

Unclassified

DCD/DAC/CPDC(2007)2

Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

27-Jul-2007

English - Or. English

DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION DIRECTORATE  
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE

### DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation

#### CPDC FRAMING PAPER - DESIGNING, IMPLEMENTING AND MONITORING ARMED VIOLENCE REDUCTION

##### A Framing Paper for OECD DAC Guidance on Armed Violence Reduction

*Please find attached the Framing Paper for the CPDC Workstream on 'Armed Violence Reduction and Development' which is designed to lay the basis for future DAC guidance on this subject.*

*Members are asked to send their comments to the CPDC Secretariat by September 7, 2007.*

Mark Downes: Tel: +33 1 45 24 15 07; Fax: +33 (0)1 44 20 61 47, [mark.downes@oecd.org](mailto:mark.downes@oecd.org)

JT03230606

Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d'origine  
Complete document available on OLIS in its original format

DCD/DAC/CPDC(2007)2  
Unclassified

English - Or. English

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD .....	3
INTRODUCTION .....	4
Why AVR Guidance?.....	4
AVR Background.....	4
Producing AVR Guidance.....	5
SECTION I. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS .....	7
What is Armed Violence? .....	7
How Can Development Actors Support AVR?.....	7
Understanding Contexts of Armed Violence .....	9
SECTION II. DONOR APPROACHES TO AVR: RESULTS OF A SURVEY.....	12
SECTION III: APPROACHES TO AVR PROGRAMMING .....	14
AVR Diagnostics.....	15
National and Local Level Assessments.....	15
International, Regional and National Frameworks.....	15
Programming Entry Points .....	16
Multilateral Frameworks and All-of-Government .....	19
SECTION IV. MONITORING AND EVALUATING AVR.....	20
ANNEX 1. PRELIMINARY OUTLINE OF <i>GUIDANCE ON ARMED VIOLENCE</i> .....	23
REFERENCES .....	27
Policy literature .....	27
Synthesis reports .....	28
Assessments, evaluations and guidelines .....	30
Country-specific reports.....	31

### Tables

Table 1. A Typology of Donor Approaches to Programming AVR.....	13
---	----

### Boxes

Box 1. The Guidance Challenge: Relevance and Acceptance .....	6
Box 2. Multiple Contexts for AVR Programming .....	8
Box 3. Thinking Through Different Types of Armed Violence.....	10
Box 4. OECD-DAC Survey: How Do States Currently Approach AVR?.....	12

## FOREWORD

1. Whether in contexts of all-out conflict or crime, armed violence is widely acknowledged by states and civil society organisations alike as a major constraint to poverty reduction. A growing body of research is revealing how in certain contexts armed violence reduction – from early prevention activities to arms control – can generate positive outcomes on the development prospects of individuals, communities and entire societies.

2. This *framing paper* represents a preliminary attempt to outline the parameters of armed violence and to enhance the coherence and capacities of donors and partner governments to undertake prevention and reduction activities. It consciously lays the groundwork for OECD-DAC *Guidance on Armed Violence Reduction* which will be finalised late in 2007. As such, the framing paper offers a general overview of key definitions and concepts, programmatic entry-points, diagnostic instruments, assessment and planning mechanisms and monitoring and evaluation strategies. It suggests that the Guidance should focus primarily on AVR policy and programming contexts characterised by ‘intermediate’ levels (found in state situations that fall somewhere between “at peace” and total collapse i.e. where armed violence is persistent and dynamic) of armed violence (including criminal and urban/rural violence).

3. The *framing paper* demonstrates that current donor and partner government approaches to armed violence reduction are fragmented. Though many development actors are investing politically and financially in promoting prevention and reduction strategies, greater coherence and coordination is required. Drawing on a small-scale survey administered among a dozen OECD-DAC countries, the *framing paper* nevertheless demonstrates a robust resolve to take action.

4. More practically, the *framing paper* highlights a range of strategic entry-points for donors and host governments to engage in proactive AVR policy and programming. AVR interventions can be ‘stand-alone’ or ‘integrated’ into existing development activities. In focusing interventions on the ‘instruments’ (small arms, light weapons and landmines), the ‘agents’ (users and abusers of arms) and ‘institutions’ (structures that enable or delimit resort to armed violence), AVR can make a positive contribution to enhancing development opportunities.

5. As with all development programming, effective AVR programmes must be grounded in a nuanced contextual analysis. Every programming context is unique, as are the dynamics and types of armed violence. A core finding of the *framing paper* is that effective AVR programming requires robust understanding of the causes, dynamics and outcomes of armed violence and development. Because of the inherently political nature of armed violence and AVR and the high risks (and higher returns) involved, it is critically important that donors and host governments build AVR programmes based on evidence, adopt concrete, measurable and achievable objectives, draw from established best practice and adopt a robust monitoring and evaluation strategy.

6. The DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation would like to acknowledge the work of the Small Arms Survey and SecDev in putting together this paper.

## INTRODUCTION

### Why AVR Guidance?

7. Armed violence, whether in contexts of conflict or organized crime, is widely acknowledged as a global phenomenon with negative implications for security and development. Research has identified the relationships between acute violence and poverty. It has also demonstrated how in certain contexts that armed violence reduction – from early prevention activities to arms control – can generate positive outcomes on the development prospects of individuals, communities and entire societies.<sup>1</sup>

8. The normative linkages between armed violence prevention and reduction (AVR hereafter), and development are clearly articulated in various multilateral instruments. For example, the OECD-DAC *Guidelines of Eligibility for ODA* were broadened in 2005 to include most aspects of arms control programming.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, in 2006, the *Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development* reinforced these linkages and signalled a growing international determination to make measurable reductions by 2015.<sup>3</sup>

9. As important as these political and policy developments are, there are still considerable challenges in converting research, policy prescriptions and examples of good practice into AVR programmes and operational practice. The OECD-DAC is preparing *Guidance on Armed Violence Reduction* (forthcoming 2008, *Guidance* hereafter) for development practitioners precisely to fill this gap. The following framing paper provides a preliminary outline of core themes of the *Guidance*.

10. This *framing paper* is designed to lay the basis for the forthcoming *Guidance*, and is divided into four sections. Section 1 provides a working *definition* of ‘armed violence’ and offers a preliminary conceptual framework to examine violence contexts and AVR more generally. Section 2 presents the *results of a survey* of current donor approaches to AVR, revealing that there is, as of yet, little shared vision in terms of the normative contours and programmatic boundaries. Section 3 offers a preliminary outline of the *programming parameters and entry points* for AVR. Section 4 considers *monitoring and evaluation* to assess AVR coherence but also outcomes and impacts.<sup>4</sup>

11. The *Guidance* on Armed Violence Reduction will be operationally focused and build on- and learn from the recently published *OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice* ([www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/if-ssr](http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/if-ssr)), which also aimed to bridge the gap between policy and operational practice.

### AVR Background and current approaches

12. Policies and programmes designed to prevent and reduce armed violence are not necessarily new. Since the early 1990s, donors and non-governmental agencies have developed considerable experience and expertise in a large number of pertinent areas such as conflict prevention, peace-support and peace-building. A range of guidelines and best practices have emerged to enhance coherence, harmonise approaches, and apply best practices to ensure that interventions are infused with a development perspective, enhance development outcomes and do no harm.<sup>5</sup> Despite their importance in relation to AVR, a number of gaps remain.

13. Until comparatively recently, most donors investing in AVR have focused primarily on fragile state and recovery contexts, with programming directed at addressing the underlying ‘roots’ or ‘causes’ of conflict. Interventions thus focused on promoting economic recovery, political reconciliation and on promoting ‘good’ (or good enough) governance in order to prevent conflict (re)onset. Despite supporting certain forms of DDR and weapons collection, most development donors were less concerned with the ‘hardware’ of violence, than with manipulating the ‘software’ giving rise to conflict to begin with. Crucially, despite growing awareness of the inter-relationships between underdevelopment, conflict and crime, donors invested comparatively less energy and fewer resources in other contexts in which armed violence undermined development. For example, policy making and programming in environments characterised by severe armed criminal and urban violence remains comparatively under-developed (see Part 1 below for further discussion).<sup>6</sup>

14. A growing number of development agencies are already directly or indirectly promoting activities to reduce armed violence, either as discrete project areas or as components of larger sector-specific development programmes. For example, a growing number of multilateral development actors are committed to reducing the incidence and outcomes of armed violence in the context of crisis and post-conflict (UNDP), conflict and ‘peaceful’ contexts (WHO), urban spaces (UNHABITAT) and amongst ‘high risk groups’ (UNICEF).<sup>7</sup> Significantly, the UNDP and WHO launched an Armed Violence Prevention Programme (AVPP) which aims to enhance inter-agency collaboration but also to identify, appraise and monitor armed violence prevention and reduction initiatives in select countries such as Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica and Kenya.<sup>8</sup> Likewise, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also regularly administers crime and victimisation surveys to develop comparable cross-national indicators of armed violence.<sup>9</sup>

