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The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2008-2020

December 2020

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) is a tri-partite partnership between the g7+ group of countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations, the OECD-DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), and the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS). Its purpose is to improve the way in which international and national actors operate in fragile and conflict-affected situations. The OECD hosted the Secretariat of the International Dialogue from 2008 to 2020. This report reviews the ten years of the history of the International Dialogue and spotlights its key achievements. It is intended to serve as a reference and departure point for the future trajectory of the International Dialogue.

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Foreword

This report was commissioned by the OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate and produced by the Nordic Consulting Group, led by Anne-Lise Klausen, Lydia Kemunto Bosire, and Kathryn Nwajaku-Dahou, and supported by Alma Wetterling.

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The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) is a tri-partite partnership between the g7+ group of countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations,¹ the OECD-DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF),² and the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS).³ Its purpose is to improve the way in which international and national actors operate in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Since 2008, the OECD has been hosting the Secretariat of the International Dialogue. This report, based on a desk review of literature provided by the OECD and a series of selected key informant interviews, reviews the ten years of the history of the International Dialogue and spotlights its key achievements. As the OECD period of hosting the Secretariat draws to a close, this report is intended to serve as a reference point and to mark the key milestones on the journey. It is also intended to serve as a point of departure for the future trajectory of the International Dialogue. The report is divided into an introductory overview section followed by thematic chapters. Its main audiences are the Co-Chairs and key constituencies of the International Dialogue, existing and potential future partners and all those interested in understanding the unique features of this partnership, its influence and impact.

This report uses IDPS and International Dialogue interchangeably.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ACU	Aid Coordination Unit
AD	Asian Development Bank
AfDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, South Africa
CAR	Central African Republic
CAP	Common African Position on the Post-2015 Agenda (AU)
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSPPS	Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
g7+	Voluntary association of 20 countries that are or have been affected by conflict
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
IDA	International Development Association (World Bank)
IDPS	International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, also commonly called the International Dialogue
IFC	International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group)
INCAF	International Network for Conflict and Fragility (OECD DAC)
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSGs	Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SDRF	Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
WDR	World Development Report

Executive summary

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding created in 2010 as a permanent platform for dialogue between countries affected by conflict-fragility and the OECD-DAC, has since then, had its Secretariat hosted by the OECD. This unique arrangement enabled the International Dialogue, for more than ten years, to develop a close working relationship with the OECD-DAC through its International Network on Conflict and Fragility and other OECD policy communities in ways that have played a critical role in amplifying the voice and influence of countries and translated country ownership and leadership into meaningful practice.

The International Dialogue's principal achievement, among many others, was the development and negotiation of the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* (hereafter the New Deal) endorsed by over 40 countries and organisations in December 2011.⁴ The New Deal rests on three pillars: the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals of legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services and the FOCUS and TRUST principles, which respectively define development partners' and partner countries' terms of engagement and commitment to results. The New Deal has effectively pioneered a shift in thinking about conflict and fragility, peacebuilding and statebuilding. It has also focused attention on the need for inclusive processes, and it insists that multi-stakeholder analysis of conflict and fragility should inform political decision-making and development planning. The OECD hosted Secretariat provided a joint platform for the International Dialogue members until the end of 2020.

By using and championing the New Deal principles, members of the International Dialogue have been instrumental in influencing policy and practice around fragility in a wide range of contexts, ranging from contributing to the inclusion of a Sustainable Development Goal on peaceful, just, and inclusive societies in the global development framework of Agenda 2030 SDG 16, to influencing fragile-to-fragile advocacy around the Ebola crisis. In assessing the achievements, as well as the overall contributions of the International Dialogue to the fragility agenda over the last twelve years, this report considers two distinct phases.

The first phase was from 2008-15, where the International Dialogue and its constituents popularised the notion, throughout the international community, that it was important to bring together the fragility and aid/development effectiveness agendas. This was done in light of the acknowledgment of the Millennium Development Goals' failure to make headway in many countries affected by conflict and fragility and of the need to focus specific attention on fragility and its root causes if development ambitions were to be achieved. As outlined first in the Dili Declaration,⁵ the International Dialogue aimed to foster coherent support to 'country-owned and country-led' peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, and in addition to advance dialogue on how to address fragility, in the global discussions about what should succeed the Millennium Development Goals framework.

During this phase, the International Dialogue drove change by bringing together communities of practice that had been focused on how to operate in fragile situations on the one hand, and those who had been focusing on how to promote aid effectiveness on the other. Collectively, they developed an action plan and negotiated the framework that would eventually become the New Deal, the crowning achievement of the International Dialogue. The New Deal as both a framework and as an ideal, set a new international

standard about the need to include countries affected by conflict and fragility in decision-making about them, as articulated in the g7+ slogan 'Nothing About Us Without Us.'⁶ The International Dialogue itself became a common platform for amplifying the collective voice of its signatories and constituents to advocate for substantively linking together politics, security, and development. Eight countries agreed to pilot the New Deal in early 2012: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Somalia. Piloting the New Deal and deliberate advocacy engagements by the International Dialogue members at the highest levels, alongside intense efforts at socialising the New Deal across constituencies, contributed to critical elements of the New Deal being eventually incorporated into the Sustainable Development Goals and the broader Agenda 2030 during this phase, notably into SDG 16.

The beginning of the second phase of achievements from 2016 – to the present, was marked by the issuing of the Stockholm Declaration, endorsed at the fifth Global International Dialogue Meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, in April 2016. At the meeting, Ministers from International Dialogue member countries successfully re-invigorated international commitment to addressing fragility in line with the New Deal principles, but emphasised the need to retrofit the New Deal to the 2030 Agenda. Having learned the lessons from country-level experiences of piloting the New Deal, the Stockholm Declaration affirmed the need to focus greater attention on more effective support to countries' own efforts at peacebuilding, preventing conflict, and on countries' own progress on their specific pathways out of fragility. Moreover the International Dialogue has continued to inform policy discussions on the broader peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resilience agenda in a number of different fora.

This process of re-positioning has been ongoing ever since the Stockholm Declaration and has demonstrated the International Dialogue's agility and ability to be a more nimble platform, capable of seizing opportunities to advance New Deal principles and SDG 16+ at national, regional, and global levels.⁷ This is an achievement in itself. In 2018, the International Dialogue committed to delivering increased, better targeted and more effective country-owned peacebuilding and statebuilding that will amplify and sustain efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda, with a focus on SDG 16+ and the wider, evolving agendas of sustaining peace and conflict prevention.⁸ Through the 2019 – 21 Peace Vision, members updated their collective commitment to the New Deal principles and Stockholm Declaration by singling out National Cohesion, Gender Equality, Women, Peace and Security, and a Peace Promoting Private Sector as core priority areas of focus. In so doing, they demonstrated their willingness to respond to evolving member priorities (fragile-to-fragile co-operation, peer learning, private sector for peace) and to a changing external environment (characterised by the proliferation of policy arenas, notably around SDG 16). Rather than competing with these alternative arenas, the International Dialogue committed itself to using them, to advance the New Deal Principles and the Stockholm Declaration.

The second phase of achievements was therefore characterised by members of the International Dialogue contributing to the development of other seminal policies and global events in the humanitarian, development, and political fields. In practice, this has meant that the International Dialogue platform has increasingly focused on instigating change through its members rather than promoting itself as a platform solely for the sake of visibility. This approach is consistent with the New Deal focus on the need to address the political obstacles and challenges to effective support to peacebuilding and statebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected situations, both in terms of how the international aid architecture works and needs to work, and in how governments in countries affected by conflict and fragility effectively engage their societies in terms of inclusivity.⁹ By providing tools and knowledge products, the International Dialogue has since focused its efforts on strengthening the efforts of individual constituency members to enable them to have greater visibility and impact as change agents.

