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2017 REPORT ON THE DAC UNTYING RECOMMENDATION

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Introduction and Main Findings

1. Untying aid – removing the legal and regulatory barriers to open competition for ODA funded procurement – generally increases aid effectiveness by reducing transaction costs and improving recipient countries ownership. It also allows donors to take greater care in aligning their aid programmes with the objectives and financial management systems of recipients.

2. This note reviews information on the tying status Official Development Assistance (ODA). It covers data on ODA, as well as *ex ante* notifications of untied aid tenders for 2015-16, and data on *ex post* contract awards for 2014. Section 1 reviews DAC Member performance in implementing agreed commitments of the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries (the Recommendation). Section 2 looks at trends and patterns in untying ODA more generally (i.e. covering all ODA categories and all countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients). Finally, Section 3 discusses some central issues for the future.

3. The main findings are as follows:

- Most Members report as untied all or almost all of their ODA covered by the Recommendation. The average DAC share stood at 87.1% in 2014 and dropped to 83.5% in 2015. These shares remain high by historic standards, although they represent two consecutive drops compared to 2013. A number of donors persistently fall well short of their untying commitments. The DAC should invite these Members to undertake measures to honour their commitments.

- A key factor in the drops of the share of untied aid over the two years was, in 2014, a sharp reduction in the volume of ODA covered by the recommendation, which disproportionately affected untied aid; followed in 2015 by a partial recovery of ODA volumes, which was disproportionately accounted for by tied aid.

- The provisions of the Recommendation aimed at providing transparency that *de jure* untied aid might remain *de facto* tied, are not consistently adhered to across the DAC membership. In particularly, *ex ante* notifications of untied aid offers are poorly or not reported by the majority of DAC members. In a number of donor countries, moreover, the persistently high share of contracts that continue to be awarded to domestic suppliers remains a source of ongoing concern. The DAC should invite the Members concerned to ensure that their procurement procedures are also *de facto* untied.

- Looking at all bilateral ODA beyond that covered by the Recommendation (i.e. all categories, all recipients), DAC Members overall continue to sustain an improved performance on untying ODA in line with their commitments. However, there are important differences between donors with regard to the share of ODA that they report as untied. For the 2014-15 period, progress among donors with already above-average performance contrasts with further slippage in the group of donors that have been performing below par. The DAC should encourage these Members to honour their Accra and Busan untying commitments.

- The Agenda 2030 and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda raise the importance of the private sector in the development agenda, and imply an evolving role for private sector actors. In this context, concerns have grown about potential conflicts of development and commercial objectives, and increased instances of tying. It will be important for the DAC to further assess these concerns and clarify, how the private sector agenda relates to commitments on untying.

1. IMPLEMENTING THE DAC UNTYING RECOMMENDATION

1.1 Untying agreed forms of ODA

4. In 2001, the DAC agreed the Recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). This was amended in 2008 to include remaining Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) not already covered by way of their LDC status. The Recommendation covers most forms of ODA, but excludes free-standing technical co-operation. Moreover, it was left up to Members as to whether they could untie food aid.

5. For 2014, ODA covered by the Recommendation amounted to 75% of total bilateral ODA to the LDC/HIPC groups. The equivalent figure for 2015 was 77%. The following section will look at untying trends overall, i.e. covering all categories of ODA and all countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients.

6. In 2014, the share of ODA covered by the Recommendation that was reported as untied stood at 87.1%.[1] This marks a drop of 2.4 percentage points, from 89.5%, in 2013. After a further drop of 3.6 percentage points, the share stood at 83.5% in 2015. The share remains high by historical standards, but represents the lowest figure since 2009.

Figure 1. Total bilateral ODA commitments and shares untied



Source OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS)

[1] All calculations of the share of aid untied exclude administrative costs and in-donor refugees.

7. As in past years, the clear majority of DAC members report all or almost all of their ODA covered by the recommendation as untied (Table 1). The two consecutive drops in overall share of untied aid covered by the Recommendation followed a sustained upward trend over previous years.

8. For both years, the overall figure masked a diverging picture among individual DAC members. Of 29 DAC members in 2014, 22 scored above the overall share of 87.1%, with ten of them meeting the 100% target. Overall, far more members recorded an increase in their individual share than those showing a decrease. In 2015, whereas 11 members reached the target of 100% untied aid under the Recommendation, only 21 scored above the overall share of 83.5%. Moreover, slightly more members recorded a decrease in their individual share than those showing a gain.

9. Several donors fell short of their obligation under the recommendation, some of them on a continued basis and to a very significant extent. Greece and Slovenia reported 0% of their aid as untied in 2015. The Slovak Republic recorded 0% as untied in 2014, although recorded 100% untied aid for 2015. In all cases, the volume of ODA covered by the recommendation remains well below USD 1 million. Poland's share stood at 3.1% in 2014 and at 3.6% in 2015. The figure for the Czech Republic was 23.7% in 2014 and 44.2% in 2015, and for Portugal it was 31.7% and 38.9% respectively. Korea saw its share drop form 58.4% in 2014 to 49.1% in 2015. At 68.3% in 2014 and 58.1% in 2015, the share of US aid reported as untied also fell well below the overall average in both years.

