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Peer Review

Learning from DAC Peer Reviews: DAC Declaration on a new approach to align development co-operation with the goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change

This note presents learnings from the latest DAC Peer Reviews as evidence to inform the report on the DAC Declaration on Paris Alignment, mandated by the DAC, during its 2023 High-Level Meeting.

It complements the background note [DCD_DAC_ENV_2024_9] for the ENVIRONET session 7 on 18th September, during which ENVIRONET Members will be invited to provide feedback and guidance for the finalisation of the report, with a view to ensuring the report's emerging findings and strategic narrative make it impactful and relevant for policymakers and can serve as a guide for further action.

Néstor Pelechà Aigües, DCD/RPDI Nestor.PELECHAAIGUES@oecd.org
Anjeza Llulla, DCD/RPDI Anjeza.LLULLA@oecd.org

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Learning from DAC Peer Reviews: DAC Declaration on a new approach to align development co-operation with the goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change

1. Introduction

The 2021 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Declaration on a new approach to align development co-operation with the goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (OECD/LEGAL/0466, hereafter "the DAC Declaration") aims at steering development co-operation towards achieving global climate goals and ambitions. By committing to aligning Official Development Assistance (ODA) with the Paris Agreement, the DAC Declaration sets a framework for development providers to support net-zero emissions and climate-resilient development co-operation practices. The DAC Declaration also ensures that development co-operation efforts address climate change by supporting partner countries in their just green transitions, increasing support for climate change adaptation, particularly in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Islands Developing States (SIDS).

This paper presents the main findings and evidence of progress by DAC members against the commitments of the DAC Declaration, drawing on the most recent DAC Peer Reviews and mid-term reviews. Peer Reviews are instrumental in identifying good practices and areas for improvement in DAC member systems. Learnings from Peer Reviews' work over the last years have examined five critical areas for mainstreaming environmental consideration in development co-operation: strong policy commitment and leadership; robust systems, processes and tools; capacity and continuous skill development; shared knowledge, learning and engagement; well-supported country systems (OECD, 2019[1]). The 2023 Peer Review Methodology includes a specific commitment to monitor progress on the DAC Declaration during mid-term and peer reviews (OECD, 2023[2]). Peer review reports systematically include an annex tracking a member's adherence to the DAC Declaration, and mid-term reviews treat the DAC Declaration as a recommendation of the previous peer review. This paper draws on insights from the most recent peer reviews -from 2021 onwards[1]- of Czechia, Denmark, Finland (forthcoming), France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Luxembourg (forthcoming), Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia (forthcoming), the United States, and mid-term reviews of Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

2. DAC members are aligning their development co-operation with the Paris Agreement goals, but scaling up climate efforts remains challenging

In line with the DAC Declaration, DAC members have made significant progress in developing strategies and targets to align their development co-operation with the Paris Agreement goals. While these strategies vary in form, they reflect a serious intent to support climate action. Some countries, such as Poland, have adopted a stand-alone climate strategy that outlines their commitment to supporting climate action in developing countries. Others, like Germany, have integrated the Paris Agreement and 2030 Agenda at the centre of their development policy. South Korea and France have embedded climate targets

[1] Peer Reviews of Denmark and Germany were also consulted even though conducted prior to the signing of the declaration as they both included focus areas on climate and environment that could provide relevant information for this paper.

within their broader strategies, emphasising green growth or aiming for a significant portion of their ODA to contribute directly to climate action. Collectively, these efforts reflect a determination among DAC members to systematically and strategically incorporate climate action into their development co-operation.

Climate considerations are being mainstreamed into development co-operation, helping providers advance towards their climate objectives. By acknowledging the interlinkages between development and climate, mainstreaming enables climate considerations to be addressed systematically across policies, plans, budgets and activities, as highlighted in *Greening Development Co-operation: Lessons from the DAC* (OECD, 2019[1]). The Netherlands, for instance, has made significant advances in embedding climate resilience into various sectors, including health, education, and infrastructure. Poland integrates climate considerations into its broader development co-operation, emphasising that all projects must address climate risks and opportunities. Slovenia is currently developing guidelines to embed climate considerations into all of its ODA portfolio. Even though there is room for improvement in mainstreaming by some members, as highlighted in the 2021 Denmark Peer Review, integrating climate considerations across programmes and projects is becoming a standard practice across development co-operation providers. Mainstreaming is common practice in typical sectors such as water, agriculture and natural resources, and members are enhancing these efforts in other sectors by introducing tools for mainstreaming climate considerations.