Throughout the two phases, the International Dialogue succeeded in three particular areas. First, as a norm setter the International Dialogue contributed to shaping an array of global policy agendas. The New Deal principles – particularly with respect to country ownership and leadership, bringing politics and development together, timeliness of aid, the need for joint assessment of risk, and strengthening of national

capacities in countries affected by conflict and fragility – became new norms, and were borrowed and featured in much subsequent policy thinking with respect to how to effectively engage in fragile situations. The New Deal and the Stockholm Declaration, spearheaded and popularised by the International Dialogue, succeeded in giving a strong policy impulse to push fragility up front and centre of the development cooperation policy agenda. The norms and standard setting work of the OECD-hosted International Dialogue, contributed to strengthening the link between peace and development.

In some policy frameworks there was explicit reference to New Deal language, and in others there was not. For example, the principles of the New Deal were incorporated into the 2016 twin UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on Sustaining Peace, the 2017 UN-World Bank joint report: *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Prevention*, and the *OECD-DAC Recommendation on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus*.¹⁰ The International Dialogue also inspired shifts in development approaches in fragile and conflict-affected countries, in aid directorates in development partner countries ranging from Switzerland to the UK, and in the European Union (“Statebuilding Contracts”), bringing the inclusion of peacebuilding and statebuilding as priorities in strategies; the integration of conflict sensitivity; a fragility lens into their approaches to development assistance.

The second area of achievement was in national ownership, inclusion and voice. At the country level, the implementation of the New Deal varied, depending on factors specific to each context, notably the existence of relevant frameworks already in place and the degree of political appetite amongst governments and development partners for the New Deal.¹¹ At the global level, the International Dialogue was able to use its OECD-hosted status to open doors into rooms that were previously exclusive. The hosting of the Secretariat at OECD also enabled constant contact between development partners and countries affected by conflict and fragility, normalising and enabling their participation in global conversations, as well as in defining joint processes at country level where partner countries could steer the conversation together with development partners. This elevation of the g7+ countries internationally contributed to strengthening the group’s own efforts, which culminated in them successfully obtaining observer status at the UN General Assembly, and the g7+ is now institutionalised as a recognised platform for raising the visibility of countries facing conflict and fragility.

Finally, the International Dialogue reconfigured the boundaries of what constituted best practice in development assistance and engagement and brought to light frequently overlooked questions. These boundaries of best practice have become international best practice standards in their own right; notably the need for fragility (context) analysis as a precondition for effective development assistance; fragile-to-fragile co-operation as a new model for multilateral engagement; the need for a responsible private sector in creating jobs and revenues, and the centrality of gender to notions of inclusion. The International Dialogue provided an important platform for convening around these themes, as well as developing knowledge products that individual constituencies could use in their own advocacy efforts to advance effective collaboration in fragile settings.

Today the International Dialogue is an agile, nimble, external-facing, politically networked platform that is well-placed to use diverse channels to influence more and better support for peacebuilding and statebuilding amongst political, justice, security, humanitarian, and development actors, as well as with the diverse set of stakeholders with whom the International Dialogue developed innovative collaborations, notably regional institutions and the private sector.¹²

The International Dialogue Secretariat’s strategic location at the OECD, in the same Directorate and Division that hosts the Global Partnership on Effective Development Co-operation, also enabled some important synergies to take place and the International Dialogue to shape the evolution of global monitoring of effective development co-operation. The Global Partnership on Effective Development Co-operation’s monitoring exercise tracks progress made in implementing effective development co-operation commitments at the country, regional, and global level, supporting accountability among all development actors and informing UN-led follow-up and review of the Sustainable Development Goals. Between 2018

and 2019, an open working group, comprising of members of the International Dialogue and the Global Partnership Steering Committee, was convened to guide the development of a tailored approach to monitoring effectiveness in fragile contexts. This tailored approach was presented at the Global Partnership's Senior Level Meeting (New York, 2019) and informs the reform of the monitoring exercise under the Global Partnership's 2020-22 Work Programme.

Background

The global debate around what is required to make aid more effective in fragile situations has been facilitated by the OECD and its Development Co-operation Directorate, in particular through its efforts to bring together two separate conversations.

The first conversation was around governance and aid effectiveness. The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), at the turn of the century, faced growing criticism because decades of engagement had failed to end poverty. The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provided an opportunity to take stock and correct course. An examination of aid practices up to that point revealed that the aid community was pulling in many different directions and was not set up to succeed in implementing the MDGs. Some of the challenges that got in the way of results included lack of coordination, unrealistic targets and timeframes, and non-alignment between governments and development partners. Through a series of high-level fora on aid effectiveness – Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan (2011) – the case was made for aid to be aligned with the MDGs, for decisions to be driven by partner countries, for the use of country systems, and for the strengthening of national capacities.

The second conversation was centred around fragile and conflict-affected situations. In view of the changing dynamics of intra-state conflict in the post-Cold War period, in 1995, the DAC established a special taskforce on conflict prevention, focusing on how development partners could promote peace and prevent conflict. This effort culminated in the 1997 Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, which were revised in 2001. Meanwhile, as the MDGs emerged as the guiding framework for thinking about development results, the conversation expanded to include how to ensure conflict-affected states could meet their development commitments under the MDGs. In 2005, at the time of the five-year review of the MDGs, the OECD issued its first report on fragile states,¹³ as well as the draft Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, (“The Fragile States Principles”)¹⁴ adopted by OECD-DAC ministers in April 2007 and piloted in six countries. The Fragile States Principles reflected the growing international consensus that engagement in fragile states could not take place on the same terms as in other countries: that international responses including security, diplomacy, development co-operation, peacebuilding, humanitarian action, and economic affairs, all needed to be specifically tailored to the needs of fragile states.

The Fragile States Principles between 2008-11 were piloted in six then 13 countries and monitored through a voluntary survey in 2009 and 2011,¹⁵ the results of which were eventually fed into the Busan High-Level Forum 2011. It was in fact the six countries that had initially piloted the Fragile States Principles that came to constitute the g7+ (seven countries after Cote d'Ivoire joined) at the High Level Forum in Accra (2008).¹⁶

In preparing for Accra, development partners and fragile partner countries met in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and as laid out in the Kinshasa Statement, for the first time fashioned a consensus on priority actions in situations of conflict and fragility. In Accra in 2008, at a roundtable co-chaired by the DRC, France, and the African Development Bank (AfDB), the countries in which the Fragile States Principles had been piloted stressed the importance of having a permanent forum through which to engage international actors, one that would recognise their collective experiences as a valid basis upon which to base development partner programmes. They also called for greater connectedness between politics,

security, and justice, and for country ownership and mutual accountability for results. Out of this encounter the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding was born.¹⁷

In 2009, the DAC created the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), a network of DAC members and key multilateral agencies (observers to the DAC), for sharing experiences about, and developing joint approaches to working in fragile and conflict-affected states. INCAF and g7+ countries were joined by a network of northern and southern civil society organisations present in the countries, the Civil Society Platform on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS), which advocated for an inclusive whole of society approach to peacebuilding and statebuilding and became the third pillar of the International Dialogue. Between 2008 – 2010 these three partners drafted an ‘action plan’ that later took shape as the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (see figure 3). To support its work, an International Dialogue Secretariat was created and hosted by the OECD. The first official meeting of the International Dialogue took place in Dili, Timor-Leste, in 2010.¹⁸

The International Dialogue was created to foster coherent support to country-owned and country-led peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, and to advocate for a new model for development co-operation with fragile states at the centre. It became instrumental in creating convergence around a number of critical themes; taking fragile contexts, country ownership and leadership seriously (the first fragile states principle); making the aid effectiveness agenda operational in fragile situations; and supporting coherent approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding.¹⁹ The founding principle was “Nothing About Us Without Us”. It was structured to be jointly chaired by representatives from INCAF and g7+ countries and since it was created it convened regularly at ministerial and technical level, with a structure of rotating, representative co-chairs (see figure 1).

