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DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE

MORE EFFECTIVE DELIVERY OF CLIMATE ACTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

DAC Perspectives on Effective Development Co-operation

This document is submitted for INFORMATION to inform user-friendly DAC tools to support DAC members implement their long-standing effectiveness commitments in view of the rapidly evolving global architecture of development co-operation and diverse national contexts.

This secretariat note sets out an overview of the main challenges across the DAC in relation to the effectiveness principles and their application to deliver climate action in developing countries.

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1 Effective development and climate action

Sustainable development and climate change are closely intertwined

A just transition towards environmentally sustainable, low-emissions and climate-resilient development pathways is critical for countries' ability to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development[1]. Yet, sustainable development and climate change are often perceived as competing for financial resources and policy attention[2]. Adopting aggressive emissions reduction policies may curb economic growth which in turn can limit countries' capacity to respond to climate risks. Climate action can also have potentially significant spill over effects that adversely affect development efforts. Decisions relating to infrastructure, settlement and city design for instance may cause maladaptation[3] when creating long-term commitments to wasteful patterns of fossil energy use. Unless carefully planned, development efforts can increase vulnerability to climate change.[4]

As the urgency of stabilizing the climate mounts, countries' development choices will be increasingly influenced by the pressing need to reduce emissions and adapt to the impact of climate change. Development partners can support developing countries to acquire the knowledge, resources and capacities to undertake their just transition towards low-emissions and climate-resilient development. Development co-operation activities can help building resilience and adaptive capacity along with promoting livelihood security for poor and vulnerable people. Sound climate policy is therefore also sound development policy.

Members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) issued a joint Declaration ahead of COP26 committing to align official development assistance (ODA) with the goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. This includes applying the Busan Principles for effective development co-operation systematically across their development co-operation efforts and the broader climate finance landscape to accelerate progress against the Paris Agreement. This requires at the same time to integrate such considerations within their own organisations. To date, the integration of environmental and climate concerns has been difficult to fully achieve in practice.[5]

The question for development co-operation is how to most effectively support developing countries to mitigate climate risks and adapt to climate change. The picture on the ground is likely to be more nuanced and complex, but the same issues that were raised through the effectiveness agenda,

[1] (IPCC, 2022[28])
[2] (World Bank Group, 2010[3])
[3] Maladaptation refers to actions that may lead to increased risk of adverse climate-related outcomes, including via increased greenhouse gas emissions, increased or shifted vulnerability to climate change, more inequitable outcomes, or diminished welfare, now or in the future. Most often, maladaptation is an unintended consequence
[4] (World Bank Group, 2010[3])
[5] (OECD, 2019[38])

and that are reflected in the development effectiveness principles, remain crucial in the context of climate action.

Several processes and efforts are underway that are concerned with the effectiveness of climate action. Initiatives such as the 'Principles and Recommendations on Access to Climate Finance'[6] or the NDC Partnership take the effectiveness agenda as a basis for developing principles and approaches tailored to the climate finance context. In light thereof, there is a real risk that an increasing momentum for separate effectiveness processes for climate finance risks re-learning the same basic lessons since the adoption of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which will take time, based on the same mistakes made.

To realise both the opportunities for enhanced effectiveness, and address the risks of disjointed, separate effectiveness agendas, it is key to ensure the learnings and principles of the effectiveness agenda are brought to climate action. Nevertheless, development and climate actions remain largely isolated from each other.[7] Conscious and proactive efforts are required to bridge the development community and the climate community towards enabling the much-needed momentum for closer collaboration.

Climate finance is a key ingredient of global and national climate action

Climate finance takes predominantly the form of climate related ODA (Box.1**).** Designated climate funds are typically capitalised by bilateral ODA. At the same time, they only account for a small share of partner countries' total climate finance expenditure. The delivery of most support to developing countries for climate and environmental objectives takes place through the rest of the development system i.e., through development budgets and finance, through its institutions, channels and instruments, both bi- and multilateral.

[6] Established by the UK COP26 Presidency's Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance.
[7] (Horn-Phathanothai and Tanner, 2014[4])

Box.1. Climate-related ODA

For this paper climate finance is defined in the narrow sense as "*climate-related bilateral ODA provided by the members of the OECD-DAC*". According to OECD estimates, in 2019, 79% of climate finance counting towards the USD 100 billion commitment took the form of climate-related ODA. Most DAC members use these climate-related ODA flows, bilateral and multilateral, as base for reporting to the UNFCCC. The paper adopts this narrow definition in view of conceptual and methodological clarity fully recognizing the validity and relevance of broader climate finance definitions, particularly those under the UNFCCC. The latter refers to climate finance in a broad sense as local, national, or transnational financing—drawn from public, private and alternative sources of financing—that seeks to support mitigation and adaptation actions that will address climate change. Lessons learned reviewed for this paper include

Adopting a narrow scope inevitably entails leaving some relevant topics out of the analysis. Potential synergies, for instance, between climate-related ODA and other sources of climate finance, private sector, or climate specific aid modalities such as green guarantees are not explored. While acknowledging that several DAC members deliver their climate action predominantly through multilateral channels, this paper does not enter in greater details on the specificities of multilateral climate finance delivery (for instance through the Green Climate Fund or the World Bank Group) unless lessons learned might be relevant for bilateral climate finance provided by DAC members.