DAC members have a wide variety of tools to channel efforts in integrating climate considerations across ODA portfolios, but better sharing and harmonisation could be beneficial. DAC members have diverse policies, systems, tools, and procedures for putting climate and the environment at the centre of their development work (OECD, 2019[1]). At present, many methodologies guide providers' sustainable development financing, and efforts are underway to align this finance with the Paris Agreement. For instance, France's Sustainable Development Analysis and Opinion Mechanism is central to AFD's approach to ensure the impact on sustainable development across its projects at an early stage, assessing the coherence of each project with low-carbon trajectories and climate resilience (OECD, 2024[3]). KOICA uses its environmental and social safeguards as guidelines for screening projects for environmental and social risks. Other examples of tools developed by DAC members highlighted in recent DAC Peer Reviews include the Netherlands' Climate Finance Dashboard for overviewing climate finance stemming from various ODA budget lines, or the Danish Climate Envelop, which has improved the profile of climate action in Danish development co-operation (OECD, 2021[4]). The United States uses climate risk screening tools to assess potential climate risks during the project design phase. Against the diversity of already existing tools across providers, sharing and harmonising them across DAC members will help other providers, especially providers with less expertise on climate issues, to adopt good practices and reduce confusion among partner countries.

DAC members face capacity challenges when scaling up their climate efforts, including limited technical expertise. As development co-operation evolves by integrating climate action, so should the skill set of DAC members' staff at headquarters and in-country offices. All providers have encountered challenges in building climate expertise within their systems, though each DAC member is at a different journey stage. For example, Hungary pursues relevant efforts in agriculture and water but could benefit from strengthened expertise in project design to highlight the relevance of such projects for environmental and climate concerns. Austria and Slovenia also face challenges due to limited technical capacity within their system, where only one dedicated climate expert supports the integration of climate considerations across all programs, creating bottlenecks and increasing pressure on the climate specialist. Capacity building within provider systems is essential to ensure that climate action is effectively integrated across all development co-operation activities.

While biodiversity efforts are gaining increasing attention from DAC members, the slower integration reveals a lag that could hinder environmental sustainability. Often guided by strong international commitments like the Paris Agreement, many DAC members have placed a greater emphasis on climate change than biodiversity in their development co-operation. For example, Slovenia's strategy prioritises climate-related interventions with specific targets, but biodiversity protection is only mentioned as part of a broader environmental protection goal. Similarly, Poland's multiannual programme acknowledges biodiversity, but its implementation remains largely focused on climate, with limited funding allocated for biodiversity efforts. This is partially explained by the fact that DAC members have been under pressure to act on climate change, which has resulted in slower progress in integrating biodiversity. Nevertheless, despite generally starting from a relatively lower base compared to climate change, biodiversity considerations are a growing interest among DAC members. Indeed, more and more members are integrating biodiversity protection into their ODA portfolios, with a few members now exploring how these biodiversity and climate domains could come under one roof, notably through the use of nature-based solutions. For instance, France is one of the first OECD countries to have developed a dedicated biodiversity development co-operation strategy and has tripled its ODA earmarked for biodiversity. The Netherlands is incorporating biodiversity into its ODA, with projects designed to preserve natural habitats and promote sustainable land use practices. USAID also deploys efforts for biodiversity protection, exploring intersections and entry points for integration between conservation and development sectors, including health and democracy, human rights, and governance. While incorporating biodiversity considerations remains difficult for many providers, and much of the action is delegated to the multilateral system, the DAC has played an important role in keeping biodiversity on the international agenda (DAC, 2024[5]).

Implementing whole-of-government approaches is crucial for the effective integration of climate considerations. Climate mainstreaming requires co-ordination between development co-operation and environment ministries and other ministries and bodies involved in ODA. In larger and decentralised DAC members, this coordination typically occurs through climate-specific working groups and mechanisms, while in smaller members, it often occurs through inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms for development co-operation. Providers can also agree on a set of whole-of-government co-operation priorities for environmental and climate action based on their domestic expertise, as recommended to Portugal in its 2022 Peer Review. Adopting a systematic integration of the gender-climate nexus in all pillars of co-operation, as done by Luxembourg, can significantly improve climate mainstreaming in development co-operation. Whole-of-government approaches ensure that climate action is addressed across all sectors and levels of government, fostering a more cohesive and comprehensive response to climate change. Some DAC members also make use of whole-of-government approaches to address limited climate expertise in their development agencies and ministries, drawing on capacity and technical skills from other ministries. Slovenia's Directorate for Development Co-operation, for instance, regularly partners with the Ministry of Environment to draw on its climate expertise. However, as highlighted in the DAC Declaration implementation survey, the need for support and peer learning in whole-of-government approaches to expand climate action is increasingly recognised.

