

DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION DIRECTORATE
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE**International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)****Improving International Support to Peace Processes****Key Workshop Recommendations****Geneva, 19-21 September 2011**

The “key workshop recommendations” captured in this document reflect the discussions at the Geneva meeting on “Improving international support to peace processes” that took place on 19-21 September 2011.

This meeting took place as part of the DAC's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) work to deliver against its PWB output 1 (Support for peacebuilding, statebuilding and security in situations of conflict and fragility through programming and application support). It builds on earlier events in Bonn and Ottawa, as well as a number of informal publications. On the basis of work to date INCAF will prepare a comprehensive publication in the Conflict and Fragility series on international support to peace processes.

The workshop was hosted by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and INCAF. It was supported by the governments of Canada, Germany, the United States and the Mediation Support Project. The workshop recommendations do not necessarily reflect the views of individual participants or the institutions they represent, and they are the sole responsibility of the meeting organizers.

Please note this document is available in pdf only.

Contact:Mr. Erwin van Veen, tel. +33 1 45 24 75 43; email: erwin.vanveen@oecd.org**JT03312434**

Improving International Support to Peace Processes

Key Workshop Recommendations

Geneva, 19-21 September 2011

Introduction

Violence sets development in reverse. Peace processes, which can end decades of violent conflict, are critical periods that can (re-)start longer-term peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts towards more equitable and peaceful societies. Effective international engagement can deliver an important contribution to a successful peace process. Yet peace processes — and international support for such processes — are as difficult as they are critical. They are both politically and psychologically complex. The failure of a peace process reduces confidence and increases cynicism.

Approximately 60 practitioners, policymakers and researchers involved in peace processes as mediators, development or security professionals met in Geneva from 19-21 September 2011 to develop recommendations on how to improve international support to peace processes. The starting point for discussion was that mediators, development and security actors need to work together better — both with actors in their own area of operations and with each other — to support peace processes more effectively and to avoid doing harm. Recommendations were mainly developed on the basis of in-depth analyses of examples from Burundi, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Somalia and Sudan. Because each case is unique, some of the recommendations contained in this summary are more pertinent to some situations than to others, but they reflect the overall sense emerging from the workshop.

The workshop was hosted by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the OECD-DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF). It was supported by the governments of Canada, Germany, the United States and the Mediation Support Project.¹ The event was part of a longer-term INCAF project on this topic, preceded by events in Bonn and Ottawa as well as a number of informal publications.

OVERVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Incentives:** *Develop incentives for better international co-operation.*
- **Coherence:** *International actors supporting a peace process should conduct joint conflict analysis and agree on a joint support strategy whenever possible.*
- **Local:** *Link international support more effectively to existing local and national conflict resolution mechanisms.*
- **Timing:** *Ensure international efforts support transition periods and arrangements that are of sufficient duration, create space for positive change and build trust.*
- **Flexibility:** *Ensure experts have broad skill-sets and are deployed in pre-existing teams.*



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra



Recommendations

1. **Incentives: Develop incentives for better international co-operation**

Co-operation between security, mediation and development actors often comes naturally to practitioners in the field if they are able to put aside institutional stereotypes. The critical added value of the experience, tools and resources of the three professional fields is generally recognised. Yet collaboration is often problematic at headquarters because of institutional, domestic and geopolitical considerations.

- i. **Leaders in foreign ministries, development and international organisations can create incentives for better co-operation** between security, development and mediation experts by articulating frequently, and with consequence, that they view co-operation as vital to successful support. Bureaucracies that shape, fund and deliver international support to peace processes are sensitive to the signals of their senior and political leaders. Without clear, top-down messages it is easy to 'hide' behind existing mandates and institutional silos.
- ii. **Joint budgets to finance international support to peace processes can also create incentives for co-operation and address resource mobilisation challenges**, if they are underpinned by joint strategies and if participating actors are flexible on how best to work together and set priorities.² Because international support to peace processes involves a strong development component, Official Development Assistance (ODA) envelopes can and should provide a significant contribution to such joint budgets.