In 2021 DAC members allocated only 27.6% of their bilateral ODA to climate objectives.[8] For the first time, adaptation-related ODA surpassed mitigation-related ODA. Over one-third of climate-related ODA supported climate action as a *principal* objective in 2021 (USD 14 billion, like 2020). Activities that supported climate action as a significant objective totalled USD 23 billion.[9] At the same time, the data do not support a strong or clear overall increase in the focus on environmental and climate objectives since 2015, which could be expected from an overall enhanced focus on or mainstreaming of these dimensions across development programmes.[10] This points to the potential to further enhance the integration of climate and environmental objectives across development co-operation activities which would contribute to greater effectiveness of current climate finance.

Many developing countries share a perception that neither the scale nor the quality of climate finance is adequate for addressing the mounting challenges of climate change. The questions of providing and supporting climate actions, are questions that relate to actual operations, policy and mechanisms for delivery and coordination through the development system, which relate immediately and directly to the core of the development effectiveness agenda.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation and effective climate action

Already in 2011, the Busan 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness made explicit the link between the aid effectiveness principles and climate-related ODA. Climate finance was outlined as a priority for effective international development, to "*continue to support national climate change policy and*

[8] (OECD, 2023[6])
[9] (OECD, 2023[6])
[10] (OECD, 2019[38])

planning as an integral part of developing countries' overall national development plans and ensure that – where appropriate – these measures are financed, delivered and monitored through developing countries' systems in a transparent manner". In the past, the GPEDC and ENVIRONET worked together on a Partnership on Climate Finance and Effective Development to foster more coherence and collaboration between the climate change and development policy communities.[11]

More recently the Co-Chairs of the GPEDC issued a Statement on Effectiveness Lessons for more Impactful Climate Action in Development Co-operation ahead of COP26 calling for renewed emphasis on making "*effective development co-operation and effective partnerships critical enablers of net-zero and climate-resilient pathways*." Experiences and lessons of the diverse partners leading the GPEDC on how to apply the effectiveness principles can help to unleash more effective development co-operation and partnerships for impactful climate action at country level. Plenary discussion at the 2022 Effective Development Co-operation Summit in Geneva focused on an emerging understanding of a forward agenda for enhanced effectiveness of climate finance (See Box.2).

Box.2. Key message from the 2022 Effective Development Co-operation Summit's session on "Effectively Financing Climate Adaption"

- Without prior consultation and leadership from the local communities who know and understand the local realities, donor-led interventions may risk having a negative effect, causing maladaptation, rather than strengthening the resilience of vulnerable communities.
- Policy coherence and country ownership is critical. It does not make sense to invest in fossil fuels on one hand and invest in adaptation measures on the other. A just transition implies development partners apply the same "green" requirements to their domestic investments as well as development co-operation. Climate actions as outlined in Nationally Determined Contributions and National Adaptation Plans must be fully integrated in national planning and development strategies, including in the coordination of international development cooperation.
- There is a large potential for the UN System, bilateral development partners and GPEDC to take a stronger role in coordinating efforts, increasing effectiveness of climate finance and strengthening resilience to ensure no one is left behind.

Source: Plenary Session 1: Effectively Financing Climate Adaptation: Country-Owned Approaches in Building Resilience & Leaving No One Behind | Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (effectivecooperation.org)

DAC tools to support more effective development co-operation

This secretariat note explores the challenges and practices across the DAC to meet their ambition in addressing the climate challenge in partner countries. It was developed as part of the preparatory process for the plenary session on effectively financing climate adaptation at the 2022 Effective Development Co-operation Summit. It also responds to the DAC Declaration on Climate Change which calls upon "*sharing best practice and engage in peer learning to enable and improve DAC members' climate and environment policies*". DAC members' effectiveness focal points can engage their climate policy experts to discuss and explore how to proactively connect the effectiveness and climate agenda, and to ensure the lessons and principles of effectiveness are brought into the climate agenda.

[11] Partnership for Climate Finance and Development 2015.pdf (oecd.org)

The paper provides some initial indications on how DAC members make best use of the four Effectiveness Principles to transform climate action into more effective development interventions and partnerships. Through a member-driven, collaborative effort the DCD effectiveness team is developing operational guidance and complementary user-friendly training materials, including TIPS *in practices.* In addition, the DCD effectiveness team is developing TIPS[12] Fundamentals that unpack the effectiveness principles in view of members' current approaches to apply them across different country settings. This comprehensive set of new DAC tools will support peer learning for more effective engagement at the country level and inform future peer reviews.

An important challenge to substantiating the learning areas in this paper is the limited evidence and concrete examples in the literature of how bilateral climate finance providers address some of the challenges identified in this paper. This paper summarizes the main findings from a review of academic journals, grey literature and primary sources from DAC members and other providers of development co-operation in addition to technical contributions and strategic deliberations from DAC members throughout the several informal reference group discussions and Effectiveness Sounding Board meetings that have taken place since the GPEDC Senior Level Meeting in 2019. Early draft versions of this paper have benefited from technical inputs by Sweden and Switzerland, respectively incoming and outgoing co-chairs of the GPEDC, as well as feedback by ECDPM, ODI and the NDC partnership.

[12] Development Co-operation TIPs · Tools Insights Practices is a searchable peer learning platform that offers insights into making policies, systems and partnerships more effective.

2 Binding constraints, tensions and operational challenges

Recent evaluations and studies largely concur on persistent challenges for delivering climate action in line with the effectiveness principles and associated good practices. These challenges cut across DAC members' policies, mechanisms, systems and capacities to deliver climate action in partner countries. DAC member efforts to tackle these institutional and operational bottlenecks are often detached from country-level dialogue and coordination and don't respond to national contexts of respective partner countries.

