The Development Assistance Committee has agreed to revise the Casebook on Conflict, Peace and Security Activities [DCD/DAC(2007)20/REV1], in accordance with the updated ODA reporting directives. This work follows the agreement reached at the DAC High Level Meeting (HLM) in February 2016. The examples are meant to illustrate the application of the eligibility rules agreed by the DAC. They will facilitate the assessment of the eligibility of similar cases in future.

The Casebook was circulated to the DAC for approval under a written procedure in September 2017. This final version includes minor edits to improve the readability of cases and the alignment of the description of the eligibility assessment with the Directives. In addition, previous cases 26, 34, 36, 37 and 52 were removed as one member disagreed with the eligibility assessment.

The cases are also available online in an ODA-eligibility database that will regularly be updated with new cases on different topics as and when they arise: see http://oe.cd/oda-eligibility-database/.

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JT03421264

This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
ODA CASEBOOK ON CONFLICT, PEACE AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES

INTRODUCTION

The Development Assistance Committee has agreed to revise the Casebook on Conflict, Peace and Security Activities [DCD/DAC(2007)20/REV1], in accordance with the updated ODA reporting directives. This work follows the agreement reached at the DAC High Level Meeting (HLM) in February 2016. The updated eligibility rules are reproduced in the Annex.

The ODA Casebook on Conflict, Peace and Security Activities is divided into two parts:

The first part with activities submitted by DAC members contains six sections, which are:

- Activities involving provider country military
- Activities involving partner country military
- Activities involving provider country police
- Activities involving partner country police
- Provider engagement in partner country’s security sector
- Preventing violent extremism

The second part discusses the ODA-eligibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Trust Funds and NATO Operations, which were provided by both DAC members and NATO.

The ODA Casebook on Conflict, Peace and Security Activities includes both ODA-eligible and not ODA-eligible cases.

The examples are meant to illustrate the application of the eligibility rules agreed by the DAC. They will facilitate the assessment of the eligibility of similar cases in future. Each assessment includes a reference to the relevant paragraph(s) in the Statistical Reporting Directives.
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Normal font = ODA-eligible in whole or in part
Bold font = Not ODA-eligible

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ACTIVITIES INVOLVING PROVIDER COUNTRY MILITARY
CASE 1: SNOWDROP TRAINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Africa, regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>Belgian Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Information Not provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Recurrent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Not ODA-eligible**

**Background information**

Snowdrop is an aerial delivery procedure designed to airdrop food to civilian populations in remote and otherwise inaccessible areas of a country. This procedure does not pose a risk to those on the ground and does not require any additional presence on site for preparing or marking the drop zone. The execution of snowdrop directly benefits populations in need; however, enabling this technique requires dedicated training and equipment. The training of the snowdrop procedure is mandatory prior to its execution.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The main objective of the project is to provide specialised training to Belgian military personnel on the snowdrop procedure. While airdrop provisions will mainly contain nutrition; it may be possible to broaden the technique to include the provision of medication.

**Results**

This training of Belgian military personnel in order to maintain a level of expertise, will enable the safe execution of the snowdrop procedure. By having dedicated personnel (aircrews and handling teams) trained, the international community will be better prepared to provide essential humanitarian assistance to remote areas. In doing so, the military may safeguard the civilian population in need from starvation.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed not ODA-eligible. The training of provider country military is excluded from ODA and so are the costs for providing that training activity.

The deployment of provider country military used to perform aerial delivery procedures in recipient countries, in order to deliver development services and humanitarian aid, would be ODA-eligible, but additional costs only (paragraph 97). Furthermore, training of partner country military in performing the aerial delivery procedures would qualify as training in humanitarian response and disaster relief preparedness, which is one of the listed eligible training areas in the Reporting Directives on partner country military. That activity could hence be ODA-eligible provided the ‘last resort’ principle is met (paragraph 97).
CASE 2: TRANSPORT OF HUMANITARIAN GOODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODA-eligible</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Background information

The transport of humanitarian goods from Belgium to African countries comes at a high cost for NGOs. By using the spare capacity of military ships and aircrafts travelling to the region, these costs can be drastically reduced.

Objectives and concrete activities

The Belgian Defence Force regularly contributes to the transport and delivery of humanitarian goods to Africa.

Results

This activity improves the delivery process of humanitarian goods to Africa.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. The additional costs incurred by the transport of humanitarian goods by provider country military personnel and equipment are included in ODA, as it enables the delivery of development services and humanitarian aid (paragraph 97).
CASE 3: OBSERVATION MISSION IN MOZAMBIQUE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODA-eligible</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (EUR x 1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Background information

The International Observer Military Team for the Cessation of Military Hostilities (EMOCHM) in Mozambique aimed to observe, monitor and ensure the agreement on a cessation of hostilities and implementation of the subsequent stages, without the use of force. This includes the social and economic integration of men of the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) into the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), as well as their social and economic integration.

Objectives and concrete activities

This activity provided support for civilian activities related to peacebuilding and conflict resolution by participating in a team of international military observers, monitoring the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Mozambique and Renamo.

Results

The Observation Mission in Mozambique contributed to the implementation of the agreement to cease hostilities in the country.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. Participation in monitoring activities in the context of civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution is reportable as ODA (paragraph 109). Furthermore, monitoring the social and economic integration of Renamo men into the police and other activities related to their social and economic reintegration is included (paragraph 106).
CASE 4: HUMANITARIAN AID TO FOGO ISLAND

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ODA-eligible</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (EUR x 1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

In November 2014, the volcano Pico de Fogo on Fogo Island, Cabo Verde erupted. The pre-eruption seismic activity and the eruption itself resulted in the evacuation of residents.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

In response to Cabo Verde’s post-eruption assistance requests, Portugal deployed a naval ship to transport and deliver civil protection assistance equipment such as shelters, water, sanitation, health services, and supply of medicines. The naval ship was also equipped with dinghies and a helicopter to enable rapid access to the archipelago and the transportation of people and equipment. In addition, a C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft was made available to transport ambulances as well as other rescue equipment. Simultaneously, Portugal provided several seismological stations to strengthen the seismic monitoring capability of the island.

Concrete activities included:

- Transport of relief assistance material and rescue equipment (shelter, water, sanitation, health supplies and medicines, ambulances);
- Provision of rapid means to access the island (dinghies and a helicopter since Cabo Verde is an archipelago);
- Provision of capabilities to detect seismic activity (seismological stations).

The types of additional costs reported, include: donated civil protection assistance and medical equipment (such as shelters, water, sanitation, health services, supply of medicines); donated seismological stations; personnel daily allowances; fuel (for the naval ship, helicopter, dinghies, C-130 Hercules) for the transportation to Cape Verde and between islands (evacuation of residents and transportation of rescue civil protection and medical equipment).

**Results**

The project contributed to the immediate safety and protection of the affected population and strengthened seismic monitoring capabilities.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. The additional costs incurred by the use of donor military personnel and equipment to deliver development services and humanitarian aid are included in ODA (paragraph 97). In this context, the employment of military personnel and equipment to deliver civil protection assistance after a natural disaster falls within the boundaries of ODA.
CASE 5: COMBATING OUTBREAK OF EBOLA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (EUR x 1000)</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>72010 Material relief assistance and services</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Background information**

The United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) was established in September 2014 and closed on July 2015. The UN emergency health mission was the first of its kind and was set up in response to the unprecedented outbreak of Ebola virus disease in the countries of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The temporary Mission responded to the immediate needs on the ground related to the fight against Ebola.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

This project aimed to provide humanitarian and emergency assistance to affected areas in the Republic of Guinea. At the request of the UN (via UNMEER), Portugal made available a C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft to transport two ambulances equipped to combat the spread of Ebola. Their use was exclusively to deliver humanitarian aid.

The types of additional costs reported, include: donated civil protection assistance and medical equipment (specialised medical equipment, medications, fully equipped ambulances); personnel daily allowances; fuel (for the C-130 Hercules) for the transportation of the donated equipment to and between affected countries.

**Results**

The activity contributed to an increased availability of medical capabilities to combat the outbreak of Ebola and the rapid spread of the disease.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. The additional costs incurred by the use of military personnel or existing equipment provided by the donor, when used to deliver humanitarian aid in accordance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence are included in ODA (paragraph 97).

This project employed military personnel and equipment to deliver humanitarian aid in the context of an international effort to combat the spread of the Ebola virus disease. Military assets were only deployed due to a critical humanitarian need that could not timely and effectively be met with available civilian assets. The logistic capabilities and state of readiness of the military prevailed in providing timely life-saving assistance. The military involvement was of civilian nature and under civilian coordination.

The activity reported was an emergency humanitarian response to the outbreak of Ebola, in the scope of UNMEER and led by the World Health Organisation (WHO). UNMEER coordinated the deployment. Both the UN and WHO operational principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence were respected.
CASE 6: MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND MEDICAL SERVICES IN PROVIDER COUNTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (EUR x 1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Background information

This project utilises basic health care services and medical assistance based in Portugal for the treatment of military personnel of partner countries. Portugal has signed multiannual framework programmes with partner countries’ authorities and the activity reported is part of one of the framework programmes signed since 2006.

Objectives and concrete activities

This activity enables the access of partner country military to hospital assistance in Portugal, such as medical appointments, treatments or surgical procedures which cannot be performed in their own countries due to the lack of human or technical resources.

Results

This project aimed to improve the medical conditions and health care to partner country military personnel.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed not ODA-eligible. This project concerns the provision of basic health care and specialised medical services to partner country military personnel that is not available in the partner countries. Although the assistance may be considered of a humanitarian nature, it is excluded from ODA on the ground that it consists in providing aid to the military in partner countries. This exclusion covers assistance directly benefitting counterpart military structure and other contributions linked to a specific defence effort e.g. assistance that contributes to the strengthening of the military or fighting capacity of the armed forces (paragraph 97). In this context, the intended health benefits are to these people as military actors and therefore considered part of regular military support to its human capacity rather than additional costs for use of military for development or humanitarian purposes.
CASE 7: SUPPORT OF THE SÃO TOMÉAN COAST GUARD ORGANISATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODA-eligible</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (EUR x 1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Background information
In support of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe’s efforts to strengthen surveillance of its territorial waters, Portugal provides maritime security support to the Coast Guard and Maritime Authority of São Tomé and Príncipe. Portugal has signed multiannual framework programmes with partner countries’ authorities and this activity is part of one of the framework programmes signed since 2006.

Objectives and concrete activities
This project aims to develop the functional, logistic and administrative aspects of the Coast Guard and Maritime Authority of São Tomé and Príncipe in order to reinforce maritime security in the country. The Coast Guard lacks both the technical capacity to operationalise the equipment and the ability to effectively organise available means for the security of maritime traffic mainly of commercial ships and fishing boats. In addition, Portugal also provided technical advice to the Port Authority and Maritime Authority with regards to system organisation and operationalisation. The budget reported as ODA was allocated for both the renovation and maintenance of maritime signalling equipment, lighthouses and small beacons as well as for maintaining the safety of maritime traffic.

Results
This activity aims to assure modernised coast lighthouses equipment and security for navigation in general – mainly for commercial ships and fishing boats – in the partner country.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility
This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. The primary purpose is civilian as it concerns security measures for shipping navigation in general, and in particular commercial ships and fishing boats, which are fundamental in a Small Island Developing State highly dependent on sea resources. For the purpose of ODA reporting, coast guard in their civilian police law enforcement functions is not considered military but police, even if administered under the Ministry of Defence (see paragraph 100). In São Tomé and Príncipe, the Coast Guard and Maritime Authority is administered by the Ministry of Defence. In that context, the Portuguese Ministry of Defence was identified as the appropriate counterpart for providing the support. Only additional costs are counted as ODA.
ACTIVITIES INVOLVING PARTNER COUNTRY MILITARY
## CASE 8: ENHANCING HUMAN SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>Austria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>South of Sahara, regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution in cooperation with The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (EUR x 1000)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Since 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15220 Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Background information

The project will be implemented by the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), in partnership with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). Operational support is provided by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports through the secondment of an Austrian officer as course director to the KAIPTC and the provision of subject-matter expertise to training courses on humanitarian assistance (jointly designed and delivered by civilian and military actors). Implementation of the programme will be under civilian oversight and with a clear development purpose.

### Objectives and concrete activities

The project aims to enhance human security in West Africa and contributes in a wider context to peace, justice and strong institutions (Sustainable Development Goal 16). Concrete activities are:

- Two iterations of the “Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa” course (simultaneously interpreted in English-French). As well as humanitarian assistance planning and delivery, a focus is put on civil-military interagency coordination and cooperation and on promoting mutual trust and understanding.
- Development and the pilot delivery of a new one-week “Train the Trainers on Humanitarian Assistance in West Africa” course which seeks to target trainers and humanitarian assistance professionals who can act as multipliers.
- Development of a sustainability strategy for KAIPTC’s training portfolio on humanitarian assistance as well as the formulation and implementation of a Sustainability Roadmap strategy.

### Results

The expected outcomes of the project are strengthened institutional capabilities within civilian, military and police agencies (a mixed group of civil, police and military professionals, including at least 40% women) that will allow for more effective humanitarian assistance delivery in West Africa.

### Assessment of project’s ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. It involves training of a mix of civilian, police and military personnel. While training of civilian and police personnel on development matters is eligible, training of partner country military personnel, including in non-military matters, is generally not eligible, except in limited areas listed in the Reporting Directives on partner country military (paragraph 97) and under civilian oversight and with a clear developmental purpose for the benefit of civilians. Training should be preferably by civilian actors, jointly by civilian and military actors or, by way of last resort, by military actors. The project is about training in international humanitarian law, humanitarian response and disaster relief preparedness which are amongst the limited eligible areas; the training is delivered jointly by civilian and military actors. As the provider country’s military is involved, only additional costs of their contribution are reported as ODA. Additionally, this activity meets the ODA-eligibility rules of activities involving partner country police, specifically with regard to the provision of related non-lethal equipment and training. All the respective safeguards are met (paragraph 97-98 and 100-101).
CASE 9: TRAINING ON HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Benin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Triannual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15250 Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

Many African countries are affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war. Some of these countries have requested advice and assistance through courses similar to those provided by Humanitarian Mine Action Programmes and Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. With the support of France, Benin has created a regionally-focused national school, specialising in the training of humanitarian demining. The school is better known by its acronym “CPADD” (Centre de Perfectionnement aux Actions post conflictuelles de Déminage et Dépollution/Centre for Humanitarian Demining Training).

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The Belgian Defence Force contributes to this project by providing trainers three times a year.

**Results**

Improving the expertise in humanitarian demining by helping the CPADD to fulfil its mission.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed not ODA-eligible to the extent that the training is for partner country military. If the training is for a mix of non-military and military actors, or non-military alone, the activity is considered partially or fully eligible respectively (see bullets below). The project will be beneficial for the civilian population; however, the Reporting Directives on the eligibility of activities in the field of peace and security give strict instructions in order to draw a clear line between ODA and non-ODA activities: training of partner country military personnel, under civilian oversight and with a clear developmental purpose for the benefit of civilians is limited to the areas listed in paragraph 97. Training in demining is not included in the list of eligible areas of training of partner country military.

The rules in relation to demining can be summarised as follows:

- Conduct of demining activities for civilian purposes by any actors can qualify as ODA (see paragraph 107); if conducted by military actors, additional costs only;
- Training of civilians in demining qualifies as ODA (paragraph 107); if delivered by military or provider country police, additional costs only;
- Training of military personnel in demining does not qualify as ODA (the section of the Reporting Directives on providing training to the military specifies limited areas of training which are reportable as ODA and does not include demining, paragraph 97).
CASE 10: TRAINING ON LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODA-eligible</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Background information

Every soldier must respect the international law that regulates behaviour during armed conflicts in order to limit the negative effects of war. Some African Armed Forces have a lack of experts/trainers that specialise in the law of armed conflict. The consequence of this being that soldiers who do not have a basic level of knowledge or understanding regarding the rules in this domain may be put in a position where they inadvertently violate international humanitarian law. The training is provided by Belgian soldiers or civilian professors working at the Royal Military School in the chair of law. As the Royal Military academy has the expertise and the ability to provide practical examples internally, the Ministry of Defence avoids subcontracting.

Objectives and concrete activities

Each year, the Belgian Armed Forces trains African officers on the law of armed conflict during a six-week course given in either Belgium or in the partner country. A Train the Trainer approach is used with the objective that the officers trained become experts within the general staff of the army in their respective country or operate in a training cell of a military school or of a unit.

Results

This project aims to improve the expertise of African military officers in international humanitarian law, protection of woman, human rights and rule of law through a Train the Trainer approach, by training each soldier on the law of armed conflict. This will ensure that the behaviour of the military is in line with the law of armed conflict and hence safeguard and better protect civilian populations.

Assessment of the project's ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. Training of partner country military personnel, including in non-military matters, is generally not eligible, except in limited areas and under civilian oversight and with a clear developmental purpose for the benefit of civilians. Training in human rights and rule of law and in international humanitarian law are amongst the limited areas listed in the Reporting Directives on partner country military (paragraph 97).
CASE 11: TRAINING ON CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING

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<th>Not ODA-eligible</th>
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<td>Provider country</td>
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<td>Recipient country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Background information
The Congolese Military Engineering Corps actively contributes to civilian projects such as bridge construction and maintenance; infirmaries and hospitals; schools and housing for the families of the military in regions where access is difficult or unsafe.

Objectives and concrete activities
Each year, the Belgium Defence Force provides training and coaching to Congolese military on civil and construction engineering. A Train the Trainer approach is used with the objective that the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) will be able to train their personnel autonomously in the medium term.

Results
This project aims to improve the expertise of the Congolese military and through a Train the Trainer approach, help the FARDC to operate autonomously in the construction engineering. Engineering Construction units are used to build facilities for the benefit of the civilian population (housing, schools, and medical facilities).

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility
This activity is deemed not ODA-eligible. Training of partner country military personnel, including in non-military matters, is generally not eligible, except in limited areas and under civilian oversight and with a clear developmental purpose for the benefit of civilians. Training in construction engineering is not included in the list of eligible areas of training of partner country military in the Reporting Directives on partner country military (paragraph 97). For reference, note that similar training for civilian actors would be eligible. Also, the provision of military personnel to carry out some of the activities described, i.e. activities with a developmental purpose such as building facilities for the benefit of the civilian population – schools and medical facilities – are reportable, but additional costs only and if only the specific need cannot be met timely and effectively with civilian actors.
## CASE 12: EDUCATION ON REMOVAL OF EXPLOSIVES ORDNANCE

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<td>Year(s)</td>
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<td>Purpose code</td>
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**Background information**

The Tunisian Armed Forces are responsible for the dismantlement and removal of explosive ordnance on their national soil.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

Belgian Defence Forces will provide education to Tunisian Armed Forces personnel in the field of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The course consists of two nine-month modules during which the trainees will acquire the necessary skills to identify and neutralise a variety of munitions and explosive ordnance.

**Results**

This project aims to improve the EOD skills of the Tunisian Armed Forces in order to provide indigenous forces with the capacity to intervene autonomously against the threats related to explosive ordnance and as such save civilian lives.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed not ODA-eligible. The project will be beneficial for the civilian population; however, the Reporting Directives on the eligibility of activities in the field of peace and security give strict instructions in order to draw a clear line between ODA and non-ODA activities: eligible training of partner country military personnel, under civilian oversight and with a clear developmental purpose for the benefit of civilians is limited to the areas listed in the Reporting Directives (paragraph 97). Training in demining is not included in the list of eligible areas of training of partner country military.

The rules in relation to demining can be summarised as follows:

- Conduct of demining activities for civilian purposes by any actors can qualify as ODA (see paragraph 107); if conducted by military actors and additional costs only;
- Training of civilians in demining qualifies as ODA (paragraph 107); if delivered by military or provider country police and additional costs only;
- Training of military personnel in demining does not qualify as ODA (the section of the Reporting Directives on providing training to the military specifies limited areas of training which are reportable as ODA and does not include demining, paragraph 97).


CASE 13: MILITARY TRAINING MISSION IN MALI (EUTM MALI)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<td>Budget</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>Recurrent</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15220 Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution</td>
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</table>

**Background information**

The EU, operating under the control of legitimate civilian authorities, conducts a Military Training Mission in Mali to provide military and training advice to the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF).

**Objectives and concrete activities**

EUTM Mali aims to contribute to the restoration of the Malian military. This activity will support the MaAF to conduct military operations designed to restore Malian territorial integrity and reduce the threat posed by terrorist groups. The activity is responding to the operational needs of the MaAF through the provision of:

- Training and advice on command and control, logistical chain and human resources, as well as training on International Humanitarian Law, protections of civilians and human rights.
- Training support for the benefit of the MaAF.
- A contribution, upon Malian request and in coordination with MINUSMA, to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process framed by the Peace Agreement, through the provision of training sessions in order to facilitate the reconstruction of inclusive Malian Armed Forces.
- Support to the G5 Sahel process, within the activities of EUTM Mali in support of the MaAF, by contributing to enhancing coordination and interoperability within the G5 Sahel national armed forces.

EUTM Mali provides advice at both the strategic and regional level to the Ministry of Defence, MaAF and to military headquarters to support the implementation of structural reforms outlined in the Defence Programming Law. French-speaking, multi-disciplinary, military advisors share their experience and expertise with their Malian counterparts in the domains of human resources management, logistics, intelligence, conduct of operations, information systems, finances and planning.

**Results**

Improving the expertise of Malian military officers in international humanitarian law, protection of women, HR and rule of law through a Train the Trainer approach and provide each soldier with a basic understanding on the law of armed conflict. In addition, this activity ensures that the behaviour of the military is in line with the law of armed conflict and hence safeguard and better protect the civilian population. During the last three years, EUTM Mali has successfully trained eight Battlegroups whereas five Battlegroups have been retrained. Additionally, several Leadership Courses as well as Specialised Training Courses took place. In total, more than 8000 soldiers have been trained by EUTM which represents two thirds of the Malian Army.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed partially ODA-eligible. Training of partner country military personnel, including in non-military matters, is generally not eligible, except in limited areas and under civilian oversight and with a clear developmental purpose for the benefit of civilians. Training in human rights and rule of law and in international humanitarian law are amongst the limited areas listed in the Reporting Directives on partner country military (paragraph 97). Training in areas other than those listed in the Reporting Directives is excluded, such as training in intelligence gathering.
CASE 14: EXCHANGE OF EXPERTISE IN THE FIELD OF SEVERE BURN TREATMENT

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<td>Recipient country</td>
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<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<td>Year(s)</td>
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<td>Purpose code</td>
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</table>

Background information
The expertise of the Military Hospital Queen Astrid (Brussels) in the treatment of severe burns is recognised worldwide. Treatment is provided to military and civilian victims.

Objectives and concrete activities
During a two to three days’ workshop, experts from Belgian Defence Forces and Egyptian Armed Forces exchanged views and expertise on the treatment of victims with severe burns.

Results
This project aimed to improve the skills and techniques of the Egyptian Armed Forces on the treatment of severe burns, improving their expertise to heal severe burns sustained by soldiers and civilians.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility
This activity is deemed not ODA-eligible. Training of partner country military personnel, including in non-military matters, is generally not eligible, except in limited areas and under civilian oversight and with a clear developmental purpose for the benefit of civilians. Medical treatment of severe burns does not come under one of the limited areas; hence this activity is excluded from ODA (paragraph 97).

However, provision of treatment to civilians by the armed forces might be eligible if the care could not be provided by civilian assets timely and effectively (additional costs only).
CASE 15: EXCHANGE OF EXPERTISE IN THE DOMAIN OF TROPICAL DISEASE

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<td>Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>12281 Health personnel development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

Both the Rwanda Defence Force and the Belgian Defence Force have expertise in the field of tropical disease which they share with civilian hospitals. An exchange of expertise between Rwanda and Belgium seeks to improve the prevention, treatment, care and support of those infected by tropical diseases. In Rwanda, the military hospital is at the forefront of matters regarding communicable diseases and it is therefore more appropriate for exchanges of information to be between military doctors. In Belgium, military doctors often work in the civil service.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The objective is to seek to improve the prevention, treatment, care and support of those infected by (tropical) communicable diseases through an exchange of information between military experts in the military hospital of Rwanda.

**Results**

Exchange expertise to improve the treatment and care of those infected by tropical diseases and ultimately decrease the number of victims of tropical diseases.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. Training of partner country military personnel, including in non-military matters, is generally not eligible, except in limited areas and under civilian oversight and with a clear developmental purpose for the benefit of civilians. Training in the prevention and treatment of communicable diseases is amongst the limited areas listed in paragraph 97; moreover the activity is being intended for civilian benefit. The primary purpose of the project is for the benefit of Rwanda - increased expertise through training.
CASE 16: TRAINING FOR MILITARY EXPERTS TO COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

| Provider country | Hungary |
| Recipient country | Iraq |
| Implementing agency | Hungarian Ministry of Defence |
| Budget (USD x 1000) | 16 |
| Year(s) | 2016 |
| Purpose code | Not applicable. |

Background information

Hungary has offered to provide expert training to a group of Iraqi soldiers through its military training facility to enable them to counter the threat stemming from the widely used improvised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs are a direct threat not only to military forces but to the civilian population. Building capacities to counter this threat will preserve civil society from these risks and maintain conditions required for socio-economic development. In 2017, Hungary will be offering similar training to Iraqi police forces as well.

Objectives and concrete activities

This project aims to increase capacity building and the resilience of the Iraqi army personnel through the training of experts.

Results

Skills acquired from the training can be readily used upon return to the homeland to protect troops and civilians from the threat of IEDs.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed not ODA-eligible. The project will be beneficial for the civilian population; however, the Reporting Directives on the eligibility of activities in the field of peace and security give strict instructions in order to draw a clear line between ODA and non-ODA activities: eligible training of partner country military personnel, under civilian oversight and with a clear developmental purpose for the benefit of civilians is limited to the areas listed in the Reporting Directives (paragraph 97). Training in demining is not included in the list of eligible areas of training of partner country military.

Training in demining of civilian actors such as Iraqi police as planned in 2017 could be ODA-eligible, as are the additional costs incurred with the use of military for the removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war for civilian purposes (Paragraph 107).

The rules in relation to demining can be summarised as follows:

- Conduct of demining activities for civilian purposes by any actors can qualify as ODA (see paragraph 107); if conducted by military actors, additional costs only;
- Training of civilians in demining qualifies as ODA (paragraph 107); if delivered by military or provider country police, additional costs only;
- Training of military personnel in demining does not qualify as ODA (the section of the Reporting Directives on providing training to the military specifies limited areas of training which are reportable as ODA and does not include demining, paragraph 97).
CASE 17: COMPREHENSIVE DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

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<td>Recipient country</td>
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<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x1000)</td>
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<td>Year(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
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Background information
The detrimental humanitarian and economic impact caused by natural disasters is one of the factors undermining sustainable development in Central Asia and Caucasus, as well as in Japan. At the third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai, Japan in March 2015, the “Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030” was adopted by UN member states. This programme will share knowledge and the Japanese experience of taking action at different levels; from central and local government to local community. Participants, including military personnel, are expected to establish effective countermeasures and proper governance based on the experiences and lessons learnt from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (1995) and the East Japan Earthquake (2011).