The International Dialogue brought countries affected by conflict and fragility into the conversation for the first time. Up until its creation at the Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2008, development partners had issued guidelines for engagement in fragile states, crafted from a development partner perspective, without a permanent seat at the table, for partner countries themselves. Further, there was no forum in the multilateral system with a specifically dedicated space for fragile states. The G77 at the United Nations (UN) contains states that are nominally ‘fragile’, but the ‘fragility’ label remains sensitive and countries affected by conflict and fragility do not constitute a caucus in the G77 context.

The International Dialogue developed and helped negotiate the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*. It developed the parameters and led the stakeholder negotiations for the agreement, distilling insights from the constituencies, and from the aid effectiveness and the fragility agendas more broadly, into a set of inclusive principles for good donorship. This process also saw a new engagement of a range of other actors (security, diplomacy, economic, humanitarian) engaged in fragile states. The New Deal pioneered a shift in thinking about conflict and fragility and peacebuilding and statebuilding, particularly among the aid community and among members of the partnership.

The International Dialogue then maintained political attention on the need to ensure more effective funding and implementation of commitments to the New Deal principles and provided a platform for continuous collaboration, learning and fostering of consensus among a broad range of stakeholders on issues relating to fragility and conflict. Its members committed to finding, promoting and implementing better ways of building peace, strengthening resilience, and preventing conflict. The partners also committed to mutual support and to facilitate the use of the New Deal principles for collectively and individually advocating for good donorship at country level.

Figure 1. Governance of the International Dialogue





Figure 2. Chronology and milestones

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding: Timeline of milestones



Achievements

Over the decade 2010-20, the International Dialogue promoted comprehensive approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding.

The International Dialogue energised and brought together conversations that had been going on for decades among disparate communities of scholars and practitioners. It enabled the formulation of principles that could appeal to multiple stakeholders working towards the common purpose of optimising the role of aid and obtaining meaningful results in fragile states. At a time when public appetite for value for money and immediate results was growing ever more acute, the International Dialogue pushed for recognition of development goals that are longer term and perhaps less tangible than others, but that are critical in helping countries exit fragility.²⁰ These achievements of the International Dialogue can be considered under three overarching themes: advancing global policy and support for fragile states, promoting the inclusion, voice and ownership of fragile states, and pushing boundaries of engagement. This section addresses these key areas in turn.


1. Advancing global policy and support around fragility

Over the years, the International Dialogue has developed and advocated approaches that have become mainstream policy and practice norms with respect to fragile and conflict-affected environments. The International Dialogue achieved this primarily through the New Deal, whose principles in turn have become international standards, influencing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other global policy agendas since.

New Deal

The International Dialogue spearheaded and negotiated the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States through a series of global events designed to bring together countries affected by conflict and fragility with development partners in order to set an agenda for making aid effective in these contexts. At the first global meeting of the International Dialogue in 2010, where the g7+ was officially launched, the Dili Declaration was adopted, with the aim of developing a new framework for development partner engagement in fragile situations. At the second meeting of the International Dialogue in 2011, the international community agreed on the Monrovia Roadmap, adopting the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), thereby formally recognising the importance of legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and state capacity to manage revenues and services as necessary priorities for the international engagement, and contingent to succeed traditional development programmes.

Figure 3. The structure of the New Deal



Negotiation and consensus-building were essential for the New Deal. Following the first meeting of the International Dialogue in Dili in 2010, four working groups were created to address key issues: capacity development, aid instruments, planning processes, and political dialogue. In the inclusive spirit of the International Dialogue, each group was co-chaired by a developing country and a development partner, and included representatives of member countries and civil society. An advisory group including officials working on the World Bank's World Development Report of 2011 provided evidence to substantiate the arguments in the New Deal.

When the International Dialogue launched the New Deal at the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, it sought to change the “business as usual” practices by advocating for a set of operating principles summed up as three core pillars (also shown in Figure 3):

1. PSGs (peacebuilding and statebuilding goals) stress that legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services are all central for countries to develop.
2. FOCUS principles (fragility assessment, one plan, develop a compact, use PSGs to monitor progress, support political dialogue), which identify causes of fragility and define country-led pathways out of fragility, including processes which can build consensus, harmonise aid, strengthen accountability for results, and keep politics and its trade-offs in sight.
3. TRUST principles (transparency, risk sharing, use of country systems, strengthen capacities, and timely aid), which define commitments for results, placing development partners and countries on a footing for mutual accountability, strengthening the capacity of countries, and promoting context-responsive aid.

The New Deal received wide support and generated wide ranging impact. Despite the high ambition of the agenda, the New Deal attracted a broad range of signatories, including 44 countries, 9 multilateral

entities, and members of civil society.²¹ The New Deal inspired a number of policy changes in development partner countries and organisations, examples of which are listed in Box 1.

Box 1. Progress towards good donorship

1. The United States drew on the PSGs to define priorities for building conflict prevention capacity in its 2015 National Security Strategy.
2. The United Kingdom prioritised fragile states and a “whole of government” political, security and development approach to addressing fragility in its National Security Strategy, and committed to the overarching objectives of “leaving no-one behind” on poverty earmarking half of ODA for fragile states.
3. Sweden integrated the New Deal principles into its country strategies in g7+ countries, and adopted a “whole of government” approach, committing to making all assistance conflict and gender-sensitive.
4. Switzerland integrated the principles of the New Deal into its Fragile States Strategy, committed half of its aid to fragile states, and undertook reforms of the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation to make it ‘fit for purpose’ in fragile states.
5. The AfDB created a dedicated Transition Support Facility to assist underfunded fragile countries, and in 2014 it adopted a Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa.
6. The World Bank President committed to meet twice a year with g7+ finance ministers.
7. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) introduced a new Staff Handbook on Working Differently in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States in 2012 and an Operational Plan in 2013.
8. The EU developed a 2014 Staff Handbook on Operating in Situations of Fragility and Conflict, which offers tools and guidance developed by staff for achieving the behaviour change and objectives envisaged in the New Deal.
9. The UN Peacebuilding Fund allocates resources to nationally owned peacebuilding and statebuilding plans, and membership of the g7+/New Deal is considered as an important indicator of a country’s commitment to peacebuilding.

Note: Draws from: Independent Review, p 27-28

SDG 16 on just, peaceful, and inclusive societies

The International Dialogue in general, and the New Deal in particular, have always been closely tied to the global development goals. The International Dialogue was born of the recognition that not a single fragile state was on track to meet the MDGs. However, by the time it was launched in 2011 in Busan, discussions were already underway for the post-2015 agenda. Thus, when in September 2011 the UN Secretary-General launched the UN Task Team on the post-2015 Development Agenda to start preparations for the successor agenda to the MDGs, the International Dialogue was well positioned to use its framework to inculcate a new way of doing business in fragile states.

The International Dialogue intentionally set out to drive engagement around a peace goal in the post-2015 development agenda using the New Deal experience. Towards that end, it facilitated three actions.

First, it worked through key International Dialogue leaders to influence UN discussions at the highest level. In July 2012, the UN Secretary-General appointed a High Level Panel of Eminent Persons

on the post-2015 Development Agenda. The mandate was to set the vision for the successor development agenda, taking into account, among other things, the particular challenges of countries in conflict and post-conflict situations. The panel was co-chaired by President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, a country that had piloted the Fragile State Principles and was a founding member of the g7+. The other co-chair of the panel was the UK Prime Minister David Cameron. The UK was also co-chair of the International Dialogue and an influential INCAF member. One of the High Level panellists was Emilia Pires, then Minister of Finance of Timor-Leste, and Chair of the g7+ and the International Dialogue, and personally committed to advocate for a goal on peace. The broad-based membership of the International Dialogue, coupled with strong leadership with personal commitments to a peace goal, ensured that the issue of peace survived the competing priorities that were on the table during the negotiations.

Box 2. Advocating for a Sustainable Development Goal on peace

The way in which SDG 16 came to be framed and secured within Agenda 2030 was the result of a collective effort, shaped by the actions of a wide range of actors (countries as well as global knowledge and policy platforms, organisations, and interests). The political stakes were high as were fears amongst the G77 of the 'securitisation of the development agenda' and the infringement of national sovereignty. Without the ownership and efforts of members of the African Union, but also of the g7+ backed by constituencies united through the International Dialogue, it may have been difficult to mobilise a sufficiently sizeable constituency within the G77 to put Goal 16 on the table, or to undertake the complex negotiations required to frame and agree upon the Goal.

Source: Interview and Independent Review of the International Dialogue and the New Deal pp 24-25

Second, it helped mobilise broad support at the African level. Working strategically through both the g7+ members' missions in New York and g7+ leadership in capitals, the International Dialogue was able to support strategic advocacy for a peace goal directed towards African states. President Sirleaf of Liberia was the coordinator for the 2014 Common African Position of the African Union (AU), and was supported in her advocacy efforts by International Dialogue members, as she made a strong case for peace in the post-2015 framework. Once the Common Africa Position had been formulated to include peace, it offered the positions to be defended by the Africa bloc in the G77 at the UN, paving the way for inclusion.

Third and critically, the International Dialogue supported g7+ advocacy. Aware that the idea of linking conflict to development did not, at the time, have natural champions at the UN where the agenda would be shaped, the International Dialogue organised a wide range of meetings, including among INCAF ambassadors in New York, increasing opportunities for g7+ visibility as the voice of conflict-affected states ('fragility' within the UN system was and remains a contested and sensitive label). INCAF members were also the contributors to a UNDP New Deal financing support facility, which supported g7+ participation in key meetings and platforms at which global policy was being formulated. Against this backdrop, g7+ members worked with the AU, Small Island and Developing States, and Least Developed Country coalitions, in order to build a common cause around the principle that there could be no development without peace, and that focusing on fragility was one way to make sure that "No-one was left behind".

As a result of these efforts, the negotiated text of the proposed post-2015 agenda included a goal on peace, and some of the indicators now associated with Goal 16, including reducing violent deaths, addressing justice and security, as well as addressing external drivers of conflict, were directly lifted from the earlier International Dialogue work on measuring the PSGs.²²

Even following this early success, the engagement efforts of the International Dialogue and its constituencies continued until Goal 16 was secured. For example, aware of the pressure to reduce the number of goals in the negotiations among Member States of the General Assembly, the g7+ continued

to actively work through the ambassadors in New York. At the 2014 General Assembly, the g7+ held an event for all New York stakeholders, chaired by Sierra Leone, and attended by the Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, in order to stress the universality of peace and stability, and the peace-development nexus. Eventually, Goal 16 succeeded in staying in the final framework, capturing much of the spirit of the New Deal.

Norm setting on peacebuilding and statebuilding

Since its adoption in 2011, the New Deal has played an important role in setting global norms on peacebuilding and statebuilding in contexts of fragility, conflict, and violence. Beyond the 2030 Agenda, the principles of the New Deal have become international standards. The International Dialogue was able to help create the normative shift in three critical ways.

First, in the conceptual mainstreaming of peacebuilding and statebuilding as belonging in the same register as development. Through the New Deal, members of the International Dialogue stressed that statebuilding was first and foremost political, so any development assistance had to be comfortable starting at the political rather than at the technical level. Government functions were important, they were hollowed out by conflict, and aid had a role to help strengthen them, and this could only succeed with the acknowledgement of the salience of politics, and in partnership with fragile states themselves.

Second, the activities of the International Dialogue socialised new ways of working in fragile states. Through regular meetings and convenings over a twelve-year period, the International Dialogue inculcated shared values and ideas among members across its three constituencies, OECD-DAC (INCAF), g7+ and civil society, about how to operationalise the principles of the New Deal. In this way, the International Dialogue was able to contribute to shaping a range of agendas from sustaining peace to the humanitarian-development-peace nexus and increases in International Development Association (IDA) funding for fragile states. The g7+ and the development partners in the International Dialogue repeatedly made the case for increased IDA financing to fragile states, as well as for greater attention to jobs and revenue generation, with the result that organisations like the International Development Association (IFC), started adapting instruments to be relevant for this group of client countries. Whilst attributing all of the above to the efforts of the International Dialogue would be difficult, it can be said that it contributed to championing the fragility agenda and the New Deal principles in a way that created a set of norms, many of which lay outside the International Dialogue's immediate control, yet came to hold sway.

Third, the International Dialogue has laid the groundwork for future engagement with the fragility agenda that it helped shape in the last decade. Through the Stockholm Declaration of 2016, which was adopted at the 5th global meeting of the International Dialogue, Ministers from over 50 countries (OECD and g7+) and civil society organisations, re-affirmed the relevance of the New Deal, and recommitted to addressing the root causes of fragility, contributing to implementing the 2030 Agenda by using the New Deal, delivering financing in ways and at levels necessary to end conflict and its humanitarian consequences, and strengthening wider and stronger partnerships, including among fragile states. The Stockholm Declaration put the New Deal in a broader framework, that of supporting the implementation of the SDG process.

The IDPS Peace Vision (2019-2021) went a step further still, reaffirming collective commitment to the New Deal principles and the Stockholm Declaration, but also to scaling up efforts to translate and promote them through external platforms, beyond the International Dialogue itself. By national cohesion, gender equality and Women Peace and Security and a peace promoting private sector as core priority areas of focus, the International Dialogue from 2018 onwards, demonstrated its willingness and ability to be a more nimble platform capable of seizing opportunities to advance New Deal principles and SDG 16+ at the national, regional and global levels. Through the Peace Vision, the International Dialogue committed to delivering increased, better targeted and more effective country-owned peacebuilding and statebuilding.

In doing so, the aim is to amplify and sustain efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda, with a focus on SDG 16+ and the wider, evolving agendas of sustaining peace and conflict prevention.²³

Box 3. The New Deal's influence beyond SDG 16

2015 The 2030 Agenda makes an explicit reference to peace as one of the four pillars in addition to planet, people, prosperity, and partnership.

2015 Report of the High Level Panel on Peace Operations, *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace*, stressed the need for inclusive partnerships for building and sustaining peace.

2015 Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on UN peacebuilding, *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*, stressed the need for coherence across development, political and security actors, pointing out under-investment of ODA in the political, security and justice.