10. Overall, data patterns do not allow establishing, whether the two consecutive drops reflect natural variation, an overall plateauing or trend-reversal. The data, however, heightens concern about DAC Members meeting the untying commitments they have undertaken, and further reinforce the importance of monitoring and analysing further potential drivers behind figures. The DAC may wish to invite those members failing to meet their obligations under the Recommendation to take appropriate action to improve their performance.

1.2 Effort Sharing

11. The efforts required to meet the terms of the Recommendation vary considerably across individual DAC members. This is due to differences in volume and composition of Members' programmes. Mindful of this, the 2001 Recommendation aims to promote a balanced effort sharing among DAC members. To do this, it foresees an assessment of Members performance over time against two benchmarks for effort sharing. These are:

1. The untying ratio, measuring total untied bilateral ODA to LDCs/HIPCs as a share of total bilateral ODA to those countries, with a reference base of 0.60; and

2. The effort-sharing composite indicator, measuring total untied ODA to LDCs/HIPCs as a share of GNI, for which the reference benchmark is 0.04.

12. The objective of improved effort sharing continued to be met and to well exceed the benchmark, with the untying ratio standing at 0.80 in 2014 and 0.79 in 2015, although this constituted a continuous decline from previous years. The effort sharing composite indicator recorded 0.10 for DAC members overall in 2014 and 0.11 in 2015. After a fall in the previous year, the increase in the composite indicator from 2014 to 2015 does not support a trend decline in this measure.

13. As in the previous year, however, Greece, together with Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia the most recent new DAC Members for the period under consideration, score well below the benchmark on both measures during both 2014 and 2015.

14. At 0.54, Korea did not quite meet the benchmark for the untying ratio in 2014, and dropped further to 0.45 in 2015. While Portugal also fell just short on the untying ratio in 2014, with a value of 0.56, it met the benchmark 0.60 in 2015. Both countries also continue to exceed the composite indicator benchmark.

15. Moreover, in 2015 the US dropped below the reference base of 0.60 for the untying ratio, to 0.54. With regard to the composite indicator, Spain failed to reach the 0.04 benchmark in 2015. Finally, several countries recorded values on the composite indicator below their individual base values for the 99-01 period, although on the untying ratio, all DAC members, for whom base data from 99-01 existed, continued to score above their respective individual base values.

1.3 Some underlying data factors

16. The 2014 picture is peculiar in that a decline in the overall share coincides with an increase in respective country shares by twice as many DAC members recorded as those recording a drop. One key factor behind this is diverging allocation patterns. Bilateral ODA from DAC members to LDCs/HIPCs covered by the Recommendation showed a marked contraction in 2014 compared to 2013 (-30%). This decrease was significantly more pronounced for the group of DAC members with above average untying share (37%), than for countries who had a below average share (9%). Consequently, the overall share of untied aid dropped, even as the majority of DAC members recorded either 100% of untied aid or increased their individual share.

17. Moreover, the 2014 drop of ODA covered by the recommendation disproportionately affected untied aid. For DAC members overall, untied aid accounted for 95% of the overall decrease of aid under the recommendation, well above overall share of untied aid.

18. From 2014 to 2015, ODA covered by the recommendation recovered about half of the drop from the previous year. This recovery would have been even more substantial but for depreciation against the USD of all other DAC members, which dampened considerably the USD figure of 2015 contributions relative to 2014.

19. The implied share of untied aid in this increase, however, corresponded to only 65%, i.e. well below the figure for the total. Overall, whereas untied aid was disproportionately affected by the extensive drop of ODA covered by the recommendation, untied aid was relatively underrepresented in the partial recovery in 2015.

20. This pattern is very worrying, inconsistent with the Recommendation, and its objective to ensure inefficiencies associated with tied aid are not borne by the countries covered by the Recommendation, which are least able to afford them.

1.4 Transparency provisions

21. For untying to be effective, it is important that ODA is not only *de jure*, but also *de facto* untied. To that effect, the Recommendation includes transparency provisions that call for *ex ante* notification of untied aid offers to be posted on the Untied Aid public bulletin board[2] as well as *ex post* statements about contracts awarded. While there are important differences between Members in honouring these conditions, overall they are being met poorly, and with a long-term trend decline in particular with regard to *ex ante* notifications.

[2] http://www.oecd.org/dac/untied-aid/untyingaidofficialdevelopmentassistancecontractopportunities.htm

22. *Ex ante notifications on untied aid offers* continues to be reported inconsistently and only by a small sub-set of DAC members (Table 3). Some Members may have little to report, e.g. little ODA covered by the Recommendation or ODA to LDCs/HIPCs with no direct procurement content, such as budget aid or debt relief, or project volumes below the notification threshold.[3] A few members continue to perform well, notably Belgium, France, Japan and the United States. Other members report some notifications, which however represent only a very small share of the volume of their programmes in the LDC/HIPC groups. Well above half of the DAC membership do not report any ex ante notifications. As a result, the provision for *ex ante* notifications provides only limited transparency, and cannot be expected to contribute to building confidence about *de facto* adherence to the Recommendation by the DAC Membership overall. Past calls for improved reporting requirements did not result in an enhanced observation of the transparency requirements, as the trend for a decreasing number of DAC members to report *ex ante* notifications has continued over time.