3. Achieving climate finance ambitions requires mobilising diverse resources, promoting innovative finance mechanisms and balancing partner country demands with providers' objectives

Climate finance disbursements by DAC members are on an upward trajectory, yet challenges remain when scaling up support. DAC members' bilateral ODA for climate change is increasing, both in volume and as a share of the total. In 2022, developed countries provided and mobilised USD 115.9

billion in climate finance for developing countries, exceeding the annual USD 100 billion goal for the first time. Public climate finance -bilateral and multilateral attributable to developed countries- accounted for close to 80% of the total in 2022 and increased from USD 38 billion in 2013 to USD 91.6 billion in 2022 (OECD, 2024[6]). In recent years, providers such as New Zealand have expanded climate efforts and deployed strategies to deliver on international commitments. However, many other DAC members still face challenges when scaling up support for climate action. The DAC Peer Reviews of Poland, Slovenia, and the Netherlands underline challenges such as ODA budget constraints, limited expertise, and capacity issues. Against this context, providers can support partner countries in better accessing and co-ordinating climate finance, including from multilateral organisations and funds, as recommended in the 2023 New Zealand Peer Review. Balancing speed, scale, and quality in climate finance is also crucial, as well as generating evidence to support resource allocations. Korea's DAC Peer Review noted that while the country has rapidly increased climate-related ODA, disbursements have been variable over the years. This variability, together with the need for clearer procedures and safeguards across implementing agencies, underscores the importance of maintaining the quality and consistency of disbursements. The Netherlands' 2021 Climate Finance Evaluation serves as an example of generating evidence to inform future resource allocations.

Some DAC members have significantly increased their climate finance in recent years, with a few even making it additional to their ODA commitments. France, Korea, New Zealand, and the Netherlands have all increased their climate finance commitments in the last years, as highlighted in recent DAC Peer Reviews. Luxembourg and Italy have gone further by ensuring that their climate finance contributions are additional to their existing ODA, setting an example for others. However, sustaining and ensuring predictability in climate finance is necessary for accountability and long-term impact. The United Kingdom's experience highlights the importance of predictability, where the 2023 Written Ministerial Statement outlined how the United Kingdom intends to meet its GBP 11.6 billion climate finance pledge by 2025-26. The United Kingdom aims to offer greater predictability for partner countries by providing greater details on commitments, including geographic allocations. Other development co-operation providers could look at these examples and consider how they can similarly enhance their predictable climate finance contributions, in addition to ensuring alignment with partner countries' national climate goals and priorities.

DAC members are exploring ways to scale up their climate finance through private sector investments, but mobilising these resources remains complex. The Netherlands and France have been actively working to attract private sector investments, with the Netherlands leveraging instruments like the Dutch Fund for Climate and Development (DFCD) to support potentially bankable projects in their early stages. However, one significant challenge is the limited availability of bankable projects, particularly in sectors like adaptation, where financial returns are less immediate or harder to quantify. Consequently, private sector investments have primarily been directed towards mitigation in middle-income countries (MICs), where projects are perceived as more financially viable. For example, while France has succeeded in mobilising private finance for mitigation, it continues to face challenges in directing these investments towards adaptation projects. Similarly, Korea, through its Green New Deal ODA Strategy, has sought to engage the private sector in green projects but has encountered difficulties in scaling up investments in adaptation, particularly in areas with lower financial returns. These challenges underscore that climate finance does not operate in a vacuum; it is still beset by broader development challenges. The slow pace of private sector engagement reflects the ongoing difficulties in aligning financial interests with the broader sustainable development goals. Addressing those will require complex, long-term reforms, such as building capacity, strengthening financial and regulatory institutions, and fostering a stable, predictable investment climate.