2016 High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing in 2016 recognised the need to invest more in reducing fragility and fragile situations, and in building country systems and institutions, in order to shrink humanitarian needs in the long-term.

2016 UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262 and Security Council Resolution 2282 define a “sustaining peace” agenda, and echo the Stockholm Declaration’s call to prevention by addressing the root causes of conflict and fragility through a political approach to peacebuilding, based on inclusivity and national ownership (Stockholm Declaration).

2017 UN-World Bank joint report: *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Prevention* also echoed the core messages of the New Deal.

2019 *OECD-DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus*, an OECD legal instrument that advocates for policy and operational coherence when addressing fragile states, as well as appropriate financing, with the aim of “leaving no-one behind”.

2. Promoting inclusive leadership and country ownership

The second area where the International Dialogue has made a difference is in country ownership of processes aimed at addressing fragility. This has emerged from piloting the New Deal at country level with fragile states in the lead and ensuring advocacy and voice of stakeholders from fragile states. Country ownership of the fragility agenda is reflected in the articulation of one of the priority areas of focus today, i.e. ‘National Cohesion’ spearheaded by the current g7+ chair and International Dialogue co-chair Sierra Leone, and outlined in the Peace Vision.²⁴

Piloting the New Deal

While critics considered the New Deal to be rigid, countries drew on the New Deal as a menu of tools they could use as needed. Between 2011 and 2014, the New Deal was piloted to differing degrees in seven countries: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste. Implementation ranged from an almost comprehensive approach to using it as a light, empowering framework for development ministries to advocate for better delivery of existing plans and programmes.

On the one hand was Somalia, which initially embraced a wider range of the New Deal principles and tools. As a fragile state from which most of the development partner community had disengaged following the outbreak of war in the 1990s, Somalia had very little in way of development partner legacy programs. As a result, most development partners were interested in taking forward the New Deal approach, seeing it as a particularly useful opportunity to gather stakeholders around a common approach to fragility.

Somalia development partners and national actors were co-ordinated at the highest levels. The President and Prime Minister took the lead for the process. UNDP supported an Aid Coordination Unit (ACU) in the Office of the Prime Minister, reinforcing its capacities to coordinate the implementation of the Somali Compact. While there was no fragility assessment as in other New Deal pilot countries, the PSGs were the organising framework for the Somali New Deal Compact, each with a multi-stakeholder working group, enabling actors to pull in one direction. A multi-donor financing facility was created, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) to channel funding for the Compact. According to the Independent Review of the New Deal, between 2013 – 2015, the total proportion of aid channelled through the SDRF grew from 8% to 31% of total aid.²⁵

While Somalia made progress in the New Deal, the Independent Review of the New Deal found that the shortcomings of the process included a rushed consultation as well as a disconnect between the efforts on counterterrorism and the statebuilding projects; and between the Somali government who wanted more aid on budget and development partners who wanted to see stronger public financial management systems. After 2016, Somalia, in search of a more country owned, less comprehensive, and more manageable national development planning framework, dropped the New Deal nomenclature, whilst retaining many of the elements of the Compact and Mutual Accountability framework.

On the other end of the spectrum was Afghanistan, which used the New Deal as a set of principles with which to advocate for greater national ownership, but the pre-existing Tokyo compact limited explicit references to the New Deal. Yet the compact (which was strongly advocated in the New Deal) was still used in Afghanistan (within the Tokyo framework) and empowered the Ministry of Finance to focus on the priorities already internally defined within existing national plans, rather than starting development planning from scratch. According to the Independent Review of the New Deal, the approach to the New Deal taken by Afghanistan was useful in:²⁶

1. Providing the government with an international platform to influence global development policy toward building national ownership, institutions and reduction of aid dependency.
2. Increasing transparency and accountability of development policy in Afghanistan.
3. Sharing lessons, expertise, and resources with other countries facing similar challenges.
4. Attracting resources to address Afghanistan's challenges and priorities, including resources from development partners that were allocated to the newly-endorsed Sustainable Development Fund.
5. Undertaking regular monitoring and assessments of Afghanistan's progress in the PSGs area.
6. Providing concrete recommendations to inform the National Priority Plans revision process.
7. Enshrining an important role for civil society actors in the development process and providing them with a forum to participate in the dialogue on aid effectiveness, highlighting critical areas needing support, and influencing Government and development partner activities.

Finally, the International Dialogue facilitated knowledge sharing from national experiences with the New Deal. One of the ways the International Dialogue supported the implementation of the New Deal, while elevating the voice of the constituencies was by capturing the views and experiences of fragile states, distilling them into knowledge products and presenting them in a manner that could be most accessible to stakeholders, including other fragile states. For example, the International Dialogue drafted guidance on "How to do country dialogues on Transparency and Use of Country Systems" to help deliver better aid to advance the SDGs.

Box 4. New Deal components in action at the country level

In the Central African Republic, the Ezingo Fund was set up by the United Nations as “a multi-development partner facility to support the financing of a coordinated response to stabilisation, peace consolidation and recovery efforts in the Central African Republic”.

One of the intervention areas of the Ezingo Fund is dedicated to the implementation of the five PSGs. The Government of the Central African Republic can access these funds in form of direct budget support compliant with best practice of channelling development finance ‘on plan, on budget, on treasury, and on report’. Risk sharing is also served through funding of police force salaries as well as the FOCUS priority “One vision, one plan” as the fund’s guiding document is the Government’s Roadmap and Emergency Programme.

The Ezingo Fund is an efficient way to mitigate development partner reluctance to using country systems in fragile and conflict-affected situations. The g7+ sees this mechanism in accordance with the New Deal TRUST principles and development partners can look at the Ezingo Fund as a model and opportunity for reporting achievements in development co-operation practice.

Source: IDPS (2017), New Deal Insights Report, A ‘glass –half-full’ approach to Monitoring Progress on New Deal implementation, in light of the Stockholm Declaration .

Advocacy and voice

From the beginning, the International Dialogue was a critical forum for amplifying the voice of all stakeholders in three ways.

First, it elevated visibility of the g7+ members and their priorities within the OECD. For example, the International Dialogue organised a wide range of high-level events with global decision makers, including Ministerial meetings, delegate round tables, and general advocacy including at the margins of multilateral events, creating opportunities for development partners to report on how they were integrating fragility (in the form of the New Deal) in their strategies, and for the g7+ to report on progress in their own New Deal commitments. It also provided visibility for g7+ and CSPPS voices in the work of INCAF, including informing the content and dissemination of the States of Fragility report. This model of inclusion was largely driven by the International Dialogue tripartite arrangement and has since become standard practice. Moreover, the International Dialogue also influenced most notably the *OECD DAC Recommendation on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus*²⁷ which explicitly refers to, both the New Deal and the Stockholm Declaration, whose principles remains critical for adherents when supporting countries in addressing fragility.

Second, the International Dialogue was an effective multi-constituency platform. As the first forum to bring fragile states and development partners together as equals and peers, the International Dialogue challenged the way business had been done. It was no longer acceptable for development partners to set the agenda for fragile states to follow. For example, in the lead up to the New Deal, while development partners tended to want to focus on risk mitigation, g7+ countries wanted to focus on risk sharing in the financing of development in fragile states. Subsequently, the final agreement of the New Deal focuses on risk-sharing. This reflects what, at the time, was the power of the collective voice of the g7+ to influence development partner positions.

Third, the International Dialogue mobilised development partners to commit resources to the fragility agenda. On one level, biennially at the World Bank Spring and Annual meetings, meetings were

facilitated for g7+ representatives with the President and Regional vice-Presidents of the World Bank, and in some cases with the International Monetary Fund, in order to make the case for increases in funding. On a smaller scale, INCAF members supported the UNDP-financing facility for the New Deal, which allowed members of the International Dialogue, who required support for activities such as travel and national consultations to obtain assistance. This increased engagement where it might otherwise have been constrained budgetarily, and supported physical participation in global policy processes, including at the G20, the AfDB and other for a. As discussed elsewhere, this enabled the constituencies of the International Dialogue, particularly the g7+, to become a constituent voice with a regularity of presence at international for a, whose views could not be ignored.

3. Pushing boundaries of engagement

A key strength of the International Dialogue is that it has brought together three constituencies whose collective contributions are more than the sum of their parts. As such, the platform has been able to push boundaries in a manner that individual constituencies would not have been able to. This approach was most visible as fragile states made the case for fragility assessments, and scaled-up fragile-to-fragile co-operation, in pushing the gender agenda in a context of diverse perspectives among constituents, and in advancing the private sector conversation.

Contextual understanding through fragility assessments

The New Deal popularised the importance of a joint approach to understanding context ('joint analysis'), and the principle of taking context as the starting point of aid, rather than development partner priorities. This principle had been part of the aid effectiveness agenda since the outset (2005), the Paris Declaration Principles on Aid Effectiveness highlighted the importance of understanding the context of each country, including the peacebuilding and statebuilding conditions, the risks and constraints, as well as opportunities and entry points. Using an analogy of doctors needing to diagnose illness before prescribing medication,²⁸ fragile states called on development partners to assess the different constraints facing states, depending on their particular type of fragility, before deciding how much to give in aid, how to channel it, and for what purposes and priorities.

Fragility assessments were advanced as a tool to help development processes focus on the right priorities. Joint analysis would allow development partners to move away from a universal, undifferentiated approach, towards a case-by-case design of engagement. Building on this agreement, the International Dialogue facilitated the inclusion, within the New Deal, of conducting a fragility assessment, as a collaborative exercise where all stakeholders, including state and non-state actors, would agree on fragility fundamentals in a given context ('what fragility looks like'). The assessment subsequently informs national planning, prioritisation, and development partner engagement.

Fragility assessments were implemented across a number of New Deal countries over the course of this period, and in some cases on several occasions (revised versions). Implementation was varied based on the context prevailing in the country concerned. Central African Republic, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste all carried out fragility assessments using different methodologies. Some assessments were consultative with the participation of a broad range of stakeholders in society, others had limited consultation, while others still were desk reviews. A number of countries outside the pilot group, including Comoros, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Togo also carried out fragility assessments. Meanwhile Somalia, which had the most extensive implementation of the New Deal, did not conduct a fragility assessment.

Fragility assessments contributed to new conceptual thinking around fragility, which integrated the g7+ notion of a perception based fragility spectrum. The enduring impact of the fragility assessments was that they made the case for primacy of political analysis before action, and for the need for a country-led diagnosis of fragility and understanding of its different dimensions ahead of providing aid. Whilst it was challenging to integrate country owned and led fragility assessments into development partner planning processes, the existence of the fragility assessment at least influenced the content of the World Bank's own fragility assessments and encouraged more joined up development partner analyses of fragility (eg World Bank-EU-UNDP-AfDB implemented Risk and Resilience Assessments in CAR 2017), and the reconceptualisation of the OECD's own fragility framework, which underpins the States of Fragility Report.

Box 5. What is a fragility assessment?

A fragility assessment is an inclusive and participatory exercise carried out by national stakeholders to assess a country's causes, features and drivers of fragility as well as the sources of resilience within a country. In doing so, it takes a look not only at historical legacies, but also at more recent and current drivers of fragility. Its objectives are to:

1. Promote inclusive multistakeholder dialogue about the challenges to peacebuilding and statebuilding.
2. Identify possible areas of incremental progress towards resilience, including targets in line with the New Deal's PSGs.
3. Help fragile and conflict affected states and development partners to assess and manage risks jointly.

The value of its findings is not only in presenting a clear picture of the country's sources of fragility and resilience, but also in reflecting the views of those either affected by the current fragility or playing a role in building peace and resilience.

Source: IDPS (2014) Fragility Assessment Guidance Note

Advancing fragile-to-fragile co-operation

The International Dialogue has demonstrated that lessons of how to address fragility and transition from fragility to greater resilience, can come from other fragile states themselves. To this end, the International Dialogue (through the INCAF-member funded UN financing facility) has supported and amplified g7+ efforts at peer learning or what is commonly referred to as "fragile-to-fragile co-operation", modelled on South-South co-operation principles but for countries facing conflict and fragility.

One early example of fragile-to-fragile co-operation was the participation of the g7+ in track-II diplomacy in the CAR. In 2014, the g7+ convened protagonists of the conflict in the Central African Republic in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, to hold closed-doors meetings designed to address the conflict. The purpose of the gathering was to share the experiences of countries like Timor-Leste and facilitate interactions that could promote the start of a process of reconciliation. Among other things, the meeting served as preparation for the Bangui Forum on national reconciliation, a conference designed to foster national cohesion. Subsequently, Gusmao Xanana, the g7+ Eminent Person of the Advisor Council and former Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, made a High Level visit to the CAR, where he met with all parties to the conflict and later attended the Bangui Forum. Timor also donated US\$1m, and channelled it through country systems, in support of the crisis; this supported the settlement of 28,000 internally displaced families in the country.²⁹

A second example was during the Ebola outbreak of 2014 in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea. The initial response from the international community to the outbreak was slow, which prompted the g7+ to step up their advocacy. With the support of the International Dialogue Secretariat, and the OECD more generally, which facilitated access of IDPS co-chairs and members to a variety of influential OECD policy arena, the g7+ issued a statement calling development partners to accelerate their support. Putting into practice the New Deal principle of timely aid channelled through country systems, Timor-Leste, a member of the g7+, pledged USD2 million. The experience and lessons drawn from IDPS constituency engagement with respect to the Ebola crisis, offer valuable lessons for how the global community needs to address the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected situations, as outlined in the IDPS Joint Statement on Safeguarding Peace During the COVID-19 pandemic.³⁰

Box 6. The IDPS and the Ebola crisis

In 2014 – 2016, an Ebola virus epidemic broke out in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Initially considered a health crisis, Ebola soon became a social and economic crisis. It disrupted the way of life and challenged trust between citizens and institutions. The outbreak was seen as a symptom of fragile systems across the affected countries; recovery required aid to be delivered in a coordinated manner across the affected region, while strengthening the capacity of countries to withstand future outbreaks. Practically, it was also important for all aid to support one government's goal of eradicating Ebola and avoid duplication of effort in the emergency.

Early in the crisis, in August 2014, the g7+ made a statement of solidarity with the affected countries, calling for urgent action from the international community. Soon the world was paying attention, and the UNDP, World Bank, AfDB, and EU sponsored an Ebola Recovery Assessment process.

In February 2015, the IDPS hosted global stakeholders to discuss a “framework for effective recovery”. The g7+ Chair, Kaifala Marah, the Minister of Finance of Sierra Leone, proposed the establishment of a New Deal platform for Ebola recovery. At the same time, the UNDP New Deal facility, supported by INCAF development partners, funded a consultant to provide technical assistance to the countries and ensure their recovery plans integrated the New Deal.

The IDPS stakeholders advocated for the use of New Deal principles in Ebola response: with a focus on “systems, not sectors”; a decentralisation of the response in order to put the government closer to the people; the development of one national plan to avoid competition among development partners and ministries; the provision of budget support where possible; the creation of a mutual accountability framework; and building on the dialogue started during Ebola to further build civic trust.

In March 2015, a development partner conference was organised in Brussels, co-chaired by the Presidents of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Prime Minister of Togo, as well as ECOWAS, EU, AU and the UN. The meeting included representatives of 150 delegations, including 69 countries contributing to the fight against Ebola, together with international and non-governmental organisations, the private sector and the scientific community. The co-chairs of the conference reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of the New Deal and to the PSGs, affirmed national ownership and leadership of recovery interventions; and called for mutual accountability of recovery investments and equitable service delivery.

Significant allocations were made by the AfDB in all three countries; France in Guinea, the UK in Sierra Leone, and the EU in Liberia and Sierra Leone, all of which were crucial in building government capacity, especially early in the Ebola outbreak when the citizens' trust in Governments was at its lowest. While only 16% of Ebola recovery funds were given on budget, Ebola was nonetheless an important inflection

point in the use of country systems, demonstrating what could be done by both development partners and fragile states when there was political will.

Source: Interviews

Promoting gender equality as an approach to fragility

Gender Equality, Women, Peace and Security, is currently, one of the International Dialogue's three core priorities, championed by its current INCAF co-chair, Canada, as outlined explicitly in the 'Peace Vision 2019-21'. This builds on commitments to gender equality and the well-established Women, Peace and Security Agenda in the Stockholm Declaration echoing the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which aligns with the SDGs, in particular on achieving gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls (SDG 5), reducing inequality (SDG 10), and achieving peaceful, just and inclusive societies (SDG 16). Steady and incremental progress in promoting concrete actions to advance gender equality have taken root in the International Dialogue over the past decade.

While gender was not explicitly prioritised in the New Deal, it has been included in its predecessor agendas. The 2007 DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, called for gender equality; The Accra Agenda for Action (2008) committed development partners to promote the protection and participation of women in conflict-affected countries; and The Dili Declaration (2010) called for a building of states that could respond to the needs of their populations, including women. In addition to raising the level of awareness in the community on gender progress since the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security of 2000, the International Dialogue stressed that the inclusive language of the New Deal set it up for success in the inclusion of women.

As a result of collective critical efforts of key gender protagonists across all three constituencies, gender has come of age in the International Dialogue: in INCAF (through its investment in gender and statebuilding advisory capacity), CSPPS (through the leveraging of its research and guidance on how to promote gender equality in fragile situations), and through the notable consistent interventions of key figures in the G7+ (Sierra Leone's co-chair office and Somalia Minister for Gender and Women's Affairs). Their efforts have helped to ensure that gender equality in contexts of fragility is less contentious today as features as core International Dialogue priority. It also continues to work with members to translate commitments into concrete actions. For example, they have called for gender analysis in fragility assessments, and provided direct support to national stakeholders to advance gender in peacebuilding and statebuilding.

Constituencies of the International Dialogue have also advanced the agenda. The CSPPS has called for the New Deal's implementation to take into account the gender dimension of the PSGs; issued a set of recommendations which disaggregate the Stockholm Declaration into gendered principles, mandates, actions, and work plans, linked to the declaration with UNSCR 1325 and SDG 5; and called for gender budgeting approaches to allocate aid. The CSPPS secretariat at Cordaid also developed a Handbook on Integrating Gender in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, and supported country-level consultations and workshops in Somalia, Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC. INCAF, together with GENDERNET, the OECD's Network on Gender Equality, also conducted joint research which highlighted blind spots on gender in development partner thinking on conflict and fragility and recommended the need for more gender-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding.

Box 7. Amplifying gender in the Somalia Compact

In 2015, a review of civil society engagement in the Somalia Compact noted that "...the compact should have been more attentive to women and other gender sensitive concerns in a cross-cutting manner". In response, in December 2017, IDPS members (CSPPS, g7+, Government of Somalia, and UNDP), supported by the IDPS secretariat, facilitated a country-level stakeholder dialogue specifically on gender, entitled "Inclusion of gender sensitivity and women's empowerment in the National Development Plan".

The purpose of the workshop was to facilitate a discussion among IDPS stakeholders on how international actors could more effectively channel support to ensure that government plans mainstream gender sensitivity within the national plan. An OECD INCAF-GENDERNET report on development partner support to gender equality in fragile settings gave important evidence, and the CSPPS supported toolkit/handbook on the New Deal and Gender was guiding practical approaches, and g7+ government interest and leadership through the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development jointly framed the discussions.

The deliberations highlighted the challenge of persistent silos in approaches to gender, in particular amongst development partners operating in Somalia.

Source: IDPS (2018), Gender and the IDPS.

Expanding the engagement of private sector stakeholders: A Peace Promoting Private Sector

Today one of the three priorities outlined in the International Dialogue Vision is for a Peace Promoting Private Sector. This is the culmination of over five years of consistent attention to the importance of translating the PSG4 'building economic foundations for peace' into concrete actions for the International Dialogue. Since 2014-15, the International Dialogue has actively sought to foster relationships with the private sector, acknowledging that all international actors operating in fragile and conflict-affected situations, can through their actions either promote or undermine peace. The International Dialogue has long recognised that jobs and revenues are essential for ensuring that fragile states can deliver on their social contract of providing economic well-being to citizens. It has therefore experimented and learned a number of useful lessons about how to engage the private sector, which has implied adopting a new 'language' and understanding how private actors operate, rather than seeking to impose International Dialogue ideas on them.

In this respect the International Dialogue has benefited from the hosting of its Secretariat in the OECD, which has provided access to multiple fora on responsible business and supply chains to facilitate g7+ member access and to access networks of expertise. The International Dialogue has commissioned guidance for members to translate responsible business norms and standards of interest to countries facing conflict and fragility. Moreover, the International Dialogue has conducted joint-pieces of research with private sector actors on how to scale up responsible business in fragile environments as well as convening multi-stakeholder discussions to share lessons across the International Dialogue constituencies and private sector business fora, in-country (Sierra Leone, 2015) and at international level (Responsible Investor Europe Forum),³¹ and been involved in a series of projects with peacebuilding think tanks working on private sector. Such examples include:

1. In 2015, experts and private sector actors, think tanks, OECD teams, and NGOs, collectively designed with the International Dialogue Secretariat the strategy for "Promoting More and Better

Business in Fragile and Conflict Affected States”, including perspectives from institutional investors.³²

2. The International Dialogue also produced the “International Standards for Responsible Business in Conflict Affected and Fragile Environments” which consolidates and distills guidance from different voluntary standards that exist, and presents a set of relevant information for fragile states.³³
3. The International Dialogue joint report,³⁴ with asset managers entitled ‘How To Scale up Responsible Investment and Promote Sustainable Peace in Fragile Environments’, to encourage institutional investors to think of fragile markets as potential investment targets.
4. Advocacy from the International Dialogue and its constituents on the importance of job creation and investing in fragile states was part of the chorus of evidence informing the creation of the Private Sector Window of IDA 18, enabling the International Finance Corporation, the largest investor in fragile states, to expand its balance sheet for supporting countries.

Box 8. Influencing global monitoring of effective development co-operation in fragile contexts

The International Dialogue Secretariat’s strategic location at the OECD, in the same Directorate and Division that hosts the Global Partnership on Effective Development Co-operation, also enabled some important synergies to take place and the International Dialogue to shape the evolution of global monitoring of effective development co-operation, conducted by the Global Partnership on Effective Development Co-operation. The Global Partnership on Effective Development Co-operation’s monitoring exercise tracks progress made in implementing effective development co-operation commitments at the country, regional, and global level, supporting accountability among all development actors and informing UN-led follow-up and review of the Sustainable Development Goals. Between 2018 and 2019, an open working group, comprising of members of the International Dialogue and the Global Partnership Steering Committee, was convened to guide the development of a tailored approach to monitoring effectiveness in fragile contexts. This tailored approach was presented at the Global Partnership’s Senior Level Meeting (New York, 2019) and informs the reform of the monitoring exercise that is currently underway

Looking ahead

Twelve years after the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding was born, the world is facing a crisis of global proportions, brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. This crisis has exacerbated and exposed underlying fragilities, faced particularly by many of the member countries who established the International Dialogue. COVID-19 has brought to the fore the need for concerted action to reinforce inclusive leadership and respond to the needs on the ground. This is a 're-validation' of the International Dialogue mission and purpose as reflected in the Peace Vision (2019-21), which highlights the continued commitment of International Dialogue constituencies to building on successes and leveraging lessons from this first decade of work, as it embarks on future chapters. The fragility challenges which many countries face, particularly those affected by conflict and systemic violence, has made the International Dialogue to be seen both as a platform and an ethos, which is more relevant now than ever. In committing to a more nimble and agile agenda with three core priorities (National Cohesion; Gender Equality and Women, Peace and Security, and a Peace Promoting Private Sector), the International Dialogue has paved the way for the International Dialogue's future, in which it is fit for purpose, and equipped for relevance and ability to spread the word, where the message of concerted action to address fragility through inclusive country ownership and leadership, needs to be heard the most.

The Secretariat of International Dialogue published a substantive list of papers and publications between 2010-20. Please visit the website to learn more.

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Notes

¹ The g7+ is a voluntary association of initially 7 and now 20 countries that are or have been affected by conflict and fragility and are now in transition to the next stage of development. www.g7plus.org.

² INCAF is a network of OECD DAC members and key multilateral agencies working in fragile situations.

³ The CSPPS is a South-North non-governmental coalition of peacebuilding organisations that coordinates and supports.

⁴ The New Deal was also developed with the support of the Overseas Development Institute's Budget Strengthening Initiative, which for almost a decade provided direct capacity building support to the g7+ secretariat in Dili. A 'New Deal' for fragile states <https://www.odi.org/news/477-new-deal-fragile-states>.

⁵ The Dili Declaration was endorsed by International Dialogue members in April 2010 as a response to the important challenges in achieving the Millennium Development Goals in fragile and conflict-affected situations and insists that there can be no development without peace.

⁶ g7plus.org/3/our-approach

⁷ SDG16+ includes 12 targets from SDG16 and 24 targets from seven other Sustainable Development Goals that directly measure an aspect of peace, justice, and inclusion. The SDG16+ targets aim to be enabling to reach other goals and address interlinkages. <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=33954>. SDG16+ is promoted by a likeminded group of member countries called Pathfinders <https://www.sdg16.plus/>.

⁸ 'The Evolution of the International Dialogue platform', an International Dialogue internal document, 2018.

⁹ OECD (2017), INCAF, *Hitting the Target Missing the Point: Assessing Donor Support for Inclusive and Legitimate Politics in Fragile Societies*.

¹⁰ OECD, DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, [OECD/LEGAL/5019](https://www.oecd.org/legal/5019), p.5. The OECD's Recommendation on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus was informed by, and explicitly refers to both the New Deal and the Stockholm Declaration, whose principles remains critical for adherents when supporting fragile countries in addressing fragility

¹¹ Sarah Hearn (2016), “Independent Review of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States for the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,” New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University.

¹² ‘How to Scale Up Responsible Business and Promote Sustainable Peace in Fragile Environments, A Draft Report Developed in conjunction with BNP Paribas Asset Management, 2016, https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/8b/27/8b27b529-8fcc-4a2c-8d7b-87aabc55f7f3/final_privatesectorreport.pdf.

¹³ OECD-DAC (2005), A Proposal for Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States, December.

¹⁴ <https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/38368714.pdf>.

¹⁵

<https://www.oecd.org/fr/pays/republiquedemocratiqueducuongo/monitoringthefragilestatesprinciples.htm>.

¹⁶ The g7+ was officially launched at the First Meeting of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, in Dili in 2010. g7+ Foundation (g7plusfoundation.org).

¹⁷ Roundtable 7 Summary: Aid Effectiveness in Situations of Fragility and Conflict, 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2-4 September, 2008. On file.

¹⁸ The Overseas Development Institute’s Budget Strengthening Initiative, played an important role in shaping the New Deal and in providing the g7+ with critical technical advisory support, to enable its full and active participation in the International Dialogue as a critical constituency.

¹⁹ See Donata Garrasi (2015), New Models of Development Cooperation: The g7+ and Fragile-to-Fragile Cooperation, UNUCPR, Nov 2015, p2.

²⁰ OECD (2015), Development Co-operation Report 2015: Making Partnerships Effective Coalitions for Action, ‘The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding’, by Kaifala Marah, former Minister of Finance Sierra Leone and former Chair of g7+.

²¹ IDPS (2011), New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, pdf available at http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf.

²² International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Working Group on Indicators, 2012. The question of a set of universal indicators of fragility had been contentious within the International Dialogue, as the g7+ feared they would undermine the principle of ‘context as starting point’ and lend themselves to misleading rankings and comparisons.

²³ ‘The Evolution of the International Dialogue platform’, and International Dialogue internal document, 2018.

²⁴ https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/f8/5a/f85a6879-f10d-4c25-b776-6b65376fa0bd/final_idps_peace_vision_eng.pdf.

²⁵ Sarah Hearn (2016), “Independent Review of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States for the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,” New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University.

²⁶ See Sarah Hearn, Independent Review of the New Deal, p 40-41.

²⁷ OECD, DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, [OECD/LEGAL/5019](#), p.5.

²⁸ Interview.

²⁹ Interview with g7+ Secretariat; g7+ (2015), Official visit of Hon Kay Rala Xanana REPORT Gusmão, Eminent Person of the Advisory Council of g7+, to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic, On file.

³⁰ See <https://www.g7plus.org/home/newsDetail/225/idps-joint-statement-on-safeguarding-peace-during-the-covid-19-pandemic> and the IDPS Joint Statement on Safeguarding Peace during the COVID-19 Pandemic https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/91/64/91646f16-4fce-4479-bd18-1dbe3e3fa663/idps_covid-19_statement_english_version.pdf.

³¹ Responsible Investor: Response Global Media https://www.responsible-investor.com/?e=ri_europe_2017.

³² Final International Dialogue – More and better Business in FCAS, see https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/41/73/4173b3a8-3705-4640-be70-8e2c4d737eb8/final_international_dialogue_-_more_and_better_business_in_fcas.pdf.

³³ IDPS, 'International Standards for Responsible Business in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Environments; An Overview' https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/6f/96/6f96d1ad-45bb-48ae-8614-8d84d6f7b2e9/id-rbc.pdf.

³⁴ IDPS, 'How to Scale up Responsible Investment and Promote Sustainable Peace in Fragile Environments', see https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/8b/27/8b27b529-8fcc-4a2c-8d7b-87aabc55f7f3/final_privatesectorreport.pdf.