23. Ex post reporting on contract awards is observed by a significantly larger share of the DAC membership (Table 4). This more complete reporting notwithstanding, it is difficult to associate the number of value of contracts awarded in a given year with the activities reported to the CRS in earlier years. Factors such as considerable time gaps between commitments and disbursements, or a single commitment being executed in numerous disbursements make direct comparison difficult. Nevertheless, for some Members, the amounts notified are consistently small in relation to their total ODA volumes provided to countries covered by the Recommendation. They add up to substantially different multi-year aggregates, indicating that differences are not due to a significant extent to delays between commitments and disbursements.

24. *The geographical sourcing of contract awards* continues to show a relatively balanced picture overall for 2014. In terms of number of contracts, 42% were awarded to suppliers from the donor country, 9% to suppliers from other donor countries, whereas 48% went to developing country suppliers, of which 31% to those from LDCs/HIPCs. Looking at the distribution in terms of the value of contracts, the distribution is 46% to the donor country, 16% to other donors, and 38% to developing countries, of which 4% to LDCs/HIPCs.

25. This can be considered a reasonably balanced distribution of contract awards. Looking at the data more closely shows that, while LDCs are awarded a high share the contracts, in terms of volume they tend to be smaller. Whereas the overall average contract size awarded in 2014 was USD 3.7 million, the average volume for contracts awarded to LDCs was USD 0.5 million. The highest average contract value in 2014 is recorded by bidders from other developing countries at USD 7.2 million, followed by other donors at USD 6.3 million, while contracts awarded to bidders from the donor country average at USD 3.9 million.

26. The skewed pattern of smaller contracts awarded to bidders from LDCs/HIPCs may reflect the fact that scale is a relevant factor, as smaller contracts are less attractive for non-domestic bidders. Procurement costs relative to project size are a likely further factor. In the same vein, the lesser prevalence of awards of big contracts to LDCs would be consistent with greater international competition for contracts with substantial commercial value. Weaker capacity and limited international competitiveness of LDCs, as would be reflected e.g. in their share of trade of relevant product markets, are further factors likely to play a role. The fact that third countries, either other donors or other developing countries, are relatively more prevalent in awards of more sizeable contracts further supports an explanation of stronger international competition for bigger contracts with substantial commercial value.

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[3] The transparency Provisions of the Recommendation *ex ante* notifications apply to activities above a threshold of SDR 700,000 (SDR 130,000 in case of investment related technical co-operation).

27. As in previous years, this aggregate picture conceals important variations across Members. For several DAC Members, including Australia, Austria, Canada and the United Kingdom, a very high share (often more than 75% of ODA volume or contract number) of contracts goes back to suppliers from their own jurisdiction.[4] For example, in value terms, 91% of Austria's contracts were awarded to Austrian suppliers, and the same figure for Canada reached 95%. Encouragingly, two countries that exhibited this feature in the past have reduced this share form such very high levels, even if still well above the overall average. In the case of Korea, it dropped to 66%, from fully 100% the year before; and for the United States, the 2014 figure stood at 68%, down from 89% for 2013. The lowest share of contracts awarded to domestic suppliers in terms of value was recorded by Luxembourg (1%) and Spain (9%). In light of these differences, the DAC may wish to encourage Members with high shares of contracts awarded to their domestic suppliers to ensure their procurement regimes are commensurate with the requirements for ODA to be untied. Members are also encouraged to explore, whether other programme features may result in a data bias for contract awards patterns. Overall, improved data on the supply chain of contracts (to establish award patterns along the supply chain) would contribute considerably to a more complete and informed picture on distribution of awards, and contribute to an enhanced understanding of *de jure* and *de facto* untying.

2. OVERALL TRENDS IN AID UNTYING

28. The Recommendation aims to encourage untying to countries beyond those covered by its provisions. It explicitly invites DAC Members to continue providing untied aid in activities and countries not covered by the Recommendation, and to study the possibilities of extending untied aid to activities and countries, where aid is still provided tied, a commitment further confirmed by DAC Members in the context of the Accra and Busan High Level Forums.

2.1 Share of ODA reported as untied

29. The share of DAC bilateral ODA that was reported as untied peaked at 78.6% (Table 6) in 2014, exceeding slightly the 2013 figure of 78.5%, before receding to 76.2% for 2015. Both values exceed the 74.2% baseline from 2010, when providers endorsed in the Busan Partnership Agreement to "accelerated efforts to untie aid"[5], a commitment that was carried forward into the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation.[6]

30. Individual country performance again varies significantly. In 2014, 18 of the 29 DAC Members scored above the average. Of these, eight reported fully or almost fully untied aid programmes (above 95%), and five more exceeded 90% of their ODA programmes reported as untied. Similarly, 18 DAC Members exceeded the average in 2015, while the number of those reporting fully or almost fully untied aid rose to eleven, and three more scoring above 90%.

31. There are, however, also cases where the share has declined, or remains below par with no indication of any tendency to increase for 2014 and 2015, as is the case for Austria, the Czech Republic,

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[4] The data collection is not set up to capture information beyond primary contracts and the extent to which award patterns further down the supply chain reflect greater geographic diversification.