Objectives and concrete activities
The objective of this programme is to allow countries to analyse their current situation, and develop an Action Plan in order to improve the disaster risk reduction system in each organisation, with a specific focus on natural disasters. Concrete activities include:

- Job report presentation “Lectures on Japan’s national strategy and policy for disaster risk reduction”;
- Hyogo Prefecture’s / Kobe City’s strategy and policy for disaster risk reduction;
- Role of meteorological office for disaster risk prevention, Education for disaster risk reduction, JICA’s efforts for DRR etc.;
- Practical training for disaster risk management and disaster risk education etc.;
- Visit to Kobe and Niigata to learn strategies and policies for disaster risk reduction and to eastern Japan to see the affected areas of Great East Japan Earthquake.

Results
In addition to formulating a country-specific action plan, expected results of this programme are as follows:

- To understand Japanese approaches to different disasters and examine how to adopt acquired knowledge in each country.
- To understand roles of national and local governments in disaster risk management in Japan and examine how to apply knowledge acquired in each country.
- To understand the role of other actors and stakeholders such as international organisations, private companies, and NGOs in disaster risk management.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility
This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. Training of partner country military personnel, including in non-military matters, is generally not eligible, except in limited areas and under civilian oversight and with a clear developmental purpose for the benefit of civilians (paragraph 97). Having military personnel amongst the participants of training in this area does not exclude the project from ODA, as, under the rules, training of partner country military personnel in humanitarian response and disaster relief preparedness is eligible.
CASE 18: UN TRUST FUND IN SUPPORT OF AMISOM AND SNA

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2015-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
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**Background information**

The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) entered Somalia in 2007 to fight the terrorist insurgent group, Al-Shabaab, and to provide security to the Somali Government in the capital of Mogadishu. Troops from the Somali National Army (SNA) have been fighting alongside AMISOM in these offensives. The UN Trust Fund provides logistics support to AMISOM troop contingents and civilian police as well as non-lethal logistical support to the units of the SNA that are conducting joint operations with AMISOM.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The purpose of the UN Trust Fund is to provide long term capacity building support to the SNA and to enhance the capacity of the SNA troops conducting joint operations with AMISOM. Currently, the SNA has a minimal level of logistical capacity. The non-lethal support provided by the UN Trust Fund includes food, water, fuel, transportation, tents, in-theatre medical evacuations, field defence stores and High Frequency (HF) communication equipment. It also includes a mandatory training of the SNA-troops in UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP).

**Results**

Logistical support to AMISOM and the SNA enhances their success in dealing with Al-Shabaab and restoring security in former Al-Shabaab areas. This is crucial for the overall success of the ongoing state-building in Somalia. Furthermore, contributing to capacity building of the Somali security forces is vital for long term peace and stability in Somalia.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

The project is deemed not ODA-eligible. AMISOM’s aim, with support from the SNA, is to fight terrorism through kinetic activities, which is excluded from ODA (paragraph 117). The purpose of providing non-lethal support such as food, transportation, tents and HF communication equipment is to enhance the capacity of the SNA troops. Since financing of military equipment or services generally is excluded from ODA and strengthening partner countries military capabilities is explicitly excluded, the project is not reportable as ODA (paragraph 97). If the financial support would be earmarked to the training of the SNA-troops in UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, that particular support might be ODA-eligible.
CASE 19: EU MILITARY TRAINING (EUTM RCA)

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<td>Provider country</td>
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<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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<td>Year(s)</td>
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Background information

The 17 and 18 November 2015 European Council concluded that a common approach was required, alongside the UN in the Central African Republic, to reform indigenous security forces, stabilise the situation and support the political process. Therefore it was decided that the EU should conduct a Common Security Defence Policy Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) in order to contribute to the Defence Sector Reform in the Central African Republic (CAR) as part of the Central African Security Sector Reform process coordinated by MINUSCA (the UN mission present in CAR).

Objectives and concrete activities

The EUTM RCA aims to develop self-sustainable Central African Armed Forces’ (FACA) capabilities, necessary to fulfil its assignments in the security sector and to allow progressively developing FACA in a way that is credible, accountable, and ethnically representative as well as regionally balanced and that is under democratic control. The EUTM RCA provides:

- Strategic advice to CAR’s Ministry of Defence, Military General Staff;
- Education of both commissioned and non-commissioned officers as well as specialists;
- Operational training to the FACA.

Results

The aim is that, over four years, CAR MOD and État Major des Armées should respect the principles of the SSR and the coordination with MINUSCA, especially concerning the deployment and employment of FACA in CAR.

As of September 2017, some important documents for re-establishing the FACA have been drafted. About 15% of the target audience has been educated and one battalion has been trained (another is being trained).

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

This project is deemed not ODA-eligible as it aims at building defence capacities of the partner country’s armed forces. Only technical co-operation provided to the armed forces as part of wider national security system reform to improve good governance and civilian oversight could be deemed eligible (paragraph 105). The mission of EUTM RCA is to provide training to the partner country military; this is not ODA-eligible except for training in limited areas (paragraph 97).
ACTIVITIES INVOLVING PROVIDER COUNTRY POLICE
CASE 20: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLOMBIAN POLICE

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<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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<td>Year(s)</td>
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<td>Purpose code</td>
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**Background information**

Technical assistance provided by the Swedish National Police to strengthen the capacity of the Colombian National Police in the area of human rights and gender equality.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The overall objective of the project is to strengthen the Rule of Law, governance and the respect of human rights in Colombia through integrated institutional strengthening of the National Police of Colombia. Other objectives were:

- improved techniques for prevention and persecution of gender-based violence;
- community policing: introduction of new working methods applying human rights principles and working more closely with the community;
- increased quality of police training: integration of new areas into the curriculum e.g. basic tactical training (such as methods for non-violence) and subjects related to gender-based violence. The latter training in how the police should investigate and act upon crimes related to domestic and sexual violence.

**Results**

The tension between the Police and the community has been reduced and relations have been strengthened. Standard of qualifications from graduated polices has been improved. Some of the identified weaknesses in addressing and preventing gender-based violence have been overcome.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. The use of police personnel or equipment provided by the donor to perform development services is included in ODA although only the costs in relation to the mission concerned and in addition to the regular budget can be reported (e.g. premia for expatriation, travel costs). In practice, when policemen are assigned to a developmental task in a developing country, their regular pay is not reportable as ODA unless the policemen were specifically recruited to carry out these activities or replaced at home. The costs of substituting the policemen in the provider country are not reportable as ODA (paragraph 100). For this project, Sweden has recruited one police officer specifically for this activity, whose pay is considered an additional cost.
CASE 21: RAPID LAND BORDER SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROJECT

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<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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<td>Year(s)</td>
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<td>Purpose code</td>
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Background information

This military ‘train and equip’ project aims to establish and strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) Land Border Regiments, and forms the largest part of the UK’s support programme to the LAF. With UK support, the LAF Land Border Regiments have been operational since 2013. They are charged with detecting, deterring, and disrupting border attacks against Lebanon, and gaining the trust of local border communities, along Lebanon’s border with Syria.

Objectives and concrete activities

The objectives of this project are to:

- establish the Land Border Regiments alongside the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF);
- equip the Land Border Regiments with vehicles, protective personal equipment, protected border observation posts, mobile observation platforms, and communications equipment;
- train 11,000 Lebanese soldiers in the specialist techniques of urban counter-terrorism (operating amongst people), and/or border security;
- train over 2000 troops in specialist border security techniques.

Results

The project is expected to help secure Lebanon’s border with Syria and to detect, deter and disrupt border attacks against Lebanon, and gain the trust of local border communities.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed not ODA-eligible as it aims to build defence capacities of the partner country’s armed forces. While work with civilian law enforcement actors such as border agencies can be eligible, the Reporting Directives are clear that aid linked to defence efforts is not reportable as ODA (paragraph 97). [Only technical cooperation provided to the armed forces as part of wider national security system reform to improve good governance and civilian oversight can be deemed eligible (paragraph 105).]
CASE 22: DEFENCE EDUCATION: DEFENCE IN A WIDER SECURITY CONTEXT

Provider country: United Kingdom
Recipient country: Developing countries, unspecified
Implementing agency: UK Ministry of Defence
Budget (USD x 1000): 198
Year(s): 2016
Purpose code: 15210 Security system management and reform

Background information
Managing Defence in the Wider Security Context (MDWSC) is a defence education course delivered to personnel from the defence and security sector, both military and civilian. It is particularly relevant to countries making the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, or emerging from conflict, and seeks to reinforce good practice in relation to civilian oversight and control of the armed forces. It promotes responsible approaches to the management of defence and security, particularly in relation to accountability, transparency and corruption, gender and conflict, protection of human rights and observance of international humanitarian law, and thus underpin wider security sector reform efforts. Defence education is distinct from defence training, which seeks to impart specific military skills.

Objectives and concrete activities
The course is delivered by a combination of civilian academic and military instructors. Elements covered by the course include:

- civilian oversight and control of defence and security including relative roles of politicians, civil servants and security personnel and security sector reform/development;
- civil-military relations;
- democratic accountability and transparency, anti-corruption and risk;
- legal framework for defence, e.g. rule of law, international humanitarian law and human rights;

Results
The course explores approaches to the management of defence and seeks to encourage and reinforce positive behaviours of attendees, and through them influencing the culture of their employing organisations. The course helps to reinforce democratic oversight and control of the armed forces, and engender greater transparency and accountability in the defence sector. It does this by embedding an approach to management and leadership that adheres to international humanitarian law and standards of accountability, transparency, human rights, gender security and protection of civilians. In 2016, courses were delivered in the ODA-eligible countries of Chile, Fiji, Serbia and Uruguay.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility
This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. The activity is in support of civilian oversight and democratic control of the military system and the topics covered by the course relate exclusively to the areas of military training listed in paragraph 97 of the Reporting Directives. The directives state that training should be preferably by civilian actors, jointly by civilian and military actors, or, by way of last resort, by military actors. Involvement of the provider country military in delivery of the course is essential, as civilian personnel do not have the full range of knowledge and experience necessary to deliver the course, or the credibility to cover certain aspects. The combination of civilian and military personnel working in close partnership in the delivery of the course also reinforces, in itself, some of the key lessons relating to the relationship between military and civilian personnel working in the security sector.

By improving the capacity to manage security challenges responsibly, within a framework of proper democratic oversight and control and respect for human rights, the course contributes to the welfare of the population of recipient nations. It contributes to the development of effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, recognised in the UN Sustainable Development Goals as being at the core of sustainable development.
ACTIVITIES INVOLVING PARTNER COUNTRY POLICE
CASE 23: SUPPORT TO TRANS-NATIONAL CRIME UNITS IN WEST AFRICA

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODA-eligible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

This regional project supports the creation and strengthening of Transnational Crime Units (TCUs) in five ECOWAS member states. It supports the national TCU operations and develops the required linkages with ongoing national, regional, bilateral and multilateral actions conducted in West Africa to support the implementation of the “ECOWAS Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organised Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa”, specifically item 1.5.2: “create/strengthen centralised inter-institutional investigative agencies/departments/units for the control of illicit drug trafficking and organised crime in each member state”.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The project will promote and support the appropriate information exchange and operational cooperation of TCU’s with:

- Drugs/organised crime units in other ECOWAS member states;
- Specialised airport and seaport control units operating in West African countries;
- National and regional INTERPOL National Central Bureaus (NCB); and,
- Regional enforcement operations supported by ECOWAS and by the international law enforcement community in West Africa.

**Results**

- TCU’s operations are integrated into national and regional law enforcement structures.
- The three TCUs in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea-Bissau are fully operational.
- TCU’s have been established and are operational in Côte d’Ivoire and the Republic of Guinea.
- TCU’s participate in regional and international law enforcement operations, leading to an increase of seizures and prosecutions.

**Assessment of project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. It demonstrates the rules on activities involving partner country police, specifically with regard to financing for police functions pursuant to preventing and addressing criminal activities, and the provision of related non-lethal equipment and training in the context of countering transnational organised crime (paragraph 100). The following safeguards are met:

- Narcotics control expenditures are limited to activities that focus on economic development and welfare. Activities by the donor country to interdict drug supplies destroy crops or train or finance military personnel in anti-narcotics activities are not reportable (addendum 1, footnote 2).
- The supply of equipment intended to convey a threat of, or deliver, lethal force, is not reportable as ODA and training in counter-subversion methods, suppression of political dissidence, or intelligence gathering on political activities are excluded from ODA (paragraph 101). [Intelligence gathering does not refer to data collection for development purposes nor to preventative or investigatory activities by law enforcement agencies in the context of routine policing to uphold the rule of law, including countering transnational organised crime (footnote 38).]

This activity also complies with the rules on provider engagement in partner country’s security sector reform (paragraph 105).
CASE 24: MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>ODA-eligible</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provider country</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recipient country</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementing agency</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget (USD x 1000)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year(s)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose code</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

At a 2013 summit in Cameroon, heads of state and government from West and Central African countries agreed to strengthen the regional structure for maritime security also known as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Through the EU’s programme “Gulf of Guinea Inter-Regional Network”, Denmark will be providing earmarked financial support to focus explicitly on capacity development related activities aimed at strengthening the civil objectives of the Yaoundé structure and the related legal framework. Denmark will also contribute through the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) West and Central Africa Trust Fund and assist states in the region to build their capacity through IMO training on port security and as such support the implementation of the Code of Conduct concerning the prevention of piracy, armed robbery against ships and illicit maritime activity in the region.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The objective for the Danish programme for maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is to enhance national and regional capacity to pursue maritime governance and security in the Gulf of Guinea. This will be achieved through reinforced cooperation with the long term purpose of strengthening trade, investment and sustainable development in the region. The Danish support through the EU will be earmarked to:

- capacity development of civilian staff, functions and structures of Yaoundé structure’s lower levels;
- facilitate information-sharing among states relevant to maritime governance in order to prevent, detect, and suppress maritime security threats including piracy and armed robbery at sea;
- capacity development provided to ensure implementation of international conventions;
- revision of legislation on pursuit and prosecution of crimes at sea.

As for the support through the IMO, the Danish support will be earmarked to:

- capacity development to ensure effective self-auditing of security in ports;
- implementing updated port facility security plans;
- establishing port security committees;
- development of port security assessment methodology.

**Results**

Strengthened regional cooperation and communication resulting in gradual improvement of the maritime governance and security in the region and in the longer term improved framework conditions for growth and development in the region.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. The earmarked eligible capacity development of civilian staff in the field of maritime security is included in ODA as part routine police functioning (paragraph 100). The additional safeguards are taken into account as the following activities are excluded: training in counter-subversion methods, suppression of political dissidence, intelligence gathering on political activities (in compliance with footnote 38) and the supply of the donor’s police services to control civil disobedience.
CASE 25: CONTRIBUTION TO THE FINANCIAL SUSTAINMENT OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY FORCES: POLICE COMPONENT

ODA-eligible

Provider country  Hungary
Recipient country  Afghanistan
Implementing agency  Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
Budget (USD x 1000)  100
Year(s)  2015-2017
Purpose code  15130 Legal and judicial development

Background information

Part of the Hungarian contribution to the financial sustainment of the Afghan National Defence Security Forces is intended to assist the capacity building of Afghan police forces. The Hungarian contribution is transferred to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, currently managed by UN Development Programme (UNDP), although this responsibility will be assumed by the Afghan Ministry of Interior once certain conditions are met. The use of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan is part of a wider effort that is based on a set of objectives defined by UNDP; contributions from donors are used to cover expenses such as the salaries of the police staff, improving police infrastructure, training police officers with the ultimate objective of professionalising the Afghan police.

Objectives and concrete activities

This activity aims to improve the capabilities of the Afghan police forces and to help the force move towards civilian policing.

Results

Strengthened law enforcement institutions to perform functions related to civilian policing thereby replacing the current focus on fighting the insurgency.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. Financing for routine civil policing functions (i.e. pursuant to preventing and addressing criminal activities and the promotion of public safety) and the provision of related non-lethal equipment, or training, is reportable as ODA. Training in the governance and management of police equipment is eligible including the safety, security and storage of equipment intended to convey a threat of, or deliver, lethal force (paragraph 100).

In regards to the additional safeguards, any of the following activities involving the police should be explicitly excluded from ODA (paragraph 101):

- Training in counter-subversion methods, suppression of political dissidence, or intelligence gathering on political activities.
- The supply of the donor’s police services to control civil disobedience.
CASE 26: COMMUNITY POLICING IN JORDAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>Siren Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
<td>1 071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2015-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15220 Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

The lengthy duration of the Syrian crisis has severely decreased the prospects for return among refugees in Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps in Jordan. As refugees are increasingly facing the reality of a longer-term stay in refugee camps, the need for an effective Jordanian police force to alleviate tensions inside the camps and within host communities increases. The Community Support Teams pilot intends to prevent conflict escalation in refugee camps, and contribute to the internal stability of the camps. The project has the potential to be extended in order to decrease tensions between refugees and host communities as well, since the vast majority of refugees live within Jordanian communities rather than in the camps.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The projects activities include:

- financing the placement of 50 extra community police in Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps;
- provision of two Mobile Police Stations that will be able to move from area to area;
- training of retired Jordan police personnel to understand the sensitivities of the refugee population and effectively deal with them.

The objectives of these activities are to reach a greater number of refugees, in particular those in so-called problem areas and to increase the capacity of the community police to effectively handle complaints by camp inhabitants.

**Results**

The expected results of the project are an increase in stability and the feeling of security within the entire refugee community and an increase of trust between the community and the police.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. The project aims to increase the community policing capacity of the Jordanian police. Financing for routine civil policing functions (i.e. pursuant to preventing and addressing criminal activities and the promotion of public safety) and the provision of related non-lethal equipment, or training, is reportable as ODA. Training in the governance and management of police equipment is eligible including the safety, security and storage of equipment intended to convey a threat of, or deliver, lethal force.

The safeguards are met as this activity does not involve training in counter-subversion methods, suppression of political dissidence, or intelligence gathering on political activities, nor does it concern the supply of equipment intended to convey a threat of, or deliver, lethal force, or training in the use of lethal equipment (paragraph 101).
CASE 27: REGIONAL PROGRAMME POLICE COOPERATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Western Balkans, regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) is the funding agency. Implementing agencies are: Police Cooperation Council for South East Europe Secretariat, BK Criminal Intelligence Service Austria, UNODC, IOM, OSCE Mission to Serbia and OSCE Mission in Kosovo. The Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces acts as intermediary management body and fund manager and is SDC’s direct contract partner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
<td>5 903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2011-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15210 Security system management and reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

The Western Balkan countries have made substantial progress towards stability and security. Yet, transnational organised crime remains a serious problem for the region and Western Europe. Countries have recognised the need for a common legal framework and the importance of transnational cooperation to tackle the issue. However, challenges such as the integration of Kosovo in cross border cooperation persist. Despite this positive intent, cooperation among countries in the region, mutual trust and strategic and operational capacities have proven to be too weak to tackle transnational security threats.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

To strengthen transnational police cooperation to fight serious and organised crime in the Western Balkans, thus contributing to improved security of the population in the Western Balkans region and throughout Europe.

Activities include: support to the PCC SEE to strengthen structures and processes in order to enable more effective cross-border cooperation and incorporation into national law and practice; support to the International Law Enforcement Units (ILECUs) to organise joint regional trainings for law enforcement agencies and improve efficiency of regional exchange of information; capacity development of Border Police Officials to undertake and oversee joint border patrols; capacity development of analysts in criminal investigations to enhance intelligence led policing and information and data exchange across countries as well as support to law enforcement officials working in port control units to successfully intercept smuggling through shipping containers.

**Results**

Five regional projects are supported; e.g. contributing to the Police Cooperation Council roadmap implementation through improved use of cooperation methods for joint investigation teams, cross-border surveillance.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. It directly aims at supporting the fight against serious and organised crime in the Western Balkans. It demonstrates the rules on activities involving partner country police, specifically with regard to financing for police functions pursuant to preventing and addressing criminal activities, and the provision of related non-lethal equipment and training in the context of countering transnational organised crime (paragraph 100). None of the expenditures focus on enhancing security in Western Europe.

Activities were delivered by international partners (OSCE Missions, IOM, and UNODC) and not the Swiss Police. Swiss stakeholders acted as advisors to the Steering Board, but were not remunerated for their efforts. If the police would deliver this activity, it would still be ODA-eligible, but only the additional costs are then reportable as ODA (paragraph 100).
PROVIDER ENGAGEMENT IN PARTNER COUNTRY’S SECURITY SECTOR
CASE 28: UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE DESTRUCTION SERVICES IN RAMADI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Recipient country</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>United States Department of State via Sterling International</td>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
<td>1000 (Danish contribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total budget approximately: 2000 for one year</td>
<td>Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

The rising threat in Iraq from unexploded ordnance and, in particular, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), is particularly acute in liberated areas where IEDs have been used by Da’esh. The threat of IEDs is delaying the restoration of critical infrastructure and the return of citizens to their homes. In order to kick-start civilian clearance activities, the U.S. Department of State has contracted Sterling International to provide IED destruction experts to survey and clear critical infrastructure and habitable sections of Ramadi to enable timely inspection, the repair of facilities and the safe return of displaced persons.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The objective of this cooperation is to rapidly and safely remove the threat of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO), improvised explosive devices and man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS). This activity is in cooperation with Iraqi authorities and focuses on infrastructure so that Ramadi’s displaced citizens can return to their homes. Sterling’s IED destruction experts will also provide training to Iraqi emergency response EOD staff to enable them to address complex IEDs in the longer term. All work and training will be done in accordance with IMAS standards (or NATO STANAGS in the case of IEDs); will meet host nation requirements and will conform to international and industry best practices.

**Results**

This activity contributed to the safe removal of unexploded ordnance and abandoned ordnance and improvised explosive devices.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

The activity is deemed ODA-eligible, as it concerns the destruction of explosive remnants of war, including MANPADS and landmines and has clear benefits for civilians in developing countries (paragraph 107). Given the large amount of unexploded ordnance, in particular improvised explosive devices (IEDs) left behind by retreating Da’esh forces, coordinated mine action is key to stabilising areas, facilitating the return of IDPs and enabling the provision of basic services. Without timely and adequate clearance of critical infrastructure and residential and administrative areas, other stabilisation efforts will be delayed, which would be potentially destabilising as well as leading to safety concerns due to the extent of the contamination. The project’s training component targets civilian emergency response personnel and local nationals recruited from affected areas. The use of commercial contractors is in line with UNMAS’ current strategy for “blended solutions” to the twin demands of clearance and capacity development in Iraq.
CASE 29: UNDP JUSTICE AND SECURITY TRUST FUND II

<table>
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<tr>
<th>ODA-eligible</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Background information

The Swedish contribution to support the reform of Liberia’s Security Sector and Judiciary involves capacity building of police officers, corrections officers, immigration officers, construction of border posts, construction of magisterial courts and training of pathologists and staff within the judiciary. There is no military component or support. The largest budget items are recruitment and training, as well as a judicial infrastructural initiative.

Objectives and concrete activities

This programme aims to ensure that justice and security policies and systems are in place to deliver effective and timely services to citizens in line with Liberia’s international and national obligations.

Results

This activity’s results include:

- Infrastructure, equipment, and systems critical for command, control and operational response established for the Regional Hub.
- Justice and security service providers at the regional hubs level provide fair and accountable professional services.
- Justice sector institutions have adequate human capacity to provide key justice services.
- Victims of sexual and gender based violence provided prosecutorial, psychosocial, educational, medical and socio-economic support services.
- The Bureau of Corrections develops a comprehensive strategy to ensure that it upgrades the quality of services rendered through increased man-power training.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible as it demonstrates technical co-operation provided to law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to assist review and reform of the security system to improve good governance and civilian oversight. This project focuses on the non-military part of security sector reform, such as civilian competence and capacity building, which is included in ODA (paragraph 105).
CASE 30: SUPPORT TO EFFECTIVE MINE ACTION AND STRENGTHENING OF NATIONAL MINE ACTION CAPACITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
<td>1 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2015-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15250 Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

BiH remains heavily contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) and is still considered one of the most landmine-affected countries in the world. Mine contamination jeopardises safe usage of basic resources such as agricultural land, forests, and woods. Mines also block access to key public services (education, and healthcare) and pose a constant threat for people living near mine fields, affecting, together with the cluster munitions, the lives of 650,000 people.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) ratified the Mine Ban Treaty in 1998 and is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines by no later than 1st March 2019. BiH is highly unlikely to complete this goal: the progress in demining remains relatively slow (due notably to a lack of financial resources and a previous lack of engagement by the national authorities). Significant external support is needed to sustain and speed up mine action activities thus enabling land release for productive use by the affected population.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

Through this project, Switzerland will contribute to improving the quality of life of the population in areas affected by mines and other explosive remnants of war. This will be achieved by speeding up and supporting more effective mine action activities in BiH thus creating preconditions for socio-economic development in the country. Specific activities include:

- Adequate mine and cluster clearance interventions conducted in eight priority municipalities, needs assessment survey (pre- and post-intervention) realised in four communities;
- Implemented targeted technical survey (two special detection dogs provided to the project partner in replacement of old ones);
- BiH public mine action organisations trained for development and utilisation of targeted technical survey within land release;
- BiH Armed Forces Demining Battalion provided with two additional special detection dogs (including adequate training of dog handlers) and with ten new high-quality metal detectors.

**Results**

The population has safe access to land cleared of mines and cluster munitions and is given a perspective for socio-economic development. Furthermore, the BiH mine action authorities have additional resources and expertise as to implement more efficiently and effectively their international mine action obligations.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. Demining activities are only ODA-eligible when for civilian purposes (paragraph 107). The project will contribute to improving quality of life in the areas affected by mines and other explosive remnants and thus creating preconditions for socio-economic development in the country.
CASE 31: SECURITY AND JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM PROJECT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>United States</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2012-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15130 Legal and judicial development; 15210 Security system management and reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

Guatemala is a transit country for the trafficking of humans, drugs, arms and contraband. Recent surveys found that over 60% of Guatemalans believe that insecurity is the most significant problem facing the country. While crime and violence are now recognised as serious problems with high economic and social costs, the Guatemalan security and justice sector, which suffers from corruption, impunity and inefficiency, has been ill-equipped to respond appropriately.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The Security and Justice Sector Reform Project (SJSRP) seeks to improve the Government of Guatemala’s ability to administer, manage and provide security and justice and to enhance accountability through increased civil society oversight. It provides on-site and intermittent technical assistance, training, commodities, and in-kind and financial assistance. Activities include: improving financial and administrative management procedures in select security and justice sector institutions to meet international standards; supporting passage of a new Organic Law for the Police and implementation of a career development program for officers and officials of the National Civilian Police; and supporting the establishment of new types of courts – including a 24-hour model court, a High Impact Court and a Pluripersonal Criminal Court – to meet specific needs of Guatemalans within the judicial sector.

**Results**

The overall goal is improved citizen safety and strengthened reform of the Security and Justice Sector. Specific outcomes include:

1. Greater state capacity to manage security and justice administration;
   - Establishment of an adequate career system for the National Civilian Police
   - Strengthened financial management systems for Security and Justice Sector Institutions
   - Improved management and administration of Security and Justice Sector Institutions
2. Greater state capacity to provide security and justice for citizens;
   - Improved performance, efficiency and accountability of Security and Justice Sector Institutions
3. Greater civil society oversight of public and private security services;
   - Strengthened advocacy and oversight of non-governmental actors to increase accountability and transparency of Security and Justice Sector Institutions

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

The overall activity is deemed ODA-eligible as it promotes security system reform including technical co-operation provided to government ministries, law enforcement agencies, the civil society and the judiciary to improve good governance and civilian oversight (paragraph 105). The police assistance component of this project is also considered ODA-eligible since the assistance to the partner country police, including non-lethal equipment and training, is designed to address criminal activity and promote public safety (paragraph 100).
CASE 32: SOMALIA SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAMME (SSJP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>Various: UN Agencies, private sector, NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
<td>45 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2016-2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15210 Security system management and reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

The programme is an expansion of existing support to basic police and justice functions combined with support to political dialogue and negotiation on Somalia’s federal security arrangements and public financial management and accountability within state security and justice institutions. This will improve the overall sustainably of basic security and justice functions across Somalia.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

- Development of political, legal and financial frameworks to define the differing degrees (between the centre and the regions) of operational control and jurisdictions of the police and justice sector in Somalia and ensure the system is established in a fiscally sound and affordable manner.
- Expand, train, equip and provide infrastructure for police by providing basic non-lethal training, equipment and infrastructure for regional police who are extremely under resourced.
- Expand, train, equip and provide infrastructure to justice agencies in targeted areas, which focuses on the judiciary/courts, particularly on the criminal justice aspects of court work to ensure the criminal justice chain provides a base level of functionality in the regions.
- Monitoring and risk management, by providing an independent third party monitoring mechanism to monitor results and delivery to understand progress and ensure objectives are being met.

**Results**

- Re-establish basic policing and justice functions in key urban areas recovered from Al-Shabaab;
- Cover other districts in south-central Somalia and consolidating the provision of legal assistance and mobile courts in Somaliland and Puntland. The support will in particular target women and girls and ensure they have equal access to legal services;
- Establish counter-explosive ordinance policing capacity in key urban areas;
- Strengthen financial management within the security sector’s federal and sub-national levels;
- Support the development of federal and sub-national policing and justice policy and legislation;
- Establish a common score-card for assessing policing and justice provision at district level.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. It meets the Reporting Directives on activity with partner country police which apply to support to the police as a whole, including in the context of security sector reform (footnote 37). Specifically, financing for routine work and training of civil police is reportable as ODA (paragraph 100). The activity also satisfies the specific safeguards on activities involving civilian law enforcement as it is focusses on effectively addressing criminal activity and supporting public security. It does not include any training in counter-subversion, suppression of political dissidence or intelligence gathering, and does not involve the use of donor police services to control civil disobedience (paragraph 101). It also meets the Reporting Directives on security sector reform through technical co-operation provided to law enforcement agencies to assist review and reform of the wider security system to improve good governance and civilian oversight (paragraph 105). This assistance is deemed eligible as it is limited to improving the capacity and capabilities of civilian institutions to better manage key non-lethal resources in Somalia. It also supports improved civilian and community oversight of the security sector and does not involve assistance to the Ministry of Defence or armed forces.
PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
CASE 33: BUILDING RULE OF LAW INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
<td>3800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2015-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15130 Legal and judicial development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

The purpose of this engagement is to strengthen Somali institutional building blocks in the rule of law sector. The absence of government-supported institutions providing the rule of law in most of Somalia is a major contributor to instability and a critical gap that needs filling in order to support peace and development. An example of such engagement has been the response to focused international and Somali efforts to develop prison systems which was initially driven by the ambition to deal with convicted pirates, high risk offenders and captured Al Shabaab fighters.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The work to build Rule of Law institutions comes in two parts. The first focusses on the continued management of prisons in Somaliland and Puntland in line with international norms, including a focus on rehabilitation efforts and vocational training workshops. The second focuses on the construction of Mogadishu Prison and Court Complex. This prison will include a special cell block to deal with high risk offenders – such as members of Al Shabaab – and will include integrated rehabilitation programmes.

**Results**

It is expected that support to the Somali Rule of Law sector will be a key component in the ongoing stabilisation efforts of the country, including how to best deal with violent extremism. The establishment of the necessary structure for penal corrections is an achievement in itself and will pivot around the continued management of the already established prisons in Somaliland and Puntland. In addition, the construction of the Mogadishu Prison and Court Complex will constitute a key building block for the Rule of Law in South Central Somalia.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. The activity focuses on “continued management of the prisons in Somaliland and Puntland” and “the construction of Mogadishu Prison and Court Complex”. This relates to support to the rule of law which is included in ODA. It is taken into account that the project also includes a special cell block for terrorists, but not as a primary objective.
CASE 34: STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE TO VIOLENCE AND EXTREMISM
(STRIVE PAKISTAN)

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<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>EU Institutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GiZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
<td>6,524</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2014-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15110 Public sector policy and administrative management</td>
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</table>

**Background information**

This activity is part of the EU’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. Pakistan’s fragility has serious political and security considerations for the country and also the region. The people and government of Pakistan continue to face threats from groups who advocate the use of violence in pursuit of their goals. Since 2006, and particularly in 2009 when violence peaked, thousands of people have lost their lives and been injured; many thousands more have lost their assets and livelihoods through bombings and internal displacement.

Over two thirds of Pakistan’s population is below the age of 30. With this in mind, strategically targeting youth, and strengthening their resilience to being drawn into radicalism, is important in any project aimed at countering violent extremism in the country. STRIVE projects target the media, education, civil society and governments to increase awareness of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), the necessity of prevention, build capacity of actors in these fields to engage in P/CVE, and undertake targeted interventions in areas which could contribute most to P/CVE.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The overall objective of the project aims to support the promotion of a stable, peaceful, pluralistic and tolerant society in Pakistan. More specifically, the objective is to strengthen Government, media and civil society capacity to implement and monitor programmes that will have demonstrable impact in strengthening resilience against extremism and violence.

**Results**

This activity contributed to:

- strengthened provincial government capacity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab to operationalise and monitor STRIVE strategies.
- strengthened resilience of youth to extremism and violence.
- strengthened media capacity to implement a code of conduct on ethical journalism that contributes to strengthening resilience to violence and extremism.
- an improved understanding of ‘what works’ in strengthening resilience in Pakistan.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. It demonstrates preventing violent extremism through non-coercive, intentional and targeted use of developmental assistance approaches aiming at providing positive alternatives to those most at risk of violent extremism in partner countries and countering the narrative of violent extremism that incites support for violence which is included in ODA (paragraph 116). ODA-eligible activities for preventing violent extremism must be undertaken in accordance with respect for the peaceful exercise of political, social and economic rights, including the right to non-violent forms of political expression (paragraph 118). This programme’s objectives and activities comply with the examples of eligible activities given in paragraph 119.
CASE 35: STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE TO VIOLENCE AND EXTREMISM
(STRIVE HORN OF AFRICA)

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<th>ODA-eligible</th>
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<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
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<td>Recipient country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
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Background information

This activity is part of the EU’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. For the EU, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) is a key concept both in internal and external security circles, supported by activities at both the Member State and EU level. Under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) several P/CVE-specific projects are being implemented and aim to address the threat of violent extremism by accumulating data and a deeper understanding of the concept itself in order to prevent radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism. STRIVE Horn of Africa represents the first attempt by the European Commission to implement P/CVE-specific activities outside of Europe targeting the media, education, civil society and governments to increase awareness of P/CVE, the necessity of prevention, build capacity of actors in these fields to engage in P/CVE, and undertake targeted interventions in areas which could contribute most to P/CVE.

Objectives and concrete activities

The project aims to develop best practices to implement and monitor programmes that have demonstrable impact on strengthening resilience against extremism in the Horn of Africa, in respect of human rights and international law.

- Build the regional capacity of security sector and law enforcement authorities to engage with civil society in fighting violent extremism.
- Strengthen capacity of women’s organisations in the region to counter violent extremism.
- Increase the understanding of the challenges faced by EU born Somali youth in Somaliland.
- Identify and tackle the drivers of radicalisation among youth in Kenya.

Results

Research into young people at risk; developing personal skills, employment opportunities; preparing for return via sporting, cultural activities. Engage women’s groups and bring together stakeholders to find community based solutions to CVE. Capacity building programmes for law enforcement and intelligence agencies focusing on how to engage with the public. Understanding the drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism, particularly among young people in two areas of Kenya afflicted by violent conflict.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

The activity is deemed ODA-eligible as its objectives and activities comply with the example of eligible activities in the field of PVE given in paragraph 119:

- Working with civil society groups specifically to prevent radicalisation, support reintegration and deradicalisation, and promote community engagement.
- Building the capacity of security and justice systems in specific skills required for the prevention of extremist or terrorist threats, such as in the collection and correct use of evidence or fair trial conduct, to ensure more effective and human rights-compliant behaviours.
- Research into positive alternatives to address causes of violent extremism in developing countries.

In regards to the safeguards, intelligence gathering and training in counter-subversion method or suppression of political dissidence should be explicitly excluded from ODA.
CASE 36: COUNTERING EXTREMISM THROUGH YOUTH ENGAGEMENT

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<th>Provider country</th>
<th>EU Institutions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>The project will be implemented by the Kofi Annan Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
<td>3 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2016-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15220 Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution</td>
</tr>
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**Background information**

This activity is part of the EU’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The use of violence to further extreme ideological platforms – be that political, religious, nationalist or other – is not a new phenomenon. However, the rise of violent extremist groups has renewed concern amongst policymakers and practitioners on preventing and countering violent extremists and mitigating the appeal of extremism amongst communities and vulnerable groups, particularly young people.

While young people are often the target of such groups, they can also play a critical role in countering violent extremism and should therefore be placed at the centre of such efforts. Working in partnership with the Kofi Annan Foundation, this initiative will seek to empower young people by mobilising a network of individuals and organisations active in peacebuilding, counter-terrorism and youth engagement. Through the establishment of ten youth advocates this project will promote peer-to-peer engagement to inform and empower young people across the globe to counter violent extremism.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The overall objective of the project is to improve the capacity of young people to contribute to the effort to prevent and counter extremism in their communities in line with international best practice and policy.

- To develop a set of easily accessible and well informed guidelines for young people on preventing and countering violent extremism and make them widely available.

**Results**

- Establish a group of ten youth advocates and promote interaction with other youth organisations, networks and universities.
- Organise a strong digital and traditional media campaign to disseminate advocacy materials and facilitate interaction between advocates and young people worldwide.
- Create a comprehensive and accessible set of guidelines for young people to counter and prevent violent extremism.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. It demonstrates preventing violent extremism through non-coercive, intentional and targeted use of developmental assistance approaches aiming at providing positive alternatives to those most at risk of violent extremism in partner countries and countering the narrative of violent extremism that incites support for violence which is included in ODA (paragraph 116). ODA-eligible activities for preventing violent extremism must be undertaken in accordance with respect for the peaceful exercise of political, social and economic rights, including the right to non-violent forms of political expression (paragraph 118).
CASE 37: PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: LEADERS TELLING A DIFFERENT STORY

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<th>ODA-eligible</th>
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<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
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<td>Recipient country</td>
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<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Background information**

This activity is part of the EU’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The Club de Madrid (CdM) is the world’s largest independent and non-profit organisation of former democratic Presidents and Prime Ministers. It partners with governments, inter-governmental organisations, civil society, scholars and the business world, building bridges between those institutes, current leaders and policy makers in order to encouraging dialogue to foster social and political change. The CdM also addresses issues of national democratic government, transnational governance and of the global community. This project builds upon the EU funded project implemented by CdM last year: the ‘Policy Dialogue on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The overall objective of this action is to produce comprehensive, multilateral recommendations that would strengthen counter violent extremism narratives and positive messaging using media tools and citizen journalism to prevent and counter radicalisation and violent extremism.

- To bridge the gap between government officials, civil society actors and practitioners, including specialised journalists and representatives from the media and to work collaboratively towards developing an effective counter-narrative alternative to violent extremism;
- To facilitate knowledge-exchange on counter-recruitment and counter-narratives;
- To promote the implementation of international community efforts in the P/CVE field, in particular the work of the EU and other international and regional actors, in developing effective counter-narratives.

EU funds covered the organisation of the meeting in Brussels and also the funding for the CdM to carry out the project itself.

**Results**

Development of comprehensive, evidence-based recommendations on alternative narratives to messages of hate and intolerance; strengthened cooperation among policy makers, civil society organisations and media experts at local, national and regional levels for the development of sustainable P/CVE policy; creation of informal multi-stakeholder, multi-regional platform for cross-learning on P/CVE policies, counter narrative communication strategies and good practices, with special emphasis on the use of traditional and social media; raised awareness on existing international community’s tools and initiatives for building P/CVE capabilities; increased visibility and dissemination of good practices and project recommendations on the online platform to promote proven P/CVE communications practices; development of in-depth qualitative research analysis on the elements of effective counter-narratives and alternative-narratives to violent extremism, including communication tools, messaging, language and audience.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

The programme is deemed ODA-eligible as its objectives and activities comply with the eligible activities in the field of PVE: working with civil society groups specifically to prevent radicalisation, support reintegration and deradicalisation, and promote community engagement and research into positive alternatives to address causes of violent extremism in developing countries (paragraph 119).
CASE 38: CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT (GCERF)

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<tr>
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<th>Switzerland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
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<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2015-2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>Not applicable. (multilateral)</td>
</tr>
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Background information

The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) is the first global effort to support local, community-level initiatives that address the local drivers of violent extremism and strengthen resilience against violent extremist agendas. This international funding mechanism works in partnership with governments, civil society and the private sector in beneficiary countries to provide support to: specific local drivers of radicalisation; provide tangible, positive alternatives to what violent extremist groups may offer; counter violent extremist narratives and messaging; and build capacity of governments and civil society to prevent violent extremism. GCERF is governed by a fifteen-member board made up of representatives of governments (donor and beneficiary), civil society, the private sector and foundations.

Objectives and concrete activities

Strengthen resilience against violent extremist agendas through community engagement; prevent recruitment and/or radicalisation to violence by addressing the local drivers of violent extremism

Of the USD 35.3 million approved budget for 2016, it is expected that USD 15 million will be for a new round of proposals in the three initial countries receiving support (Bangladesh, Mali and Nigeria), USD 15 million will be for grants to begin work in Kenya, Kosovo and Myanmar, and USD 5.3 million will cover Secretariat and governance costs. In 2017, the plan is to include three more countries for an estimated annual budget of USD 52.9 million. Discussions have begun for potential future inclusion of Indonesia, Tunisia and Kyrgyzstan.

Results

Expected results are improved community resilience to recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremism in various developing countries.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible (multilateral ODA contribution), GCERF was included on the DAC List of ODA-eligible international organisations in 2015 (Annex 2 of the Reporting Directives).

Acknowledging that issues of conflict and fragility are important challenges to development and are areas that must be addressed in reducing poverty and promoting economic growth, the Reporting Directives explicitly mention preventing violent extremism, stating that “In the spirit of the recommendations of the 2016 UNSG Plan of Action to prevent violent extremism, activities preventing violent extremism in developing countries are reportable as ODA, as long as they are led by partner countries and their primary purpose is developmental.” They further clarify the ODA-eligibility with a list of examples of eligible activities. To be eligible for funding from GCERF, countries must be on the DAC List of ODA Recipients, face a challenge of radicalisation to violent extremism in the country, and have government commitment to address the issue.
CASE 39: PATTERNS OF RADICALISATION INTO VIOLENT EXTREMISM:
TARGETING CHILDREN AND YOUTH

Provider country | Switzerland
Recipient country | Bosnia and Herzegovina
Implementing agency | Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Budget (USD x 1000) | 19
Year(s) | Information not provided.
Purpose code | 15110 Public sector policy and administrative management

Background information

Children and youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina seem to be particularly vulnerable to radicalisation and are increasingly targeted by recruiters, while the number of adult volunteers is gradually decreasing.

Objectives and concrete activities

The project aims to examine the patterns and agents of radicalisation into violent extremism among children and youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The research would look into the root-causes of this process including the population at risk; underlying issues and grievances that are being used as tools for radicalisation; the geography of the process; societal, cultural and economic backgrounds; the role of religious ‘authorities’ and particularly social media. Also, interviews with families that lost their members to ISIL will provide a unique insight into the pathways of radicalisation, alienation, and eventually departures from their respective homes and families in pursuit of violent Jihadism in Syria and/or Iraq. Finally, this study will try to determine the key stages in the cycle of radicalisation and recommend the most appropriate actors as well as the roles they should play to successfully counter this trend.

Results

The research led to the publication of a report entitled “The New Lure of the Syrian War – The Foreign Fighters’ Bosnian Contingent” (Sarajevo, 2016).

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. It demonstrates preventing violent extremism through non-coercive, intentional and target use of development assistance approaches aiming at providing positive alternatives to those most at risk of violent extremism in partner countries and countering the narrative of violent extremism that incites support for violence which is included in ODA (paragraph 116). In addition, ODA-eligible activities for preventing violent extremism must be undertaken in accordance with respect for the peaceful exercise of political, social and economic rights, including the right to non-violent forms of political expression. Intelligence gathering is excluded from ODA. In addition, training in counter-subversion method or suppression of political dissidence is excluded from ODA (paragraph 118).

This activity concerns the research of root causes of radicalisation, which is listed amongst the examples of eligible activities in paragraph 119.
CASE 40: TRANSITON SUPPORT PROGRAMME (PAT-MALI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>United States</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2014-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15110 Public sector policy and administrative management</td>
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**Background information**

Since the 1970s, an extremely conservative Wahabbist organisation called ‘Ansar al Sunnah’ (Community of Helpers of the Sunna) has established itself on Kadji Island in Gao and extended along the Niger River. By the mid-nineties, the movement had spread to approximately 30 villages along the river with between 5,000 and 8,000 members.

Some of these communities have isolated themselves in an effort to ensure religious purity. This self-imposed isolation has been accompanied by a marked neglect by the state and surrounding populations. The conflict of 2012 revealed that members of these communities were vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

In order to prevent future radicalisation and recruitment by violent extremists of these communities which have already proven vulnerable, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) began programming in Gounzoureye Commune in Gao in June 2014. Activities were guided by the following theory of change: if the social, political, economic marginalisation and isolation of communities in Gounzoureye Commune is reduced, then these communities will be less vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist organisations.

The USAID/OTI strategy included 1) responding to urgent needs in order to gain entry into the community and build trust (e.g., provision of potable water), 2) strengthening connections within and between communities in order to decrease marginalisation (e.g., intercommunity dialogues, intercommunal sport and cultural events), and 3) confronting extremist ideology head-on (e.g., reading and debate clubs, youth exchanges).

OTI delivered more than twenty small grants to enable this strategy. Illustrative projects include the establishment of a training and cultural facility for youth from Gounzoureye’s thirteen villages, development of a Malian youth CVE agenda, dissemination of local language media programming and support for the Government of Mali’s internal CVE Strategy.

**Results**

Overall, the project was part of a larger effort to help restore a sense of normalcy and reconciliation across northern Mali. It resulted in discernible increases in social cohesion and reconciliation, including improved integration of once-isolated communities and a reduction in religiously conservative attitudes and opinions.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. It demonstrates the non-coercive, intentional and targeted use of development assistance approaches to provide positive alternatives to those most at risk of violent extremism in partner countries (paragraph 116). Specifically, the Reporting Directives specify that work with civil society to prevent radicalisation and promote community engagement is included in ODA (paragraph 119).
CASE 41: CAPACITY BUILDING WORKSHOP FOR AFRICAN POLICY MAKERS AND CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS TO ADDRESS THE THREAT OF EXTREMIST GROUPS AND TACKLE RADICALISATION IN THE REGION

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<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
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<td>Recipient country</td>
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<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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<td>Year(s)</td>
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<td>Purpose code</td>
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</table>

Background information
The project involved arrangement of an Addis Ababa 2016 roundtable meeting with policymakers, academics, analysts, religious leaders and practitioners from relevant countries, to address the role of religion in preventing radicalisation and recruitment to extremist groups in Africa and internationally, which was held in Addis in order to guarantee local and regional engagement.

Objectives and concrete activities
The event brought together civil society stakeholders from African countries affected by the threat of extremist groups with policy, security and legal experts from Africa, Europe and the US, to promote better understanding of the role of religion in preventing radicalisation through:

- facilitation of exchange of best practice approaches towards more effective, long-term strategies for tackling radicalisation and recruitment;
- consideration of how community actors, with support from organisations, governments and multilateral institutions, can contribute to radicalisation prevention and de-radicalisation efforts – including roles for religious actors in ‘non-religious’ sectors e.g. governance and economics;
- identification of actions to prevent radicalisation and reduce its ‘appeal’, including countering extremist narratives on social media, outreach to families/carers to monitor recidivism and evaluation of strategies to rehabilitate de-radicalised citizens through grassroots programmes;
- exploring ways to enhance further co-operation and promote further dialogue between state and non-state actors to counter the promotion and financing of extremism in Africa.

Results
- Creation of new networks of preventing violent extremism (PVE) practitioners and religious leaders (the project beneficiaries) from the region, strengthening existing relationships, built new cross-faith partnerships and increased networking between African, North American and European development policy makers, civil society stakeholders and religious leaders to further strengthen shared work on PVE in Africa.
- Promotion of social cohesion among key civil society and religious actors from ten African countries, which included representatives from the African Union and the Ethiopian government.
- The conference report captures the broad scope of the debate and the key issues for policy makers and practitioners in Africa, including proposals for continued policy development and programme activity. It will also summarise ‘the current state of play’ of PVE in a range of African contexts informing both African and donor countries’ PVE development policy and projects in the region.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility
This activity is deemed ODA-eligible as it aims to support civilian activities related to preventing recruitment to extremist groups in Africa. The event aimed to contribute to this by working to leverage religion and faith to prevent radicalisation in the region. The sessions were largely led by African specialists. There was no discussion of perceived threats to donor countries. Specifically, the project meets the Reporting Directives on preventing violent extremism through working with civil society groups (who will lead on implementation in the region) to prevent radicalisation, support reintegration and deradicalisation and promote community engagement (paragraph 119).
PART 2. ACTIVITIES BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION (NATO)
NATO Trust Funds

NATO’s Trust Fund mechanism, launched in 2000, was originally created to assist NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) partners with the safe destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines as a part of their obligations under the Ottawa Convention. Since then, the mechanism has been opened to all NATO partners and its scope broadened to cover a variety of long-term programs and ad-hoc projects.

In parallel, NATO has launched Trust Funds also in support of NATO’s crisis management operations. The most significant of these is the Afghan National Army Trust Fund, which is a part of the wider International Community’s commitment to financially support the sustainment of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces.

Generally, NATO Trust Funds can be categorised as:

- Assisting partner countries with the safe destruction of surplus and obsolete landmines, weapons and munitions, and build capacity in areas such as demining and munitions stockpile management (PfP Trust Funds).
- Supporting wider defence transformation through projects such as easing the transition to civilian life of former military personnel, converting military bases to civilian use, and promoting transparency, accountability, good governance and gender mainstreaming in the security sector.
- Supporting defence capacity-building packages for selected countries facing significant security challenges, with a view to strengthening their defence and security institutions and capabilities.
- Supporting NATO’s crisis management operations.

Since the year 2000, NATO Trust Funds have helped destroy, for example, 162 million rounds of ammunition, 5.2 million anti-personnel landmines, 2 million hand grenades and 626,000 Small Arms and Light Weapons. They have provided retraining assistance to some 12,000 former military personnel and engaged 19 NATO member and partner nations in activities to promote good governance and reduce the risk of corruption by training civil and military personnel in the defence and security sectors. They have also provided training and required equipment on Counter Improvised Explosive Devices, border security and support for a defence institution building school.
CASE 42: FINANCIAL SUSTAINMENT OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY FORCES

Provider country: Hungary
Recipient country: Afghanistan
Implementing agency: NATO
Budget (USD x 1000): 350
Year(s): 2015-2017
Purpose code: 15210 Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security

Background information
The wider international community is committed to financially support the sustainment of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF). The Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund is part of that. Continued support to the financial sustainment of the ANDSF through 2020 was confirmed at the NATO Warsaw Summit in 2016.

Objectives and concrete activities
The ANA Trust Fund mainly focuses on the sustainment of the ANA, but can also be used in support of literacy training, capacity and integrity building activities, and women’s participation within the relevant Afghan Ministries and security institutions. These activities cover the ANA, Afghan National Police (ANP), and Ministries of Defence (MoD), Interior (MoI) and Finance. Examples:

- Provision of facilities supporting the ANDSF Human Rights Ombudsmen;
- Financial management information system training for both MoD and MoI;
- ANA and ANP literacy projects;
- Power Delivery & Purchasing Agreement with the Asian Development Bank connecting ANA and ANP bases to the electrical grid;
- Medical projects in support of both ANA and ANP and their dependants;
- Counter-Improvised Devices/Explosive Ordnance Disposal training; robots and disposal equipment supporting both ANA and ANP;
- Dismounted cell phone jammers/electronic counter-measure systems for ANA & ANP vehicles;
- Maintenance contracts;
- Military Academy and Logistics School facilities;
- Scholarship programme for Women in ANA.
- Pilot Course on civilian oversight of ANDSF.

In 2015 and 2016, Hungarian contributions were used to assist in supplying uniforms to members of the ANA and in support of the outfitting of the Shorab Regional Hospital.

Results
Ensuring the equipment, sustainability and training of the ANDSF and hence contributing to a secure environment for the population and to economic development. Increasing capacity and resilience of the ANDSF and moving towards self-reliance, also financially.

Assessment of the project’s ODA eligibility
The Hungarian contribution is deemed not ODA-eligible. Supplying uniforms to members of the ANA is provision of aid to the partner country military is not reportable as ODA. Support of the outfitting of the Shorab Regional Hospital could be ODA-eligible only in the case where the hospital is also accessible to civilians (only additional costs if the hospital remains primarily a military facility; pro-rata if the facility has dual mandate). Hungary indicated that the hospital at Camp Shorabak in Helmand province is in principle a medical facility of the Afghan National Army but that possibly in the future civilians will be treated as well.

As regards ANDSF in general, it is deemed partially ODA-eligible. Activities that support the sustainment of ANA are in general not ODA-eligible (only activities that improve good governance and civilian oversight would be eligible such as the ANA Pilot Course on Civilian Oversight of the Armed Forces). Activities that support police in their routine functions are ODA-eligible (e.g. ANP literacy projects).
CASE 43: JORDAN III TRUST FUND

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<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
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<td>Recipient country</td>
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<td>Purpose code</td>
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Background information

The Jordan III Trust Fund is a capacity building project to develop servicewomen in the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF). The JAF has developed a Military Women’s Strategy for 2006-2016 that aims to capacity-build through the recruitment and training of more women in JAF and subsequently creating wider employment and participation opportunities.

Objectives and concrete activities

The Jordan III Trust Fund supports the Jordanian Armed Forces to increase female officer representation and provide women with wider career opportunities. The Trust Fund serves as a strong advocate to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue partners and other regional actors developing servicewomen and their roles in peace and the security sector. The Trust Fund consists of three initiatives:

- Support to the Directorate of Military Women’s Affairs in developing and implementing a 3-year Action Plan. This will include a review of policy objectives and requirements as well as adoption of selected concepts in line with NATO policies.
- The Military Women’s Training Centre provides all women with training in core basic military skills and leadership. Enhancements to the current centre’s infrastructure will allow 25% increased training throughput to 550 students yearly, with modernized instructional and teaching facilities and improved living standards.
- Education and Training is the way to deliver and affect change. An analysis of officers’ courses will be followed by the design and integration of amendments, commencing with gender awareness, intro courses and programmes for both female and male officers. Appropriate new courses will be developed to support change and promote wider regional cooperation.

Results

Support the recruitment of female officers, enhance provision of gender training and increase gender awareness in the Jordanian Armed Forces. This Trust Fund also contributes to supporting the SDG 5 on Gender Equality and supporting the empowerment of all women.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed not ODA-eligible. ODA excludes the provision of aid to the military in partner countries. This exclusion covers assistance directly benefitting counterpart military structure and other contributions linked to a specific defence effort e.g. assistance that contributes to the strengthening of the military or fighting capacity of the armed forces (paragraph 97). Capacity-building through the recruitment and training of more women in the JAF to create wider employment and participation opportunities is considered direct aid to the military in the partner country and does not qualify as ODA.

By contrast, security sector reform activities to garner respect for human rights and inclusive, gender-sensitive security institutions would be considered eligible (paragraph 105). This support can include the ministry of defence but it then “must be part of a national security system reform strategy and be approved by the partner country ministry with overall responsibility for co-ordination of external assistance.”
CASE 44: UKRAINE MEDICAL REHABILITATION TRUST FUND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Partially ODA-eligible</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
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</table>

**Background information**

At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO launched substantial new programmes to enhance assistance to capability development and sustainable capacity-building in Ukraine's security and defence sector. Medical rehabilitation was identified as one of the key areas to develop further cooperation.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

The Ukraine Medical Rehabilitation Trust Fund provides support to patients, i.e. active and discharged Ukrainian servicemen and women and civilian personnel from the defence and security sector, to ensure they have rapid access to medical rehabilitation and longer-term medical services. It reinforces the medical rehabilitation system in Ukraine to ensure that it has the means to provide long-term sustainable services. The Trust Fund involves short, medium and long-term activities:

- Medical rehabilitation services and assistive devices abroad, subsidising travel costs, accommodation, food, treatment, physical rehabilitation and provision of prostheses/orthoses.
- Vocational rehabilitation services, designed to enable beneficiaries to prepare for application procedures, as employment is being considered essential to gain or regain independence.
- Sport rehabilitation services in partnership with the National Paralympic Committee of Ukraine. Beneficiaries consist of up to 50% former servicemen/women and 50% civilians or internally displaced persons from the Donbas area.
- Provision of appropriate equipment to five medical rehabilitation units in hospitals to improve the quality of services. The beneficiary hospitals are under the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Policy and the National Guard.
- Provision of equipment and facilitation of technology transfer to two prostheses centres.
- Competencies development of professional staff to ensure quality and sustainability of medical services, including on-the-job training, mentoring, participation in conferences, train-the-trainer training, distance-learning, and the development and conduct of short-term courses to refresh and enhance skills and knowledge at managerial and expert level.

**Results**

Reinforcement of the medical rehabilitation system in Ukraine to ensure that the health system has the means to provide long-term sustainable services to active and discharged Ukrainian servicemen and women and civilian personnel from the defence and security sector.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility**

This activity is deemed partially ODA-eligible. The provision of aid to the partner country military is not reportable as ODA. This exclusion covers the direct participation in military expenditures, assistance directly benefitting counterpart military structure and other contributions linked to a specific defence effort e.g. assistance that contributes to the strengthening of the military or fighting capacity of the armed forces (paragraph 97). In this case, the provision of medical rehabilitation to Ukrainian servicemen and women is considered direct aid to the military in the partner country. However, the provision of medical rehabilitation to civilians is eligible.
CASE 45: UKRAINE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE TRUST FUND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODA-eligible</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
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<td>Purpose code</td>
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</table>

Background information

Through the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, NATO is committed to assist Ukraine in addressing legacy challenges arising from Soviet-era military activities. One of these legacy challenges is radioactive waste stored within a border guard site in an aging concrete well, which does not comply with International Atomic Energy Agency best practices. This poses serious health and environmental risks, such as:

- There is no radiation control or monitoring at the site; personnel do not have the required information and training and the required level of radiological protection is not met in the current situation.
- With the current condition of the concrete well and the level of groundwater being unknown, there is a risk due to the degradation of the concrete that the radioactive material can come in contact with the soil and the groundwater.

Objectives and concrete activities

The Disposal of Radioactive Waste Trust Fund has established three work packages with the objective to remediate the site, located in Vakulenchuk, central Ukraine, and transfer the radioactive waste to the Ukrainian national system for radioactive management. The Trust Fund implements the following work packages:

- Radiation Survey and Site Investigation. Provides recommendations for the work to be executed during the next work packages.
- Pre-treatment of Waste. Extract, transport and store the waste in an appropriate authorized national radiological waste management site.
- Site Restoration. Restore the site to its original conditions to prevent further environmental impact.

Results

To enable Ukraine to recover and secure the radioactive material in line with international standards, to restore the site to its original condition and thereby remove the threat posed to the environment and the local population.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. It relates to disposal of hazardous waste to mitigate a risk of radioactive contamination for the benefit of the civilian population.
CASE 46: BUILDING INTEGRITY TRUST FUND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>Various NATO members</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Developing countries, unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
<td>2 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2015-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15210 Security system management and reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Background information

The Building Integrity (BI) Trust Fund was established to provide assistance in developing transparent and accountable defence and related security sector institutions under civil and democratic control. BI activities are developed, implemented and assessed by a community of practitioners drawn from international organisations, national authorities, professional associations and civil society, including NGOs focused on good governance and reducing risk of corruption. The targeted audience is Ministry of Defence personnel.

Objectives and concrete activities

The Building Integrity Trust Fund carries out activities in the following areas:

- Training and education on the risk of corruption, impact and promoting good practices;
- Anti-corruption exercises;
- Peer-to-peer contacts, by sharing information and promoting best practices;
- Tailored support through the BI Self-Assessment Questionnaire used to diagnose existing procedures and business practices within the MoD and taking part in a Peer Review to identify good practices and gaps.

Results

BI activities contribute to enhanced political and social stability and resilience within nations and regions. Efforts under the BI Trust Fund are expected to result in improved understanding of the nexus of corruption, crime and terrorism; enhanced transparency, accountability and integrity in the defence and related security sector; and enhanced human security.

Assessment of the project's ODA-eligibility

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible as it demonstrates technical co-operation provided to government ministries to assist review and reform of the security system to improve good governance and civilian oversight. Eligible assistance is limited to civilian competence/capacity building and strategic planning/advice activities that promote political, institutional and financial transparency, accountability, civilian oversight, as well as respect for human rights and inclusive, gender-sensitive security institutions. However, as the targeted audience is the Ministry of Defence, the support must be part of a national security system reform strategy and be approved by the partner country ministry with overall responsibility for co-ordination of external assistance. Any other assistance to the Ministry of Defence of armed forces is not reportable as ODA (paragraph 105).

Furthermore, this activity also links in with the Reporting Directives on training of partner country military. Training in anti-corruption, including prevention of predatory behaviour against civilians and in transparency, respect of civilian oversight and democratic control are amongst the eligible areas listed in the Directives (paragraph 97).
CASE 47: UKRAINE II TRUST FUND – DEMILITARISATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ODA-eligible</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provider country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
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Background information
The Ukraine II Trust Fund focuses on the destruction of small arms and light weapons (SALW), conventional ammunition and anti-personnel landmines.

Objectives and concrete activities
The Fund supports Ukraine to fulfil its commitments under the Ottawa Convention and improves regional security for the population. This will be carried out through industrial destruction and consists of three initiatives:

- **Initiative A:** improve human security by reducing all forms of violence, and work with governments and communities to find lasting solutions to conflict and insecurity through surplus stocks destruction. The destruction of SALW, carried out by a Ukrainian company, consists of dismantling, smelting and recycling.
- **Initiative B:** the destruction of Conventional Ammunition, carried out by a Ukrainian company, consists mainly of dismantling, recycling, open burning, controlled incinerating and, on rare occasion, open detonating.
- **Initiative C:** contribute to a fully budgeted plan for the destruction of Ukraine’s entire stockpile of anti-personnel landmines (APL) in accordance with Article 4 of the Ottawa Convention. The destruction work, carried out by a state enterprise, consists of dismantling, recycling and controlled incinerating.

Results
This activity will contribute to the destruction of:

- 366 000 Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW);
- 76 000 tonnes of Conventional Ammunition (CA), including small arms ammunition; and,
- approximately 3 million PFM1 Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL).

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility
This activity is deemed ODA-eligible as the initiatives A-C relate to stockpile destruction for developmental purposes. When provided by military actors, only the additional costs are reportable as ODA. (Paragraph 107)

This Trust Fund also contributes to supporting the Sustainable Development Goal 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, which aims to significantly reduce all forms of violence, and work with governments and communities to find lasting solutions to conflict and insecurity.
CASE 48: MAINTENANCE ADVISORS AT KABUL AIRPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider country</th>
<th>Greece</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient country</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agency</td>
<td>Hellenic Air Force General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (USD x 1000)</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose code</td>
<td>15210 Security system management and reform</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Background information**

Following the completion of the mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at the end of 2014, a new, follow-on, NATO-led mission called Resolute Support was launched on 1 January 2015 to provide further training, advice and assistance for the Afghan security forces and institutions. At the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allied leaders decided to extend the presence of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) beyond 2016. Some 13 000 personnel from NATO member states and partner countries are deployed in support of RSM. The mission operates with one central hub (in Kabul/Bagram) and four spokes in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Laghman.

**Objectives and concrete activities**

Operation Resolute Support focuses on training, advising and assisting Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) and Afghan Security Institution (ASI) development.

Resolute Support’s presence at Afghan airports, while primarily intended to support military operations, has been used to stabilise and modernize the civilian aviation sector. A high priority has been placed on training Afghans in the skills required to operate airfields and manage airspace. The focus of the efforts in civil aviation is training in the five key services required to operate an airfield: air traffic control; crash and rescue; communication, navigation and surveillance; safety management; and meteorology. The training in these areas will help sustain the civil aviation sector once NATO’s military presence has ceased.

Hellenic Air Force contributed by deploying four Maintenance Advisors at Kabul Airport.

**Results**

With their support, Greece aimed to contribute to the sustainment of the civil aviation sector in Afghanistan.

**Assessment of the project’s ODA eligibility**

This activity is deemed ODA-eligible. Operation Resolute Support in general is not ODA-eligible as the provision of aid to the military in partner countries is excluded (Paragraph 97). However, the specific contribution from Greece to deploy Maintenance Advisors at Kabul Airport is ODA-eligible when the training of Afghans is for civilian purposes; only additional costs can be counted as ODA.
CASE 49: NATO OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR

Provider country | Various NATO members, including Greece
Recipient country | Central-East Mediterranean sea
Implementing agency | Hellenic Air Force general
Budget (USD x 1000) | 530
Year(s) | 2015
Purpose code | 15230 Participation in international peacekeeping operations

Background information
Operation Active Endeavour (2001-2016) was the first of its kind NATO Article 5 operation, enshrining the principle of collective defence. It was invoked for the first time after the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001. It aimed to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and monitored shipping in the Mediterranean to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity. NATO forces hailed over 100,000 merchant vessels and boarded some 155 suspect ships. By conducting these maritime operations against terrorist activity, NATO’s presence in these waters benefited all shipping travelling through the Straits by improving perceptions of security. The operation was succeeded in 2016 by maritime security operation Sea Guardian. The Sea Guardian currently performs three Maritime Security Operations tasks in the Mediterranean: support to Maritime Situational Awareness, support maritime Counter-Terrorism and contribute to maritime security capacity building.

Objectives and concrete activities
NATO helped to keep seas safe, protect shipping and control suspect vessels. Moreover, this operation also enabled NATO to strengthen its relations with partner countries, especially those participating in the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue. Greece contributed directly to the operation with naval assets. Hellenic Air Force employed in operation a C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft equipped with an Automatic Identification System for one sortie per month under NATO tactical control and four sorties per month under national tactical control. The tasks included: supporting maritime situational awareness, support to maritime counter-terrorism, contributing to maritime security capacity building.

Results
The experience that NATO accrued in Active Endeavour has given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in the deterrence of maritime terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. This expertise is relevant to wider international efforts to combat terrorism, as well as enhanced cooperation with non-NATO countries and civilian agencies.

Assessment of the project’s ODA-eligibility
This activity is deemed not ODA-eligible as it contributes to an armed response to terrorism (activities to combat terrorism through kinetic activities and the use of force, whether by military of civilian police are not ODA-eligible, see paragraph 117). The activity does not meet the primary purpose for ODA, it seems to be primarily beneficial for the security interests of NATO members rather than for developing countries (development co-operation should not be used as a vehicle to promote the organisation’s own security interests, see box 2 of the Reporting Directives). Only projects concerned with preventing violent extremism through a non-coercive, intentional and targeted use of development assistance approaches aiming at providing positive alternatives to those most at risk of violent extremism in partner countries and countering the narrative of violent extremism that incites support for violence are ODA-eligible (paragraph 116).
ANNEX: EXTRACT FROM THE REPORTING DIRECTIVES – ELIGIBILITY RULES FOR PEACE AND SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES

II.8 Peace and security-related activities

95. In order to facilitate the assessment of ODA eligibility of activities in the field of peace and security, specific rules and principles are defined.

### Box 2. Overarching principles to guide ODA reporting on peace and security-related activities

As for all ODA, the reporting of peace and security-related activities is guided by the general statement that the main objective of ODA is the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries. When assessing the ODA eligibility of activities in the field of peace and security, the primary purpose must therefore be considered.

Financing of military equipment or services is generally excluded from ODA reporting. This blanket exclusion is to avoid channelling ODA funds to the partner country military, thus strengthening partner countries' military capabilities.

Development co-operation should not be used as a vehicle to promote the provider's security interests. Hence, when assessing the ODA eligibility of activities involving engagement with the partner country military, specific rules and exclusions apply, and are detailed below. Specific reporting rules and exclusions also apply to the exceptional cases where the military are used as delivery agents of development services or humanitarian aid.

The supply of equipment intended to convey a threat of, or deliver, lethal force, is not reportable as ODA.

i) **Rules governing ODA reporting in relation to the military**

96. For the purpose of these Directives, the term military refers to all armed forces (land, navy and air forces) reporting to government departments charged with national defence or the projection of armed force (normally “the Ministry of Defence”). The term “military” also covers the Ministry of Defence itself, and state funded and controlled armed bodies not falling within the category of “police” (see paragraph 99).  

97. ODA excludes the provision of aid to the military in partner countries. However, there are circumstances, outlined below, where engagement with military institutions, in addition to other actors, is necessary to provide effective support to security sector reform and is recognised as ODA. Also, the use of (usually donor) military personnel and equipment to deliver development services and humanitarian aid is included in ODA (additional costs only, see below). To assess the eligibility of an activity involving the military, it is necessary to distinguish between provider and partner country military.

**ODA eligibility of activities involving provider country military:**

- The additional costs incurred with the use of military personnel or existing equipment provided by the donor, when used exclusively to a) deliver humanitarian aid in accordance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence or b) perform development services, are included in ODA if and only if a specific capability or asset requirement that cannot timely and effectively be met with available civilian assets has been identified.

- The rationale for not counting the regular costs is to acknowledge that the primary objective of the provider armed forces is the provider’s own defence, and their role in delivering humanitarian aid or other development services for developing countries can only be a secondary objective. In this context, only additional or “extra” costs associated with the ODA-eligible task are reportable as ODA.

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32. Non-state armed factions are covered in paragraphs 106 and 113.

33. It is the obligation of members to undertake and make available, on request by the Secretariat, evidence that demonstrates that such an assessment was made on an objective basis.
Additional costs are not part of the regular (military) budget and are in excess over what
the personnel or equipment would have cost to maintain had they not been assigned to
the development activity concerned. Therefore, regular salaries and expenses are not
eligible, nor the regular equipment costs (e.g. maintenance costs). Additional costs are
reportable as ODA, when it is feasible to clearly isolate these costs from the regular
costs.

**ODA eligibility of activities involving partner country military:**

- The provision of aid to the partner country military is not reportable as ODA. This
  exclusion covers the direct participation in military expenditures, assistance directly
  benefitting counterpart military structure and other contributions linked to a specific
defence effort e.g. assistance that contributes to the strengthening of the military or
  fighting capacity of the armed forces (including the provision and use of equipment
  and/or services that contribute to developing the kinetic, offensive and/or lethal
capabilities of partner countries).

- Generally, provider engagement with the partner country’s military forces is not eligible,
  except for support for civilian oversight and democratic control of the military system.

- In exceptional circumstances, the operating environment renders necessary the delivery
  of humanitarian aid or development services through the military of the partner country.
  In these cases, the activity design needs to clearly describe the expected role of the
  military as a delivery agent.\(^{34}\) The regular costs of the military forces involved cannot be
  counted as ODA. Only the additional costs associated with the use of military personnel
  or existing equipment of the partner country’s military forces, when used exclusively to
  a) deliver humanitarian aid in accordance with the humanitarian principles of humanity,
  neutrality, impartiality and independence or b) perform development services, are
  reportable as ODA (and not for example the donation of military equipment) provided a
  specific capability or asset requirement that cannot timely and effectively be met with
  available civilian assets has been identified\(^{35}\).

- Training of partner country military personnel, including in non-military matters, is
  generally not eligible, except for training, under civilian oversight and with a clear
developmental purpose for the benefit of civilians, in the limited areas below. Training
  should be preferably by civilian actors, jointly by civilian and military actors or, by way
  of last resort, by military actors\(^{36}\), in:
  - human rights and rule of law;
  - protection of women in conflict and prevention of sexual and gender-based
    violence;
  - international humanitarian law;
  - humanitarian response and disaster relief preparedness;
  - prevention and treatment of communicable diseases;
  - anti-corruption, including prevention of predatory behaviour against civilians; and
  - transparency, respect of civilian oversight and democratic control.

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\(^{34}\) Upon request, members need to demonstrate that the design met the criteria prior to the intervention.

\(^{35}\) It is the obligation of members to undertake and make available, on request by the Secretariat, evidence that
  demonstrates that such an assessment was made on an objective basis.

\(^{36}\) It is the obligation of members to provide an explanation of the programme design process on request by the
  Secretariat.
Training in the use of equipment intended to convey a threat of, or deliver, lethal force, is not eligible.

Training that contributes to the fighting capacity of the armed forces is excluded.

Additional safeguards

98. In addition, the following activities involving the military are explicitly excluded from ODA:

- The use of military personnel to control civil disobedience, even in emergency situations.
- Activities to protect the security of persons or property through the use or display of force, including in the context of humanitarian aid.

ii) Rules governing ODA reporting in relation to the police

99. For the purpose of these Directives, the term police refers to all civilian (non-Defence Ministry) law enforcement agencies that exercise police powers, especially the power of arrest and detention within a broader rule-of-law system (such bodies may include immigration/border, customs and other specialist civilian law enforcement agencies). The term also covers actors such as the gendarmerie, the guardia civil and the coast guard in their civilian police law enforcement functions even if they are administratively under the Ministry of Defence.

100. As with the military, to assess the eligibility of an activity involving the police, it is necessary to distinguish between provider and partner country police.

ODA eligibility of activities involving provider country police:

- The use of police personnel or equipment provided by the donor to perform development services is included in ODA although only the costs in relation to the mission concerned and in addition to the regular budget can be reported (e.g. premia for expatriation, travel costs). In practice, when policemen are assigned to a developmental task in a developing country, their regular pay is not reportable as ODA unless the policemen were specifically recruited to carry out these activities or replaced at home. (The costs of substituting the policemen in the provider country are not reportable as ODA.)

ODA eligibility of activities involving partner country police:

- Financing for routine civil policing functions (i.e. pursuant to preventing and addressing criminal activities and the promotion of public safety – see exclusions in paragraph 101) and the provision of related non-lethal equipment, or training, is reportable as ODA. Training in the governance and management of police equipment is eligible including the safety, security and storage of equipment intended to convey a threat of, or deliver, lethal force.

Additional safeguards

101. In addition, the following activities involving the police are explicitly excluded from ODA:

- Training in counter-subversion methods, suppression of political dissidence, or intelligence gathering on political activities.
- The supply of the donor’s police services to control civil disobedience.

37. Support to police is not exclusively provided in relation to security, and ODA eligibility rules in this section apply to the police as a whole. Such support may be primarily aimed at security system reform [report under purpose codes 152xx] or legal and judicial development [purpose code 15130].

38. Intelligence gathering does not refer to data collection for development purposes nor to preventative or investigatory activities by law enforcement agencies in the context of routine policing to uphold the rule of law, including countering transnational organised crime.
iii) List of ODA-eligible items in a context of peace and security

102. Keeping the above principles and rules of eligibility in mind, this section defines the eligibility of items in the peace and security sector.

A. Provider engagement in partner country’s security sector

1. Security system management and reform [CRS purpose code 15210]

1.1. Management of security expenditure

103. Technical co-operation provided to government to improve transparency, accountability, civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, financial management and auditing of security expenditure, including military budgets, as part of a public expenditure management programme is reportable.

1.2. Enhancing civil society’s role in the security system

104. Assistance to civil society to enhance its competence and capacity to scrutinise the security system so that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and democratic governance is reportable. This includes support to NGOs and other civil society organisations, the media, universities, and research institutions.

1.3. Security system reform

105. Technical co-operation provided to parliament, government ministries, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to assist review and reform of the security system to improve good governance and civilian oversight. Eligible assistance is limited to civilian competence/capacity building and strategic planning/advice activities that promote political, institutional and financial transparency, accountability, civilian oversight, as well as respect for human rights and inclusive, gender-sensitive security institutions. Furthermore, any such support to defence ministries must be part of a national security system reform strategy and be approved by the partner country ministry with overall responsibility for co-ordination of external assistance. Any other assistance to the Ministry of Defence or armed forces is excluded.

2. Reintegration and small arms and light weapons (SALW) control; mine clearance for civilian purposes; child soldiers

2.1. Reintegration and SALW control [CRS purpose code 15240]

106. Reintegration of demobilised military personnel into the economy; conversion of production facilities from military to civilian outputs; repatriation and demobilisation of armed factions, and disposal of their weapons; technical co-operation to control, prevent and/or reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). SALW activities under this directive are defined as:

i) development of laws, regulations and administrative procedures for the control and reduction of weapons proliferation;

ii) development of institutional structures for policy guidance, research and monitoring;

iii) public awareness campaigns on SALW;

iv) promotion of regional co-operation and information exchange on SALW programmes;

v) weapons collection and destruction. (Funding of action to seize arms by force is excluded.) The provision of these activities by military actors is reportable as ODA (additional costs only).

2.2. Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war [CRS purpose code 15250]

107. All activities related to land mines and explosive remnants of war which have benefits to developing countries as their main objective, including removal of land mines and explosive remnants
of war, and stockpile destruction for developmental purposes; risk education and awareness raising; rehabilitation, reintegration and assistance to victims, and research and development on demining and clearance. Only activities for civilian purposes are ODA-eligible; the provision of these activities by military actors is reportable as ODA (additional costs only).

2.3. Child soldiers [CRS purpose code 15261]

108. Technical co-operation provided to government – and assistance to civil society organisations – to support and apply legislation designed to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers. This excludes the costs of military operations against groups that may have recruited child soldiers. Assistance to improve educational or employment opportunities for children so as to discourage their recruitment as soldiers and build capacity (including advocacy) within civilian government and civil society to prevent children from becoming soldiers is eligible. Efforts to demobilise, disarm, release, reintegrate, repatriate and resettle (DDRRR) child soldiers are eligible. On the other hand, support to the armed forces themselves is not eligible. Assistance that contributes to the strengthening of the military or fighting capacity of the armed forces is excluded.

B. Provider engagement in peacebuilding and peacekeeping

1. Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution [CRS purpose code 15220]

109. Support for civilian activities related to peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, including capacity building, monitoring, dialogue and information exchange. This excludes engagement in military strategy and defence co-operation.

110. This category includes bilateral participation in international civilian peace missions such as those conducted by the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) or the European Union (European Common Security and Defence Policy), and contributions to civilian peace funds or commissions (e.g. Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding thematic window of the MDG achievement fund etc.). The contributions can be financial or in kind, taking the form of provision of equipment or civilian or military personnel (e.g. for training civilians).

111. In the event that civilian peacebuilding activities supported include disclosure of military strategy, such assistance is eligible except where military staff or ministry of defence officials benefit from such funding. Direct assistance to the defence ministry or the armed forces is excluded. However, assistance can indirectly be used by civilian organisations/authorities, excluding the ministry of defence, for participation by defence ministry or armed forces staff in the above activities.

2. Participation in international peacekeeping operations

2.1 Bilateral participation

112. This item covers bilateral ODA-eligible peacekeeping expenditures within a UN context. It includes the cost of a donor’s bilateral participation in ODA-eligible activities (see examples below), net of any compensation received from the UN, when they are part of an international peace operation mandated or authorised by the United Nations through a Security Council resolution and conducted by international organisations (the cost of bilateral activities is calculated as the excess over what the personnel and equipment would have cost to maintain had they not been assigned to take part in a peace operation).

113. Typical ODA-eligible activities carried out in a peacekeeping context include: human rights and election monitoring; rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure; monitoring or retraining of civil administrators, penal/corrections personnel and police forces; security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities; training in customs and border control procedures; advice or training in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilisation policy; reintegration of demobilised

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39. Paragraphs 114 and 115 in this section are subject to a technical review clarifying the eligibility of costs in participating in international peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate.
soldiers; repatriation and demobilisation of armed factions, and disposal of their weapons; explosive mine removal; humanitarian-type activities.

114. Costs for military contingents participating in UNPKO peacekeeping operations are, for the time being, not reportable as ODA.

2.2 Multilateral contributions

115. The List of ODA-eligible international organisations (see Annex 2 of the Reporting Directives) sets out the ODA eligibility of core contributions to international organisations active in the field of conflict, peace and security. In particular, an ODA coefficient is applied to members’ assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget. Note that, as indicated on Annex 2, not all UN peacekeeping operations are ODA-eligible and that multilateral contributions to UN peacekeeping operations should be reported operation by operation in the DAC activity database (CRS++). Financing of international engagement in post-conflict peacekeeping by non-UN international forces, e.g. African Union or others, is, for the time being, not reportable.

C. Preventing violent extremism

116. Preventing violent extremism through non-coercive, intentional and targeted use of development assistance approaches aims at providing positive alternatives to those most at risk of violent extremism in partner countries and countering the narrative of violent extremism that incites support for violence.

117. Financing activities combating terrorism is generally excluded from ODA. For example, activities to combat terrorism through kinetic activities and the use of force, and support for armed response or combat operations, whether by military or civilian police are excluded. In the spirit of the recommendations of the 2016 UNSG Plan of Action to prevent violent extremism, activities preventing violent extremism in developing countries are reportable as ODA, as long as they are led by partner countries and their primary purpose is developmental. Activities targeting perceived threats to the donor country, as much as to recipient countries, rather than focusing on the economic and social development of the partner country, are excluded (e.g. protection of developed countries’ nationals not engaged in humanitarian or development activities).

118. ODA-eligible activities for preventing violent extremism must be undertaken in accordance with respect for the peaceful exercise of political, social and economic rights, including the right to non-violent forms of political expression. Intelligence gathering is excluded from ODA. In addition, training in counter-subversion method or suppression of political dissidence is excluded from ODA.

119. Eligible activities include:

- Education.
- Activities that support the rule of law.
- Working with civil society groups specifically to prevent radicalisation, support reintegration and deradicalisation, and promote community engagement.
- Building the capacity of security and justice systems in specific skills required for the prevention of extremist or terrorist threats, such as in the collection and correct use of evidence or fair trial conduct, to ensure more effective and human rights-compliant behaviours.
- Research into positive alternatives to address causes of violent extremism in developing countries.

40. For the purposes of these Directives, violent extremism is defined as promoting views which foment and incite violence in furtherance of particular beliefs, and foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence.

41. Intelligence gathering does not refer to data collection for development purposes nor to preventative or investigatory activities by law enforcement agencies in the context of routine policing to uphold the rule of law, including countering transnational organised crime.