODA in their own right, with an increase from 2021 to 2022 (e.g. +9.3% for UNHCR, +10.6% for WFP, +21.9% for UNICEF and +41.1% for UNFPA).


Regional and recipient allocation

- **Unsurprisingly, the crisis in Ukraine has changed allocation priorities** as the proportion of total humanitarian ODA going towards Europe has increased from 3% to 12% of the total.²¹ Conversely, the proportions of humanitarian ODA going towards Asia (from 51% to 41%) and to Africa (29% to 27%) have decreased (Figure 10).

²⁰ This analysis only refers to the core funding envelopes received by multilateral development banks and UN agencies. Earmarked projects funding by a DAC member and delivered by a UN agency would be reported under DAC member humanitarian ODA.

²¹ In the OECD Creditor Reporting System, Türkiye is classified in the region "Europe". In 2022, USD 562 million of humanitarian assistance was allocated to Türkiye, against USD 882 million in 2021.

Figure 10: Regional allocation of humanitarian ODA by All Official Donors, 2021-2022



- **Despite the decrease in proportion, the volumes of humanitarian ODA to Africa have remained relatively stable** from USD 10.3 billion in 2021 to USD 10.1 billion in 2022. Humanitarian ODA towards Asia has decreased from USD 18.3 billion to USD 15.1 billion largely due to a USD 2.3 billion decrease in humanitarian allocations to Syria and to a USD 501 million decrease in allocations to Yemen.
- **The increase in humanitarian ODA to Europe is due almost exclusively to Ukraine** which received USD 2.9 billion out of USD 4.5 billion of humanitarian ODA for Europe.²² Most of this humanitarian aid was provided by DAC members (95%), many of which supported Ukraine for the first time in 2022. Multilateral organisations also increased their assistance to Ukraine, particularly the UN, essentially through a USD 62.6 million CERF allocation.
- **Not all humanitarian ODA to Ukraine was additional.** Total humanitarian ODA increased by approximately USD 700 million while humanitarian ODA to Ukraine alone accounted for USD 2.9 billion. This shows that not all humanitarian ODA to Ukraine can be considered additional, potentially to the detriment of other crisis areas.

²² The second largest recipient which is Europe, regional with USD 892 million contains several projects which reference Ukraine or its regional consequences.