[5] Japan and the United States interpret the Accra and Busan commitments on untying to be restricted only to ODA covered by the DAC Recommendation on Untying Aid.

[6] http://effectivecooperation.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/GPEDC-Monitoring- Framework-10-Indicators.pdf

Greece[7], Poland, and Slovenia. Portugal and the Slovak Republic are also part of the group that fall well short of the DAC average, although in the case of Portugal there has been a consistent increase over recent years, while the share of the Slovak Republic recorded a very strong increase in 2015.

32. Overall, the drop in the collective share was driven essentially by a decline in the untying share of DAC Members already scoring below-average on this measure. The collective share of members scoring above average remained relatively stable, reaching 91% in 2014 and 93% in 2015, after a coming in at 92% in 2013. Contrary to this, the collective share of the below average group of DAC members saw successive drops, from 69% in 2013 to 67% in 2014 and 62% in 2015. The DAC may wish to call upon these Members in particular to join the majority of DAC Members and increase the share of aid that is provided untied.

3. LOOKING AHEAD

3.1 Refocusing on transparency provisions

33. As this report has shown, reporting on and compliance with *de jure* provisions on untying continue to be robust. The transparency provisions, however, which underpin the *de facto* untying of ODA, are not adhered to systematically, although they are likely to play a central role going forward.

34. Solid *ex ante* and *ex post* safeguards that help clearly establish the tying status of a given intervention are essential for the transparency that underpins confidence in and credibility of the system. Open tenders for untied aid are essentially synonymous with ensuring competition. However, unless transparency safeguards on de facto untying are perceived as sufficiently robust, and are systematically observed, concerns about market distortions would risk significantly constraining the scope for DAC members to mobilising private finance towards development uses.

35. In light of this, it will be important going forward to complement sustained monitoring of tying trends and compliance with the DAC Recommendation with a renewed focus on implementing transparency provisions.

3.1.2 Applying ex ante notifications directly to the purpose of competitive tendering

36. Compliance of DAC members with the Untying Recommendation is weakest in the area of *ex ante* notifications. To encourage stronger compliance with this provision by more DAC members, it might be considered to which extent the information provided may be used to serve the purpose of competitive tendering, beyond being a reporting obligation to DAC members.

37. The underlying rationale of this transparency provision *is* to contribute to *de facto* untying essentially by providing information to potential bidders for contracts. Whereas the reporting of *ex ante* notifications currently serves to provide transparency about tenders to other DAC members, however, it is not clear that this information currently contributes to enhanced awareness of relevant market actors.

38. In this regard, the DAC could explore options for channelling information on tenders provided to the *ex ante* notification database onward, adjusted as appropriate, to relevant information platforms used by

[7] Greece notes that the high percentage of tied aid is due to the composition of its development assistance. This includes a high share of tied technical co-operation in its aid portfolio. This takes mostly the form of scholarships and imputed student costs – considered by the DAC as tied aid by definition and reported accordingly by Greece.

prospective bidders. As a corollary benefit of reporting *ex ante* notifications, DAC members could thus benefit from free, enhanced market awareness of their public tenders.

3.2 Untying and the evolving role of the private sector in the development agenda

39. At a fundamental level, the increased focus accorded to the private sector by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) also entails an evolving role for and contribution from the private sector. Many DAC members have made enhancing the contribution of the private sector to development a major priority for their development efforts. This has led to questions and concerns about the relation to and the impact on their untying commitments. A specific concern in this regard is that this prioritisation may lead to increased instances of tying, and as a pretext to weaken untying commitments.

40. The approach of development actors to private sector counterparts is framed by the prospective contribution of private sector to development outcomes that guide development policy and finance, and the changes in this regard warrant further reflection on the implications for untying. In essence, the traditional relationship to private sector counterparts has been that of contractor or provider for ODA financed interventions – donors worked ‘through’ the private sector.

41. The ambition of Agenda 2030 and the AAAA is to unlock the potential of the private sector to make a central contribution to development goals. This entails a different relationship: private sector counterparts evolve from contractors to contributors. A key question that follows for donors is, how to work ‘with’ the private sector to unlock these contributions.[8]

42. Conceptually, it is difficult to find reasons to suggest that advancing the role of the private sector as a contributor to development would require or be favoured by a lessened commitment to untying. The essence of the untying agenda is about facilitating competition through open procurement, with a view to enhancing aid effectiveness in terms of value for money, as well as alignment and ownership. At issue is the awarding of tenders for ODA-financed projects or other development interventions to contractors or implementers.

43. In this regard, the role foreseen for the private sector by Agenda 2030 and the AAAA is not about ODA-financed goods and services from commercial counterparts, but that of contributor to development, in terms of finance, capacity, expertise, solutions, etc. It is, therefore, not clear that or how untying commitments, relating to procurement of ODA-financed interventions, would have a bearing on the objective of enhanced private sector contributions to development.

44. However, the picture may be more complex in practice. For instance, the new development agenda implies the need for strengthened partnerships with private sector counterparts, based on co-ownership and co-creation. It is not the intention of the untying provisions to unduly constrain such partnerships, which is not defined by private sector counterparts engaging in a capacity of recipient of ODA funds.