Innovative finance remains in its early stages and needs to be scaled up for a broader impact in expanding climate finance. Given DAC members' diverse capabilities and contexts, each provider needs to identify and leverage its comparative advantages. For instance, Luxembourg has promoted innovative financing mechanisms by adopting an innovative finance strategy and establishing a unique green stock exchange. France's sustainability bonds have also been a resounding success, covering 50% of AFD's financing needs and featuring significant involvement of private investors. While replicating such initiatives may be challenging for others, it underscores the value of tailored approaches that play to each provider's strengths. Scaling up innovative finance also involves broader adoption of strategies like blended finance mechanisms and the support of green technologies, which can mitigate risks and facilitate the mobilisation of funding for climate. Beyond innovative finance, innovation in broader terms also offers an opportunity to explore and target interconnected challenges, such as fragility and biodiversity, particularly for providers working in vulnerable, high-risk, disaster-prone, and often fragile environments, as recommended to New Zealand in its Peer Review.

Enhancing transparency and accountability in reporting climate-related ODA contributes to achieving climate finance ambitions and promotes greater trust and collaboration in global efforts. Advancements in transparency and accountability of climate finance contribute to ensuring that funds are used more effectively and help build trust amongst stakeholders, including providers' own national parliaments and societies, as well as partner countries. For many DAC members, reporting against the Rio Markers remains the primary approach to achieving transparency in climate finance. Finland and the Netherlands have been noted in their DAC Peer Reviews for their efforts in improving the accuracy and transparency of their climate-related ODA reporting as a way to advance towards climate finance ambitions. France has enhanced reporting efforts to promote greater trust and collaboration in global climate finance efforts. However, some members, such as Belgium and Poland, could benefit from improved screening and more consistent use of the Rio Markers.

Strategic use of multilateral organisations can amplify the impact of DAC members' climate finance, but it requires careful selection of areas that align with their priorities and capacities. New Zealand's Peer Review highlights the importance of leveraging multilateral and regional channels for delivering climate finance quickly and effectively. The Netherlands was commended in its 2023 Peer Review for its advocacy of adaptation finance and efforts to mobilise private climate finance. The United Kingdom has shown significant leadership in multilateral fora to drive global climate action. At the same time, France has been on the multilaterals' boards, helping to ensure that climate vulnerability is considered in making partner countries eligible for concessional funding. The contributions of France and Korea to international climate funds further highlight their strategic use of multilateral channels. For DAC members with less climate expertise, such as Slovenia, specialised multilateral organisations offer an opportunity to maximise the impact of their contributions. Nonetheless, navigating the multilateral climate finance landscape can become complex and resource-intensive. DAC members need to engage with multilaterals with full awareness of the resources and engagement needed to ensure success in their partnership with multilaterals. For instance, Iceland targets areas where its contributions can have the most significant impact, such as fragile contexts, and New Zealand focuses on substantial investments in a few key areas.

4. DAC members are supporting green transitions by phasing out coal and fossil fuels, enhancing technical assistance, and aligning domestic actions with global sustainability goals

DAC members are committed to supporting just, green transitions, including by transitioning away from supporting coal and fossil fuels. As outlined in the 2024 Development Co-operation Report,

integrating climate action with efforts to end poverty and reduce inequalities is crucial for development co-operation, especially as climate change threatens to push an additional 132 million people into poverty by 2030 (OECD, 2024[7]). In 2021, DAC members committed in the Declaration to aligning their ODA with the goals of the Paris Agreement, prioritising support for renewable energy and energy efficiency, and ending new ODA for unabated international thermal coal power generation by the end of 2021 (DAC, 2021[8]). G7 members also committed to ending direct government support for unabated thermal coal power generation by the end of 2021 and provided up to USD 2 billion to support partner countries in transitioning from coal (G7, 2021[9]). Other DAC members that are not part of the G7 have also committed to or taken action to end support for fossil fuels projects, shifting focus to green energy initiatives. For instance, the Netherlands has been commended in its 2023 Peer Review for aligning its development co-operation with sustainable energy goals by ceasing fossil fuel subsidies. Similarly, South Korea's peer review highlighted its ambitious Green New Deal ODA Strategy, which prioritises green energy and supports the energy transition in partner countries.