15. An innovative approach is that advanced by the World Bank’s Urban Crime and Violence Program and its Small Grants Programme for Violence Prevention (SGPVP). The SGPVP actively supports innovative local-level initiatives, that advance ‘community-based’ perspectives focusing alternately on reducing the number of weapons in circulation, altering the attitudes and behaviour of the agents that might potentially use them or strengthening public and private institutions that regulate security and strengthen good governance.<sup>10</sup> The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) recently established guidelines for preventing armed criminality and victimisation and for actively supporting municipally-driven efforts to reduce armed violence and mines in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Balkans, Africa and Southeast Asia.<sup>11</sup>

16. While not specifically describing their work as AVR, a host of bilateral aid agencies of OECD member states are also engaged in conflict-prevention, peace-building, and security promotion activities such as security system reform (SSR), DDR and transitional justice, all of which potentially overlap with the objectives and programming targets of AVR.<sup>12</sup> Likewise, governments and civil society groups are increasingly advancing practical and needs-based approaches to planning, implementing and monitoring AVR on the ground. Drawing purposefully on public health, criminal justice, peace-building, rights-based and environmental design perspectives, many of these locally-developed interventions are at the cutting edge of AVR.<sup>13</sup>

### **Producing AVR Guidance**

17. There is general agreement among multilateral and bilateral donors that clear guidance is needed to help enhance coherence and coordination in relation to AVR. The forthcoming *Guidance* is therefore expected to deepen donor and practitioner understandings of AVR programming in relation to development. The *Guidance* will focus primarily on those forms of armed violence involving small arms, light weapons or anti-personnel mines, as well as on ostensibly newer programming contexts such as crime and urban/rural violence reduction. The *Guidance* will draw from existing guidelines and standards,

established lessons learned from practical experience, and specific field research undertaken in affected countries<sup>14</sup> (Box 1).

**Box 1. The Guidance Challenge: Relevance and Acceptance**

To be useful to practitioners, whether managers at headquarters, desk officers, or country-level officers, the Guidance must make sense of the existing (development) programming universe in which they operate. The Guidance should not add a new and separate layer to their work but should fit into ongoing approaches. In other words, the Guidance should highlight issues that are of already of concern, and provide concrete advice on how to surmount them.

If the country context requires a 'whole of government' response, absorbing AVR into programming may be more complicated because a combination of development, humanitarian, security and military experts may already be involved. Multiple agencies/departments may already be experiencing difficulties in integrating their operational paradigms, even while AVR surely involves them all and speaks to each. The Guidance will endeavour to strengthen this 'shared understanding'.

The Guidance will need to assist policy makers in capital and practitioners in affected countries to think through how and when AVR is most appropriate. It should explain what kinds of 'assessments' are appropriate to specific contexts of armed violence, how AVR priorities can be included into 'national development frameworks', the kinds of 'policy/programming/project' options available, and the specific ways AVR can be 'monitored and evaluated' over time.

18. Overall, the *Guidance* aims to clarify the key principles for engagement in AVR programming, and provide practical strategies for the design and implementation of coherent AVR policies and programmes. *Guidance* sections will cover: (i) understanding the context, through a review of the strengths and weaknesses of existing analytical toolkits for diagnosing the context and types of armed violence; (ii) international, regional and national frameworks for guiding and shaping interventions; and (iii) programming entry-points, for both 'stand-alone' interventions and those that integrate AVR into existing development priorities (see Annex 1). The *Guidance* will also provide insights into how development actors might engage with risk factors and outcomes of armed violence.

## SECTION I. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

### What is Armed Violence?

19. Central to programming in AVR is a clear understanding of what is actually implied by ‘armed violence’. Current definitions describe armed violence in relation to ‘intent’ and the subjective and physical outcomes such as intentional death, injury and under-development. The WHO and others also highlight the role of ‘risk factors’ in shaping the intensity of violence at multiple levels.<sup>15</sup> Thus, while there is no agreed operational definition, there is a general consensus on its conceptual parameters. For the purposes of this framework paper, and noting that the *Guidance* is to target development policy makers and practitioners, armed violence is defined here as

***the intentional and illegitimate use of armed force with small arms, light weapons and anti-personnel mines, threatened or actual, against a person, group, community or state that results in death, injury and/or psycho-social harm and that can undermine prospects for development.***

20. *Legitimacy* has legal, social and political properties. For the purposes of this framing paper, legitimacy is defined with respect to global norms and conventions as contained in international law and practice. For example, the *Declaration on Human Rights*, the *Geneva Conventions* and their *Protocols* all provide a normative framework in which legitimacy is assured. Notwithstanding the influence of these norms on shaping what is and is not considered legitimate, AVR can be further strengthened or weakened by national laws, perceived political acceptability and local customary practices and norms.

21. *Small arms, light weapons and mines* include manufactured and craft-produced handguns, semi and automatic weapons, shoulder-fired rockets and mortars, landmines including anti-personnel landmines.<sup>16</sup> In many contexts, bladed weapons, blunt objects, explosives and a host of other vectors are also associated with a range of violent outcomes. As the cases of Rwanda and Cambodia amply demonstrate, however, handguns, assault rifles, grenades and rocket-propelled grenade launchers are frequently deployed to hasten the killing, even if machetes may be used as well.<sup>17</sup> An emphasis on various types of small arms and light weapons is warranted because in global terms they disproportionately contribute to the overall burden of violence of all types.<sup>18</sup>

### How Can Development Actors Support AVR?

22. The definition presented above suggests that armed violence, whether occurring in situations of conflict or crime, often entails the inter-personal and collective use of small arms, light weapons or landmines to achieve specific political, social and economic goals.<sup>19</sup> As revealed in Box 2 below, conflict and crime frequently overlap and fuel each other, and occur across a wide-range of country programming contexts (e.g. ‘pre-conflict’, ‘crime-affected’, ‘crisis- or conflict-affected’, ‘fragile’ or ‘post-conflict’).

### Box 2. Multiple Contexts for AVR Programming

Armed violence phenomena range from armed criminality to war. As indicated in the figure below, an AVR programming focus in any related context is on weapons and the manifold factors underpinning their misuse. The AVR lens, therefore, must consider instruments, agents and institutions that together enable and fuel armed violence in all of its permutations.



Crime here includes inter-personal and collective acts such as armed assault, theft, extra-judicial killings, disappearances, kidnappings, narcotics-fuelled violence and assassinations as well as sexual and domestic violence. It also includes trafficking in arms, humans, narcotics and natural resources, as well as protection and extortion rackets. Organised criminal violence can occur in countries nominally 'at peace' or countries experiencing socio-political conflict. In the latter context armed crime often overlaps with armed political movements to produce warlordism and war economies.

Armed socio-political conflict includes, primarily, collective acts such as rebellions and resistance movements, inter-group conflicts, civil wars, interstate conflict, as well as systemic sexual violence and ethnic cleansing. The state, or its representatives, can also be a perpetrator of armed 'criminal' violence, in the form of the illegal use of state force (e.g. summary execution of prisoners by individual police officers, through to the excessive use of state force to combat socio-political threats or resistance movements).

23. A focus on preventing and reducing armed violence necessarily draws attention to the instruments used in armed violence, the underlying motivations and means driving their misuse (agents) and the wider environment that enables or encourages these instruments misuse (institutions). Discussed at length in section III, this focus on instruments, agents and institutions offers a practical lens for developing an integrated approach to designing stand-alone interventions or mainstreaming AVR into existing programmes and is elaborated in more detail in subsequent sections of the framing paper.

24. This re-conceptualization of armed violence presents a number of potential challenges to orthodox development thinking. Traditionally, development actors have downplayed the *hardware* of violence, focusing instead on influencing the so-called root causes of violent conflict or crime. A guiding assumption is that only by addressing the underlying factors can violent crime or conflict be prevented or reduced. More recently, donors have come to better understand the relationships between insecurity, under-development and the availability of arms.<sup>20</sup>

25. The scale, distribution, intensity and duration of armed violence are often strongly associated with the easy availability of small arms, light weapons and mines.<sup>21</sup> Such weapons are durable, simple to use and transport and often recycled from one conflict or context to another. While arms are seldom the single 'cause' of criminal or conflict-related violence, their availability can act as a 'trigger', pushing a crisis situation past the tipping point.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, in post-recovery contexts, surplus arms and munitions are often recycled for criminal purposes.

26. Development practitioners are especially well-suited to adopt a holistic approach to AVR programming because they are attuned to the specific development context (the agents and institutions) of the countries in which they operate. This attention to the specificities of country context, and



peace support interventions (for instance, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, peace-building, or transitional administration) and humanitarian assistance. In recent years, development assistance in this context has undergone a transformation, from beginning after the end of an emergency phase to becoming an integral part of an emergency response at the earliest moment. In such circumstances, development activities range from the (re)establishment or reform of civilian and security institutions to extensive local capacity building, and physical and other forms of reconstruction, all as part of a formal peace process.