45. It will be important for the DAC to assess these questions in further detail and clarify, how the evolving role of the private sector in the context of the 2030 Agenda and the AAAA relates to commitments on untying. Any work on this should follow a two-pronged approach: assessing possible unintended implications of the current regime on the scope for DAC members to cooperate with the private

[8] For additional context on the issue of donor engagement with private sector counterparts, see OECD (2016), Private Sector Engagement for Sustainable Development: Lessons from the DAC, Paris.

sector as a contributor to development; and at the same time ensuring, and as appropriate reinforcing, the effectiveness of safeguards related to the fundamental rationale of the untying provisions.

46. More clarity on these issues is a high priority for the untying agenda. It is also important for the credibility of DAC members' work with private sector counterparts, and more broadly to facilitate progress on the new, ambitious private sector agenda. The DAC may wish to ask the Secretariat to propose options for further structured work on this issue.

Table 1. DAC members' bilateral ODA to LDCs and non-LDC HIPCs as covered by the Untying Recommendation (1)

	Total (USD million, constant 2014 prices)				Share untied (%)			
	2012	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**
Australia	550	461	553	467	100.0	98.8	99.3	100.0
Austria	187	66	144	24	76.8	28.4	88.8	84.8
Belgium	512	262	310	268	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Canada	743	688	620	660	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Czech Republic	10	6	7	7	59.5	11.9	23.7	44.2
Denmark	819	702	931	406	92.5	93.3	91.2	100.0
EU Institutions	3 930	4 647	1 572	4 063	93.0	82.2	93.0	84.3
Finland	189	124	140	153	99.1	94.2	91.9	89.1
France	2 988	1 665	1 417	1 762	97.2	97.2	97.0	97.2
Germany	1 553	1 326	1 132	1 655	100.0	99.9	99.9	100.0
Greece	..	..	0.1	0.2	..	..	100.0	0.0
Iceland	11	14	12	12	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ireland	255	240	231	208	100.0	99.6	100.0	100.0
Italy	172	152	216	329	94.1	96.6	97.8	99.4
Japan	1 489	8 323	3 439	5 022	100.0	99.8	100.0	99.6
Korea	633	1 020	1 127	1 067	40.0	58.2	58.4	49.1
Luxembourg	95	106	102	36	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Netherlands	1 100	613	467	420	100.0	94.3	97.9	97.1
New Zealand	44	61	97	71	98.8	97.6	97.9	98.7
Norway	786	1 294	975	622	100.0	100.0	100.0	96.7
Poland	..	46	39	51	..	10.7	3.1	3.6
Portugal	125	78	52	52	15.8	24.5	31.7	38.9
Slovak Republic	..	0.6	0.5	0.3	..	..	0.0	100.0
Slovenia	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.6	..	..	..	0.0
Spain	153	337	192	90	86.2	95.5	95.5	82.4
Sweden	337	605	726	698	99.7	99.7	98.9	94.8
Switzerland	517	757	632	587	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
United Kingdom	1 043	1 335	1 067	1 254	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
United States	6 692	7 602	6 661	7 270	61.6	74.5	68.3	58.1
Total	**24 930**	**32 534**	**22 862**	**27 255**	**85.7**	**89.5**	**87.1**	**83.5**

1. Excluding donor's administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs

Source: OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS), commitments basis.

Table 2. DAC Members' positions: Reference Indicator Matrix
(LDCs and non-LDC HIPCs Bilateral ODA)

	Untying ratio (1)			Effort-sharing composite Indicator (2)		
	(Reference point : 0.60)			*(Reference point : 0.04)*		
	Base (99-01 avg.)	*2014*	*2015*	*Base (99-01 avg.)*	*2014*	*2015*
Australia	0.42	0.92	1.00	0.05	0.09	0.10
Austria	0.66	0.86	0.79	0.09	0.09	0.08
Belgium	0.53	1.00	1.00	0.11	0.19	0.18
Canada	0.42	0.99	0.99	0.05	0.09	0.15
Czech Republic	..	0.18	0.25	..	0.02	0.03
Denmark	0.78	0.92	1.00	0.35	0.35	0.25
EU Institutions	..	0.66	0.71	..	..	..
Finland	0.72	0.95	0.91	0.10	0.18	0.21
France	0.59	0.96	0.96	0.10	0.13	0.18
Germany	0.45	0.86	0.90	0.06	0.11	0.12
Greece	..	0.09	0.07	..	0.02	0.03
Iceland	..	1.00	1.00	..	0.09	0.11
Ireland	0.85	1.00	1.00	0.15	0.19	0.18
Italy	0.40	0.95	0.96	0.05	0.05	0.07
Japan	0.77	0.86	0.90	0.06	0.11	0.17
Korea	..	0.54	0.45	..	0.06	0.05
Luxembourg	..	1.00	1.00	..	0.45	0.48
Netherlands	0.85	0.98	0.98	0.28	0.14	0.18
New Zealand	..	0.85	0.80	..	0.10	0.08
Norway	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.34	0.34	0.33
Poland	..	0.07	0.08	..	0.02	0.02
Portugal	0.41	0.56	0.60	0.11	0.05	0.06
Slovak Republic	..	0.00	0.31	..	0.02	0.03
Slovenia	..	0.00	0.00	..	0.02	0.03
Spain	0.46	0.95	0.82	0.06	0.04	0.03
Sweden	0.57	0.92	0.93	0.25	0.30	0.34
Switzerland	0.84	0.97	0.97	0.11	0.16	0.16
United Kingdom	0.63	1.00	1.00	0.10	0.19	0.20
United States	..	0.61	0.54	..	0.05	0.04
Total DAC	**0.55**	**0.80**	**0.79**	**0.05**	**0.10**	**0.11**