Some DAC members provide technical assistance and capacity strengthening to support partner countries' green transitions. New Zealand is noted for its efforts in capacity strengthening, supporting partner countries in developing the necessary infrastructure and expertise for sustainable development. Through its technical assistance, New Zealand draws on cross-government engagement through peer-to-peer networks of senior officials in the Pacific region. It also actively involves regional technical organisations, which has proven to help support sustainability in delivering climate finance in Pacific SIDS. The Netherlands provides technical support to developing countries, focusing on transitioning to sustainable energy sources. Czechia has also offered capacity-building programs to enhance the skills and knowledge required for just green transitions, exemplified by the Aragvi Protected Landscape project in Georgia, which strengthens the socioeconomic well-being of the local communities while protecting the natural and cultural heritage (OECD, 2023[10]). These examples showcase how DAC members can support partner countries in tailored ways by providing expertise in valued and relevant areas. To further improve capacity strengthening efforts, providers can enable locally led development by respecting and integrating local knowledge, facilitating tailored capacity building, and supporting peer-to-peer networks and strong partnerships. These approaches ensure more sustainable, locally owned outcomes.

Providers increasingly leverage their political influence in international fora to support partner countries' green transitions, underlining the need for coordination and follow-up of climate initiatives. Smaller providers like Czechia and Slovenia have used their European Union Council Presidencies to push for stronger commitments and support for green transitions in the international arena. Some have worked in partnership with partner country governments to support their participation and leadership in international fora, as Switzerland has done with Peru during COP20 in Lima or Luxembourg by helping Cabo Verde in climate negotiations. Other providers, such as the United Kingdom, have advocated for climate justice, using its leadership in multilateral climate negotiations to support the voices of LDCs and SIDS. Or France, whose political efforts in global climate forums have emphasised the importance of aligning climate action with social equity, ensuring that climate strategies do not exacerbate existing inequalities. However, while initiatives like the United Kingdom's Task Force on Access to Climate Finance and the Netherlands' role in the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action contribute to advancing specific climate goals, there is a need for careful co-ordination and follow-up. This ensures that all climate finance efforts complement the already complex multilateral landscape, avoiding potential overlaps and maximising collective impact.

Aligning domestic policies with global sustainability goals is crucial for ensuring DAC members' comprehensive approaches to supporting green transitions in partner countries. In this sense, the Netherlands has significantly changed its domestic policies, reducing fossil fuel subsidies and increasing

investments in renewable energy. However, most DAC members face challenges in addressing transboundary impacts on developing countries, as highlighted in the OECD 2024 Report on Policy Coherence for Development (OECD, forthcoming[11]). These challenges include gaps in quality analysis, evidence, and political support, which undermine the effectiveness of development co-operation. For instance, Portugal could further strengthen policy coherence mechanisms to maintain its international standing on environmental and climate action, leveraging its legal and institutional frameworks. Similarly, while the United States and South Korea have taken steps to align their domestic policies with international commitments, fully integrating these efforts remains a challenge. Ensuring a globally just transition requires providers to identify and manage the spillover effects of their climate policies on developing countries. By prioritising greater policy coherence, development co-operation providers can build mutual trust and deliver mutually beneficial outcomes for global just transitions, as emphasised in the 2024 Development Co-operation Report (OECD, 2024[7]).

5. Balancing adaptation efforts is crucial to better supporting LDCs and SIDS, setting clear policies, and adapting financing modalities

Clear policies and targets for climate change adaptation can advance adaptation efforts yet need to be delivered upon. To respond to the commitments made in the DAC Declaration, DAC members have developed policies and targets for climate adaptation. For example, Portugal has developed strategies for climate adaptation. New Zealand has committed to invest at least 50% of its international climate finance in adaptation and at least 50% in the Pacific, while the Netherlands has committed to achieving a share of 50% of adaptation finance. Iceland also aims to maintain a balance between climate finance for adaptation and mitigation. Developing such policies and targets can be a helpful strategy to signal a good commitment to the agenda and to be kept accountable. While there are examples such as France exceeding their adaptation target in 2018, questions remain, however, on how such targets will be met in the context of pressure on ODA and whether the volume of commitments can match the urgent need for adaptation action.

The choice of financing modalities significantly impacts providers' adaptation efforts. The different needs of a specific context determine the appropriate mix of instruments. This means that the use of grants and loans should be tailored to the desired positive impact of adaptation measures in partner countries. The Peer Review of France suggested increasing adaptation efforts by directing more funding in the form of subsidies, a better financing option for social infrastructure, especially in LDCs where poverty and climate change intersect. Other DAC Members are piloting other modalities. For instance, New Zealand is exploring opportunities to use "flexible budget financing" in a number of priority partner countries with a clear set of results tagged to national adaptation plans. In fragile environments, working through multilateral channels can be strategic for delivering climate adaptation support, as demonstrated by Iceland's contributions to the UN Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund. DAC members should keep in mind that different financing modalities do lead to different development impacts, which calls for the need to keep questioning and adapting the instruments to contexts and needs.

Climate finance for adaptation could target better the most in need. The 2024 Development Co-operation Report underlines how while overall LDCs received almost twice as much bilateral ODA from DAC members for adaptation than for mitigation, data on the distribution of ODA per person in extreme poverty shows that adaptation ODA has not kept up with the concentration of extreme poverty in LDCs (OECD, 2024[7]). In line with the ambitions of the DAC Declaration, findings from Peer Reviews highlight that there is a need for enhanced focus on LDCs and SIDS. While some DAC members have increased support for adaptation in LDCs and SIDS in their policies and actions, as done by Luxemburg and New Zealand, other countries such as France aim to ensure a better balance between mitigation and adaptation

funding, more targeted at LDCs. The Netherlands' peer review also highlighted that the current climate strategy that creates opportunities for Dutch businesses in adaptation and mitigation could potentially exacerbate risks that support will focus on middle-income countries that can afford Dutch services instead of the most vulnerable and in need.

Locally led adaptation is an approach that has become increasingly relevant for DAC members to implement adaptation solutions driven by those most affected alongside supporting Nationally Determined Contributions. A number of DAC members and other development partners have committed to the Principles for Locally Led Adaptation[2], which aims to increase climate adaptation funding to local actors, devolve decision-making to local actors, and leverage local knowledge and capacities. It centres on the agency, needs, and knowledge of local communities, especially the most in need and heavily affected by the impacts of climate change when crafting and executing climate adaptation strategies (World Resources Institute, n.d.[12]). Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States are among the DAC members championing locally led adaptation with a successful implementation of programs. Such initiative, as well as the increasing relevance of locally led development in the policy agenda, underscore a collective call for change to promote local leadership and agency in the face of historic power imbalances that have long shaped development practices (OECD, 2024, forthcoming[13]). This approach can also be supported by aligning DAC member support with Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). While most DAC members have some examples of supporting NDCs, either bilaterally or through multilateral organisations, it would be valuable to take stock of the practices that better support local ownership, priorities and capacities.

6. Conclusion

DAC members have made progress in aligning their development co-operation with the goals of the Paris Agreement, yet challenges remain. While DAC members have developed varied strategies, targets, and tools to align their programmes and projects with the Paris Agreement, the integration of climate considerations into ODA requires stronger policy coherence and a focus on managing transboundary impacts. To achieve just transitions, DAC members would benefit from prioritising cross-government collaboration and ensuring that their domestic policies do not undermine global sustainability goals.

Climate finance disbursements are increasing, but they still face challenges when scaling up climate efforts. Ensuring predictability, transparency, and scalability in climate finance is critical, particularly for reaching the most vulnerable countries. Moving forward, DAC members need to continue innovating and expanding partnerships, particularly with the private sector, to mobilise additional resources while ensuring that financing mechanisms are well-targeted. The strategic use of multilateral organisations can also amplify the impact of DAC members' climate finance, but it requires a careful selection of multilaterals and sectors to partner with.

Positive steps have been taken in supporting green transitions, including the phase-out of fossil fuel support—where still provided at the time of the DAC Declaration—and enhancing technical assistance and capacity building.DAC members are also leveraging their influence in international fora to advocate for green transitions. However, coordination and follow-up of international initiatives are crucial to avoid fragmented efforts. DAC members could prioritise strategic, co-ordinated actions that align with their capacities and partner countries' needs. Additionally, aligning domestic policies with global sustainability

[2] DAC members endorsing the Principles for Locally Led Adaptation: Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States (World Resources Institute, n.d.[12]).

goals is essential for maximising development co-operation efforts.

Adaptation efforts are gaining momentum, but more needs to be done to support the most vulnerable, particularly in LDCs and SIDS. Clear policies, appropriate financing modalities, and a focus on locally led adaptation are key to effective climate action. DAC members need to ensure that their adaptation strategies are adequately funded and effectively targeted to address the needs of those most impacted by climate change, ensuring that development co-operation supports those most in need.

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