30. Between these two extremes – countries at peace and collapsed states - is a large ‘intermediate’ area where armed violence is persistent and dynamic. This area is characterised by situations in which armed criminal violence, and/or various forms of socio-political violence, increasingly challenge the capacity and legitimacy of the state (and its national/municipal authorities) to carry out its basic responsibilities (Box 4). Such contexts encompass so-called ‘pre-‘ and ‘post-conflict’ environments (e.g., fragile states, crisis countries, and post-conflict recovery contexts), and can also include strong state contexts dealing with highly organized and localized armed violence that generate a significant impact on local development prospects with concomitant demands on existing security institutions.

### Box 3. Thinking Through Different Types of Armed Violence

There are many ‘types’ of armed violence in the ‘intermediate’ area between peace and state collapse. These include, inter alia:

**Criminal/Political Violence:** Beyond the limited scale of incidents of domestic violence are the more corrosive effects of organised/disorganised criminal violence and political violence by a range of parties, including the government. Individuals may be guilty of violating criminal law and criminal organisations may exhibit transnational elements. Political parties may be responsible for significant breaches of human rights. Alternatively, actors within armed political resistance movements may also engage in organised criminal activity, in part to finance their activities. In principle, state institutions have established responsibilities for addressing armed criminal violence, even if such powers may be abused.


**Intra-Communal Violence:** Armed violence within a defined community may erupt over a number of issues, including disagreements over land, leadership and succession, or access to/distribution of resources. Whatever the initial intensity or scale of the violence, this kind of armed violence has the potential to generate wider destabilising effects, and be difficult for national authorities to control. Rather than drawing exclusively on traditional law and order responses, addressing intra-communal conflicts requires a sophisticated approach to resolution and reconciliation rooted in deeper knowledge of local customs and practices unavailable in formal statutes. Governments only rarely acknowledge the inadequacy of conventional state mechanisms in settling such local conflicts.

**Inter-Communal Violence:** Armed violence between communities may erupt for many of the same reasons as intra-communal violence, with additional factors including oppositional identities, historical animosities or territorial ambitions. Inter-communal conflicts are as difficult to resolve as intra-communal ones and often have a greater potential for contagion (including over state borders). The central government may be unable to respond adequately to this type of armed violence, because of limited capacity or restricted political latitude. In addition, an inter-communal conflict may be brought into the government itself, through a multi-party election or some (un)constitutional arrangement, and then fought out through state institutions. Similarly, the government may come from one community and the opposition from another, with the political order becoming the axis of the conflict.

**Political Factional Violence:** Political violence generated over power and resource interests that transcend communal origins or which evolved separately from them quickly pose open and direct challenges to government authority. They are one step short of the far end of the typology of armed violence. Such violence reflects that the political order may be in significant distress. A capital city may have lost control of parts of the country or there may be elements of state collapse in some local places. Armed violence may be organized to varying degrees, but are potent as they represent political insurrection and deepen fractures within a polarised body politic. The politicisation of government institutions inevitably subverts the state’s administrative capability.

31. Because of the challenges presented by armed violence to state stability, capacity and/or legitimacy, this 'intermediate' area constitutes a significant challenge for development programming. AVR programming should ideally support and deepen national and municipal or community efforts to prevent, contain and reduce the quantity and quality of armed violence. Such interventions can be either 'stand-alone' efforts focused on the reduction of armed violence per se, or can be integrated into broader development initiatives (see Section III). When national efforts are compromised or not undertaken – because the state is either unable or unwilling to address armed violence or when state authorities are themselves part of the problem<sup>26</sup> - the latitude for engagement by development actors similarly declines. As Figure 2 below suggests, the relative capacity of an affected state to effectively deal with various manifestations of armed violence necessarily affects the nature and extent of overall development assistance.

**Figure 2. Reflections on All-of-Government Approaches to Armed Violence**



32. Donors and aid agencies must make pragmatic and cost-effective decisions about when, where and how to invest. When a state exhibits relatively robust capacity for preventing and reducing armed violence, and levels of violence are correspondingly low, then there is considerable latitude for development assistance to support and encourage efforts to address the problem comprehensively through existing institutional structures from the local to the national level. But when affected state capacities are severely compromised, the relative role of development assistance decreases and becomes more piece-meal (focused more on lower-order community interventions, for example), while the role of other forms of external intervention – diplomatic, military, or their combination in the form of 'whole of government' responses – increases.

33. It is anticipated that the *Guidance* will focus primarily on AVR policy and programming in contexts characterised by 'intermediate' levels of armed violence. Indeed, there is a considerable body of evidence and practice that already exists to promote conflict resolution and peace-building strategies in contexts presenting 'overwhelming' levels of armed violence. Likewise, there is a considerable body of research and experience of operationalizing preventive strategies in otherwise 'peaceful' contexts, particularly focusing on security system reform (SSR). The *Guidance* will therefore enhance knowledge and understanding in two specialised areas – reviewing opportunities for highlighting AVR in existing diagnostics and assessments and enhancing understanding of good practice in less-well developed contexts characterised by criminal and urban/rural violence. At the same time, the *Guidance* will ensure complementarity and appropriate linkages with under work on crime and conflict.

## SECTION II. DONOR APPROACHES TO AVR: RESULTS OF A SURVEY

34. The *Guidance* must build-on existing best practices in order to avoid re-inventing the wheel. In order to determine how donor governments presently conceptualise, design and implement AVR, a small-scale survey was undertaken of more than a dozen OECD-DAC member states and UNDP.<sup>27</sup> The questionnaire requested that states define armed violence, and asked whether they had established clear policy, programme and evaluation guidance on AVR. It also reviewed the types of funding mechanisms available for AVR, examples of AVR programming, synergies with other thematic priorities such as conflict-prevention and peace-building, diagnostic tools and ‘all of government’ approaches. Overall, the results demonstrate that AVR remains a comparatively poorly defined policy and programming area, even if governments are taking steps to enhance their political engagement with the issue.

35. No government has established either a definition of, or a comprehensive policy directive for addressing, armed violence or AVR.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, donors do not share a unified vision of what constitutes the focus or boundaries of AVR programming, nor is there a shared vision of the norms or rules that should guide the process. For example, some respondents cited The *Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development* and the UN *Programme of Action* as providing the key normative frameworks for planning and financing AVR. Some also included various *UN Conventions on Mines, Conventional Weapons*, the *Principles of the Use of Force*, as well as *Conventions and Resolutions on Women, Children* and others. Still others also cited the *Geneva Conventions*, the *UN Charter*, the *UN Declaration of Human Rights* and various resolutions and principles adopted by the EU and OSCE.

36. When it comes to promoting policy and programming, the survey confirmed that donors approach AVR in a variety of ways and with multiple and heterogeneous interventions (see Box 4 below). Some respondents see their AVR initiatives as being subsumed within existing programming areas – whether conflict prevention, peace-building or post-conflict recovery activities. Others consider AVR programmes to overlap with these areas, but to also address a broader cluster of activities spanning crime and conflict.<sup>29</sup>

### Box 4. OECD-DAC Survey: How Do States Currently Approach AVR?

**Definition of armed violence:** All respondents appeared to be amenable to a flexible definition of armed violence and AVR that captured the instrument-agent-institution continuum as well as spanned the conflict-crime spectrum. A number of respondents emphasized the importance of adopting a definition that was compact, straight-forward and accessible.

**Diagnosing armed violence and AVR needs:** Respondents listed a range of diagnostic tools including: country-specific conflict, humanitarian and peace-building guidelines, locally-commissioned threat/risk assessments, and international (OECD-DAC/UN) guidelines and methodologies. Certain countries have also launched real-time ‘risk assessments’ or ‘early warning’ instruments on their own.

**Policy and programming on AVR:** Most respondents reported that their government/agency had issued white papers, action plans or statements on conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict recovery in fragile states with real and potential linkages to AVR. Programming interventions could be categorized in the following way: (i) SALW/mine action interventions to promote security; (ii) capacity building and institutional support for conflict prevention, peace-building and law and order; and (iii) peace-support and peace-keeping to promote stability (see Table A).

**All-of-Government approaches:** A growing number of governments are advancing a ‘whole-of-government’ or ‘all-of-government’ approach to programming in peace and security-related issues. Practical examples of this range from inter-departmental committees, working groups, seconded/specialized staff and consultative panels (with civil society) to joined-up programmes, pooled-funding mechanisms and multi-dimensional interventions in

fragile states. Predictably, then, donor governments adopt a wide range of approaches to programming in AVR. A survey of OECD-DAC member states reveals that despite a growth in 'all of government approaches' no government has established a definition or a comprehensive policy directive for armed violence or AVR.

**Funding AVR:** A wide range of funding mechanisms are used to fund AVR. Many countries distinguished between 'development' and 'foreign affairs' budgets which each offer separate approaches (and volumes of resources) to financing AVR. These approaches reflect the heterogeneous nature of 'armed violence' and political interests as much as the appropriateness of the specific funding mechanism for the issue at hand.

**Table 1. A Typology of Donor Approaches to Programming AVR**

Focused small arms, light weapons and mine action programmes	Stand-alone or integrated civilian arms collection/destruction, stockpile security/surplus destruction; customs and transfers controls, aviation controls, mine clearance and destruction; DDR/SSR
Activities to reinforce state and civil society capacity	Supporting states to enhance legal regimes associated with firearms, strengthen military and police capacities, and bolster rule of law/governance institutions
Peace-support activities undertaken with an 'all-of-government' approach	A means of reinforcing stability and security through dialogue; large scale policing operations; information-generation activities

Source: survey (13 states/UN agencies) 2007

37. While few states have established clear internal programming guidelines or standards for programming in or evaluating AVR, many draw on OECD-DAC best practice as reference points including the *Guidelines on Preventing Conflict* (1997) and with expectations of soon applying the recently endorsed *OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice* (2007).<sup>30</sup> Governments are also equipped with a range of development funding mechanisms to support interventions with an AVR component, ranging from direct project and programme support supplied by bilateral aid departments to investment in multilateral and multi-donor activities.


38. The forthcoming *Guidance* will seek to promote a more shared vision for planning and implementing AVR programming, which should enhance coherence and harmonization both between and within governments. The *Guidance* will clarify the key principles and norms shaping AVR, review the strengths and weaknesses of existing analytical toolkits for understanding the 'context' of violence, and identify appropriate linkages between existing development programming priorities and AVR more generally. The *Guidance* will endeavour to 'reframe' and re-orient donor priorities where appropriate rather than to create new 'workstreams'.

### SECTION III: APPROACHES TO AVR PROGRAMMING

39. AVR programming can include ‘stand-alone’ policies, programmes and projects, as well as ‘mainstreamed’ approaches that integrate AVR into wider development initiatives (e.g., in the areas of governance and SSR, poverty reduction, education, public health etc). Such programming can also target the national or regional level, or be grounded in more municipal or local initiatives. The *Guidance* will address both sectors and levels.

40. A common denominator in AVR programming is the need to reduce the risk factors and effects of armed violence. As such, AVR programming can range from coercive and compliance-based initiatives emphasising deterrence to more voluntary-based interventions seeking to modify behaviour through incentives. And, while a comprehensive review of best practice in middle-and high-income contexts reveals that effective responses adopt a combination of approaches<sup>31</sup>, it is clear that more coercive interventions are not ODA-eligible. As such, the *Guidance* will focus primarily on compliance and voluntary approaches to AVR, while also considering how these might work with other non ODA-eligible interventions.

**Figure 3. AVR Programme Planning and Entry Points**



41. The *Guidance* will structure its programming sections around the ‘critical path’ of a typical programming/project cycle. Figure 3 outlines the main components: (i) understanding the context (by way of diagnostic tools); (ii) shaping programming focus and coherence (international and regional frameworks and protocols and national planning frameworks); (iii) AVR programming entry points, both stand-alone and mainstreamed into wider development programming, as well as multilateral frameworks and all-of-government approaches; and (iv) monitoring and evaluation. It is important to consider these way stations of the programming cycle, each of which will be fully elaborated in the *Guidance*.

### **AVR Diagnostics**

42. Effective AVR programming requires robust understanding of the causes, dynamics and outcomes of armed violence and development. Every programming context is unique, as are the dynamics and types of armed violence. As with all development programming, effective AVR programming must be grounded in a nuanced contextual analysis. As indicated in Section II above, a focus on *instruments*, *agents* and *institutions* associated with producing and/or containing armed violence and its effects ensures a holistic understanding is generated.<sup>32</sup>

43. Donors use many different diagnostic tools to analyze the context of AVR-related programming. These range from general peace and conflict mapping instruments, to stability and governance assessment frameworks and drivers of change analysis.<sup>33</sup> Analysis may also be conducted at the overall national level, or at the specific programming level including conflict assessments at the local community level, or more general tools such as SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) to assess the advantages and risks of specific project proposals. As part of the drafting process for the *Guidance*, a review of selected diagnostic instruments will be administered in order to identify their commonalities and strengths, as well as their gaps from an AVR assessment perspective.<sup>34</sup> As donors have agreed to undertake more shared and collective assessments, providing guidance to support such initiative will also be covered.

### **National and Local Level Assessments**

44. Another avenue for understanding the AVR context is by drawing on national and local level assessments conducted by or with others that establish key development priorities. In ideal circumstances, national-level assessments are conducted at an inter-agency level and informed by ‘all-of-government’ perspectives. They are expected to identify critical needs and existing/expected strengths and weaknesses in relation to national development objectives.

45. Certain national level assessments – like the Common Country Assessment (CCA) – are coordinated by the UN in partnership with host governments. Other such instruments include Country Development Assessments (CDA), Peace and Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA), Joint Needs Assessments (JNA) and Local Needs Assessments (LNA). To the extent possible, national assessments are also informed by regional priorities. Such assessments offer solid entry-points to ‘integrate’ AVR priorities but also to promote advocacy and awareness of related activities more broadly. Local level assessments can be highly amenable toward ensuring that the ‘instruments-agents-institutions’ are adequately integrated in partnership with local stakeholders.

### **International, Regional and National Frameworks**

46. AVR programming focus and coherence can be usefully shaped by international, regional and national-level frameworks. These range from the *Geneva Declaration* and the UN *Programme of Action*, through to regional initiatives such as the *Nairobi Protocol* and ultimately nationally-owned development programming frameworks like poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) or UN development assistance frameworks (UNDAF) (see Table 1). Each of these strategic levels offers potential entry points for AVR.

For example, at the international and regional levels, normative frameworks that specifically address AVR (e.g. small arms control and mine action) offer opportunities for awareness raising and advocacy with local partners and national governments. In addition, regional development frameworks, such as NEPAD, offer important opportunities for integrating AVR perspectives.

**Figure 4. Frameworks and Instruments for Guiding AVR interventions**

Level	General Entry Points for Action	Examples of Normative or Programming Frameworks
International	Multilateral Frameworks and Agreements	Geneva Declaration, UN-POA, UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1612, etc
Regional	Agreements and Instruments	The ECOWAS Protocol, The Nairobi Protocol, etc., NEPAD
National	National Frameworks	PRSP, UNDAF, CFA, National Development Strategies

47. National development strategies and frameworks are critical tools that can strengthen effective AVR programming, while improving overall donor harmonization. A primary focus in this respect is the national PRSP, a multi-year mechanism that articulates national development priorities and guides development investment within developing countries. Currently AVR issues (including arms control and reduction and mine action) are integrated into only a handful of PRSPs (e.g., Uganda, Liberia, Tanzania). National Disarmament and Small Arms Control Plans/Focal Points/Commissions are also potentially critical tools for shaping and harmonizing donor programming approaches to AVR. When AVR issues are successfully integrated into a PRSP, donors are better enabled to harmonize their efforts. When AVR issues are not yet integrated, advocacy and awareness are required to ensure AVR attention in future iterations.<sup>35</sup>

48. Drawing from field research in over a dozen countries, the *Guidance* will review cases where AVR has been practically mainstreamed into national development frameworks, and what effect this has had on donor investment and improved coherence in AVR programming. It will also address some of the challenges in getting AVR issues into the PRSP and other national development frameworks.

### **Programming Entry Points**

49. AVR programming can take many different forms and occur on multiple strategic levels. For the purpose of the *Guidance*, appropriate entry points that are grounded in real life examples will be illuminated in relation to specific clusters of programming approaches: stand-alone programming, integrated programming (within or linked up with wider development sector initiatives); as well as multilateral frameworks and whole-of-government approaches.

#### *Stand-Alone and Integrated Interventions*

50. Much like gender programming, AVR can be considered a discrete programming area in-and-of-itself as well as one that should be mainstreamed into wider development initiatives on a case by case basis. Programming can also be undertaken at the national or municipal levels, with implications for different partnering strategies whether with government, civil society organisations, community leaders or otherwise.

51. Specifically, *stand-alone AVR policy making and programming* are concerned specifically with prevention and reduction of specific manifestations of armed violence. Related, *integrated AVR programming* aims to leverage opportunities for integrating priorities into a wider development initiative, and/or is pursued to minimise associated risk factors and effects that could potentially undermine core development outcomes. AVR can thus be readily integrated into core governance, justice, security sector reform, poverty-reduction, education, health, gender and alternative livelihoods programmes.

52. The *Guidance* will review and distil best practice and lessons learned for stand-alone and integrated AVR programming.

#### *Instruments, institutions and agents*

53. Whether stand-alone or integrated, there are a number of different ways to think about AVR interventions. These may be along sectoral lines (e.g. as part of a justice, security sector reform or health programme) or as national or local/municipal interventions. They might also combine these approaches. It is also helpful to focus on instruments, agents and institutions as a useful way for thinking about different types of programming:

54. *Instruments:* AVR interventions that focus on 'instruments' are concerned primarily with containing the *supply*, regulation and access to small arms, light weapons and explosives, including anti-personnel land mines and cluster munitions. These interventions are designed with the express intent of reducing the availability of the tools of armed violence at either the national or local level;

55. *Agents:* AVR interventions focusing on 'agents' are designed purposefully to influence the *demand* (motivations and means) of individuals and groups of individuals who acquire and misuse small arms, light weapons and explosives. These agents may be state or non-state based. Development-related interventions may focus on providing incentives for non-violence or alternatives to violence, addressing grievances, shaping behaviour and attitudes toward armed violence and addressing 'spoilers' in conflict or post-conflict contexts. Incorporation of gender-analysis is also critical, given that men and women are not responsible for, or affected by, armed violence in the same ways;

56. *Institutions:* AVR interventions concerned with 'institutions' are strongly linked to conventional development, conflict prevention and peace promotion activities and may directly or indirectly influence the onset and incidence (or 'triggers') of armed violence and broadly reshape the enabling environment in which misuse occurs. Such interventions are typically concerned with preventing conflict from breaking out, enhancing security and governance in fragile state contexts, promoting rule of law and due process, strengthening 'peace-building' and 'conflict resolution' activities and the promotion of targeted development in 'high risk' areas.

57. Figure 5 provides examples of AVR interventions disaggregated according to instruments, agents and institutions. While not an exhaustive list, the table illustrates the wide range of options included as AVR programming. While some of these approaches are 'stand-alone' others can be combined in a more integrated fashion, or are suitable for linking up with wider development initiatives, as the *Guidance* will elaborate and substantiate through concrete programming examples.<sup>36</sup>

Figure 5. Country Level Programming on AVR

AVR Lens	Programming Focus	Examples of Specific Programming Interventions
Instruments	AVR interventions target the <i>supply</i> , regulation and access to small arms, light weapons and explosives, with the express intent of reducing the availability of the tools of armed violence.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Micro-disarmament programmes (inventory control)</li> <li>Weapons buy-back programmes</li> <li>Arms for development/weapons-for-livelihoods</li> <li>Weapons collection/destruction programs</li> <li>Stockpile and surplus management</li> <li>Registration and licensing</li> <li>Import/export control</li> <li>Mine Action/Humanitarian Demining programmes</li> <li>Arms control checks and balances (e.g. who can possess, background checks)</li> </ul>
Agents	AVR interventions aim to influence the <i>demand</i> (motivations and means) of individuals and groups to acquire and misuse small arms, light weapons and explosives. Interventions may focus on providing incentives for non-violence, alternatives to violence, addressing grievances, shaping behaviour and attitudes toward armed violence and addressing 'spoilers' in conflict or post-conflict contexts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SALW demand reduction programs (behaviour)</li> <li>Specific programmes targeting child soldiers</li> <li>After school programs/recreation for 'high risk' groups</li> <li>Targeted education (vocation, finishing school)</li> <li>Employment – job creation for 'high-risk' groups</li> <li>Screening for at-risk/at-risk programs</li> <li>Alcohol/narcotics restrictions (at specific times/places)</li> <li>Mentoring and tutorial for 'high risk' groups</li> <li>Peer mediation/education</li> <li>Poverty reduction/de-concentrating poverty in 'high risk' areas</li> <li>Non-violent/conflict resolution training</li> <li>Training on gun safety</li> <li>Training on violence management/gun use for security officials</li> <li>Public awareness/media campaigns</li> <li>Community security</li> <li>Community development</li> </ul>

		<p>Victim/survivor assistance,</p> <p>Disability rehab/psychosocial care</p> <p>Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)</p> <p>Governance reform (power-sharing arrangements)</p> <p>Transitional and restorative justice (TRJ)</p>
Institutions	<p>AVR interventions are often linked to conventional development, conflict prevention and peace promotion activities and are typically concerned with preventing conflict from breaking-out, enhancing security and governance in fragile state contexts, promoting rule of law and due process, strengthening 'peace-building' and 'conflict resolution' activities and the promotion of targeted development in 'high risk' areas.</p>	<p>Regulations and Legislation (e.g. Arms control legislation)</p> <p>Governance Reform (to address culture of impunity)</p> <p>Governance promotion/strengthening in key thematic ministries</p> <p>Security System Reform (SSR)</p> <p>Municipal-level capacity building (surveillance, coordination, local committees/task forces)</p> <p>Judicial reform/law enforcement</p> <p>Anti-corruption initiatives</p> <p>Natural resource management in conflict-prone areas</p> <p>Community policing</p> <p>Alternate dispute mechanisms</p> <p>Targeted urban/rural development programming/environmental design</p> <p>Conflict assessments – conflict prevention and management</p> <p>Transitional and restorative justice (TRJ)</p> <p>Governance decentralization</p>

### Multilateral Frameworks and All-of-Government

58. The *Guidance* will examine the relationships between AVR and broader multilateral frameworks and all-of-government approaches. Specifically, it will focus on multilateral AVR initiatives spearheaded by the UNDP, World Bank, and others that offer potential opportunities for donors to invest in more coordinated activities. Likewise, because of its mix of development and security targets and partners, AVR programming is particularly suited to all-of-government approaches. The *Guidance* will be reviewing and distilling best practice and lessons learned in this area.<sup>37</sup>

#### SECTION IV. MONITORING AND EVALUATING AVR

59. Measuring the performance of AVR activities is central to donor accountability and improving practice. Unless interventions are having a demonstrable influence on clearly-defined indicators of armed violence and enhancing development opportunities they may be perceived as lacking credibility and legitimacy amongst stakeholders, including beneficiaries. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanism(s) should be developed as a central pillar of programmatic or project-level interventions. M&E should seek to measure not just performance indicators, but also real/subjective outputs and impacts in relation to armed violence and development. In other words, it must track the results of specific AVR interventions, but also how and why this may have occurred. It should also highlight the relationships between indicators and draw on a wide range of quantitative and qualitative methods – including participatory assessments – with sensitivity to the context and capacities in which it is established.

60. There are a range of practical challenges to developing effective M&E capacities in crisis, conflict and post-conflict contexts – or circumstances characterised by acute armed violence. Many of these obstacles have been encountered in relation to monitoring and evaluating achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. First, there are intrinsic difficulties in establishing causality in complex and dynamic open systems: whether outcome *x* can be attributed to investment/intervention *y*.<sup>38</sup> Second, there is frequently a paucity of reliable surveillance and survey data or local capacity to undertake reliable longitudinal assessments. Third, there is often little international or domestic will to invest in additional procedures in contexts where the political and humanitarian exigencies of aid drive interventions. As such, there is frequently a reluctance – in some cases even resistance - among policy makers and practitioners to demonstrate quantifiable results.

61. Donors and practitioners can mitigate these constraints by recognising that there are a host of risk factors that affect programme/project performance, and that effectiveness can be measured if other factors are controlled for. It is equally crucial that donors introduce incentives for M&E and both map-out, and invest in, legitimate national/municipal surveillance systems. M&E entails more than generating and tracking indicators – it constitutes a comprehensive ‘system’ involving training, information collection and management, analysis and communication. Donors should aim to support national stakeholder ownership of M&E systems through adequate financing, local capacity development and the introduction of checks and balances to ensure that data quality and analysis is of a high standard.

62. There is no universal M&E template or set of generic indicators that applies to all contexts in which armed violence is prevalent. Rather, form should follow function and be tailored to local dynamics. The minimum parameters of creating M&E systems are straight-forward. For example, any M&E process requires the articulation of realistic indicators of performance that rationally follow-from programme/project objectives. These indicators can be ‘*etic*’ – or derived externally (e.g. number of consultations between primary stakeholders, reductions in homicide and incidents of armed violence, increased access to justice/policing institutions, increased participation in social networks and associations) and ‘*emic*’ or determined internally (e.g. quality of consultations between primary stakeholders, changed perceptions of security in areas where the project was undertaken or improved confidence in specific institutions/services). In ideal cases, indicators are developed through participatory process – including focus groups and consultative meetings – with local stakeholders and beneficiaries. The process of indicator development is central to the legitimacy of M&E systems. Regardless of how they are determined, indicators must be realistic, reliable, specific and measurable.

63. M&E systems should be multi-method, but also grounded in local capacities and needs. For example, M&E can passively draw from existing national and municipal surveillance systems (e.g. public

health statistics, judicial/police records, mortuary data, education curricula surveillance), from periodic cross-section household surveys and from specific studies undertaken by academic and practitioner organisations. M&E can also adopt more proactive methods – ranging from robust longitudinal surveillance of secular trends through specially-designed surveillance, surveys or media/incident monitoring mechanisms to regular site visits, small-scale purposive panel surveys, participant observation and participatory assessments undertaken with local partners and project beneficiaries (Figure 6). A key criterion for effective M&E is that it is achievable and linked to adequate training and investment. The instruments introduced to monitor specific interventions in a comparatively data-rich country such as South Africa may be very different than those proposed in Afghanistan or Somalia. Likewise, the monitoring and evaluation of instrument-focused interventions will differ from those concentrating on agents and institutions.

64. M&E systems should be oriented to measure the specific processes, outcomes and impacts of armed violence prevention and reduction over time. In this way, M&E should establish a baseline so that conditions before and after the programme or project can be continuously assessed. In other words, M&E should be established in such a way that it is possible to measure current trends in relation to past trends. M&E systems should also seek to develop comparative assessments of areas in which interventions were not undertaken. In other words, the effectiveness of a given intervention can be assessed in relation to population groups that did not directly benefit from programme or project inputs. Establishing control groups in addition to the beneficiary cohort is recommended. This is particularly important when assessing interventions that were made ‘armed violence sensitive’ or discrete projects focusing on re-building social capital among specific population groups. This allows for a careful reading of the effects – both planned and unintended –and offers valuable insights into how such interventions can be improved.

**Figure 6. A Sample of Impact Indicators and Methods for AVR**

<b>Indicator Type</b>	<b>Minimum Data Needs</b>	<b>Data Source and Methods</b>	<b>Reliability/ Validity</b>
Changes in intentional mortality	Fatal injury profile	Morgues, Parishes, and INGOs. Monthly reporting from primary sources	Deductive/low
Changes in intentional mortality and morbidity	Fatal and non-fatal injury profiles	Referral Hospitals, Clinics and health posts. Sentinel surveillance and administered weekly/monthly	Deductive/medium
Changes in human rights violations	Objective indicators of victimisation, kidnapping, disappearance, detention, displacement, and SGBV	Human rights/gender monitoring mechanisms, international and national HR reports, police registration data. Archival review administered on a weekly or monthly basis.	Deductive/medium
Changes in real and perceived security	Qualitative indicators of insecurity and locally-defined indicators of victimisation ranging from faith in security providers to	Small representative samples (women, men, youth, gang members, community leaders, etc) and weekly or monthly focus groups administered by trained practitioners or community interlocutors	Inductive/low

Changes in social capital formation	Qualitative and quantitative indicators of socio-economic variables, including association membership, networks and local exchanges	Small cluster/panel surveys of a defined population group (e.g. beneficiaries, host communities, control group) in catchment areas. Cohort panel surveys on a quarterly basis	Inductive/ Medium
Changes in household and community victimisation	Quantitative and representative indicators of socio-economic impacts, armed violence and victimisation.	Large-scale simple random/cluster survey (confidence interval tbd) to assess impacts. Epidemiological team could be developed to support the process and carry out pre/post surveys in urban and rural centres.	Inductive/ high

65. In summary, there are a range of preconditions for designing and maintaining reliable and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation systems. First, a given armed violence prevention/reduction policy, programme or project must clearly and coherently articulate its aims and objectives. Second, policy makers and practitioners should develop a baseline – drawing on a combination of etic and/or emic indicators – against which any progress can ultimately be measured. Third, interventions should articulate their results chains – or theories of change – so that its logical development can be tracked. Finally, planners should anticipate a multi-method approach so that findings can be triangulated and unintentional outcomes tracked in a reliable and timely fashion. This section will also build on the results of the current CPDC work (with the DAC’s Network on Development Evaluation) to develop guidance on undertaking evaluations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes.

ANNEX 1. PRELIMINARY OUTLINE OF *GUIDANCE ON ARMED VIOLENCE*

Section	Contents	Approx. Length
<b>Introduction</b>	Why armed violence is a development issue: linkages between insecurity, arms and underdevelopment; direct and indirect development effects; including effects on women and children. Rationale for the <i>Guidance</i> (how it relates to, but is different from, existing OECD guidelines); Content of the <i>Guidance</i> and target audience; BOX on related OECD <i>Guidance</i> BOX on AVR-related Declarations/Initiatives	5-10
<b>Definitions and Concepts</b>	Definition and conceptual framework outlined in the framing paper	3-6
<b>Principles for Policy and Programming</b>	Key principles, norms and rules guiding engagement Core international and regional agreements and resolutions BOX on OECD-DAC survey questionnaire findings	4-8
<b>Integrating AVR into the programming cycle</b>	Brief introduction to the programming cycle and entry points for AVR programming (drawing from other experiences (e.g. with conflict or gender) where appropriate)	
<b>Diagnostics and assessments</b>	Review of some of the key diagnostic tools for understanding development/programming context from an AVR perspective; Example-based discussion of the integration of AVR perspectives into national level assessments like the CCA, as well as specific programming assessments. Box on field research findings	5-10
<b>National Planning Frameworks</b>	Review of opportunities for integrating AVR into PRSPs, UNDAFs, CDFs to enhance coherence and donor harmonization. Challenges for AVR integration. BOX on World Bank/IADB approaches Box on UN inter-agency approaches Box on field research finding BOX on PRSP Review in Africa/Latin America	4-8
<b>Stand Alone AVR</b>	National and Local Levels, with boxed examples of good practice, and the gender perspective; Discussion of partnership strategies with emphasis on local strategies BOX on field research findings BOX on PREVIVA Municipal violence reduction in Colombia	5-10
<b>Integrated AVR</b>	Appropriate linkages and entry points at both national and local /municipal levels; Likely linkage “sectors” to be covered: Governance; JSSR; Poverty Reduction; Education; Health; DDR & Alternative Livelihoods; Community Security and Development Gender dimensions and local ownership strategies will be highlighted throughout. BOX on field research findings BOX on PEAP/arms control in Uganda	15-20
<b>Whole of Government Approaches</b>	Short review of OECD efforts in relation to AVR Short review of partner government efforts in relation to AVR	2-4
<b>Monitoring and Evaluation</b>	Review of multiple M&E systems to measure outcomes and impacts Box on field research findings	5-10

\* **Field Visits** will be undertaken by Small Arms Survey/SecDev personnel to: Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Burundi or South Africa, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Guatemala

\*\* Commissioned Research: PRSP Desk Review; CCA/UNDAF Review; Review of assessment frameworks; World Bank/IADB Review of best practice; Columbia (Early Violence Prevention); Haiti (Community Violence Prevention and Reduction); Sierra Leone; El Salvador, Brazil; and South Africa.

## Endnotes

---

<sup>1</sup> See the 2005 Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (Centre for International Cooperation, Bradford University). This research, supported by the UK Department for International Development (DfID), mapped the relationships between armed violence and under-development (including the Millennium Development Goals) in a sustained fashion. Such studies are regarded as increasingly important as a means of highlighting the ‘relevance’ of AVR for development policy makers and practitioners, particularly in relation to undertaking effects-driven or ‘results-based’ management. See also UNDP (2005) and WHO (2002) *World Report on Violence and Health* [http://www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/violence/world\\_report/en/full\\_en.pdf](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/full_en.pdf); Muggah 2003. ‘Obstructing Development: The Effects of Small Arms on Human Development’. *Small Arms Survey: Development Denied*.

<sup>2</sup> The DAC guidelines include, for e.g., voluntary weapons collection, destructions, legal and governance reform, public awareness, and attention to specific risk groups (child soldiers). See DAC Statistical Reporting Addendum, 07 April 2005. See OECD Statistical Reporting Directives: Addendum; Annex 5 ODA Coverage of Certain Peacebuilding, Conflict and Security Expenditures, DCD/DAC (2000)10/ADD1/REV1; 7 April 2005.

<sup>3</sup> The *Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development* signed in June 2006 commits over 50 states to making measurable reductions in violence by 2015, by “initiatives to prevent and reduce the human, social and economic costs of armed violence, to assess risks and vulnerabilities, to evaluate the effectiveness of armed violence reduction programmes, and to disseminate knowledge of best practices.” Likewise, the *Guatemala Declaration* and the forthcoming *African Declaration* commit states to meeting the objectives set by the Geneva Declaration with specific attention to regional variations. A central pillar of the AVR agenda, then, includes the progressive development of concepts and instruments to measure the phenomena of armed violence and relationships between violence reduction and improvements in human development. The Small Arms Survey has recently supported two workshops designed specifically to articulate core indicators of armed violence, appropriate methods and instruments to gauge change, and an agenda for taking research on AVR forward. Note also: Earlier initiatives shaping the AVR agenda include the 2001 Programme of Action on Small Arms (PoA), the 1997/2001 OECD-DAC Guidelines on “*Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*,” and the 1994-1999 *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict*.

<sup>4</sup> An assortment of annexes are also included that review a sample of OECD-DAC member country approaches to AVR.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, relevant OECD Guidelines such as the 1997/2001 *Guidelines on Preventing Violent Conflict*; the 2007 *Handbook on Security System Reform*; the 2005 *Preventing Conflict and Building Peace – A Manual of Issues and Entry Points and others*.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Moser, C. (2006) ‘Reducing Urban Violence in Developing Countries’ *Policy Brief* (1). Washington DC: Brookings Institute.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision*, available at <http://esa.un.org/unup/>; United Nations. 2006. *State of the World's Cities 2006/07*. New York: United Nations; UNODC (2007) South-South Crime Prevention Project.

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, WHO/UNDP (2007) AVPP Review: Phase 1. Geneva: WHO; WHO/UNDP (2007b) AVPP Review: Phase 2. Geneva. WHO.

<sup>9</sup> However, Ted Leggett (UNODC) and others note that International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) and related surveys are becoming increasingly difficult to resource on account of other competing priorities. The WHO, CDC and the Small Arms Survey have also recently elaborated and tested guidelines to cost the economic burden of armed violence in order to measure the benefits of prevention and intervention programmes.

<sup>10</sup> For example, eleven projects from Honduras and Nicaragua were recently selected among more than 100 project proposals that the Urban Crime and Violence Program received after having launched the SGPVP the second semester of 2005. The SGPVP offered seed funding (between USD 5,000 and USD 20,000) for innovative, community-based violence prevention projects.

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). n.d. *Guidelines for the Design of Violence Reduction Projects*. Washington D.C.: IADB; IADB 2002. *Violence as an obstacle to development*. IADB Technical Note 4. Washington, D.C., IADB; and IADB 2000. *Violence Control at the Municipal Level*. Technical Note 8. Washington, D.C., IADB.

<sup>12</sup> See Part 2 below, Survey of OECD-DAC member states on approaches to AVR.

<sup>13</sup> See Part 2 below, Survey of OECD-DAC member states on approaches to AVR.

<sup>14</sup> The Small Arms Survey and SecDev will undertake focused studies in 12 countries – decided in consultation with OECD-DAC members.

<sup>15</sup> The WHO (2002) issues a separate definition of ‘violence’ which will not be explicitly used for the purposes of this *Guidance*. They describe it as: ‘the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation’. See WHO (2002) *World report on violence and health*. [www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/violence/world\\_report/en/full\\_en.pdf](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/full_en.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, *Small Arms Survey* (2007; 2006; 2005; 2004; 2003; 2002; and 2001) and the work of the Geneva International Centre for De-mining.

<sup>17</sup> See, for example, Meijer, C. and P. Verwimp (2005) *The Use and Perception of Weapons Before and After Conflict: Evidence from Rwanda*, Small Arms Survey Working Paper 5.

<sup>18</sup> In Latin America, for example, they are commonly reported in between 70-80 per cent of all fatal violence, and the costs associated with gun-related injuries (injury treatment, rehabilitation, loss of livelihood) are generally higher than for other types of injuries from violence.

<sup>19</sup> This description adapted from UNDP (2005).

<sup>20</sup> The importance of focusing on the ‘instruments’ of violence within development programming is clearly signalled by both the 2005 OECD-DAC *Guidelines of Eligibility for ODA* and the 2006 *Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development*.

<sup>21</sup> See, for example, *Small Arms Survey* (2007; 2006; 2005; 2004; 2003; 2002; and 2001).

<sup>22</sup> See UNDP (2005) *Securing Development*. New York: UNDP.

<sup>23</sup> For example, in rural areas, urban contexts, or in isolated regions in a country otherwise ‘at peace’.

<sup>24</sup> Finally, armed violence is highly concentrated in young and adult male populations, though women and girls are also affected in different ways. Males are both the most frequent perpetrators and victims of armed violence.

<sup>25</sup> The Figure is not intended as a ‘continuum’ to show established relationships or pathways but rather different ‘contexts’.

<sup>26</sup> Through excessive use of force in political repression or summary execution of prisoners, for example.

<sup>27</sup> There were 13 member states and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Response (BCPR/UNDP) out of a possible 23.

<sup>28</sup> The Swiss government and UNDP, however, emphasised the importance of the Geneva Declaration on AVR as providing important policy direction.

<sup>29</sup> There is still a relative level of disagreement among donors in this area as how AVR relates to other programming categories and where linkages exist between sectors. The Guidance will address these issues thoroughly.

<sup>30</sup> Sweden, however, insisted that its peace and security policy offered clear direction in relation to AVR – as noted in the annex attached.

---

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, Jutersonke, O., Krause, K. and R. Muggah (2007-forthcoming) 'Guns and the City', *Small Arms Survey*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>32</sup> *Instruments*: Focuses on understanding how and why weapons are available for misuse at the national and/or local levels; *Agents*: Focuses on understanding the *demand* for weapons, that is the motivations of those individuals, groups or state actors who acquire and misuse the weapons (e.g. from unresolved grievances through to economic motives, through to concerns for personal security, or corruption and protection of state/personal interests etc); *Institutions*: Focuses on the wider 'enabling environment' that allows or encourages the misuse of weapons (e.g. governance issues, legal and regulatory frameworks etc).

<sup>33</sup> See, for example, forthcoming OECD-DAC CPDC guidelines on monitoring and evaluating conflict prevention and peace-building.

<sup>34</sup> As appropriate, the guidance will develop diagnostic tools to supplement, or bring the AV perspective into, already existing tools. The guidance will also need to advise on the merits of elaborate/comprehensive assessments as compared to limited/quick assessments which are adequate for the purpose at hand.

<sup>35</sup> The upcoming field work for the guidance will specifically examine countries in which AV programming has been integrated into the PRSP (to understand how and to what effect), as well as other contexts where states have appeared reluctant to explicitly address AV in "national" aid programming frameworks, with a view to better understanding and advising on the challenges in this regard.

<sup>36</sup> The eventual *Guidance* will further elaborate and develop linkages between contexts—and contextual analysis—and AVR programming. It's important to note that most donors are already supporting such initiatives as reflected in Table x. However, few donors program comprehensively and holistically on AVR. The guidance will address the issue of integrated programming across sectors and levels of intervention.

<sup>37</sup> In this respect, The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have important experience. See "Integrating Security Work into Development: Whole-of-Government Frameworks," Chapter 2 of *Security System Reform and Governance*, OECD, 2005 (pp. 19-31).

<sup>38</sup> Some have described this as the 'attribution gap' and observed how a host of exogenous factors can influence specific interventions in 'conflict' contexts.

## REFERENCES

### Policy literature

DfID. 2007. *Preventing Violent Conflict*. London. <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/preventing-conflict.pdf>

*Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development*. 2006.  
[http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/measures/Measur\\_pdf/i\\_measur\\_pdf/o\\_%20measur/20060615\\_geneva\\_decl.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/measures/Measur_pdf/i_measur_pdf/o_%20measur/20060615_geneva_decl.pdf)

OECD-DAC website on “Understanding Conflict Prevention and Peace-building” (contains links to country strategies on conflict reduction and peacebuilding from Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US)  
[http://www.oecd.org/document/38/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_34567\\_33989670\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/38/0,2340,en_2649_34567_33989670_1_1_1_1,00.html)

OECD-DAC. 2007 *OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice*. Paris.  
[http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_34567\\_37417926\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,2340,en_2649_34567_37417926_1_1_1_1,00.html)

OECD-DAC. 2006. *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*. Paris.  
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf>

OECD-DAC. 2005. *Preventing Conflict and Building Peace: A Manual of Issues and Entry Points*. Paris.  
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/3/35785584.pdf>

OECD-DAC. 2005. *Security System Reform and Governance*. Paris.  
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf>

OECD-DAC. 2005. *Piloting the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*. Fragile States Group (FSG) Concept Note. Paris. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/25/35238282.pdf>

OECD-DAC. 2005. *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States: Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships (LAP)*. Paris.  
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf>

*Paris Declaration 2005*  
[http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_3236398\\_35401554\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html)

Smith, Dan. 2004. *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting their Act Together*. Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2004/0044/ddd/pdfv/210673-rapp104.pdf>

UNDP. 2005. *Securing Development: UNDP's support for addressing small arms issues*. New York.  
[http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/sa\\_control/securing\\_development.pdf](http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/sa_control/securing_development.pdf)

UNGA. 2005. *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*. Report of the Secretary-General. New York.

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElement>

UNGA. 2004. *A more secure world: our shared responsibility*. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York. <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf>

World Bank. 2004. *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An Evolving Agenda*. Washington. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-1112884026494/20482669/ConflictAgenda2004.pdf>

WHO. 2002. *Recommendations from the World report on violence and health*. Geneva.

[http://www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/violence/world\\_report/en/wrvhrecommendations.pdf](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/wrvhrecommendations.pdf)

### Synthesis reports

Bourne, Mike and Owen Greene. 2004. *Armed violence, governance, security sector reform, and safety security and access to justice*. Briefing paper. Bradford, UK: Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Bradford University.

[http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/cics/publications/AVPI/briefing/AVPI\\_SSR\\_Briefing\\_Paper.pdf](http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/cics/publications/AVPI/briefing/AVPI_SSR_Briefing_Paper.pdf)

Centre for International Cooperation and Security. 2005. *The impact of armed violence on poverty and development*. Full report of the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI). Bradford University, UK.

[http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/cics/publications/AVPI/poverty/AVPI\\_Synthesis\\_Report.pdf](http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/cics/publications/AVPI/poverty/AVPI_Synthesis_Report.pdf)

Collier, P. et al. 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War & Development Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press and World Bank.

Donini, A. et al. 2005. *Mapping the Security Environment: Understanding the perceptions of local communities, peace support operations and assistance agencies*. Boston: Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University. [http://fic.tufts.edu/downloads/mapping\\_security.pdf](http://fic.tufts.edu/downloads/mapping_security.pdf)

Dowdney, Luke. 2005. *Neither War nor Peace: International comparisons of children and youth in organised armed violence*. Viva Rio, ISER (Instituto de Estudos da Religião), IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms). <http://www.coav.org.br/publique/media/NewAll.pdf>

Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman and Norman Loayza. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime". *The Journal of Law and Economics*.

[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/inequality\\_and\\_violentcrime.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/inequality_and_violentcrime.pdf)

Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman and Norman Loayza. 2000. "What Causes Violent Crime?" *European Economic Review*.

[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/whatcauses\\_violentcrime.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/whatcauses_violentcrime.pdf)

Greene, Owen and Mike Bourne. 2005. *Armed violence and conflict assessments*. Briefing paper. Bradford, UK: Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Bradford University.

[http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/cics/publications/AVPI/briefing/AVPI\\_Conflict\\_Assessment\\_Briefing\\_Paper.pdf](http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/cics/publications/AVPI/briefing/AVPI_Conflict_Assessment_Briefing_Paper.pdf)

Hegre, Håvard, Ranveig Gissinger and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2002. "Globalization and Internal Conflict." *Globalization and Conflict*. Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri & Nils Petter Gleditsch, eds. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield.

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/GlobalizationAndInternalConflict.pdf>

Jennings, Kathleen. 2007. *The War Zone as Social Space: Social Research in Conflict Zones*. Oslo: FAFO. <http://www.faf.no/pub/rapp/20008/20008.pdf>

Patricia Justino. 2006. *On the Links between Violent Conflict and Chronic Poverty: How Much Do We Really Know?* Brighton: Households in Conflict Network, University of Sussex. <http://www.hicn.org/papers/wp18.pdf>

Pons-Vignon, Nicolas, and Henri-Bernard Solignac Lecomte. 2004. *Land, Violent Conflict and Development*. Paris. OECD Development Centre Working Paper No. 233. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/50/29740608.pdf>

Jütersonke, O., K. Krause, and R. Muggah. 2007 (forthcoming). "Guns in the City: the Changing Landscapes of Armed Violence", *Small Arms Survey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laderchi, C.R., R. Saith, and F. Stewart. 2003. "Does it matter that we do not agree on the definition of poverty? A comparison of four approaches", *Oxford Development Studies*, Vol 31, No 3, September 2003.

Lederman, D., P. Fajnzylber, and N. Loayza. 2000. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 45, No. 1, Part 1.

Moser, Caroline and Cathy McIlwaine. 2001. *Violence in a Post-Conflict Context*. Washington: World Bank. [http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/12/11/000094946\\_01112104010285/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/12/11/000094946_01112104010285/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf)

Muggah, Robert and Peter Batchelor. 2002. *Development Held Hostage*. New York: UNDP.

Mwaura, Ciru and Lionel Cliffe. 2004. *Armed violence and rural livelihoods*. Briefing paper. Bradford, UK: Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Bradford University. [http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/cics/publications/AVPI/briefing/AVPI\\_Rural\\_Livelihoods\\_Briefing\\_Paper.pdf](http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/cics/publications/AVPI/briefing/AVPI_Rural_Livelihoods_Briefing_Paper.pdf)

Rehn, E. & E. Johnson Sirleaf. 2002. *Independent Experts Assessment of the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and the Role of Women in Peace Building*. New York: UNIFEM. [www.unifem.org](http://www.unifem.org).

Small Arms Survey. 2006. "Few Options but the Gun: Angry Young Men". *Small Arms Survey: Unfinished Business*. Geneva. [http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year\\_b\\_pdf/2006/2006SASCh12-full\\_en.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year_b_pdf/2006/2006SASCh12-full_en.pdf)

Small Arms Survey. 2005. "Violent Exchanges: The Use of Small Arms in Conflict" and "Behind the Numbers: Small Arms and Conflict Deaths". *Small Arms Survey: Weapons at War*. Geneva. [http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year\\_b\\_pdf/2005/2005SASCh7\\_summary\\_en.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year_b_pdf/2005/2005SASCh7_summary_en.pdf), [http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year\\_b\\_pdf/2005/2005SASCh9\\_full\\_en.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year_b_pdf/2005/2005SASCh9_full_en.pdf)

Small Arms Survey. 2004. "A Common Tool: Firearms, Violence, and Crime". *Small Arms Survey: Rights at Risk*. Geneva.

[http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year\\_b\\_pdf/2004/2004SASCh6\\_full\\_en.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year_b_pdf/2004/2004SASCh6_full_en.pdf)

Small Arms Survey. 2003. "Obstructing Development: The Effects of Small Arms on Human Development". *Small Arms Survey: Development Denied*. Geneva.

[http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year\\_b\\_pdf/2003/2003SASCh4\\_full\\_en.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year_b_pdf/2003/2003SASCh4_full_en.pdf)

Small Arms Survey. 2002. "Caught in the Crossfire: The Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms." *Small Arms Survey: Counting the Human Cost*. Geneva.

[http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year\\_b\\_pdf/2002/2002SASCh4\\_full\\_en.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/year_b_pdf/2002/2002SASCh4_full_en.pdf)

Stewart, F. et al. 2001. *War & Underdevelopment, Vols 1 & 2*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Strand, Arne, Hege Toje, Alf Morten Jerve and Ingrid Samset. 2003. *Community-Driven Development in Contexts of Conflict*. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

<http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/publications/2003/rep/r2003-11.pdf>

UNSC. 2002. *Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security*. New York.

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/634/68/PDF/N0263468.pdf?OpenElement>

WHO. 2002. *World report on violence and health*. Geneva.

[http://www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/violence/world\\_report/en/full\\_en.pdf](http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/full_en.pdf)

World Vision. 2005. *Small arms, children, and armed conflict*. Toronto.

<http://www.worldvision.ca/home/media/Final-Research-Paper-for-Small-Arms-and-Children-October-2005.pdf>

### **Assessments, evaluations and guidelines**

Apthorpe, R., J. Karlsrud, H. Lunde, L. Mitchell and M. Taylor. 2006. *Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building Activities*. A Report Prepared for OECD-DAC Network on Development Evaluation and the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC).

[www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/44/37500040.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/44/37500040.pdf)

Cliffe, Sarah, Scott Guggenheim, and Markus Kostner. 2003 (August). "Community-Driven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace Transitions". CPR Working Paper #7. Washington: World Bank.

[http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSPContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/09/09/000160016\\_20030909105927/Rendered/PDF/266970Conflict0prevention0wp0no.07.pdf](http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSPContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/09/09/000160016_20030909105927/Rendered/PDF/266970Conflict0prevention0wp0no.07.pdf)

EC. 2001. *Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict*. Brussels.

[http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/list.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/list.htm)

OECD-DAC. 2001. *Guidelines on Poverty Reduction*. Paris.

[http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_34567\\_1885953\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,2340,en_2649_34567_1885953_1_1_1_1,00.html)

OECD-DAC. 2001. *Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*. Paris.

[http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_34567\\_33800800\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,2340,en_2649_34567_33800800_1_1_1_1,00.html)

OECD-DAC, 2005. *Preventing Conflict and building Peace: A Manual of Issues and Entry Points*. Paris. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/3/35785584.pdf>

OECD-DAC. 2006. *Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace-building activities*. Norway. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/44/37500040.pdf>

UN and World Bank. 2007. *In Support of Peacebuilding: Strengthening the Post Conflict Needs Assessment*. [http://altair.undp.org/documents/9023-PCNA\\_Review\\_Report\\_\\_In\\_Support\\_of\\_Peacebuilding\\_\\_Strengthening\\_the\\_PCNA.pdf](http://altair.undp.org/documents/9023-PCNA_Review_Report__In_Support_of_Peacebuilding__Strengthening_the_PCNA.pdf)

UNDP and World Bank. 2005. *An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States*. New York and Washington. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/18/34245139.pdf>

UNDP and WHO. 2004. *Armed Violence Prevention Programme (AVPP): Support to Community Based Prevention Programmes*. New York and Geneva. [http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/armed\\_violence/pro\\_docs/AVPP\\_Pro\\_Doc\\_signed.pdf](http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/armed_violence/pro_docs/AVPP_Pro_Doc_signed.pdf)

Verstegen, Suzanne, Luc van de Goor, and Jeroen de Zeeuw. 2005. *The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development*. The Hague: Clingendael Institute. [http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050200\\_cru\\_paper\\_stability.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050200_cru_paper_stability.pdf)

WHO. 2004. *Preventing violence: A guide to implementing the recommendations of the*

*World report on violence and health*. Geneva.

<http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/9241592079.pdf>

### **Country-specific reports**

Buvinic, M., A. Morrison, and M. Shifter. 1999. *Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington: IADB.

Centre for International Cooperation and Security. 2005. AVPI country case studies. Bradford University, UK. <http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/cics/publications/AVPI/poverty/>

Households in Conflict Network country-specific studies. <http://www.hicn.org/index.html>

Paris Declaration Action Plans

[http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_3236398\\_18638150\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_18638150_1_1_1_1,00.html)

UN and World Bank. 2006-07. Post Conflict Needs Assessment Review country documents. <http://altair.undp.org/content.cfm?id=1655>

World Bank country assistance strategies, PRSPs, watching briefs, and country-specific research