1. The Bilateral LDCs-HIPCs ODA untying ratio represent: Untied bilateral LDC-HIPC ODA divided by total bilateral LDC-HIPC ODA (commitments basis).

2. The Effort-sharing composite indicator represents: (bilateral LDC-HIPC ODA/GNI times the bilateral LDC-HIPC ODA untying ratio) + multilateral LDC-HIPC ODA/GNI. Following the DAC convention, multilateral ODA is treated as untied.

Note: For base period (99-01 avg.), the notation ".." indicates the inability to calculate RIM indicators. Some countries had either not yet commenced reporting to the CRS, or had not been able to fully report on tying status for that period. In the case of the EU Institutions, the Effort-sharing composite indicator cannot be calculated as no ODA/GNI ratio is applicable.

Source: OECD/DAC and Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Table 3. *Ex ante* notifications posted to the DAC Bulletin Board, 2006-2016 (1)

Least Developed Countries and Non-LDC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

	Amount in USD million											Number of Notifications										
	2006	**2007**	**2008**	**2009 (2)**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009 (2)**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**
Australia (3)	82	52	20	35	0	0	0	0	0	0	..	5	6	4	4	8	1	5	6	1	1	..
Austria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Belgium	395	384	768	138	100	285	315	916	730	886	581	20	41	35	28	30	25	24	35	35	47	33
Canada	3	97	..	..	..	1	0	10	43	5	..	1	6	..	..	..	3	1	4	5	5	..
Czech Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Denmark	0	3	10	13	9	2	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	7	9	9	5	..	..	..	..	..
EU Institutions	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Finland	..	..	15	51	34	15	..	9	2	..	..	..	..	3	8	5	1	..	3	1	..	..
France	309	355	173	329	99	445	3 154	2 920	2 219	2 591	3 786	28	18	8	8	10	17	40	38	36	30	36
Germany	270	464	78	179	..	152	32	145	114	45	..	30	38	7	13	..	11	2	7	11	4	..
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Iceland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Ireland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Japan	334	1 166	730	215	..	..	956	3 787	6 197	2 150	2 811	59	86	76	24	..	..	8	12	11	10	11
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Luxembourg	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Netherlands (3)	..	0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
New Zealand (3)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Poland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Portugal	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Slovak Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Slovenia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Spain	30	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Sweden (3)	..	..	..	0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Switzerland (3)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	25	0	0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	18	23	13
United Kingdom (3)	351	..	0	0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	27		15	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United States (3)	2 242	1 128	1 910	1 992	4 593	2 822	1 251	2 073	12 626	2 413	1 730	49	40	62	73	84	72	72	62	77	79	45
Total LDCs/HIPCs	**4 022**	**3 648**	**3 704**	**2 951**	**4 834**	**3 721**	**5 708**	**9 860**	**21 957**	**8 090**	**8 909**	**226**	**237**	**217**	**174**	**146**	**135**	**152**	**167**	**195**	**199**	**138**
For memo:																						
Total Notifications	7 909	20 701	5 261	4 343	6 576	5 717	10 081	19 935	27 504	17 272	17 800	340	327	329	258	228	214	235	245	289	291	209
Other recipients	3 887	17 052	1 557	1 392	1 743	1 996	4 373	10 075	5 548	9 182	8 891	114	90	112	84	82	79	83	78	94	92	71

1. Data in the table have been revised to take account of revisions or movements in the list of least developed countries.
2. Coverage of the Recommendation was extended to include non-LDC HIPCs as from 2009.
3. In an effort to ensure competitiveness, some members have submitted notifications for which the project amount has not been made available.

Source: OECD-DAC Untied ex ante database.

Note: The notation ".." indicates no data available.

Table 4. Summary of *ex post* contract awards (1)