2. **Coherence: International actors supporting a peace process should conduct joint conflict analysis and agree on a joint support strategy whenever possible**

In-depth analysis of the cases demonstrated that international support is most effective when security, mediation and development actors work together on the basis of a joint assessment of the conflict and a joint support strategy. It is the process for producing joint assessments and support strategies that is critical, as this facilitates convergence of perspectives of international actors through discussion. Because this was largely lacking in **Kosovo**, **Lebanon** and **Somalia**, events and particular interests were able to dominate these peace processes. **Burundi**, and to a lesser extent **Nepal** and **Sudan**, provide examples of a more consolidated international approach.

However, a high degree of realism is necessary in following up on this recommendation. Due to divergent national interests, levels of trust and resources, comprehensive joint assessments and strategies that include all international actors will often be impossible. Although full inclusivity may be desirable, it is not an absolute prerequisite for improving the quality of international support in this regard. It would already make a real difference to the quality of international support if key international actors were to come together on an 'inclusive enough' basis with a few trusted strategic partners to share information, conduct analysis and build a joint view and strategy. This will require some out-of-the-box thinking and innovative ways of working to get around classification and intelligence issues. Naturally, any joint support strategy must be broadly compatible with the views of the respective parties on due process and objectives. Where particular interests, mistrust or a lack of leadership prevent such joint work, the quality of international support is likely to suffer proportionally.

Joint support strategies must be capable of mobilising a changing mix of development, security and mediation expertise and resources before, during and after a peace process. They should inform Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) and other processes on which post-conflict development assistance is based. The peace process often continues after the signing of an agreement in the form of political dialogue or a governance agenda that deals with the same topics. Finally, the quality and focus of international assessments and strategies will benefit from further research on what makes peace processes effective; on the relation between inclusiveness and sustainability; and on how best to evaluate and justify support to peace processes beyond existing log-frame approaches.

¹ The Mediation Support Project is a joint project between the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich and swisspeace, funded by FDFA. This document is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.

² One idea to ensure swift resource mobilisation in the UN system is to have the Peace Building Fund automatically release USD 3 million once a resolution calling for a significant level of support to peace processes by the UN or a regional organisation is passed by the UN Security Council.

3. **Local:** Link international support more effectively to existing local and national conflict resolution mechanisms

Local and national conflict resolution mechanisms usually exist, even in the most dire conflict situations (e.g. Lebanon, Nepal, Somalia and Sudan). They often continue to function during the conflict, but are often unknown, let alone used, by international actors. In Somalia, for example, an impressive range of internationally supported peace processes has failed and yet there are local-level security mechanisms that have been successfully negotiated and implemented. This highlights the need to first establish security as a basis for creating local stability, to explore how such practices increase resilience and how they can support broader peace processes in a gradual fashion. A variation on this theme are the promising third-generation early warning/response systems, which often operate at the local level and can bring NGOs, local authorities and traditional actors together in effective conflict-prevention efforts. More support for local mechanisms, actors and customs for negotiation and mediation will make international support for peace processes more sustainable. This requires curiosity, patience and support by international experts with in-depth and long-term contacts in a given region.

4. **Timing:** Ensure international efforts support transition periods and arrangements that are of sufficient duration, create space for positive change and build trust

Peace agreements do not resolve all critical issues and are typically the start of a longer process of political negotiation. Before a final status is established, it is important that transition periods between ceasefire arrangements, comprehensive peace agreements and first elections are sufficiently long to renegotiate issues that were left ambiguous, could not be resolved, or where new frictions have emerged. Transitional mechanisms can help create trust, incentives, options and build working relations across conflict cleavages. Yet they can only be built slowly. Unfortunately, transition periods are far too short in some peace processes. This tends to be the result of international impatience and a desire to establish democratic procedures swiftly, even if doing so risks *façade* elections. For instance, rushing towards first elections in which the winner takes all, tends to jeopardise the sustainability of a peace agreement and can cause marginalised groups to return to violence. More effective international support requires the acceptance of longer transition periods and sustained support during these periods, with security, mediation and development resources.

5. **Flexibility:** Ensure experts have broad skill-sets and are deployed in pre-existing teams

Mediators, security and development experts will have to engage in areas beyond their immediate skill- and toolsets due to the complexity of violent conflict and peace processes. Organising international support to peace processes on the basis of a classic security/mediation/development sequence of roles and activities does not reflect the messy reality of most situations. Mediation teams require mandates and resources flexible enough to allow for speed and creativity. This has two consequences for the experts who deliver international support to peace processes:

- i. **Experts need broad and varied skill sets to operate effectively**, not just deep expertise in a single functional area. Hence, they require multi-disciplinary training. Rosters should include well-rounded experts, topical specialists and mediators with knowledge outside their core competence, for instance on security and development issues. Practically, this means that existing training and rosters may need to be revised.
- ii. **It is not effective to hire individual experts, to randomly team them up and to expect that they will perform well in the field.** It is much better to establish permanent teams with a specific regional focus that can provide swift support on the basis of continuous contingency planning and good preparation. Countries and international organisations should create such teams to improve the quality of their responses and to better link conflict-prevention and early warning/response with support to peace processes.³

³ This is in line with the UN Secretary-General's report "Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict," 19 August 2011.

Insights from the case studies

Each of the seven case studies – **Burundi, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Somalia, and Sudan** – was examined from the security, mediation and development angles. Burundi, Nepal and Sudan represent more traditional cases with relatively well-defined and -structured peace processes. Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya and Somalia are ‘messier’ cases, featuring a broad variety of formal and informal peace processes and initiatives driven by different actors, and not resulting in a single implementable peace agreement. Libya was the only forward-looking case study, examined through a role-playing exercise.



Burundi

At the time, the conflict parties in Burundi were looking for a way to sit down, speak to each other and start building common political ground.⁴ The Arusha process (1997-2000), which was heavily promoted by regional actors, provided this opportunity. It was helped by the post-1989 credo that Africans should solve African problems and, as a result, the Arusha peace process was characterised by a combination of African leadership and international experts. In addition to international pressure, the conflict parties in Burundi also realised that continued conflict was not a solution. The process initially created an opportunity for people to speak informally, which proved vital to deconstruct the stereotypes and distrust that had been built over 40 years of civil war. It also helped to address key security concerns early on, recognising them as strategic issues. The process ultimately proved fruitful because it convinced, for instance, the president of the time, who represented the 16% of the population that is Tutsi, to “trade” his complete — but undemocratic — exercise of power for a 40% share in a much more legitimate democratic setup.

The peace process set-up involved four committees working in parallel: (1) truth and reconciliation, aiming to deal with the past; (2) democracy and good governance, aiming to establish a comprehensive coalition and political representation from the different communities; (3) security, aiming to change the idea that control over the army by one group was the only way to guarantee national security; and (4) reconstruction and development, aiming to explore if and how Burundi was a viable state economically, including land issues. Although this approach proved to be complicated, its advantage was that these issues could be addressed in parallel. For instance, progress and ideas on what the development of the country could look like helped ease political tensions about economic inequalities, while the political and security working groups were instrumental in designing mechanisms to minimise the risk of one group dominating the other. Hence, the organisation of the Arusha peace process illustrates one way in which security, politics and development can be linked to feed into each other.

Kosovo

Kosovo is a special case in the sense that it did not feature a formal peace process despite intense conflict.⁵ Negotiations are currently still ongoing as part of the European Union-facilitated dialogue on technical issues between Pristina and Belgrade. Still, there are many lessons to be learned from how the Kosovo conflict was settled. One of the most important insights is that the lack of a clear strategy and shared objectives among international actors seriously reduced their effectiveness and ability to support the peace process. For example, longer-term development perspectives, which could have helped resolve more immediate challenges, were not discussed because the short-term focus of the international community ensured that security and mediation actors dominated the scene. Donor fragmentation has also continued to make an effective international contribution to longer-term development difficult. Moreover, the lack of agreement and clarity in the international community with respect to Kosovo’s status complicated dialogue with the conflict parties because this was a critical variable to the resolution of the conflict. For instance, important economic issues were framed in the context of EU enlargement, which was, however, an unknown variable at the time of the peace process. This impeded progress. KFOR’s dominant role ultimately became problematic as after a few years there was no longer any clear role for the military. Yet KFOR continued to be asked for guidance and advice that it was ill-equipped to provide. In other words, the change from a military to civilian lead arguably took place too late. An adequate monitoring mechanism to trigger a discussion and decision on this matter was lacking. This

⁴ Speakers: Georg Lennkh, Julian Hottinger, Angelo Romano

⁵ Speakers: Björn F. Schulz, Thomas Busch, Khaldoun Sinno.

underscores the need to bring security, development and mediation perspectives and actors together early on in a peace process, even if there is no clear role for some actors at that stage.



Lebanon

The Ta'if agreements of 1989 helped to resolve some of the critical conflict issues in Lebanon by reinforcing the incentives of the various actors to foster peace by creating more balanced power- and wealth-sharing arrangements.⁶ The Ta'if agreement was based on a religious compromise dating back to 1943, which consisted of a national pact stipulating that Christians would not promote *laïcité* (secularism), and Muslims would not impose the Islamic concept of a state. Yet many challenges were left unaddressed. Because the Ta'if agreement built the Lebanese state on a religious compromise, instead of a political one, the exit from “sectarian logic” in politics has proven difficult. In addition, the agreements inflated the size of the government, which has reduced its effectiveness and efficiency from a resource perspective.

From 2008 to 2009, and sporadically in 2010, the inter-Lebanese dialogue proved an important vehicle to gather key actors around a single table and to openly discuss issues. The national dialogue was organised under the aegis of the president. Support from international actors was mainly technical in nature. Methodologically, the national dialogue is not a mediated process. The aim is rather to redefine social consensus without, or with very little, external help. Local ownership and a long-term, open-ended process are typical features of the inter-Lebanese dialogue. Although such processes can become problematic when they are overtly driven by elites, they can provide useful venues for starting dialogue and even decision-making when normal political procedures are blocked.

The inter-Lebanese national dialogue and its reform initiatives were supported by the *Common Space Initiative for Shared Knowledge and Consensus Building*,⁷ which offers technical support and knowledge resources to help improve, structure and deepen the debate (e.g. by helping to clarify the factual situation, by providing neutral space and facilitation, and by involving expert groups). The Common Space Initiative is driven by a core group of Lebanese actors with different affiliations and works through a number of Lebanese expert groups that are linked to the main political stakeholders, including the parliament, the Government and the presidential office.

Regarding the interaction between security, development and mediation, everything in Lebanon is interpreted through the security prism. Security issues dominate mediation and development questions. It is very difficult to stay impartial on security issues, as everything is seen in either pro-Syrian or pro-Western terms. By way of example, after the July 2006 war with Israel, various development efforts were blocked in the south because of security considerations. The economic links between major sectarian groups, foreign powers and donors tend to further solidify blocks instead of generating mutual benefits. Shared funds could help dilute sectarian resource bases and affiliations.



Libya

While all the other cases were retrospective, the discussion on Libya looked to the future. Workshop participants were asked: If development, mediation and security actors would deploy to Libya in a few week's time, what would their strategy look like, how would they co-ordinate, and how would they sequence their efforts? The discussion took place in the form of role play. In general, participants noted that there is a lack of knowledge on where Libya stands today and recognised the need to avoid descending into quick, easy generalisations that could give a feeling of familiarity but, in fact, distort reality. Hence, a better understanding and assessment of the situation was seen as the first step.

⁶ Speakers: Antoine Laham, Dimyanos Kattar, Oliver Wils

⁷ See www.commonspaceinitiative.org for more information.

With respect to security, the credibility, legitimacy and functioning of the chain of command of the main armies seems unclear, both in the forces of the National Transitional Council (NTC) and amongst the remnants of the forces of Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi. Arms are circulating everywhere, many of which could go underground and be used elsewhere. It is also unclear who the relevant political actors are and what issues need to be addressed to facilitate a transition process that should lead to democratic elections. Differences within the NTC could hamper this process. As a result, most of the “mediator roles” suggested first organising workshops, getting to know different actors, and helping to provide space for discussing ideas on power-sharing, institution building, dealing with the past and wealth-sharing. With respect to development, the humanitarian situation is serious and much of the country’s infrastructure has been destroyed. Although socio-economic development is vital to rebuild the social fabric and infrastructure of the country, Libya is not a “classic” developing country. It has, for instance, significant oil resources at its disposal that can contribute to recovery. However, these resources can also become highly contentious. A perception of any particular group trying to monopolise their control could, for instance, lead to renewed strife. What became clear by examining the prospects for peace in Libya, was the need for external actors to negotiate with the Libyans on what kind of help is needed and how best to provide it. At the same time, the international community should be more coherent in establishing its own basic objectives and positions.



Nepal

Comprehensive conflict and context analyses are essential pre-requisites to effectively support peace processes, and Nepal is no exception.⁸ A review of international support to the Nepali peace process highlighted the shortcomings and inadequacy of such analysis on four major counts:

1. Events and possibilities in the country have historically been (and continue to be) strongly shaped by India and China. Yet many international actors were slow to take account of this fact in their strategies and programming.
2. Most of the international community was slow to acknowledge the legitimacy that the Maoists enjoyed in the eyes of a substantial portion of the local population.
3. Many in the international community tended to base their support too much on the views and wishes of the Nepalese elite, instead of listening to those actors with a long history of engagement in Nepal, and, more importantly, to the Nepalese people themselves. As a result, issues of social conflict and exclusion were not coherently integrated in many development programmes.
4. With the continuing uncertainty over power-sharing and Nepal’s political direction, a security vacuum opened up. This created opportunities for criminal groups to take advantage. Many donors have still not recognised this and continue to work on the basis of past analyses. More social and political analysis is needed to inform future security, mediation and development strategies. On a positive note, national actors have now developed a strategy for security and development with the international community.

With regard to mediation, the peace process in Nepal was strongly dominated by informal and local actors and processes. Nepali facilitators played a key role. They were supported by ideas and expertise from external mediators, but never really dominated by them. The key challenge was to get the Maoists to the table. A lack of trust and confidence proved to be the key obstacle to the willingness of both sides to enter into dialogue. Mediation by local actors was also considered high-risk, because the conflict parties could easily perceive local mediators as biased towards the other side. And yet local mediation went far beyond classic mediation to include advice, human rights advocacy, facilitation, capacity building, acting as messengers, etc. This reflects the likely inadequacy of allocating specific issues or functions too tightly to specific people.

Security issues are highly political in any post-conflict setting. Major obstacles to progress included its “one state, two armies” situation, little appetite for power-sharing and the issue of demobilisation and reintegration of former Maoist combatants into Nepali society. Even more politically sensitive is the question of how best to integrate selected former Maoist combatants into a new Nepali security sector, although substantial progress was made in late 2011 (after this workshop was held). The United

⁸ Speakers: Gordon Hughes, Padma Ratna Tuladhar, Elisabeth von Capeller

Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) has now drawn down, but following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the early years of the peace process, UNMIN was successful in monitoring the two armies with only some 70 unarmed arms monitors. This was possible because the Joint Monitoring and Co-ordinating Committee (JMCC) brought both armies together at the right (high) level, did so frequently (weekly) and focused on building trust. What also worked well was the co-ordination between the UN and the rest of the international community, which helped to create the right kind of atmosphere for the leaders of both conflict parties to sit together at the same table. The co-ordination between different bilateral actors and the lack of a trust-building strategy between the international community and the Government of Nepal proved more difficult. The case of Nepal suggests that the biggest challenges to co-operation were not so much between security, mediation and development actors, but rather between international actors at-large. Local Nepali facilitators often had to suggest that the various international actors meet and co-ordinate amongst each other.