Mainstreaming climate change into development planning and policies remains work in progress

Many DAC members lack a comprehensive, dedicated strategy as to what effective climate action entails and how it should be operationalised. Providers' strategic goals for climate action tend to be largely general and diffuse, with limited strategic and operational flexibility to adjust to evolving conditions in partner countries.[13] This translates into projects that respond to pressures to deliver rapid results, without considering longer-term outcomes nor integrating results in their performance.[14]

- **High-level policy dialogue at country level**. Tackling climate change requires transformative and long-term approaches that are only feasible when underpinned by political leadership at the highest level, behind which development partners can align.[15] Climate finance providers insufficiently engage in systematic high-level policy dialogue with partner countries around the ambitious transformations needed and the ways to achieve these.[16] The limited visibility of climate action and climate awareness among government leaders in most partner countries complicates supporting a coherent whole-of-government approach and integrated national vision for tackling the risks of climate change.[17]
- **Coordination and collaboration**. Development partner coordination on climate finance is insufficient in many developing countries, with fragmented small-scale projects compromising effectiveness and sustainability of external support.[18] The lack of joint efforts to improve predictability, transparency and accountability contributes to weak ownership, limited capacities, siloed approaches and insufficient knowledge sharing at the country level.[19] Particularly capacity strengthening and policy dialogue seem to suffer most from uncoordinated and sometimes

[13] (OECD and AfDB, 2016[7]), (Lundsgaarde, Dupuy and Persson, 2018[8]), (Green Climate Fund, 2019[9]), (INTOSAI, 2022[10]), (Asensio, Blasquier and Sedemund, 2022[11]), (UNDP, 2021[12])
[14] (Bauer et al., 2021[13]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14]), (OECD, 2019[38])
[15] (CDDE, 2016[15]), (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (OECD and AfDB, 2016[7])
[16] (World Bank Group, 2020[17]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14])
[17] (OECD and AfDB, 2016[7]), (OECD, 2019[38]), (OECD, 2021[43])
[18] (OECD, 2022[40]), (OECD, 2019[38]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14])
[19] (Green Climate Fund, 2019[9]), (OECD, 2019[38]), (UNDESA, 2021[18]) (Shawoo et al., 2022[19])

competitive performance of individual providers.[20] Large variety of global and regional programmes compound the challenges of country level coordination, especially in capacity development. UN organisations at country level with their often quite central positions and larger staff count than many of the bilateral providers have an important role to play in donor coordination mechanisms through the UN Resident Coordinator (RC).

- **Use of country systems**. There is little evidence of how climate finance providers use country systems for delivering their climate action. At the same time, most developing countries have yet to fully integrate climate goals and results across their national planning, financial, budgetary and results systems. National public financial management, budgets and procurement systems often do not reflect consistent climate objectives – even where these are outlined in respective national long-term strategies (LTS), national adaptation plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) –, thus compromising effectiveness and accountability.[21] Development partners often do not involve central ministries, particularly the Ministries of Finance, to engage in joint efforts to adjust country systems to ambitious climate action.[22] Supporting partner country efforts to adjust and strengthen their national systems is a key avenue of enabling and harnessing the potential of public investments in climate action.[23]
- **Adequate aid modalities.** Small-scale project-type interventions make up most of bilateral climate finance. Despite its potential to support and reward transformative change, programmatic and policy-based climate finance remain exceptions in current climate finance due to risk adversity and lack of consistent engagement in complex country policy processes. This generates adverse incentives for partner countries that consider more ambitious action but are not receiving adequate support.[24] At the same time, weak partner country leadership and commitment to policy reforms needed for meaningful climate action are a disincentive for DAC members to consider larger-scale and longer-term climate finance.[25] Whilst the modality will depend on local context, the aim for all should be to facilitate long-term, coordinated and more predictable provision of climate finance around a nationally owned unified vision.[26]

Risks of maladaptation

Many efforts to adapt to climate change are counterproductively increasing climate vulnerability, rather than reducing it[27], causing 'maladaptation'. The risks of maladaptation increase when climate action is implemented to address only the impacts of climate change, rather than the underlying drivers of climate vulnerability, such as gender inequity, marginalization of certain ethnic groups and other power inequalities[28]. The most marginalized are often those who see their vulnerability compounded in these scenarios[29].

- **Top-down approaches**. Local communities are on the frontlines of climate change impacts, yet rarely do they and other local actors have a voice in the decisions that most affect them. At the country level climate finance remains highly concentrated on central governments with only limited

[20] (Green Climate Fund, 2019[9]), (COP26 Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance, 2021[20]), (International Monetary Fund, 2022[21]), (Shawoo et al., 2022[19]), (Asensio, Blasquier and Sedemund, 2022[11])
[21] (OECD and AfDB, 2016[7]), (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (OECD, 2019[38]), (International Monetary Fund, 2022[21])
[22] (Green Climate Fund, 2019[9]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14]), (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (Shawoo et al., 2022[19]), (UNDP, 2021[12])
[23] (World Bank Group, 2020[17]), (International Monetary Fund, 2022[21])
[24] (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (OECD, 2019[38]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14])
[25] (World Bank Group, 2020[17]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14])
[26] (Government of the UK, 2021[5])
[27] (Schipper, 2022[22])
[28] (Bertana et al., 2022[23])
[29] (Eriksen et al., 2021[24])

experiences in promoting whole-of-society ownership[30], particularly at the local level or in country contexts where governments are less motivated to leave no one behind[31]. Country offices often lack dedicated capacity to engage with an increasing number of local partners[32].

- **Adapting to individual country contexts.** Country-specific challenges are often insufficiently assessed[33] and can thus not be addressed comprehensively[34] nor linked to the prospective use of large-scale delivery modalities such as policy- or results-based financing[35]. Deficient communication with, e.g., the coordinators of national climate change plans, complicate understanding of country-specific contexts. Lack of timely and context-sensitive data and analysis compounds the difficulties to understand national contexts and respond to evolving opportunities and challenges, including in capacity development[36]. Delivering climate action in partner countries that may be affected by conflict, disaster or are characterised by very limited institutional capacity comes with its own set of challenges, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
- **Enabling environment for non-state actors**. Civil society organizations often do not have the capacity to engage in complex climate finance decision-making processes. This is further exacerbated by weak national multi-stakeholder dialogue mechanisms and shrinking civic space[37]. Overall, the enabling environment for non-state actors – including private sector – remains fragmented and underexplored, with only few providers active in this area[38].
- **Insufficient learning at country level**. Knowledge generation and management are often concentrated in global platforms that do not feed into policy reform, capacity development and learning at the national level[39]. The potential of supporting South-South and triangular learning to influence country processes and inform national reforms remains largely untapped[40]. Despite many examples of climate finance approaches, solutions and tools at the country level, too little is done to ensure that partner countries learn from each other's best practices[41].

Transparency is a central concern

Transparency around climate finance is critical for partner countries for building trust and the ability to effectively manage resources provided. Climate finance providers' lack of transparency and disclosure hinders mutual accountability[42]. Development partners and partner countries differ in their priorities over tracking finance flows versus monitoring the development results of finance[43]. Transparency supports better aligning climate finance by identify developing countries' priorities and outstanding challenges[44].

- **Predictability and transparency**. Existing tools and platforms for tracking and monitoring climate-related ODA, including the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) or the OECD's creditor Reporting System, are not sufficiently used by governments and providers to ensure

[30] (OECD and AfDB, 2016[7]), (CDDE, 2016[15]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14])
[31] (Green Climate Fund, 2019[9]), (OECD, 2019[38]), (OECD, 2021[41])
[32] (Asensio, Blasquier and Sedemund, 2022[11])
[33] (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (UNFCCC. Paris Committee on Capacity Building, 2022[25])
[34] (OECD and AfDB, 2016[7]), (UNDP, 2021[12])
[35] (World Bank Group, 2020[17]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14])
[36] (CABRI, 2021[26])
[37] (CDDE, 2016[15]), (CABRI, 2021[26])
[38] (Bauer et al., 2021[13]), (International Monetary Fund, 2022[21]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14]), (World Bank Group, 2020[17])
[39] (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14])
[40] (OECD, 2021[43]), (UNDP, 2021[12])
[41] (CDDE, 2016[15]), (Bauer et al., 2021[13]), (UNDP, 2021[12])
[42] (Green Climate Fund, 2019[9]), (OECD, 2019[38])
[43] (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16])
[44] (OECD, 2022[40])

transparency[45]. This is compounded by separate accounting frameworks for climate-related ODA (through the OECD DAC CRS) and climate finance (in view of the UNFCCC 100 billion dollar climate finance commitment). Consequently, developing countries struggle to understand what climate finance they receive compared to their 'regular' development finance. At the same time, development partners' complicated disbursement procedures or delays by partner countries to provide satisfactory audit reports slow down disbursements and implementation of projects.

- **Mutual accountability**. The lack of a shared common normative frameworks around how to account for climate finance and what alignment to the Paris Agreement practically means, slows down progress towards mutual accountability at country level[46]. As opposed to development forums enabling dialogue and accountability based in the Busan Principles for Effective Development Co-operation in many countries, there is no equivalent country-led forum of mutual accountability for climate finance[47]. Furthermore, it is hard to aggregate the outcomes of climate action as such information is reported using different methodologies, approaches and indicators[48].
- **Monitoring results of climate adaptation.** While monitoring and evaluation of adaptation outcomes is fundamental to understanding the progress and effectiveness of adaptation, most current monitoring focuses instead on planning and implementation[49]. These aspects tend to be easier to track and quantify than the outcomes or impacts of adaptation actions. Methodological challenges include attributing results to specific adaptation interventions or working around the uncertainties and shifting baselines of climate change hazards. Empirical challenges (e.g., lack of data or databases) and conceptual challenges (e.g., lack of consensus on definitions of key terms) further complicate monitoring and evaluation. In a similar vein, capacity constraints and resource limitations can also significantly impede the development of monitoring and evaluation systems for adaptation and their maintenance over time[50]. Under-resourced and fragmented national results systems with reduced influence in policymaking further compound these challenges[51]. These different shortcomings eventually limit the potential to evaluate and learn what works and what doesn't, potentially perpetuating suboptimal practices. Much more dedicated efforts are needed to identify and bring forward current good practices.

Country capacity gaps as a key challenge for more country-led climate action[52]

Mechanisms for accessing climate finance are often slow, complex, resource intensive, uncertain, and project based[53]. The main challenge faced by partner countries in effectively accessing development and climate finance, therefore, often lies in their human and technical capacity constraints in meeting donors' proposal standards and reporting requirements.

At the same time, many DAC members lack an operational approach that is adaptable to distinct contexts and tend to be overoptimistic when supporting technical dimensions of climate action delivery[54]. Few are engaging in comprehensive capacity building to support partner countries attracting and managing climate finance. DAC members pay insufficient attention to ensure that partner countries´ institutional capacities are improving to plan, implement and coordinate climate action policies and

[45] (CDDE, 2016[15]), (OECD, 2021[43]), (CABRI, 2021[26])
[46] (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (NDC Partnership, 2022[27])
[47] (CDDE, 2016[15]), (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (OECD and AfDB, 2016[7])
[48] (OECD, 2022[40])
[49] (IPCC, 2022[28])
[50] (UNFCCC Adaptation Committee, 2014[29]))
[51] (Bauer et al., 2021[13]), (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (OECD and AfDB, 2016[7])
[52] (OECD, 2019[38]), (World Bank Group, 2020[17]), (International Monetary Fund, 2022[21])
[53] (Government of the UK, 2021[5]))
[54] (Lundsgaarde, Dupuy and Persson, 2018[8]), (Cao et al., 2021[2]), (Shawoo et al., 2022[19])

programs[55]. The fragmentation and high transaction costs, including through the use of intermediaries instead of direct access to finance, compromises country-level outcomes of existing regional and global capacity platforms[56].

[55] (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (Green Climate Fund, 2019[9]), (International Monetary Fund, 2022[21]), (Asensio, Blasquier and Sedemund, 2022[11]), (UNDP, 2021[12])

[56] (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14]), (Asensio, Blasquier and Sedemund, 2022[11])

3 "Effectiveness pathways" to deliver on DAC commitments

'Effectiveness pathways' set out 'what good looks like' for each effectiveness principle in climate action in developing countries. They provide a medium-term direction of travel and reinforce members' longer-term thinking across development planning, programming and budgeting cycles towards achieving more sustainable development results. By encouraging realism and continuity towards implementing the DAC Declaration on Climate Change the effectiveness pathways support DAC members developing a coherent, strong narrative on how their development co-operation supports effective climate action, backed by a solid theory of change.

Effectiveness pathways also provide clearer incentives and accountability mechanism to support monitoring progress against the DAC Declaration on Climate Change. By identifying a baseline to assess progress over time they can inform DAC peer reviews and drive mutual learning and dialogue around DAC members' progress on applying the effectiveness principles across their climate action. They are therefore mainly targeted at programme officers and policymakers in DAC member government entities, from the central level down through to local administrative units, including development practitioners with sectoral specialisation in country offices in partner countries and Heads of Co-operation at DAC members' embassies.

The DAC does not operate in isolation but collaborates with a diverse range of implementing partners to achieve its intended development results. For the DAC's effectiveness pathways to transpire to the country level and trigger meaningful behaviour changes, therefore requires engaging all relevant development stakeholders in the discussions around how to deliver more effectively on national climate change mitigation and adaptation priorities.

Country ownership

What good looks like:

Partner countries articulate their climate change priorities and corresponding results through NDCs, NAPs and LTSs through which climate finance is invested[57]. Partner countries integrate these national climate plans into their development and economic agendas underpinned by dedicated capacity support and improved access to climate finance, especially for Least Developed Countries. Achieving country-led climate goals builds on consistent, inter-institutional "whole-of-government" coordination beyond the conventional lead role of environment ministries and involving central ministries such as development planning and finance[58].

Development partners mainstream climate change across their development strategies, policies and programmes, in line with country level priorities and adapted to the long-term horizon of the climate

[57] (Schatalek and Bird, 2015[32]), (OECD, 2019[38]), (COP26 Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance, 2021[20]), (NDC Partnership, 2022[27])
[58] (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14]), (International Monetary Fund, 2022[21])

challenge. This requires ongoing, open and inclusive dialogue, as well as addressing gaps of leadership and capacities to facilitate partner country governments' readiness to access climate finance[59]. Climate finance providers adopt coordinated approaches to avoid duplication, foster complementarity and clarify division of labour. Such harmonized approaches, including with multilateral organisations, contribute to a better enabling environment where country systems, institutional capacities or political buy-in may lag behind.

To the extent possible, development partners implement their climate action strengthening and using national and subnational systems for planning, budgeting and results monitoring, across all relevant government bodies and national stakeholders, including National Statistics Offices, to integrate national climate goals and targets in national budgets and results frameworks[60].

Learning areas:

Aligning development co-operation with the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change[61]. This entails framing the provision of climate finance through comprehensive, dedicated strategies and plans, clarifying conceptual and normative underpinnings as well as institutional and operational arrangements of how climate finance will be allocated, disbursed, implemented and accounted for[62]. A majority of DAC Members also report using specific operational tools to further assist with the alignment, as well as to systematically integrate climate and environment considerations into monitoring, evaluation and learning frameworks[63]. Safeguard and screening policies enable checking whether activities may increase environmental, climatic and associated social vulnerability and, where necessary, ensure risk management measures are put in place.

- Specific measures to operationalise climate strategies include: ruling out any support for activities that have negative environmental impacts (**Slovak Republic**); climate-proof screening of development co-operation (**Ireland**); incorporating provisions for ensuring policy coherence between development co-operation and climate objectives across regulatory and planning frameworks (**Spain, Belgium, The Netherlands**); ensuring that aid programmes do not undermine countries' NDCs and NAPs (**United Kingdom**); include commitments to increase climate-related ODA in one's NDC (**Iceland**); or assess[64] both whether strategies, programmes and projects are at risk from, or could further contribute to, greenhouse gas emissions, environmental degradation or disaster risks (**Switzerland**).

High-level policy dialogue. Individually and where feasible, in a coordinated manner, climate finance providers should engage in a more ambitious policy dialogue with the partner government at a high level and involve all relevant decision-makers to discuss the opportunities and challenges of national long-term transformation towards low-carbon, climate-resilient development.

- **Just Energy Transition Partnerships** (JETP) are a novel pooled funding model to coordinate high-level policy dialogue with partner country leadership. JETPs are underway in South Africa, Indonesia, India, Viet Nam, and Senegal and support their just transition away from fossil energy and toward clean energy. The first JTEP, agreed with South Africa, was launched at the COP26 by the International Partners Group of **France**, **Germany**, **UK**, **US** and the **EU**, chaired by the **UK**.

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[59] (USAID, 2015[30]), (World Bank Group, 2020[17]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14]), (International Monetary Fund, 2022[21])

[60] (Schatalek and Bird, 2015[32]), (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (OECD, 2019[38]), (OECD, 2021[37]), (UNDESA, 2021[18]), (NDC Partnership, 2022[27]), (Asensio, Blasquier and Sedemund, 2022[11])

[61] (Asensio, Blasquier and Sedemund, 2022[11])

[62] (OECD, 2021[41])

[63] (OECD, 2021[41])

[64] Climate, Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction Integration Guidance (CEDRIG) tool

- **Integrated National Financing Frameworks (INFF)**. A country's sustainable development strategy lays out what needs to be financed. INFFs spell out how the national strategy will be financed and implemented, relying on the full range of public and private financing sources. INFFs are a planning and delivery tool to help countries strengthen planning processes and overcome obstacles to financing sustainable development and the SDGs at the national level. Development partners can support partner countries establish climate financing strategies for their country climate change plans as part of on-going INFFs or similar processes.

Donor coordination. Coordination among international partners can be a powerful tool for efficiencies and policy influence. Development partners can work with, and build on, existing initiatives, plans and structures, enhancing coherence while supporting and amplifying government efforts already underway to set up consistent in-country and/or regional (i.e., in the case of SIDS) coordination mechanisms addressing climate action. Joint programming and coordination can take place at global, regional or national level. Bilateral donors that channel a large share of their climate finance through UN entities should ensure these organisations participate in donor coordination mechanisms. Capacity development can be particularly effective when pooled and co-ordinated, rather than provided separately by individual donors.

- The **NDC Partnership** co-ordinates major climate donors' technical assistance support on NDC implementation, for example co-ordinating NDC facilitators who support with planning, reporting and implementation, and embedding economic advisors into finance/planning ministries to support with green recovery packages in response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.
- The **Regional Pacific Nationally Determined Contributions Hub** (Pacific NDC Hub) assists Pacific Island countries and territories by providing in-country advice and technical support and promoting regional collaboration to address common issues across the Pacific with NDC implementation.
- The IFAD-hosted **Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme** provides a multi-year and multi-donor financing window to channel climate and environmental finance for smallholder farmers who often are at the forefront of climate resilience. The over 300 million USD in contributions from 10 DAC members has mobilised an estimated additional 1 billion USD co-financing yearly.

Use of country systems. Development partners need to better assess the quality and opportunities to strengthen country systems for climate action and integrate national climate goals in national PFM and budgets. Acknowledging the inherently political nature of the decision to use country systems, this should involve: i) a deeper dialogue with relevant central ministries; and ii) a phased approach to use country systems to the extent possible investing in creating the right incentives for these to be improved.

Climate-related capacity development across all actors. Given the substantial challenges at the country level, capacity development should be at the heart of climate action in partner countries and embedded from the design stages of an intervention[65]. Climate-related capacity development requires a combination of developing generic capacities, such as access to education, health services, income opportunities and political participation, as well as specific climate-related capacities, such as climate risk screening, economic analysis of climate change impacts or the costing of climate change options[66]. At the same time, the push for more ODA-related climate finance implies DAC members to proactively invest in dedicated climate expertise across a range of departments and teams, either at corporate level or at country level to enable delivering on the expectations and correctly applying their operational climate tools[67].

[65] (Asensio, Blasquier and Sedemund, 2022[11])
[66] (Lemos et al., 2013[36])
[67] (OECD, 2019[38])

Focus on results

What good looks like:

The Paris Agreement on Climate Change commits countries to plan and account for climate results through their NDCs. For climate action to achieve lasting impact on poverty and reduce inequality while also promoting the transition to a sustainable future requires greater harmonisation of climate and development-related results frameworks. Results monitoring and reporting does not disadvantage broad, long-term and complex (strategic) investments or projects/programmes, which deliver multiple results for the same investment. It strikes a balance between short-term results and longer-term capacity building, learning and knowledge sharing[68].

Development partners use partner country results frameworks and prioritise existing national indicators that are aligned to the NDCs, NAPs, LTSs and the SDGs. They capacitate partner countries' national results and statistical systems to track climate finance flows and monitor results of climate action as part of existing national monitoring and evaluation systems used for national development planning[69]. The possibility to show "value for money", not usually associated to climate finance, is a powerful driver for development partners to ensure national systems can capture and communicate results from climate finance[70]. Country results frameworks that capture results from climate finance enhance developing countries' capacity to access climate finance. They also enable learning and accountability to inform policymaking[71]. Development partners develop clear context analysis and theory of change narratives and invest in evidence gathering and base-line setting, thus avoiding shifting the burden of proof onto partner countries.

Learning areas:

Performance metrics. Localised SDG targets and indicators can underpin climate action as a shared roadmap for aligning development co-operation to national climate objectives. Partner country governments should lead the alignment to SDG results at country level and create an enabling environment for a more harmonised SDG alignment across development partners. Such an approach will increase development partners' managerial focus on long-term outcomes and its capacity to work across sector silos. Development partners support country leadership and synchronise their alignment process with country-led initiatives at national, sector or subnational levels on a case-by-case basis.

Use policy and results-based financing modalities. The focus on overall outcomes and lasting impacts of climate finance should be strengthened to better ensure that climate finance access is enabling effective mitigation and adaptation results. This requires DAC Members to move from the current focus on project-based climate finance to a more diverse set of financial instruments to support country-level climate action, for instance towards policy- and results-based financing. This should be framed by individual and collective providers' assessment of the possibilities to use country financial and budgetary systems for large-scale finance, as well as the leverage and incentives created by large-scale finance to pursue high-level policy dialogue.

[68] (Global Partnership For Effective Development Cooperation, 2021[39])
[69] (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (OECD and AfDB, 2016[7]), (Global Partnership For Effective Development Cooperation, 2021[39])
[70] (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (Green Climate Fund, 2019[9]), (OECD, 2019[38])
[71] (COP26 Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance, 2021[20]), (Bauer et al., 2021[13]), (Paris21, 2022[35]), (OECD, 2022[40])

Inclusive partnerships

What good looks like:

Inclusive partnerships among all relevant stakeholders - from local governments and parliaments to CSOs, private sector and academia - play essential roles in ensuring that climate action is embedded in whole-of-society approaches. Such approaches facilitate a strong societal and political mandate[72] and enable each partner playing to its strengths.

Partnerships can be articulated through a variety of mechanisms from inclusive policy design - including of NDCs, NAPs and LTSs - to public-private partnerships and blended finance. Where capacities and resources are available for meaningful long-term engagement, these mechanisms propel complementarity of all stakeholders' contributions needed to achieve low-carbon and climate-resilient development[73] that reduces the effects of climate change on the most vulnerable and ensures that the benefits and burdens of climate action are equitably distributed.

Development partners provide incentives for large players to support open civic space and an enabling business environment where civil society and local private actors are involved in co-creating inclusive development outcomes and partnerships that can press for just solutions in the climate crisis. Given the scale and potential impact of its investments, both development partners and partner governments share a deep interest in partnering with and improving the enabling environment for the private sector[74]. ODA is used to blend finance and mitigate risks to stimulate more climate-related private sector investment, particularly in sectors requiring high levels of investment such as energy or infrastructure, i.e. concentrated on mitigation[75].

Learning areas:

Using the resources and expertise of a diverse range of actors involved in climate action in partner countries, recognizing their differences as well as the comparative advantage of each is the foundation for building trust and empowering actors. Adopting comprehensive approaches to inclusive partnerships for climate action can help understand the challenges and potential of distinct partners and should be linked to capacity building and context-analysis, as outlined above.

Integrated policy dialogue. Providing dedicated spaces for multi-stakeholder policy dialogue and joint decision-making – such as specialized forums or country platforms - can bring together key players and be a driver for building partnerships.

- **Belgium** has set up a specialised platform that gathers a community of professionals from the private and public sectors to design and construct buildings that can have positive impact on the environment and communities. The platform ensures a dialogue between public, private and civil society actors around climate-responsive design of the building in rural areas.
- The 2nd **NDC Investment Forum**, hosted by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Commission and the Government of Saint Lucia, with support from development partners, brought

[72] (OECD, 2019[38]), (COP26 Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance, 2021[20]), (Bauer et al., 2021[13]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14]), (OECD, 2021[43]), (OECD, 2021[41]), (NDC Partnership, 2022[27]), (Asensio, Blasquier and Sedemund, 2022[11])

[73] (Green Climate Fund, 2019[9]), (COP26 Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance, 2021[20]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14]), (OECD, 2021[37]), (NDC Partnership, 2022[27]), (Asensio, Blasquier and Sedemund, 2022[11]), (Paris21, 2022[35])

[74] (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (OECD, 2019[38]), (Green Climate Fund, 2019[9]), (World Bank Group, 2020[17]), (International Monetary Fund, 2022[21])

[75] (OECD, 2019[38]), (Bhandary, Gallagher and Zhang, 2021[33]), (COP26 Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance, 2021[20]), (Bauer et al., 2021[13]), (OECD, 2021[37])

together representatives from governments, international partners, and other stakeholders, particularly private investors, to discussed concrete options to finance targeted climate actions. The Forum featured an in-person and virtual exhibition of service providers within the private sector that support green and climate-friendly goods and services.

Locally led development: Climate adaptation that is locally led is more likely to address the needs of the most vulnerable groups[76] and enable private sector investments[77], underpinning an increasingly important role of cities[78]. Notwithstanding the added complexity of engaging these communities, development partners can play an important role by providing resources and allowing time and space for such participatory processes[79]**.**

- **Denmark** supported the climate-proofing of subnational development plans in Bangladesh. It supported the engagement of communities in local decision making, planning and implementation, including capacity development for standing committees.
- The **United Kingdom** gives local communities increased influence over climate-related finance decisions through devolved climate finance mechanism that connect county- and local-level administrations.

Private sector engagement in climate action. DAC members are increasingly engaging the private sector to mobilise green investment, promote green private sector development, and harness skills and knowledge for addressing climate change in developing countries. Challenges for private sector engagement on the environment include a lack of evidence on environmental outcomes, moving beyond demonstration projects to scale up successful approaches and the need to strengthen links with partner country priorities. Emerging good practice spans ways to communicate the business benefits of addressing environmental issues (e.g., cost savings, reduced risks), understand and address the barriers to private sector engagement on environmental issues, promote sound business models and adopt a holistic approach that includes support for the enabling policy environment for investment and business.

- **The Netherlands** works through alliances with the private sector, knowledge institutes/networks, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and multilateral organisations in their climate interventions.

Delivering through multilateral institutions. For many DAC Members, multilateral channels, including MDBs and dedicated climate funds, play a key role for the delivery of their climate and environment-related ODA. This is particularly relevant for direct financing of infrastructure investments. DAC Members see their role as shareholders in multilateral development banks as an important aspect for their support to environmentally sustainable, climate-resilient, low-emissions development. Aligning the operations of major multilateral financers of infrastructure in support of climate and environment objectives is an important priority.

- **Finland** does not have bilateral programmes explicitly designed to support transitions and channels most of its development co-operation finance through multilateral organisations. Finland encourages implementing partners to align development co-operation activities with national transition strategies, a recommendation that is explicitly integrated in their development policy guideline for crosscutting objectives.
- **Canada** has established funds at several international financial institutions, including, for example the World Bank and the Green Climate Fund, to support partner countries to implement their own national transitions.

[76] (Colenbrander, Pettinotti and Cao, 2022[42]), (OECD, 2021[43])
[77] (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (OECD, 2019[38]), (Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), 2021[14])
[78] (Bauer et al., 2021[13]), (UNFCCC. Paris Committee on Capacity Building, 2022[25])
[79] (McNamara et al., 2020[31])

Triangular co-operation and South-South learning. Partnering more systematically with developing countries through triangular co-operation can be an effective way to identify and share good practice approaches for effective delivery of climate action, influence country processes and developing capacity. This requires enabling stronger focus and coordination among existing regional and global climate entities to enable identified good practices can be shared and adapted to local contexts.

- Triangular co-operation between Costa Rica, Peru and **Germany** supported knowledge exchange on the system of Payments for Environmental Services and on a Program on carbon neutrality (Costa Rica); as well as the knowledge and methodologies to mainstream Climate Change in the design of budget and public investment (Peru).
- Triangular co-operation between **Canada**, UNDP, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Haiti, Mali, Niger and Sudan Climate Change Adaptation Facility to strengthen resilience in agriculture and water management. On a global level, the Facility facilitates the sharing of lessons learned and best practices to inform policies on climate change and sustainable development at national and global levels.
- The **United States**, **Canada** and **Germany** support NAP processes and South-South knowledge exchange through the NAP Global Network.

Transparency and mutual accountability

What good looks like:

Development partners provide timely, accurate and accessible disaggregated climate finance data and information, increasing predictability for partner countries to improve decision-making, planning and public spending[80] Transparency and mutual accountability on climate strategies, resources and results empower citizens, parliaments, media, civil society and academia to meaningfully engage in the development process and ensure that tackling climate change is seen as central to the national interest.[81]

Development partners use and help strengthen country systems for planning, accessing, implementing and monitoring of climate finance. They capacitate legislatures, supreme audit institutions, media and civil society to engage in the oversight of the delivery of climate action its contribution to national climate plans[82] and to use progress reports, evaluations and audits in decision-making.

Clear, collectively agreed priorities and commitments underpin trust-based partnerships, frank dialogue and mutual accountability, leading to better quality and sustainability of partnerships for climate action[83]. Increased transparency on climate builds the necessary trust between nations to foster shared understanding, greater accountability and strengthened collective action to deliver climate actions that leaves no one behind.

Development partners provide feedback, with understandable language and appropriate communication channels, to partners, domestic stakeholders and the broader public on their climate action achievements, what has been learned, and the challenges encountered. Lessons learnt are proactively shared across countries, and coordinate with each other in the countries in which they operate to the extent possible.

[80] (Schatalek and Bird, 2015[32]), (Green Climate Fund, 2019[9]), (COP26 Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance, 2021[20])
[81] (Bhandary, Gallagher and Zhang, 2021[33]), (Asensio, Blasquier and Sedemund, 2022[11]), (OECD, 2022[40])
[82] (CABRI, 2021[26])
[83] (Ockenden and Ye Zou, 2016[16]), (Green Climate Fund, 2019[9]), (COP26 Taskforce on Access to Climate Finance, 2021[20]), (Singh et al., 2022[34]), (NDC Partnership, 2022[27]), (Paris21, 2022[35])

Learning areas:

Common standards, criteria and indicators for mutual accountability at country level. The current void in mutual accountability around climate action in developing countries should be addressed through country-level discussions among development partners and partner countries' government entities on which minimum standards and indicators of effective climate finance could be used or adjusted in each context, and whether these could inform mutual accountability exercises in the future. Considering the effectiveness principles apply to all ODA the same indicators could be used in mutual accountability frameworks for both broader ODA and climate-related ODA.

Track public resource allocations for climate actions commitments. The Rio Markers represent the most comprehensive, publicly available activity-level data on climate-related development finance from bilateral donors. Given their stated purpose to track mainstreaming of international environmental and climate change objectives, the policy makers provide a good indication of the extent of the systematic integration of these objectives across development programmes of DAC Members. Their quality and coverage rely on DAC members ensuring all CRS row entries are Rio-marked. Other areas of improvement to consider include the comparability and integration across bilateral and multilateral climate ODA datasets and improving the tracking of climate ODA to the local level.

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