Volume and number of contracts: 2003-2014

	USD million (2)									Number of contracts (2)									USD million	Contracts
	2003-06 avg.	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2003-06 avg.	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2014 (3)	
Australia	25.1	152.0	171.4	318.3	711.4	729.2	905.9	419.2	661.8	10	500	399	1 144	2 078	1 520	1 188	844	497	611	25
Austria	1.3	..	..	..	4.5	2.4	4.1	4.9	6.1	1	..	..	..	98	119	137	143	139	2	1
Belgium	11.0	39.5	54.3	21.8	43.9	13.0	10.9	3.8	11.8	19	121	115	36	42	58	30	26	36	12	36
Canada	11.6	16.2	21.1	20.4	35.1	103.7	125.2	44.4	65.4	2	4	307	366	350	315	247	125	183	55	5
Czech Republic								..	..								..	..	..	..
Denmark	0.5	11.1	32.0	47.4	65.8	49.1	35.8	45.9	45.1	1	18	13	388	452	409	378	450	418	20	9
EU Institutions								..	..								..	..	..	..
Finland	5.4	13.3	14.8	86.9	73.5	33.9	58.2	40.0	..	1	90	58	115	113	3	65	51	..	..	..
France	164.5	1 091.3	1 396.9	658.0	1 284.2	1 797.2	737.2	1 574.5	2 364.6	82	1 140	1 570	1 701	1 610	1 256	1 173	806	417	2 280	218
Germany	219.7	183.0	240.7	188.1	212.0	266.4	224.8	301.8	594.5	91	94	161	209	302	240	277	245	296	570	128
Greece	0.3	3.0	10.9	6.2	0.8	0.0	0.0	..	..	3	36	54	26	13	0	0	..	..	..	..
Iceland								..	1.2								..	2	..	..
Ireland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	6.8	..	..	..	..	0.0	0.0	4.5	0.5	1	..	..	..	..	0.0	0.0	1	18	..	..
Japan	56.1	0.0	..	3 997.9	59.4	6 423.6	2 432.8	8 554.2	6 657.0	21	23	..	278	11	302	211	632	452	6 653	226
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	17.0	112.2	98.3	54.6	..	..	..	..	..	6	157	45	56	48	19
Luxembourg	..	..	..	29.2	39.7	31.8	31.7	30.2	37.5	..	..	..	94	154	152	118	123	681	9	13
Netherlands	57.5	4.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
New Zealand	..	31.0	14.9	21.2	25.9	..	..	..	..	..	385	281	208	186	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	..	6.0	16.3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Poland								..	..								..	..	..	..
Portugal	..	16.9	2.8	2.4	2.3	9.1	5.3	17.0	12.9	..	49	50	34	93	1 667	1 102	476	531	..	..
Slovak Republic								..	..								..	..	..	..
Slovenia								..	..								..	..	..	..
Spain	12.5	0.1	..	..	..	0.0	..	..	2.7	2	4	..	..	..	0	..	..	97	0	1
Sweden	3.6	11.6	3.2	3.2	..	..	..	..	..	1	16	26	19	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Switzerland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	107.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	20	107	19
United Kingdom	11.5	368.6	749.7	592.3	540.6	656.8	931.0	696.8	1 591.4	8	841	306	174	42	86	46	118	117	1 591	117
United States	549.6	1 946.3	1 230.5	2 795.2	3 081.1	5 022.4	2 704.7	1 974.8	2 751.4	59	180	101	185	172	266	216	163	127	2 751	127
Total	**1 137.2**	**3 893.8**	**3 959.6**	**8 788.4**	**6 180.3**	**15 155.5**	**8 319.8**	**13 810.4**	**14 965.5**	**303**	**3 503**	**3 442**	**4 977**	**5 716**	**6 399**	**5 345**	**4 248**	**4 087**	**14 708.9**	**944**

1. Updates and revisions to previous years' data are included in the table.
2. As from 2007, data include information on small contracts (i.e. below previous thresholds of SDRs 700 000 and SDRs 130 000 for investment related technical co-operation).
3. Data on contracts awarded in 2014, excluding small contracts.

Note: Please refer to the footnotes in Table 5 with respect to 2014 data.

Source: OECD DAC Contract Awards database.

Table 5. Distribution of contract awards, 2014 (1)

Volume and number of contracts

	Total Contracts Awarded		In donor		Other donor		Developing countries (excl. LDCs and non-LDC HIPCs)		LDCs and non_LDC HIPCs	
	No. of contracts	USD million	No. of contracts	USD million	No. of contracts	USD million	No. of contracts	USD million	No. of contracts	USD million
Australia	497	661.8	393	593.6	59	60.5	38	7.2	7	0.5
Austria	139	6.1	137	5.6	1	0.6	..	..	1	0.0
Belgium	36	11.8	3	5.2	1	0.3	1	0.5	31	5.8
Canada	183	65.4	130	62.2	1	0.3	23	0.9	29	1.9
Czech Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Denmark	418	45.1	241	25.0	72	17.2	22	1.0	83	1.9
EU Institutions	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Finland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
France	417	2364.6	168	891.9	43	368.0	117	946.0	89	158.7
Germany	296	594.5	170	146.3	18	91.8	18	126.7	90	229.8
Greece (2)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Iceland	2	1.2	..	..	2	1.2	..	..	..	..
Ireland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Italy	18	0.5	..	..	..	..	..	..	18	0.5
Japan	452	6657.0	108	1 860.9	74	885.5	242	3 847.9	28	62.7
Korea	56	54.6	18	36.2	..	..	13	9.7	25	8.7
Luxembourg (3)	681	37.5	7	0.5	67	6.9	149	5.8	458	24.3
Netherlands	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Poland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Portugal	531	12.9	153	4.8	9	0.3	61	1.5	308	6.4
Slovak Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Slovenia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Spain	97	2.7	9	0.3	..	..	2	0.2	86	2.2
Sweden	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Switzerland	20	107.0	4	19.5	2	13.9	1	6.5	13	67.1
United Kingdom	117	1591.4	99	1 312.8	12	231.4	1	7.9	5	39.2
United States	127	2751.4	94	1 875.4	18	714.1	11	154.4	4	7.5
Total DAC	**4087**	**14 965.5**	**1734**	**6 840.1**	**379**	**2 392.0**	**699**	**5 116.1**	**1275**	**617.3**
% Distribution of contracts awarded since 2003										
2014 % of total	100	100	42	46	9	16	17	34	31	4
2013 % of total	100	100	48	39	10	8	20	49	22	5
2012 % of total	100	100	46	59	7	6	22	30	26	5
2011 % of total	100	100	42	50	8	11	21	34	29	4
2010 % of total	100	100	54	63	8	8	18	15	20	14
2009 % of total	100	100	46	51	9	7	25	38	19	4
2008 % of total	100	100	41	62	6	12	31	18	22	8
2007 % of total	100	100	56	52	6	6	23	35	14	7
2006 % of total	100	100	38	74	7	7	15	11	40	8
2005 % of total	100	100	60	61	11	18	6	6	23	16
2004 % of total	100	100	39	47	20	11	16	16	25	26
2003 % of total	100	100	27	10	35	36	10	21	28	32