Somalia

The current humanitarian crisis in Somalia is a result of a political crisis with much deeper roots.⁹ In 2004 and 2005, the situation in Somalia looked reasonably positive, but the situation deteriorated rapidly in the aftermath of the Ethiopian invasion of 2006. Today's key challenge is how the pre-2006 situation can be recreated, one that is more amenable to international support. In this regard, there are two main problems: First, the international community needs to spend much more time to identify the issues, incentives and local mechanisms that can help build peace gradually, instead of pushing for quick final status agreements. A much longer transitional phase is critical to building confidence. Second, international support to peace processes in Somalia is affected by the consequences of the global war on terror. In this war, all tools — whether humanitarian, aid, development or mediation — tend to be considered part of counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts. However, the aim of such efforts is not peacebuilding, but rather winning a conflict. Development or mediation actors may become parties in a war for which they have not signed up. A neutral humanitarian and mediation space does not currently exist in Somalia and there is a serious risk of humanitarian efforts being misused for political purposes.

On the positive side, local governance mechanisms and markets continue to function, with investment taking place in the agriculture and service sectors. Somali business outfits in Kenya are increasingly moving from the informal to the formal sector because it offers more predictability and reduces risk. Moreover, there are strong transnational Somali communities in Sudan, Dubai and Malaysia, generating a strong flow of remittances to Somalia. Perhaps surprisingly, quite a few local mechanisms for mediation also exist and function. There are, for instance, around 90 local peace processes going on in Somalia, often dealing with simple issues like access to markets, and these are often quite effective. Yet rather than supporting these, the international community has mainly supported some 14 international peace processes that have tried to build a central state, and which have all failed. As a result, the international community needs to rethink the kind of incentives that will lead Somali actors to seek peace. Instead of focusing on the central state, the international community should probably focus much more on what works (e.g. institutions and practices that have been resilient to the recurrent shocks since 2001, especially given the strong antagonism in Somalia to any form of central state).

⁹ Speakers: Peter Little, Jeremy Brickhill



Sudan

The Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement of 2002 preceded the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, and was implemented by the Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) in Nuba and South Kordufan between 2002 and 2005.¹⁰ Four lessons stand out from this period:

1. Implementation problems were generally resolved swiftly and at the lowest possible level before they became political.
2. A proactive attitude, ceaseless dialogue with plenty of patience and JMC presence on the ground proved vital. For this purpose, the joint monitoring teams often met with local authorities in villages where an incident had been reported. Building trust between international monitors and local authorities and people early also proved critical.
3. Communication was essential. Although the agreement was translated and significant investment was made to spread its key messages (e.g. theatre groups performed to 5 000 people), it still took about a year to achieve general awareness.
4. Mediation, security and development roles proved intertwined and inseparable.

The CPA probably represented a good achievement given the context of the time. The aftermath of 9/11 put pressure on the Government of Sudan, as they had hosted Bin Laden in the 1990s. The Nuba Mountains Ceasefire agreement was a way for the international community to test the sincerity of the government's intentions, and its success generated new momentum to invest in the North-South peace process. Rather than starting a new process, an old one was reinvigorated, led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The process proved challenging mainly because of a serious imbalance in knowledge between the parties to the conflict. Co-operation between mediators, development and security experts proved crucial throughout the peace process. The division of labour did not involve different actors working on different topics, but rather that different actors worked on the same topic from different perspectives and fulfilling different functions. This meant that security and development actors needed to understand mediation, and mediators needed to understand security and development.

The organisation of the peace process left little room for trade-offs, as protocols were negotiated in-sequence and sealed upon completion, which was not ideal. The 2002 Machakos protocol, though, provided a helpful framework and established principles upon which the parties could base their efforts to identify solutions and agree on compromises. As past processes had shown implementation to be a key challenge, much time was spent negotiating implementation details (e.g. who does what, when, how, paid by whom, and if it does not happen, what has to be done?).

Development expertise provided a vital contribution to the process, as negotiations with a forward-looking perspective tend to be more effective and hopeful. Such expertise does not necessarily need to be represented at the negotiation table itself, but ways need to be found to integrate it into the negotiation process. From a development perspective, it is interesting to note that Sudan's oil resources ultimately proved as strong a motivator for peace as for conflict. The realisation that peace was required for either side to enjoy the benefits of the resources, offered a strong economic incentive to start negotiations and to stabilise the situation. The South probably would have benefited from a stronger focus in the peace negotiations on building institutions to manage the country's oil wealth. As it turned out, the post-CPA period generated a huge influx of oil funds, but few institutions could put it to good use.

¹⁰ Speakers: Jan Erik Wilhelmssen, Julian T. Hottinger, Achim Wennmann

List of Participants

The recommendations and analysis above do not necessarily reflect the views of individual participants or the institutions they represent, and are the sole responsibility of the meeting's organisers. This summary was edited by Simon Mason (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich) and Erwin van Veen (OECD-DAC INCAF) and reviewed by the core group of OECD-DAC INCAF members supporting this project. The cases have been reviewed by their respective speakers.

Participant	Affiliation
Althaus, Christine	German Federal Foreign Office
Bazergan, Roxaneh	UN DPA (Mediation Support Unit)
Van Bellinghen, Marc	European Union, European External Action Service
de Boer, John	International Development Research Centre, Canada
Boivin, Anne-Julie	Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Canada
Brickenkamp, Sabine	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
Brickhill, Jeremy	Zimbabwe Peace and Security Programme
Budd, Andrew	NATO
Busch, Thomas	Advisor to EU-Facilitation Team, Kosovo
Campiche, Pierre-André	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding
Von Capeller, Elisabeth	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Agency for Development and Cooperation
Carl, Andy	Conciliation Resources, London
Eckel, Andreas	German Ministry of Defence
Gerber, Urs	Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport
Heiniger, Markus	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Agency for Development and Cooperation
Hottinger, Julian Thomas	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Division IV
Hughes, Gordon	International Security Sector Advisory Team, Geneva
Irmer, Cynthia	United States Department of State
Kattar, Dimyanos	Antonine University, Lebanon
Kumar, Chetan	UNDP, New York
Laham, Antoine	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Agency for Development and Cooperation
Lennkh, Georg	Former Special Envoy to Africa for the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Levine, Neil	United States Agency for International Development
Little, Peter	Emory University, Atlanta
Mason, Simon J A	Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich (Mediation Support Project)
Messinger Pereira, Laura Elise	UN DPA (Mediation Support Unit)
Michael, Murezi	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Division IV

Participant	Affiliation
Østbye, Eva Helene	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
Packer, John	Initiative on Quiet Diplomacy, University of Essex
Papagianni, Katia	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva
Preston, Matthew	British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Romano, Don Angelo	St. Egidio, Rome
Ruohomaki, Olli	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Sabovic, Senad	OSCE Mission in Kosovo
Salvisberg, Roland	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Division IV
Sangster, Rhett	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
Scherg, Nina	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
Schnabel, Albrecht	DCAF, Geneva
Schulz, Björn F.	German Ministry of Defense/German Army Forces Command
Sguaitamatti, Damiano	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Division IV
Sinno, Khaldoun	European Commission, Kosovo
Sontag, Eythan	United States Department of State
Stein, Sabina	Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich (Mediation Support Project)
Tiller, Simon	International Alert, London
Tuladhar, Padma Ratna	Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative
Van Veen, Erwin	OECD DAC, Paris
Wee, Asbjorn	OECD DAC, Paris
Wennmann, Achim	Geneva Peacebuilding Platform
Wilhelmsen, Jan Erik	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Special Advisor on standby
Williams, Paul	Public International Law & Policy Group/American University, Washington
Wils, Oliver	Berghof Peace Support, Berlin
Zeller, Mathias	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Division IV

With the support of