1. Includes aggregate reporting on small contracts.
2. No contracts were awarded by Greece in 2014.
3. The above data for Luxembourg do not include individual expert contracts (long-term working contracts)

Note: The Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Sweden did not report.

Source: OECD DAC Contract Awards database

Table 6. DAC members' total bilateral ODA and share untied

All sectors and countries (beyond the scope of the Untying Recommendation) (1)

	Total (USD million, 2014 constant prices)						Share untied (%)					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Australia	3 753	3 405	3 671	3 266	3 226	3 104	98.5	100.0	100.0	99.2	89.1	100.0
Austria	635	458	656	576	526	415	57.9	43.5	37.3	44.2	48.2	36.4
Belgium	2 005	1 697	1 180	1 169	1 179	1 210	94.9	97.3	96.5	98.1	96.7	96.7
Canada	3 262	3 377	2 608	2 665	3 078	3 679	86.7	90.7	97.0	92.8	93.0	98.5
Czech Republic	..	51	50	42	47	63	..	0.0	45.1	40.1	32.4	44.3
Denmark	1 732	1 828	1 744	1 756	1 684	1 599	100.0	97.3	96.1	96.5	95.1	100.0
EU Institutions	13 668	19 012	25 352	24 389	17 697	22 772	47.7	65.3	66.0	67.0	65.6	62.3
Finland	1 040	1 081	769	770	715	571	89.4	90.5	95.2	77.6	90.4	92.6
France	10 492	8 297	10 864	7 988	8 037	9 279	95.0	95.7	95.2	91.0	92.3	95.6
Germany	11 481	11 915	12 492	13 609	17 171	16 550	75.3	73.4	79.2	80.1	83.6	84.0
Greece	156	105	76	15	18	15	47.9	33.0	6.4	2.7	22.0	14.5
Iceland	..	20	22	29	26	25	..	..	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ireland	567	548	524	506	491	459	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.2	100.0
Italy	979	1 160	637	478	646	1 072	58.3	66.5	82.0	87.6	93.5	95.1
Japan	13 640	11 260	12 585	19 614	15 722	21 142	78.6	74.9	71.1	80.1	78.2	74.6
Korea	2 023	1 692	1 837	2 280	2 321	2 434	32.3	45.7	49.4	55.1	53.2	50.2
Luxembourg	313	270	276	282	277	279	99.2	98.9	94.1	97.0	97.5	98.8
Netherlands	5 580	3 218	4 357	2 709	2 800	4 128	100.0	94.9	98.4	96.7	98.4	92.7
New Zealand	303	476	281	314	504	380	81.1	82.6	84.3	88.0	81.8	84.7
Norway	3 505	3 030	2 889	3 798	3 685	3 967	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Poland	..	..	..	147	104	137	..	..	..	32.6	31.0	33.6
Portugal	385	456	415	307	270	200	42.6	27.5	24.6	30.0	34.5	49.0
Slovak Republic	..	..	..	11	14	18	..	..	..	15.2	1.2	47.5
Slovenia	19	15	17	15	15	16	..	..	..	..	..	12.4
Spain	4 538	2 316	966	785	746	673	64.4	87.7	83.4	85.1	83.6	80.8
Sweden	2 636	2 384	2 375	2 851	3 037	2 071	93.6	67.5	93.0	94.0	85.8	86.8
Switzerland	1 630	1 885	1 800	3 009	2 635	2 096	84.8	92.8	93.1	94.6	93.9	94.6
United Kingdom	5 409	4 080	4 686	6 490	8 079	7 999	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0
United States	28 634	28 366	22 865	24 902	25 056	26 481	56.7	60.2	56.2	65.4	62.5	55.5
Total	**118 383**	**112 400**	**115 994**	**124 771**	**119 809**	**132 834**	**74.2**	**74.9**	**75.8**	**78.5**	**78.6**	**76.2**

1. Excluding donors' administrative costs and in-donor refugees

Source: OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS)