Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

**07-Feb-2013**

**English - Or. English**

**DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION DIRECTORATE**
**DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE**

DCD/DAC(2012)33/REV1
**Unclassified**

# 2012 DAC REPORT ON MULTILATERAL AID

*This document is submitted to the DAC for APPROVAL under the written procedure. It reflects comments made by DAC members on the Emerging findings from the 2012 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid [DCD/DAC(2012)25] at the meeting on 12 June [DCD/DAC/M(2012)6/PROV]; written comments on the draft report [DCD/DAC(2012)33] and discussions held at the Workshop on Multilateral Aid on 4 October 2012 as well as at the DAC meeting on 30 October 2012 [DCD/DAC/M(2012)9/PROV].*

*In the absence of notifications to the Contrary by 20 February 2013, the document will be considered approved (and issued as FINAL). It will be published on the OECD website.*

*The document is only available in PDF. This version is only available in English. The final version will also be available in French.*

Emily Bosch - Tel: +33 (0)1 45 24 79 67 - E-mail: emily.bosch@oecd.org
Jolanda Profos - Tel: +33 (0)1 45 24 90 12 - E-mail: jolanda.profos@oecd.org
Suzanne Steensen - Tel: +33 (0)1 45 24 76 23 - E-mail: suzanne.steensen@oecd.org

**JT03334255**

**Complete document available on OLIS in its original format**
***This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.***

**English - Or. English**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..... 6
INTRODUCTION ..... 9
CHAPTER 1. OVERALL TRENDS IN MULTILATERAL AID ..... 10
Recent Trends in Multilateral ODA ..... 11
Total use of the multilateral system ..... 12
Future Trends in Multilateral Aid ..... 15
Multilateral Aid Concentrated in Top Five Clusters ..... 16
Non-DAC Multilateral Aid ..... 17
CHAPTER 2. FRAGMENTATION OF EFFORTS ..... 20
Fragmentation of Multilateral and Bilateral Outflows ..... 20
Re-attributing Non-core Funding to Multilaterals ..... 23
More Fragmentation – for Good Reason? ..... 26
CHAPTER 3. ASSESSMENTS OF MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS ..... 28
Overview of Types of Reviews ..... 28
Comprehensive Assessments of Multilateral Organisations ..... 29
Challenges of Multiple Assessments ..... 34
How can evidence from multiple assessments be used? ..... 35
Conclusions ..... 36
CHAPTER 4. TOWARDS GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR MULTILATERAL AID ..... 38
Managing Multilateral Organisations: Global Level ..... 39
Effective Delivery of Multilateral Aid ..... 43
Country-level Harmonisation among Multilateral and Bilateral Donors ..... 44
Emerging Guiding Principles ..... 46
REFERENCES ..... 47
ANNEX A. STATISTICAL FIGURES AND TABLES ..... 49
ANNEX B. COUNTRY TABLES AND FIGURES ..... 56
Australia ..... 57
Austria ..... 58
Belgium ..... 59
Canada ..... 60
Denmark ..... 61
European Union Institutions ..... 62
Finland ..... 63
France ..... 64
Germany ..... 65
Greece ..... 66
Ireland ..... 67
Italy ..... 68
Japan ..... 69

Korea....70
Luxembourg....71
Netherlands....72
New Zealand....73
Norway....74
Portugal....75
Spain....76
Sweden....77
Switzerland....78
United Kingdom....79
United States....80

ANNEX C....81

Table C.1: Global Bilateral Donor Fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2010 disbursements in current USD....83
Table C.2: Global Multilateral Donor Fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2010 disbursements in current USD....89

ANNEX D....95

ANNEX E....97

ANNEX F....101

**Tables**

Table 1. Advantages and disadvantages of non-core contributions....13
Table 2. Core and non-core contributions to multilateral organisations....16
Table 3. Non-DAC gross ODA disbursements, 2010....17
Table 4. Concentration of multilateral agencies (core resources)....22
Table 5. Impact of non-core funding on fragmentation....25
Table 6. Elements of different multilateral assessments....30
Table 7. Comparison of Australian Multilateral Assessment and UK Multilateral Aid Review by multilateral agency....35

**Figures**

Figure 1. Gross ODA provided by DAC member countries (2001-2011)....11
Figure 2. Gross ODA disbursements (2010)....12
Figure 3. Total use of the multilateral system, gross ODA disbursements (2010)....14
Figure 4. Total contributions to EU institutions as % gross ODA disbursements (2010)....14
Figure 5. Total use of the multilateral system as % gross ODA disbursements (2010)....15
Figure 6. Opportunities for concentration (2010)....21
Figure 7. Trend in concentration (2000-2010)....23
Figure 8. Impact of re-attribution (2007-2010)....24
Figure 9. The problem-solving model of research utilisation....36
Figure 10. Conceptual framework of example of efforts to date....39

**Boxes**

Box 1. How are terms used in this report?....10
Box 2. Chinese contributions to international organisations in 2010....18
Box 3. Measuring Fragmentation and Concentration of Aid....20
Box 4 . Two scenarios for classifying non-core funding....23
Box 5. The Australian Multilateral Assessment....32
Box 6. Busan commitment to reduce the proliferation of channels....38
Box 7. Selectivity –Draft Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programmes at the Country Level....40

Box 8. Think Twice: Recommendation from Health as a Tracer Sector .....40
Box 9. Eight Good Practice Lessons for Good Multilateral Donorship.....41
Box 10. Recommendations from the initiative 'Health as a Tracer Sector'.....42
Box 11. Accra Agenda for Action, Paragraph 19c.....43
Box 12. Best Practice Principles for Engagement of Global Health Partnerships at Country Level ..43
Box 13. Building partnerships.....45
Box 14. Harmonisation - Excerpts from Draft Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programmes at the Country Level .....45

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This fourth *DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* examines (1) recent trends in multilateral official development assistance (ODA) and aid channelled through the multilateral system; provides an (2) overview of the fragmentation of country programmable aid; analyses (3) different approaches adopted by donors in assessing multilateral organisations; and finally proposes (4) ideas for guiding principles and guidelines to limit the proliferation of these channels.

### *Trends in multilateral aid*

2. Donors of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have increased their level of multilateral aid to USD 38 billion in 2011. This is likely to lead to an increase in the subsequent outflows from the multilateral system to partner countries in 2012. Despite a 2.7% reduction in global ODA in 2011 for the first time since 1997, multilateral aid – or un-earmarked contributions to multilateral agencies – increased by 1% in real terms. Nonetheless, along with slowing overall growth in gross ODA, annual growth rates of multilateral ODA have decelerated in recent years as well, from 9% in 2008 to 5% in 2010 and down to only 1% in 2011. Contributions to EU institutions continued to account for the largest share (35%) of DAC members' multilateral ODA (USD 13.2 billion) in 2010.

3. In 2010, USD 37.6 billion was spent to fund multilateral agencies' core functions. An additional 12% of total ODA (USD 16.7 billion), though scored as bilateral, was channelled through and implemented by multilateral agencies in 2010 as earmarked funding (referred to as "non-core" or "multi-bi" aid in this report). Of the multi-bi aid allocated to specific countries, well over half benefits the poorest and most fragile countries. Taken together, the total use of the multilateral system (core and non-core) accounted for 40% of gross ODA, or USD 54.3 billion in 2010 compared to USD 51.2 billion in 2009. Twenty-one countries that are not members of the DAC reported their 2010 aid flows to the DAC, including the Russian Federation. Together, those countries contribute a growing amount of money to the core budgets of multilateral organisations, which amounted to USD 2 billion in 2010. Although China, Brazil and India do not report aid data to the DAC, China's 2010 contributions to international organisations are highlighted in this report.

### *Fragmentation of efforts*

4. Today, two out of every five donor-partner country relations are not financially significant. This fragmentation of development finance stems mostly from bilateral sources. However, multilateral agencies - together representing over one-third of the resource outflows at the global level - are also beginning to contribute to the global fragmentation picture. The fragmentation analysis in this report finds that non-core (or earmarked) aid to multilateral organisations contributes to fragmentation and may complicate fragmentation on the ground. As outlined in the *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid,* non-core contributions to multilateral agencies can have both advantages and disadvantages. Increasing (or shifting) disbursements where aid relations are "non-significant" may not always be relevant, desirable or possible. For this reason, it is important to understand the rationale behind non-core funding.

***Assessments of multilateral organisations***

5. A number of important bilateral and joint assessments of multilateral organisations have taken place in the past year: Australia's Multilateral Assessment (2012); Denmark's Analysis of its Engagement in Multilateral Organisations (2012); Sweden's Organisational Assessments (2011); Dutch Scorecards of Multilateral Organisations (2011); the United Kingdom's Multilateral Aid Review (2011); and finally assessments by the annual Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN).

6. The most comprehensive reviews (Australia, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and MOPAN) have many criteria in common, including:

- the strategic management of an organisation, and its capacity to "manage for results";
- benchmarks such as the MDGs and poverty reduction objectives;
- the fit-for-purpose of human resource policies for optimal organisational and operational effectiveness;
- measuring the impact of an organisation through an evaluation function;
- the organisation's financial accountability and how closely it operates within its mandate and in line with international commitments; and finally,
- the partnership behaviour of multilateral agencies.

7. As the different models of decision making imply, in order for the assessments to influence policy, they need to coincide with a range of other factors, including appropriate timing and political will. While it is true that there can be a political dimension to the assessments and to the demand for evidence, there is a striking degree of convergence in the different criteria adopted by the different reviews and assessments. In order to assess multilateral organisations against collective objectives, it is important that future assessments are based – at least in part - on shared objectives, rather than pursuing only the interest of an individual donor. While there is certainly a domestic accountability dimension to these assessments, mutual and international accountability requires also placing an emphasis on the evidence from clients or "end-users" of the multilateral system.

***Guiding principles to limit the proliferation of channels***

8. Members of the DAC should consider the following principles set in the context of the commitments made in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (paragraph 25) when contemplating the establishment of new multilateral channels of development co-operation and considering the use of existing channels. These seven emerging principles are:

*In line with the commitment set out in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (paragraph 25), we welcome the diversity of development co-operation actors, and agree to work to reduce the proliferation of multilateral channels by using existing channels and frameworks for programme design, delivery and assessments, drawing on the following principles:*

1. **Use existing channels as the default**, adjusting them where necessary, and address any legal and administrative barriers that may prevent their use.
2. Use the international community's appetite for new initiatives to **innovate and reform the existing multilateral system**, allowing for donor visibility.
3. **Regularly review the number** of multilateral organisations, funds and programmes with the aim of reducing their number through consolidation without decreasing the overall volume of resources.
4. **Provide core or un-earmarked contributions** to multilateral organisations, where relevant and possible.

5. **Ensure that new multilateral programmes and channels are multi-donor arrangements; are time-bound, and should contain provisions for a mid-term review; and do not impose excessive reporting requirements** if the creation of multilateral programmes and channels is unavoidable.

6. **Support country-level harmonisation** among all providers of development co-operation, including through representation on governing boards of multilateral organisations, funds and programmes.

7. **Monitor trends and progress** to curb the proliferation of channels at the global level; inform monitoring in partner countries.

# INTRODUCTION

9. Multilateral aid has a vital role to play in today's world. It is generally seen as offering an appropriate vehicle to respond to global challenges. As they govern the multilateral system jointly, and invest increasing amounts of money in multilateral co-operation, donors and governments have a responsibility to ensure its effectiveness . They can bring about reforms if they act together. This report is intended as a tool for policy makers in making informed decisions about multilateral aid, and in supporting collective efforts to improve the multilateral system.

10. Chapters 1 and 2 explore the **multilateral aid landscape**. Chapter 1 explores trends in multilateral aid. While core multilateral aid continued to increase slightly (5% in 2010, 1% in 2011), non-core resources are increasing at a much faster pace (8% in 2010)[1]. Of all the ODA donors channel through multilateral organisations, almost 70% is core, and only slightly more than 30% is non-core, earmarked for a specific country, region, sector or theme.

11. How do the increasing non-core contributions affect fragmentation of aid? Chapter 2 shows that (i) multilateral aid is less fragmented than bilateral aid, but that (ii) fragmentation of the multilateral system increases when we look at non-core multilateral aid to multilateral agencies as one (by reattributing, statistically speaking, non-core aid from bilateral to multilateral organisations). It concludes that the rationale for providing multi-bi should be given careful consideration.

12. The last two chapters deal with **collective efforts to improve the multilateral system**. Chapter 3 looks into the different bilateral and joint assessments. It finds that there is a high-level of convergence in the different criteria adopted by the different reviews and assessments. Chapter 4 takes stock of lessons learned, over the past decade, from multilateral aid, and presents emerging principles that can serve as the DAC's contribution to the discussion in the Global Partnership for Effective Development to define principles to reduce the proliferation of multilateral channels.

## CHAPTER 1. OVERALL TRENDS IN MULTILATERAL AID

13. The level of donor investment in the multilateral system continued to increase in 2011, and will likely lead to an increase in the subsequent outflows from the multilateral system to partner countries in 2012. Despite a 2.7% overall decrease in ODA in 2011 for the first time since 1997[2], multilateral ODA – or DAC members' un-earmarked contributions to multilateral agencies – increased by 1% in real terms. So, while fiscal austerity in OECD countries put pressure on overall aid levels, multilateral ODA was spared the decrease.

14. Reinforcing this is the fact that the 2012-2015 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans indicates that country programmable aid[3] will recover in 2012 notably due to *multilateral* outflows[4] to developing countries, which are expected to increase by 13% in real terms. This increase reflects the time lag from donors' previous replenishment efforts and to some extent the inclusion of contributions from beyond the DAC.

**Box 1. How are terms used in this report?**

The following OECD/DAC definitions regarding multilateral organisations and multilateral aid are used in this report:

**Multilateral organisations**

"Multilateral organisations are international institutions with governmental membership. They include organisations to which donors' contributions may be reported either in whole or in part as multilateral ODA as well as organisations that serve only as channels for bilateral ODA." *

The DAC maintains the list of organisations to which donors' contributions may be reported either in whole or in part as multilateral ODA, see the "List of ODA-eligible international organisations". Multilateral ODA contributions should only be recorded if the recipient agency is included in the List.

In the context of DAC statistics and publications, the terms "agency", "organisation", or "institution" are used interchangeably. As the DAC reporting directives state, a "fund managed autonomously by such an agency" can also be considered a multilateral organisation in DAC statistics.**

**Flows: multilateral ODA, outflows, and non-core multilateral (multi-bi or earmarked) aid**

A distinction is made between (a) multilateral ODA, measuring funding to multilateral organisations (i.e. inflows); and (b) outflows from those agencies to partner countries.

a) **Multilateral ODA** comprises official concessional contributions to multilateral agencies. These flows are also referred to as "core" contributions to multilateral organisations to distinguish them from "non-core" contributions detailed below; they are sometimes also called "multilateral inflows". According to the statistical directives, to be classified as multilateral, a contribution must be made to an institution that:

   - "conducts all or part of its activities in favour of development;
   - is an international agency, institution, or organisation whose members are governments or a fund managed autonomously by such an agency; and
   - pools contributions so that they lose their identity and become an integral part of its financial assets."**

   Multilateral ODA comprises assessed contributions – required as a condition of membership – and un-earmarked voluntary, or discretionary, contributions, or any combination thereof.

b) **Outflows:** Aid activities financed from the multilateral institutions' regular budgets are referred to as "multilateral outflows".*** This is to be distinguished from projects executed by multilateral organisations on behalf of donor countries, which are classified as bilateral flows. Thirty multilateral agencies report outflows to partner countries to the DAC.

Contributions to multilateral organisations that are **earmarked** at any level – to a specific country, region, sector or theme – are reported as part of donors' bilateral ODA and identified by channel of delivery. Any earmarked aid channelled through multilateral agencies is referred to as "non-core multilateral" ODA or "multi-bi" ODA in this report.

*Sources:*
** OECD (2010), Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System, [DCD/DAC(2007)39/FINAL/CORR5]*
*** OECD (2007), Reporting Directives, paragraph 9 [DCD/DAC(2007)39/FINAL]*
**** DAC Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts, www.oecd.org/dac/glossary*


## Recent Trends in Multilateral ODA

15. Nonetheless, there appears to be a slowing down and levelling off of multilateral ODA. In the past decade, multilateral ODA has increased from USD 27 billion to USD 38 billion and represented close to one-third of gross ODA. Since 2007, the multilateral share of ODA has levelled off to 28% from a high of 32% in 2001. Along with slowing overall growth in gross ODA, annual growth rates of multilateral ODA have decelerated in recent years, from 9% in 2008 to 5% in 2010 and down to only 1% in 2011.

16. Figure 1 below represents the composition of DAC members' gross ODA over the past decade in terms of bilateral and multilateral aid. The bottom dotted line shows multilateral ODA excluding contributions to EU institutions. The share of multilateral ODA to EU institutions[5] (the darker portion above the bottom dotted line) is a growing trend that in 2010 accounted for the largest share (35%) of DAC members' multilateral ODA (USD 13.2 billion). Figure A.1 and Table A.1 in Annex A provide an overview of disbursements to selected multilateral agencies from 2006 to 2010.

**Figure 1. Gross ODA provided by DAC member countries (2001-2011)**

(in constant 2010 prices)





** 2011 data is provisional.*
*Source:* OECD, 2012b.

**Total use of the multilateral system**

17. In 2010, USD 37.6 billion was spent to fund multilateral agencies' core functions. An additional 12% of total ODA (USD 16.7 billion), though scored as bilateral, was earmarked, channelled through and implemented by multilateral agencies (Figure 2). Taken together, the total use of the multilateral system (core and non-core multilateral aid) accounted for 40% of gross ODA, or USD 54.3 billion in 2010 compared to USD 51.2 billion in 2009.

**Figure 2. Gross ODA disbursements (2010)**

(excluding debt relief and contributions from EU Institutions, in constant 2010 prices)




*Source*: OECD, 2012a and 2012b.

18. Non-core multilateral aid continued to grow in 2010, increasing by 8% in real terms from 2009. Humanitarian aid makes up 29% of non-core multilateral aid. Forty-five percent of multi-bi aid is not allocated by country and is instead earmarked for a specific region, theme and/or sector *(i.e.* sub-Saharan Africa, food security or climate change, education). Of the remaining 55% of multi-bi aid, allocated to specific countries, the overwhelming majority is disbursed to fragile and conflict-affected low-income countries (83%). The multi-bi channel has thus maintained its importance as a channel for donors to reach the poorest and most fragile countries.

**Table 1. Advantages and disadvantages of non-core contributions**


| From the perspective of: | Advantages of non-core | Disadvantages of non-core |
|---|---|---|
| **Developing countries** | • can lead to more representative governance<br>• results in better harmonisation when compared to bilateral initiatives | • could lead to less representative governance<br>• might blur lines of accountability |
| **Multilateral organisations** | • when there are multiple donors, is preferable to numerous parallel bilateral initiatives<br>• for specific, critical, time-bound purposes, is preferable to the creation of new organisations or initiatives | • hollows out established governance mechanism as it bypasses board decisions<br>• Increases transaction costs (including reporting), especially for single-donor trust funds<br>• may conflict with the organisation's core policies or strategy<br>• may lead to the "bilateralisation" of multilateral aid |
| **Bilateral donors** | • can be focused on specific sectors, regions or countries (including fragile states) where the bilateral donor either lacks expertise or has no presence<br>• can make contributions more visible as the funding "keeps its identity" by not being pooled<br>• can circumvent onerous board decisions<br>• can serve as "pilot" for stand-alone funds | • core contributions may subsidise administrative costs of non-core funds<br>• may result in the "multilateralisation" of bilateral aid |

*Source*: Based on: 2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid

19. As can be seen in Figure 3 below, the largest volume of non-core or multi-bi flows is channelled through UN Funds and Programmes. In fact, according to the annual Report of the UN Secretary-General on development activities, 74% of total funding of UN operational activities for development (which include humanitarian assistance) are non-core, and that share is still growing (UN, 2012a). The second-largest recipient of earmarked ODA is the World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA), receiving over USD 4 billion in non-core funding in 2010. In an effort to consolidate its existing trust funds, the Bank has worked to group funds under umbrella arrangements; transform single-donor trust funds to multi-donor trust funds; and close empty trust funds. The EU only recently started to accept earmarked funds, which explains their very small share of non-core multilateral aid.

**Figure 3. Total use of the multilateral system, gross ODA disbursements (2010)**

(excluding debt relief and contributions from EU Institutions, in constant 2010 prices)





*Note:* Percentages refer to the share of multi-bi (non-core) aid as a proportion of multilateral and multi-bi ODA in that category.
*Source:* OECD, 2012a and 2012b.

20. As shown in Figure 4, EU member states provided 19% of their total gross ODA to EU institutions in 2010 including both core multilateral ODA and earmarked ODA to the EU. Total earmarked ODA to the EU was USD 192 million in 2010. Greece and Italy provided the largest share of their gross ODA to EU institutions, while Sweden and Luxembourg provided the smallest share of their gross ODA to EU institutions. In terms of volume, Germany (USD 2.9 billion), France (USD 2.7 billion), and the United Kingdom (USD 2.1 billion) provide the largest volume of ODA to EU institutions. Luxembourg (USD 36 million), Ireland (USD 166 million), and Portugal (USD 190 million) provided the least.

**Figure 4. Total contributions to EU institutions (core and non-core) as % gross ODA disbursements (2010)**

(excluding debt relief, in constant 2010 prices)





*Source:* OECD, 2012a and 2012b.

21. Comparing and contrasting the share of multilateral aid in DAC members' gross ODA produces different results depending on whether the share includes or excludes ODA to the EU. Figure 5 below shows members' share of multilateral and multi-bi ODA excluding contributions to the EU. The DAC average share is 33%. Given the inclusion of multi-bi or non-core multilateral aid in the total, some donors with a normally high share of multilateral ODA and a low multi-bi share (Germany, France) appear to have a lower than expected share of the total use of the multilateral system. The total share of the non-EU multilateral system accounts for the highest portion of gross ODA in Italy (57%), Luxembourg (55%), and the United Kingdom (53%). In contrast, Portugal (23%), Germany (22%), and Greece (11%) account for the lowest shares of ODA to the non-EU multilateral system. Figure A.3 in Annex A shows members' share of the total use of the multilateral system including those contributions to EU institutions.

22. While it may not be possible to draw conclusions on donor preferences, donors on the right-hand side of the graph tended to have larger bilateral programmes relative to their multilateral aid and/or contributed relatively less multilateral aid to non-EU institutions. For example, some of the DAC members with an above average share of aid to EU institutions (Portugal, Belgium, France and Germany) fall well below the DAC average when contributions to EU institutions are excluded, in this case signifying their relatively large multilateral contributions to EU institutions as a portion of their total multilateral aid portfolio.

**Figure 5. Total use of the multilateral system as % gross ODA disbursements (2010)**

(excluding debt relief and contributions to EU Institutions, in constant 2010 prices)




*Source:* OECD, 2012b.

## Future Trends in Multilateral Aid

23. The 2012-2015 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans asked donors to report their multilateral spending intentions. Sixteen donors were able to provide this information through 2013[6]. Compared to a baseline of 2010, 9 of the 16 donors plan to increase their multilateral ODA in real terms by 2013 and 7 predict a decrease in their multilateral spend. While these could be conservative estimates, this is a clear break from the historic disbursement pattern where 12 of the same DAC donors have regularly increased their multilateral aid each year.

24. Estimates of a future decrease in multilateral aid are in line with the overall predicted decrease in overall ODA, even if multilateral aid is not yet subject to the overall decrease in bilateral ODA confirmed in 2011. This may indicate the beginning of a "drying up" of the traditional source of multilateral funding as evidenced by multilateral organisations' effort to diversify their funding base to mobilise more resources from middle-income countries, private foundations, and through innovative financing. This is certainly the case for the funding of United Nations operations for development, given that 17% of these contributions in 2010 came from non-governmental organisations, public-private partnerships and other multilateral organisations (including global funds).[7] The *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* cited the record IDA16 replenishment, of which 4.2% was provided by non-DAC members as an example of a broadening of the resource base. The recent Asian Development Fund XI replenishment attained a record USD 4.6 billion, 2% of which was provided by non-DAC members.

**Table 2. Core and non-core contributions to multilateral organisations**

| Voluntary core contributions | Assessed core contributions as a function of membership |
|---|---|
| EDF | IAEA |
| Global Fund | EC-Budget |
| GAVI | AsDB |
| Montreal Protocol Fund | AfDB |
| IDA | IBRD |
| AfDF | IMF |
| AsDF | FAO |
| IDB Special Funds | ICAO |
| IFAD | ILO |
| IMF-PRGT | ITU |
| UNAIDS | UNDPKO |
| UNCTAD | UNESCO |
| UNDP | UNIDO |
| UNFPA | UN Secretariat |
| UNEP** | UPU |
| UN-HABITAT* | WHO* |
| UNHCR** | WIPO |
| UNICEF | WMO |
| UNRWA** | |
| UN-WOMEN | |
| WFP | |
| WHO* | |

*Both assessed and voluntary
**Small annual subsidy from regular budget of the UN used for administration

## Multilateral Aid Concentrated in Top Five Clusters

25. As in previous years, data from 2010 confirm the historical pattern of DAC members providing most of their multilateral aid to five clusters of multilaterals (81% from 2006-2010). Cumulatively for 2006 to 2010, these are the EDF-plus-EU budget (36%), IDA (22%), UN Funds and Programmes (9%), the African and Asian Development Banks (5% and 3%), and the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (7%). Only 19% of total multilateral aid is allocated to the remaining 212 multilateral organisations, funds or trust funds, many of which have a research or policy function or serve a norms-based or standard-setting purpose. Table A.2 in Annex A shows the percentages contributed by each DAC member to these groups of organisations over the five-year period.

26. The large number of recent bilateral and joint reviews of multilateral organisations that co-exist alongside more comprehensive evaluations of multilateral organisations alludes to the fact that funders of the multilateral system are in search of suitable methods to compare the effectiveness or efficiency of multilateral organisations to influence their multilateral spending decisions. At the same time they realise that a direct comparison is particularly difficult for those norms-based or standard-setting agencies that do

not implement country programmes, or for which results are less easily measured. The next chapter provides more detail on recent reviews of multilateral agencies.

## Non-DAC Multilateral Aid

27. Twenty one countries that are not members of the DAC reported their 2010 aid flows to the DAC. The eleven non-DAC EU members allocated 69% of their total ODA to multilaterals (25% excluding multilateral ODA to EU institutions), while the average multilateral share of non-DAC donor states was 22%. In 2010 Saudi Arabia reported 17% (USD 609 million) of its total aid as multilateral, and the UAE reported 7% (USD 32 million). The Russian Federation is the latest country to report its aid to the DAC, and it provided 36% (USD 170 million) of its total aid to multilateral organisations. Table 1 below provides the total DAC and multilateral share of non-DAC donors that report to the OECD.

**Table 3. Non-DAC gross ODA disbursements, 2010**

(excluding debt relief)

| Non-DAC Donor | Total ODA, excl. debt relief (in USD m) | Multilateral ODA (in USD m) | Multilateral as share of gross ODA (%) | Multilateral as share of gross ODA, excluding contributions to EU institutions (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cyprus* | 51 | 21 | 41 | 19 |
| Czech Republic | 228 | 148 | 65 | 32 |
| Estonia | 19 | 14 | 74 | 36 |
| Hungary | 114 | 86 | 75 | 40 |
| Latvia | 16 | 14 | 90 | 90 |
| Lithuania | 37 | 20 | 55 | 5 |
| Malta | 14 | 5 | 39 | 39 |
| Poland | 384 | 282 | 73 | 11 |
| Romania | 114 | 88 | 77 | 11 |
| Slovak Republic | 74 | 54 | 73 | 16 |
| Slovenia | 59 | 36 | 62 | 26 |
| **EU 11 total** | **1,108** | **768** | **69** | **25** |
| Chinese Taipei | 381 | 55 | 14 | |
| Iceland | 29 | 8 | 28 | |
| Israel** | 145 | 17 | 12 | |
| Liechtenstein | 27 | 5 | 18 | |
| Russia | 472 | 170 | 36 | |
| Thailand | 45 | 14 | 31 | |
| Turkey | 967 | 47 | 5 | |
| **Non-DAC (excl. Kuwait, Saudi, UAE** | **4,378** | **1,357** | **31** | |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | 617 | - | - | |
| Saudi Arabia | 3,494 | 609 | 17 | |
| UAE | 571 | 32 | 6 | |
| **Total** | **9,060** | **1,999** | **22** | |

*Footnote by the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Commission: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
Footnote by Turkey: The information in this document under the heading "Cyprus" relates to the southern part of the island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus" issue.
**The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

*Source:* OECD, 2012b.

28. Neither Brazil, India, South Africa nor China reported their development assistance to the DAC in 2010. The *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* highlighted Brazil's use of multilateral agencies to

provide aid to neighbouring countries and circumvent laws against providing bilateral aid. In contrast, India and China have large bilateral programmes, and it is very likely that the share of aid they channel through multilateral organisations would be well below the DAC average (28%). Any increase in the multilateral contributions of emerging donors is inextricably linked to governance and voice reform, at least for the international financial institutions. In the absence of data from some of the emerging donors, it is difficult to ascertain whether the strong political support that they provide to the United Nations translates into important financial commitments. Box 2 below provides an overview of multilateral organisations' receipts from China in 2010.

**Box 2. Chinese contributions to international organisations in 2010**

(disbursements in constant 2010 prices)

| Organisation | Core funding (USD million) |
|---|---|
| AsDB | 277.4 |
| ADF | 6.4 |
| AfDF | 34.2 |
| FAO | 13.2 |
| IDA | 4.7 |
| WHO* | 12.4 |
| UNDP | 3.6 |
| WFP | 3.1 |
| Global Fund | 2.0 |
| UNICEF | 1.2 |
| UN-PBF | 1.0 |
| UNRWA | 0.1 |

* *Note:* Assessed WHO contributions have an ODA coefficient of 76%.

*Source*: AfDB (2010, 2011), ADB (2010, 2011a, 2011b), FAO (2012), Global Fund (2011), IFAD (2011), IDA (2011), PRC (2011), UNDP (2011, 2012), WFP (2012a, 2012b), WHO (2011)

China has extended aid outside its borders since 1950 in the form of grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) manages outgoing bilateral aid and contributions to major United Nations institutions (UNDP, UNICEF, etc.), the Ministry of Finance co-ordinates China's multilateral contributions to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and the People's Bank of China oversees contributions to the regional development banks (except AsDB). In April 2011, China issued its first white paper on aid, entitled "China's Foreign Aid". According to the white paper, by the end of 2009 China had provided aid to 161 countries and to more than 30 international and regional organisations. The white paper describes China's foreign aid as "South-South cooperation" and "mutual help between developing countries."

The amounts in the table are based on information published in the main multilateral agencies' financial statements and annual reports for 2010. China contributes predominantly core resources to the multilateral system. After becoming a donor to IDA15 in 2007, it pledged USD 160.8 million to its 16th replenishment round in 2010. It also provided USD 22 million to IFAD's 8th replenishment in 2009. China also contributes some non-core, or earmarked, funding to multilateral agencies. As a new donor to FAO in 2009, it released USD 10 million for the China Trust Fund for South-South Co-operation for three successive years. This fund is used to provide developing countries - predominantly in Africa - with technical assistance, training, agricultural inputs and small equipment from China. Further non-core funding went to UNDP (USD 3.7 million), the Food and Agriculture Organisation's (FAO) multi-donor trust funds (USD 200,000), the Asian Development Bank's Technical Assistance Special Fund (USD 1.6m), the World Food Programme's (WFP) assistance to Haiti and Niger (USD 1 million) and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC - USD 565,838).

1 . At the time of publication of this report, only aggregate DAC data are available for 2011 (including multilateral aid); disaggregated data (which include non-core contributions) will be available in early 2013.

2 . Disregarding years of exceptional debt relief.

3. Country Programmable Aid (CPA) is a sub-set of aid that measures actual transfers to partner countries. CPA is critical for delivering international aid commitments in support of the MDGs, but also represents the proportion of aid that is subject to country allocation decisions by the donor. For more information on CPA see Annex B or www.oecd.org/dac/cpa.

4. Based on outturns from 24 different multilateral agencies.

5. An annex to the Statistical Directives clarifying the *sui generis* nature of the EU in relation to DAC statistics is currently under discussion in the DAC.

6. Of the nine providing estimates through 2015, four predicted a real decrease of 11% and five predicted a real increase of 16%.

7. United Nations (2012), "Analysis of funding of operational activities for development of the United Nations system for the year 2010."

## CHAPTER 2. FRAGMENTATION OF EFFORTS

29. As the previous chapter has argued, the role of the multilateral system is considerably more important than the volume of multilateral ODA alone would suggest. Multi-bi (or, non-core) funding for multilateral organisations plays an increasingly significant role. In response to the commitment made by partners in paragraph 25(b) of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation to *"…make effective use of existing multilateral channels"*[1], it is useful to examine how fragmented aid implemented by multilateral organisations is at the country level, and what role non-core aid plays in that regard. This chapter highlights the impact of non-core multilateral aid on fragmentation. It also reviews fragmentation in partner countries by region and income group.

30. The analysis of concentration and fragmentation developed in this chapter is purely quantitative; it only considers the financial relationship between the 24 DAC donors, 26 multilateral agencies (shown in Table 2) and partner countries, and does not take into consideration the political or qualitative aspects of these relations. This report fully recognises that examining the volume of ODA is not a sufficient basis for determining an aid relation significant; however, this quantitative analysis is a necessary component of any comprehensive desk study and is based on the only comparable evidence available to examine relations between donor and ODA-eligible countries at the global level.

### Fragmentation of Multilateral and Bilateral Outflows

31. This section analyses the fragmentation of multilateral and bilateral outflows in partner countries; it reviews fragmentation in partner countries by region and income group.

**Box 3. Measuring Fragmentation and Concentration of Aid**

The analysis is based on country programmable aid (CPA) plus humanitarian aid and developmental food aid. It reflects outflows of both multilateral and bilateral agencies to partner countries (hereafter this expanded concept is referred to as CPA+). In the case of the multilateral agencies, CPA+ represents the outflows on their core-funded expenditures on operational activities.

Highlighting patterns of aid fragmentation and concentration requires close examination of how multilateral and bilateral agencies operate and the financial weight they carry at the country level. A "significant" aid relation is determined by either of two ways: (1) comparing the volume of aid to the partner country to that of other donors in the same partner country; and/or (2) comparing the donor's share of aid to the partner country relative to the same donor's overall share of global aid.

A donor's concentration ratio is determined by the number of "significant" as opposed to "non-significant" aid relations it maintains.


For more information on the methodology, please see the 2011 OECD Report on Division of Labour, available at: www.oecd.org/dac/aidarchitecture.

*Note:* See Annex B, for the same analysis based on country programmable aid (CPA) alone.

32. Annex D illustrates fragmentation of CPA+ for bilateral and multilateral donors on the basis of the measures described in Box 3 above. The matrices highlight donors' significant aid relations in partner countries, and show that two out every five donor-partner country relations are not financially significant. As described in *2011 OECD-DAC Report on Division of Labour*, fragmentation stems mostly from bilateral sources; however, multilateral agencies together represent over one-third of the resource outflows at the global level and are also beginning to contribute to the global fragmentation picture.

33. In many countries, development co-operation could be more efficient if there were more significant aid relations and fewer non-significant aid relations. In this report, whether a donor is significant or non-significant in a particular country depends on the financial significance of other donors present in that same country. In addition, a significant or non-significant aid relation is measured by a donor's global share of aid relative to that of other donors. For this reason, Figure 6 illustrates the total number of non-significant aid relations for *all* donors across countries. Countries shaded dark blue represent the highest potential for efficiency gains since they have a high number of non-significant bilateral and multilateral aid relations. These are countries mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Central and Far East Asia. The average concentration ratio in these countries is 43%, meaning that more than half of the aid relations in these countries are non-significant from a financial perspective.

**Figure 6. Opportunities for concentration (2010)**




34. Multilateral donors appear more concentrated on average than DAC member countries on the basis of core multilateral outflows. The multilateral concentration ratio is 65% compared to 54% for DAC countries (Table 4), even though there are wide variations within these groups. The concentration ratio depends on the number of partner countries where donors are present, which is often a function of their mandates.

35. Many agencies have a regional mandate, which limits their aid allocations to a specific region, and results in a high concentration of finance in a limited set of partner countries. This is the case for the concessional finance of regional development banks (concentration ratio of 90%) and UNRWA (100%), an organisation with a very narrow geographic scope. On the other hand, most UN Funds and Programmes have a lower average concentration ratio (54%) due to their global mandates. Thus, when comparing concentration ratios across organisations, it is important to take account of the mandate of an organisation.

36. Geographically speaking, multilateral outflows likely contribute to an increased number of non-significant aid relations (increased fragmentation) in some countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. In these regions, the average multilateral concentration ratio is 45%, well below multilateral agencies' average concentration ratio of 65%, and the most fragmented agencies are UN Funds and Programmes.

37. Following the trend in fragmentation and concentration over the past 10 years, it is obvious that the increased number of aid relations has led to increased fragmentation (Figure 7). The number of non-significant aid relations in LICs and fragile and conflict-affected states has increased by 50% since 2000. In contrast, the number of significant relations has increased by 14%, resulting in a six percentage point decrease in the concentration ratio for these countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, each country had on average four more aid relations in 2010 than in 2000, and 60% of these new aid relations were non-significant.

**Table 4. Concentration of multilateral agencies (core resources)**

| | CPA+* (USD 2010 million) | Share of Global CPA+* (in %) | No. of relations | No. of significant relations | Concentration ratio (in %) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arab Agencies** | 1 820 | 1.9 | 99 | 38 | 38 |
| EU institutions*** | 9 875 | 10.3 | 149 | 128 | 86 |
| GAVI | 590 | 0.6 | 67 | 32 | 48 |
| GEF | 359 | 0.4 | 87 | 53 | 61 |
| Global Fund | 2 997 | 3.1 | 113 | 73 | 65 |
| IDA | 10 074 | 10.5 | 78 | 70 | 90 |
| IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) | 1 346 | 1.4 | 37 | 29 | 78 |
| Montreal Protocol | 21 | 0.02 | 10 | 7 | 70 |
| Nordic Dev. Fund | 52 | 0.1 | 18 | 17 | 94 |
| Regional Development Bank Funds: | 4 174 | 4.3 | 104 | 94 | 90 |
| *AfDF* | *1 515* | *1.6* | *38* | *31* | *82* |
| *AsDF* | *1 927* | *2.0* | *27* | *25* | *93* |
| *CarDB* | *69* | *0.1* | *14* | *14* | *100* |
| *IaDB* | *662* | *0.7* | *25* | *24* | *96* |
| UN Funds and Programmes: | 2 438 | 2.5 | 534 | 288 | 54 |
| *UNDP* | *515* | *0.5* | *136* | *75* | *55* |
| *UNFPA* | *282* | *0.3* | *117* | *75* | *64* |
| *UNHCR* | *187* | *0.2* | *86* | *43* | *50* |
| *UNICEF* | *768* | *0.8* | *120* | *51* | *43* |
| *UNRWA* | *452* | *0.5* | *4* | *4* | *100* |
| *WFP* | *235* | *0.2* | *71* | *40* | *56* |
| Other UN: | 615 | 0.6 | 298 | 201 | 67 |
| *IAEA* | *51* | *0.05* | *98* | *67* | *68* |
| *IFAD* | *462* | *0.48* | *79* | *53* | *67* |
| *UNAIDS* | *51* | *0.05* | *103* | *65* | *63* |
| *UN Peacebuilding Fund* | *51* | *0.05* | *18* | *16* | *89* |
| **Total multilaterals** | **34 360** | **35.7** | **1 594** | **1 030** | **65** |
| *Total multilaterals excl. EU* | **24 485** | **25.5** | **1 445** | **902** | **62** |
| **Total DAC countries** | **61 764** | **64.3** | **1 719** | **933** | **54** |
| *Total DAC members incl. EU* | **71 639** | **74.5** | **1 868** | **1 061** | **57** |

* Note that this analysis also includes humanitarian and food aid, but excludes regional allocations from CPA.

** Arab Agencies are BADEA, Isl. Dev Bank, OFID and Arab Fund (AFESD).

*** The EU is a member of the DAC and has its own development policy. It is presented in this report as a multilateral agency since contributions to the EU are considered multilateral ODA.

*Source:* OECD, 2012c.

**Figure 7. Trend in concentration (2000-2010)**

Figure 7.a Number of aid relations






Figure 7.b Global concentration




*Source: OECD, 2012c.*

## Re-attributing Non-core Funding to Multilaterals

38. Bilateral ODA earmarked for a specific region, country, theme or sector and channelled through multilateral agencies is usually attributed to bilateral donors when assessing fragmentation. In this way, bilateral donors appear to deliver a more significant share of aid than is likely to be true since many of these resources are in fact not implemented by DAC members alone. By redistributing the earmarked funding to the multilateral agencies through which funding is channelled, a more realistic picture of fragmentation and its sources becomes apparent. Box 4 captures the two scenarios through which fragmentation can be observed at the country-level.

**Box 4 . Two scenarios for classifying non-core funding**

This analysis looks at the impact of multilateral and non-core multilateral CPA+ on country-level fragmentation. By definition the latter is earmarked for a country, region, theme or sector and channelled through a multilateral agency.

In the base case scenario as presented in the previous section, we examined the fragmentation picture where non-core resources were counted with bilateral donors given that these flows are bilateral ODA.

In this section, non-core resources are re-attributed from the bilateral donor to the multilateral agency generally responsible for its implementation and through which the aid is channelled in order to reflect the actual implementer at country-level. It is worth keeping in mind that some of these agencies may further pass along the resources to local NGOs or other implementing entities not captured in these statistics.

As with all desk-study analyses, these results should be verified at the country-level.

*Note:* See Annex B, for the same analysis re-attributing flows to the multilateral agency based on country programmable aid (CPA) alone.

39. Figure 8 illustrates the impact of non-core funding on the number of aid relations once it is attributed to the implementing multilateral agencies. Non-core funding increases the volume of their presence in countries where they are already present. Nonetheless, overall, multilateral agencies become less concentrated (or more fragmented) when their non-core funding is taken into account. Figure 8.a illustrates the number of aid relations. Multilateral aid relations increase by 4% to be on par with the number of bilateral aid relations, which decreased by 3%. Figure 8.b illustrates the concentration of these relations.

**Figure 8. Impact of re-classification (2007-2010)**

Figure 8.a: Number of aid relations






Figure 8.b: Concentration ratio




*Source: OECD, 2012c.*

40. As Table 3 illustrates, the multilateral concentration ratio decreases from 65% to 58%, and the bilateral concentration ratio decreases from 54% to 53% when non-core multilateral aid is reattributed to multilateral agencies. Over time, the concentration ratio has decreased across all partner country income groupings, but it is in particular dragged down by the increased fragmentation in LICs. One reason why re-attributing non-core or multi-bi funding reduces multilateral donors' overall concentration ratio is that this increases their global share of aid and at the same time increases the threshold of resources required to attain significance on the basis of the donor's relative concentration at country level. Despite higher volumes, compared to the base case scenario multilateral agencies (and bilateral donors) fall short of the level of resources required to count among the top donors that together provide 90% of all aid to partner countries. Thus, their concentration ratio drops.

**Table 5. Impact of non-core on fragmentation**

| | No. of relations | No. of additional relations due to earmarked funding | Donor's share of Global CPA+* | Concentration ratio (in %) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arab Agencies** | 99 | 0 | 1.9% | 37 | ↓ |
| EU institutions*** | 149 | 0 | 10.4% | 86 | → |
| GAVI | 67 | 0 | 0.6% | 48 | → |
| GEF | 87 | 0 | 0.4% | 61 | → |
| Global Fund | 113 | 0 | 3.1% | 65 | → |
| IDA | 96 | 18 | 12.0% | 79 | ↓ |
| IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) | 48 | 11 | 1.4% | 60 | ↓ |
| Montreal Protocol | 10 | 0 | 0.0% | 70 | → |
| Nordic Dev. Fund | 18 | 0 | 0.1% | 94 | → |
| Regional Development Bank Funds: | 112 | 8 | 4.5% | 86 | ↓ |
| *AfDF* | *40* | *2* | *1.6%* | *80* | ↓ |
| *AsDF* | *33* | *6* | *2.1%* | *79* | ↓ |
| *CarDB* | *14* | *0* | *0.1%* | *100* | → |
| *IaDB* | *25* | *0* | *0.7%* | *96* | → |
| UN Funds and Programmes: | 558 | 24 | 8.2% | 39 | ↓ |
| *UNDP* | *144* | *8* | *2.0%* | *26* | ↓ |
| *UNFPA* | *119* | *2* | *0.4%* | *60* | ↓ |
| *UNHCR* | *94* | *8* | *0.7%* | *38* | ↓ |
| *UNICEF* | *123* | *3* | *1.8%* | *33* | ↓ |
| *UNRWA* | *4* | *0* | *0.6%* | *100* | → |
| *WFP* | *74* | *3* | *2.7%* | *42* | ↓ |
| Other UN: | 300 | 2 | 0.7% | 67 | ↓ |
| *IAEA* | *98* | *0* | *0.1%* | *68* | → |
| *IFAD* | *79* | *0* | *0.5%* | *66* | ↓ |
| *UNAIDS* | *105* | *2* | *0.1%* | *62* | ↓ |
| *UN Peacebuilding Fund* | *18* | *0* | *0.1%* | *89* | → |
| **Total multilaterals** | **1 657** | **63** | **43.2%** | **58** | ↓ |
| *Total multilaterals excl. EU* | **1 508** | **63** | **32.9%** | **56** | ↓ |
| **Total DAC countries** | **1 670** | **- 49** | **56.8%** | **53** | ↓ |
| *Total DAC members incl. EU* | **1 819** | **- 49** | **67.1%** | **56** | ↓ |

* Note that this analysis also includes humanitarian and food aid, but excludes regional allocations from CPA.
** Arab Agencies are BADEA, Isl. Dev Bank, OFID and Arab Fund (AFESD).
*** The EU is a member of the DAC and has its own development policy. It is presented in this report as a multilateral agency since contributions to the EU are considered multilateral ODA.

*Source: OECD, 2012c.*

41. Interestingly, the average DAC countries' concentration ratio also decreased slightly to 53% after non-core aid was attributed to multilateral agencies. This is primarily due to the fact that bilateral donors provide some aid in many partner countries to which they also provide multi-bi aid channelled through multilateral agencies. Re-attributing this aid from bilateral to multilateral donors thus means that the bilateral donor is likely to be displaced from the top 90% of donors because of the larger flows emanating from multilateral and non-core funding.

42. To test whether humanitarian aid – typically provided in response to humanitarian crises – is behind the increased fragmentation that occurs when non-core multilateral aid is reattributed from bilateral to multilateral donors, this analysis was replicated without humanitarian aid. The findings confirm that multilateral agencies are more fragmented when non-core contributions are taken into account, even when humanitarian non-core aid is not included. Without humanitarian aid, the multilateral concentration ratio decreases from 66% to 61% after reattribution (rather than 65% to 58%), and the bilateral concentration ratio stays the same (54%). The impact on individual agencies is detailed in Annex B.

**More Fragmentation – for Good Reason?**

43. Thus, the fragmentation of bilateral and multilateral aid increases when multi-bi aid is attributed to the multilateral implementer. Even in comparison to a theoretical baseline scenario where bilateral and multilateral disbursements are examined without the inclusion of multi-bi aid in either category, fragmentation increases. If both bilateral and multilateral donors are relatively worse off when non-core funding is taken into consideration, how can one make sense of the benefits of multi-bi aid? It is important to keep in mind that this measure of fragmentation, as with most quantitative desk studies, does not capture other important aspects, such as the motivation behind the funding or whether this form of fragmentation is the cause of real coordination problems on the ground. Further work led by a few DAC members could examine fragmentation directly at the country level.

44. Previous reports[2] have examined the advantages and disadvantages of providing non-core multilateral aid, which are manifold and context-specific. In reality providing non-core aid has many positive effects. In 57% of the multilateral aid relations that evolved from (financially) "significant" to "non-significant" after the reattribution, resources actually increased, but not enough to meet the new (higher) benchmarks or to be among the top 90% of donors in a given country. There are also some cases where multi-bi funding made existing aid relations between a multilateral and a partner country "significant" where they previously were not. This is the case for 33 aid relations (*e.g.* UNDP, UNICEF and WFP in Afghanistan; UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP in Haiti; IDA in Timor-Leste; the Global Fund in Honduras and Mongolia: IFAD in Mali), of which 21 are in fragile or conflict-affected states. Assuming that managing aid from different sources within one multilateral agency does not add to transaction costs, the analysis demonstrates that multi-bi aid fortifies a multilateral agency's existing presence.

45. Re-classifying non-core funding to multilateral organisations creates 50 new, but "non-significant", multilateral aid relations. Many of these relations are in countries that otherwise receive non-concessional or blend financing from the multilateral development banks and where non-core disbursements can have an important leveraging effect (South Africa, China). Other countries are in arrears and thus illegible for other concessional financing from "core" resources (Zimbabwe) or are unable to receive "core" resources due to their non-sovereign status (West Bank and Gaza). Geographically isolated regions like the Pacific Island States (Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Vanuatu) would have extremely limited sources of external assistance without earmarked assistance channelled through multilateral organisations. Finally, many of these aid relations also consist of specific targeted technical assistance programmes that typically operate on the basis of earmarked funding.

46. In conclusion, this analysis finds that multi-bi aid, or bilateral ODA channelled through multilateral agencies contributes to fragmentation, whether one includes humanitarian aid or not. In many cases, it may render the delivery of resources more complex on the ground. In others, highlighted above, non-core resources are an important lifeline. Similarly, increasing disbursements where aid relations are "non-significant" may neither be relevant, desirable nor possible. It is therefore not possible to make a generalised judgement on the value of non-core funding from data alone. What is clear is that the motivation and rationale in providing both multilateral ODA and multi-bi funding should be given close consideration. Further work on the ground could be explored to bolster the analysis, including in future editions of this report. Issues that could be explored include the following:

- deepening the analysis of fragmentation of different multilateral agencies (see Table 2);
- analysing the effect of non-core funding on institutional dynamics of multilateral organisations, including their corporate strategies and transaction costs;
- exploring the effects of institutional fragmentation in partner countries; and the conditions under which fragmentation represents a problem to different categories of partner countries.

47. UN Delivering as One and EU joint programming are some of the initiatives tailored to reduce the adverse impact of a greater number of channels at country level to reduce the load on partner country governments. Chapter 4 considers these initiatives and concludes with suggestions on emerging principles to reduce proliferation.

---

1 . Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011), Paragraph 25(b).

2. See for example the OECD's *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid.*

## CHAPTER 3. ASSESSMENTS OF MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS

48. A number of major bilateral and joint assessments of multilateral organisations have taken place in the past year: Australia's Multilateral Assessment (2012); Denmark's Analysis of its Engagement in Multilateral Organisations (2012); Sweden's Organisational Assessments (2011); Dutch Scorecards of Multilateral Organisations (2011); the United Kingdom's Multilateral Aid Review (2011); and finally assessments by the annual Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN). Some of these reviews are more comprehensive than others and/or serve different purposes, as will be discussed below. The different efforts described below are in addition to the regular evaluations undertaken by the evaluation groups and departments of multilateral organisations themselves.

49. While the methodology of the different assessments varies, the three areas generally assessed are organisational effectiveness, development results and the fit or relevance of the organisation relative to the donor's preferences (the latter was represented in the *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* by the principal-agent model). This chapter reports on DAC members' approaches and comprehensive reviews in assessing the multilateral development system and suggests points of methodological convergence, featuring a special section on the Australian Multilateral Assessment completed earlier in 2012. The discussion also addresses the use of results from assessments in policy making more generally, and offers recommendations going forward.

### Overview of Types of Reviews

50. The assessments of multilateral organisations discussed in this chapter are not necessarily formal evaluations undertaken by the Evaluation departments of the different aid agencies or ministries.[1] Instead, these assessments of multilateral organisations have tended to involve officials from across a wide range of departments within bilateral governments. If most of these assessments cannot claim to be rigorous evaluations on the performance of multilateral organisations, they do nonetheless provide a diversified base of facts, perceptions and experience that aim to guide donors' decisions to invest in the multilateral system. These assessments were based on already existing information, interviews with stakeholders, document reviews and focus groups, and both new and existing analytical tools. As such, they provide a body of evidence upon which government policies can draw.

51. The bilateral and joint assessments of multilateral organisations undertaken in the past year can be classified into three categories:

- Comprehensive assessments of a few or all major multilateral agencies based in part on own methodology (Australia, MOPAN, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom)
- Regular annual update of information sheets (Norway), and
- Analysis of multilateral engagement (Denmark)

52. Comprehensive assessments are the primary focus of this chapter, but Norway and Denmark are examples of initiatives many DAC donors undertake on a regular basis to assess their engagement with the multilateral organisations they fund. **Norway**'s regularly-updated information sheets on specific multilateral agencies are based on information from embassy officials in partner countries and in

multilateral headquarters and from existing documentation published by multilateral agencies and other actors. The information sheets highlight each organisation's history, mandate, financial information (including Norway's contributions), results achieved in the past year, and the organisational effectiveness and financial accountability of the organisation.

53. **Denmark**'s strategy for engagement with multilateral organisations aims to reinforce the multilateral system and ensure that multilateral assistance is provided primarily as core or un-earmarked contributions where organisations' core mandates align well with Danish development policy priorities. These priorities include ensuring a coordinated and coherent multilateral system to: address the challenge of conflict-affected and fragile states; provide a holistic approach to security, humanitarian needs and development; and transition to a green economy including through the formulation of the sustainable development goals. Its engagement strategy encourages continued monitoring of organisations' contributions towards achieving development results.

54. A few DAC members stated that they were currently reviewing their multilateral aid, or developing strategies(**France, Germany, Spain**), and some explicitly stated that they were using existing reviews, notably MOPAN, to inform their decision-making (**Switzerland, Ireland**), and therefore did not find it necessary to undertake an assessment of their own. **Canada** conducted a comprehensive review of different multilateral organisations to which it contributes, and **Japan** published a report that aims to improve its assessment of multilateral effectiveness (both for internal use only). The next section addresses the more comprehensive assessments of multilateral organisations.

**Comprehensive Assessments of Multilateral Organisations**

55. This section analyses the commonalities among the existing comprehensive assessments. Four members that completed comprehensive assessments of a few or all major multilateral agencies to which they contribute based it in part on their own methodology – Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.[2] In addition, the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) assessed five multilateral agencies in 2011 (IaDB, FAO, UNEP, UNHCR, and UNRWA), and is assessing six in 2012 (World Bank, AfDB, UNDP, UNICEF, UNAIDS, and GAVI), using the Common Approach methodology developed in 2009. Upon close examination, there is considerable overlap among the Australian, Dutch, Swedish, British and MOPAN assessments. Table 4 below is organised by the different criteria and benchmarks against which multilateral agencies were assessed in each review. The assessments all have a core set of common criteria even if their priorities relative to the multilateral system are not identical.

**Table 6. Elements of different multilateral assessments**

| | | Australia | Netherlands | Sweden | United Kingdom | MOPAN |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Macro-level | Effective leadership | x | | x | x | |
| | Governing body effective in guiding management | x | x | | x | |
| | Innovative approaches | x | | | | |
| | Likelihood of change | | | x | x | |
| | Lesson learning | x | | | | x |
| | **Managing for results** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** |
| | **Strategic management** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** |
| | Transparency and accountability | x | | x | x | |
| Operational | Corruption | | x | x | | |
| | Cost / value consciousness | x | | | x | |
| | Delegated decision-making | | | | | x |
| | **Effective HR** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** |
| | **Evaluation function for delivery and external results** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** |
| | Evidence-based programming | | | | | x |
| | **Financial accountability** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** |
| | Transparent information sharing | | | x | | x |
| | **Operates within mandate, international commitments** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** |
| | Organisational performance | | | x | | x |
| | Promotes transparency in partners | x | | | | |
| Country-level | Align and contribute to national country priorities / systems | x | | x | | x |
| | **Partnership behaviour** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** | **x** |
| | Participatory approach with partners, marginalised groups | x | | | x | |
| | Progress towards results | | | | x | x |
| | Relevant to major stakeholders | | | | | x |
| | Results at country level | | x | x | x | x |
| | Transparency, predictability of allocations | x | | | x | x |
| Relevance to donors' national aid objectives | Environment / Climate Change / Sustainability | x | x | x | x | |
| | Economic growth | | | x | x | |
| | Fills a policy gap | x | | | | |
| | Fragility | x | | x | x | |
| | Gender | x | x | x | x | |
| | Good governance | | x | x | x | |
| | Focus on poor countries | | | | x | |
| | Food security | | x | | | |
| | Human rights | | | x | | |
| | Humanitarian | | | x | x | |
| | MDGs | x | | | x | x |
| | People with disabilities | x | | | | |
| | Poverty reduction | x | | x | | |
| | Security / legal | | x | | x | |
| | Social development | | | x | | |
| | Sexual and reproductive health | | x | | | |
| | Water | | x | | | |

### *Points of convergence*

56. First among the common criteria is the strategic management of an organisation and its capacity to "manage for results" – that is incorporating results-based management to plan, manage, and develop programmes that deliver the best results. The MDGs and poverty reduction objective serve as benchmarks of success for almost all of the assessments. All assessments consider the fit-for-purpose of human resource policies for optimal organisational and operational effectiveness. Measuring the impact of an organisation through an evaluation function, assessing an organisation's financial accountability and how closely it operates within its mandate and in line with international commitments also form part of what is common to all assessments. Finally, all assessments assess the partnership behaviour of multilateral agencies. This refers to its contribution to policy dialogue with the various partners, its ability to coordinate and harmonise approaches with other programming partners, as well as its contribution to the wider international aid architecture.

57. A majority of the assessments also examined organisations' leadership; the effectiveness of its governing body; how easily it aligns to and contributes towards countries' priorities and systems; results achieved at the country-level; the transparency and predictability of allocations; and its relevance for achieving the MDGs. Some criteria in the table refer specifically to donors' own national aid objectives, which include a wide range of thematic and geographic preferences.

58. The convergence in all five assessments is significant, especially when one discounts those elements that are unique to each donor's national aid objectives. Of course, joint evaluations tend to look at a larger number of components and cross-cutting themes, partners and modalities in order to appeal to different donors' priorities, which can also increase the methodological challenges. Joint evaluations may be associated with high transaction costs for donors, but if the alternative is a large number of single-donor evaluations for multilateral organisations and partner countries, this argument is less significant.[3] Thus, there appears to be significant motivation to undertake joint work on such assessments in the future; indeed such is the rationale for joint assessments, including MOPAN. The Dutch, Swedish, Australian and MOPAN assessments are explored in further detail.

59. Despite significant convergence, some of the challenges of comprehensive assessments lie in determining the effectiveness of organisations with normative mandates (e.g. human rights, health, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, etc.) for which there is to-date no suitable measure of their performance "on the ground" where most of these assessments are concentrated. Another challenge is the question of how to address the "path dependence" whereby an organisation whose mandate may still be relevant suffers the effects of past political decisions leading to inefficiencies that are difficult to reverse.[4] Adopting an analytical framework may go some way in adapting the analytical tools to address these and other challenges that arise from assessing development results as such.

***The Netherlands' scorecards***

60. The Dutch scorecards assessing multilateral organisations start from the premise that multilateral aid is a government priority in order to complement its bilateral cooperation, but efforts need to be justified and better co-ordinated. The assessment looked at the *organisational effectiveness* of organisations (co-operation with other stakeholders, lesson-learning and evaluation function, transparency, fight against corruption, internal financial control, focus on the mandate and its implementation). The other component of the assessment was how well an organisation's mandate reflected the geographic and thematic priorities of the Netherlands (food security, water, security and rule of law, sexual and reproductive health and rights, gender, good governance, sustainability, international development architecture). Based on reports from embassy officials, organisations themselves, and MOPAN, multilateral organisations are assessed against the criteria above as well as on the likelihood of change.

61. As a consequence of the assessment, IDA, UNDP and UNICEF will remain the pillars of the multilateral system for the Netherlands. Other agencies are considered critical in delivering the objectives and priorities of the Netherlands and will remain an important channel: IFAD, IFC, GAVI, the Global Fund, UNHCR, OCHA and WFP. Equally, UNFPA and UNAIDS, due to their important mandates will still be important channels for Dutch aid even if progress in their performance is still possible. In contrast, contributions to UNIDO, UN-HABITAT, and IaDB will be carefully monitored, and may decrease.

***Sweden's organisational assessments***

62. Sweden assessed four organisations in 2011 (GAVI, IFAD, OCHA, and UNICEF) against three broad criteria on the basis of a series of questions. The first criteria is an organisation's relevance, which was assessed against eight priority themes: human rights, democracy and good governance, gender equality, sustainable use of natural resources and concern for the environment, economic growth, social development and security, conflict management, and humanitarian operations. In this regard, all four organisations assessed in 2011 were found to be highly relevant.

63. The second criteria focused on internal effectiveness examined on the basis of organisational structural factors, results-based management and evaluation and transparency, auditing and procurement. The third criteria assessed the external effectiveness through aid effectiveness principles and actual results based on internal documents, external evaluations and the impressions of Sweden's representatives in the field.


- UNICEF was considered to have high internal and external effectiveness.
- OCHA was considered to have good internal effectiveness and high external effectiveness.
- GAVI was considered to have very high internal and external effectiveness.
- IFAD was considered to have good internal and external effectiveness.

64. Finally, the third criteria assessed the likelihood of change in the overall direction of the multilateral organisation. This refers to whether the organisation has changed for the better or the worse over the past three years. Box 5 profiles Australia's Multilateral Assessment.

**Box 5. The Australian Multilateral Assessment**

Australia published the Australian Multilateral Assessment (AMA) on 30 March 2012 after agreeing a methodology in August 2011. The AMA was prompted by the independent review of Australia's aid programme commissioned in November 2010. The independent review recommended that Australia make greater use of the multilateral system, and that it indicate the rationale for the funding of different multilateral organisations.

**Findings**




The AMA found that 13 of the 42 organisations rate very strong or strong across at least six of the seven components; 16 very strong or strong across at least four of the components; 8 rated at least satisfactory on every component and 5 rated as weak on at least one component.

Broadly speaking and with some exceptions, ratings place most development banks and humanitarian organisations in the strong-to-very strong zone, most UN agencies and global funds in the satisfactory-to-strong zone,

and a few UN agencies in the weak zone.

The findings of the AMA will feed into the Australian Government's aid budget process, and will be one important element in informing funding decisions related to core funding. Other key factors include existing funding levels; the organisation's need for additional funding; sectoral, thematic or geographic priorities; and the prospects for reform. The findings of the AMA are also helping inform the development of a Multilateral Engagement Strategy for the Australian aid programme. This Strategy will highlight the rationale for Australia's work with multilateral organisations in the aid programme; and will detail several high-level priorities for engaging with multilateral organisations through to 2016.

**Methodology**

The AMA considered 42 multilateral organisations against an assessment framework that includes seven components.

*Results and relevance*

1. Delivering results on poverty and sustainable development in line with mandate.
2. Alignment with Australia's aid priorities and national interests.
3. Contribution to the wider multilateral development system.

*Organisational behaviour*

4. Strategic management and performance.
5. Cost and value consciousness.
6. Partnership behaviour.
7. Transparency and accountability.

The seven components were broken into 24 criteria. Ratings of "Very strong", "Strong", "Satisfactory", "Weak", or "Not Applicable" were given for each organisation.

**Lessons Learned**

The Government of Australia underscored the fact that the AMA was undertaken in the spirit of collaboration – sharing information with partners throughout the process rather than at the end of the assessment. In this way, Australia was at the same time able to strengthen its relationship with multilateral partners as it conducted this assessment, making the dialogue around the results of the AMA more constructive.

### *MOPAN's Key Performance Indicators*

65. The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), in existence since 2002, is one example of joint efforts to assess the effectiveness of multilateral organisations. MOPAN aims to generate relevant and credible information that helps its members meet domestic accountability requirements. It supports the dialogue between MOPAN Members, multilateral organisations and their direct clients and partners. Members undertake 4-6 joint assessments each year, share information and draw on each other's experience in monitoring and evaluation.

66. MOPAN adopted its current "Common Approach" methodology in 2009. The key performance indicators of the Common Approach can be separated into four broad categories: strategic management, operational management, relationship management, and knowledge management. In addition, starting in 2012, the Common Approach will include an assessment of progress towards results as identified in organisations' strategic plans, in country strategies and toward the MDGs. In addition, it includes an assessment of how multilateral organisation's objectives and programme of work are relevant to major stakeholders. Annex D outlines the MOPAN Common Approach Methodology in further detail.

67. The Common Approach is informed through responses to survey questions based on the key performance indicators. Respondents to the surveys are donors in headquarters, donors in partner countries, and direct partners or clients at the country-level (partner country government, civil society, etc.). In addition, a review of documents as well as interviews and consultations with multilateral organisations at headquarters and in partner countries complement the survey results.

***DAC Evaluation Network's Development Effectiveness Reviews***

68. The DAC EVALNET works with members of the Evaluation Cooperation Group and the United Nations Evaluation Group (which bring together the evaluation departments of multilateral development organisations) to strengthen *existing* evaluation systems, including through peer reviews of evaluation functions of UN organisations. In addition, a joint approach was developed by members of the DAC EVALNET, led by Canada to examine the development effectiveness of multilateral organisations. The reviews provide an independent and evidence-based assessment of the development effectiveness of humanitarian and development organisations. This approach was piloted with the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) and the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2010. At its June 2011 meeting, DAC EVALNET members endorsed the use of the methodology for further joint reviews. The revised approach formed the basis of the "Development Effectiveness Reviews" of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP). The Netherlands will lead a review of UNICEF in 2012. These reviews are coordinated with other assessment efforts, including MOPAN.

**Challenges of Multiple Assessments**

69. By nature, bilateral assessments are anchored in the priorities of a specific donor, so it is not unusual for different assessments of the same multilateral agency to prioritise different criteria and/or for similar criteria to yield different results. Of course, the political motivation for reviews and assessments should not be understated. Donors that have invested substantially in these reviews have done so partly to make the case for maintaining or increasing aid budgets in a time of tight fiscal constraints; this increased scrutiny on public spending would likely exist regardless of whether existing assessments had produced adequate and relevant results. Some donors have suggested that a regularly updated "menu" of indicators relating to organisations' multilateral effectiveness would enable donors to prioritise and weigh elements according to their own priorities.

70. Notwithstanding the understandable rationale for these separate assessments, divergent scores for the same multilateral agency may send mixed signals to agencies, especially those serious about reform. Two broad approaches appear to drive these various assessments: (1) the intrinsic value of the multilateral agency is measured by the direct return on investment, or the "value for money" approach; and (2) the organisation's value lies in its ability and capacity to deliver its mandate. While these approaches are not mutually exclusive, a donor leaning more towards the first approach may be more likely to adopt a strong position to increase or withhold funding on the basis of its government's domestic accountability relative to a given public investment, while a donor leaning more towards the second approach may advocate for a strengthening of the agency in question, perhaps relying more on collective reform efforts.

71. The approach, methodology, presentation of results and the conclusions drawn from these assessments depend to a large extent upon how the donor country views its engagement. As indicated in Table 4, the preferences introduced in the methodology are often defined by the donor's thematic or geographical priorities, and can greatly influence the conclusions drawn from these assessments. For example, the United Kingdom's methodology examined in the *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* uses the focus on poor countries as one of the major criteria to assess multilateral agencies, while Australia's methodology looks at multilaterals' presence in the Asia-Pacific region as a key criterion. Table 7 provides a pictorial representation of the results of the two most comprehensive reviews (Australia and the United Kingdom). This is based on the categorisation of the effectiveness of multilateral agencies as set out in each review.

**Table 7. Comparison of Australian Multilateral Assessment and UK Multilateral Aid Review by multilateral agency**

| Acronym | Multilateral Agency | Australian Multilateral Assessment (March 2012) | UK Multilateral Aid Review (April 2011) |
|---|---|---|---|
| AfDB | African Development Bank | ◕ | ◕ |
| AsDB | Asian Development Bank | ● | ● |
| CDB | Caribbean Development Bank | | ◔ |
| CERF | Central Emergency Relief Fund | | ◕ |
| CIFs | Climate Investment Funds | ● | ◕ |
| ComSec | Commonwealth Secretariat Development Programmes | ○ | ○ |
| CGIAR | Consultative Group on Intenrational Agricultural Research | ◔ | |
| | Extended Financing Window (MDG Fund) | | ◔ |
| EBRD | European Bank for Reconstruction and Development | | ◕ |
| ECHO | European Common Humanitarion Organisation | | ● |
| EC Budget | European Commission - Budget | | ◔ |
| EDF | European Development Fund | | ● |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation | ○ | ○ |
| GAVI | GAVI Alliance | ● | ● |
| GCDT | Global Crop Diversity Trust | ● | |
| GEF | Global Environment Facility | ● | ◕ |
| GFDRR | Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery | ◕ | ◕ |
| Global Fund | Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria | ◔ | ● |
| GPE | Global Partnership for Education (formerly FTI) | ● | ◕ |
| IaDB | Inter-American Development Bank | ◕ | ◔ |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross | ● | ● |
| IDA | International Development Agency | | ● |
| | International Federation of Red Cross / Red Crescent | | ◕ |
| IFC | International Finance Corporation | ● | ◕ |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development | ◕ | ◕ |
| ILO | International Labour Organisation | ◔ | ○ |
| IMF - TA | International Monetary Fund Technical Assistance Trust Funds | ◕ | |

| Acronym | Multilateral Agency | Australian Multilateral Assessment (March 2012) | UK Multilateral Aid Review (April 2011) |
|---|---|---|---|
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration | ◕ | ○ |
| UNAIDS | Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS | ◕ | ◔ |
| Adaptation Fund | Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund | ◔ | |
| Montreal Protocol | Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol | ● | |
| OHCHR | Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights | ◔ | ◔ |
| PIDG | Private Infrastructure Development Group | ● | ● |
| UNHCR | UN High Commissioner for Refugees | ● | ◕ |
| | UNITAID | | ◕ |
| UNCDF | United Nations Capital Development Fund | ◕ | |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund | ◕ | ● |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme | ◕ | ◕ |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation | ○ | ○ |
| UNEP | United Nations Environmental Programme | ◔ | ◔ |
| UNFCCC - LDC Fund | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - LDC Fund | ◕ | |
| UN-HABITAT | United Nations Human Settlements Programme | ○ | ○ |
| | United Nations Industrial Development Organisation | | ○ |
| UNISDRR | United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction Secretariat | ◔ | ○ |
| UNMAS | United Nations Mine Action Service | ○ | |
| UNOCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitary Affairs (comprising the CERF for Australia) | ◕ | ◕ |
| UNODC | United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime | ◔ | |
| Peacebuilding Fund | United Nations Peacebuilding Fund | ◕ | ◕ |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund | ◕ | ◔ |
| UNRWA | United Nations Relief and Works Agency | ◕ | |
| UN WOMEN (UNIFEM) | United Nations Women | | ○ |
| World Bank | World Bank | ● | |
| WFP | World Food Programme | ● | ◕ |
| WHO | World Health Organisation | ◕ | ◔ |

*Note:* Illustration is authors' own based on performance indicators from each review. A full moon or pie represents the maximum score for which an agency is eligible.

*Source:* DFID (2011), AusAID (2012).

## How can evidence from multiple assessments be used?

72. It is too early to tell whether there will be any discernible shift in aid allocation patterns to multilateral organisations arising from these different assessments. How research ultimately informs policy has been studied extensively by social researchers in the past decades, notably by Weiss[5]. Three models may help explain the different influences at play in decision-making: the problem solving model, the interactive model and the political model. These are described in more detail below.

73. The pretext to a ***problem-solving model*** is that policy-makers will look for information when faced with a decision. This information may be pre-existing or may require further research to fill the knowledge gap. The logical progression of the sequence is illustrated in Figure 9 below.

**Figure 9. The problem-solving model of research utilisation**




*Source*: Weiss, 1979.

74. In practice, this cycle leads to over-optimistic expectations because in practice its completion relies on the rare convergence of a number of factors and circumstances: a set of policy-makers with the authority to make policy decisions; clear, unambiguous research findings at an opportune time; and findings that do not contradict strong political interests. The application of this model to illustrate how decisions on multilateral aid allocations are made is not necessarily an ideal fit since in reality these allocation decisions, where they are discretionary[6], already take place regularly; the need for information is not new. There is, however, an enhanced need for assurances that money is well-spent arising from the budget constraints faced by the large investors in the multilateral system.

75. In this regard, less linear models of research utilisation where assessments, reviews and other research are just one element among others (experience, political insight, pressure, social technologies and judgment) may offer a more realistic model to the actual process of aid allocation decision-making within governments. Weiss refers to this as the ***interactive model*** of decision-making. The value and importance of bilateral assessments of multilateral organisations, for example, are best seen in this context – as one piece of the puzzle that guides decisions on contributions to multilateral agencies. Tracing a direct effect of evidence to decision-making from start to finish as the problem-solving model suggests is not realistic when diffuse decision points and politics enter into the equation.

76. The ***political model*** would also suggest that these assessments may also serve a role to support and/or debunk past levels of contributions to specific multilaterals. The few agencies that rated poorly in the Australian Multilateral Assessment and the United Kingdom's Multilateral Aid Review are generally not being singled out for the first time. Thus, even if the findings are not surprising for these agencies, making them "official" may spur serious reform that may not otherwise have been politically justified. Whatever the original motivation of these assessments or reviews, looking at areas of divergence and convergence may help prompt some collective, or at least complementary, action.

## Conclusions

77. The proliferation of bilateral assessments reflects today's increased scrutiny over public financial resources and heightened demand to direct scarce aid towards the most effective multilateral channels. In line with aid effectiveness commitments, mutual and international accountability require assessments to put a stronger emphasis on the evidence from partner countries or "end-users" of the multilateral system.

78. While there is certainly a political dimension to the assessments and to the demand for evidence, this chapter has demonstrated that there is a strong degree of convergence in the different criteria adopted by the different reviews and assessments. This suggests that there is great potential for joint approaches and assessments.

79. Collective efforts to assess multilateral effectiveness (such as MOPAN) or evaluation functions of multilateral organisations (DAC Evalnet initiative) require collective work to define methodology, framework, financing, and other parameters of joint assessments, and therefore have higher initial

transaction costs. On the other hand, they also entail a number of significant advantages. Enhancing existing joint assessments – for example, by having a shared, regularly updated "menu" of assessment criteria – rather than promoting comprehensive bilateral assessments with new criteria stems the proliferation of assessments, which entail a significant administrative burden for development actors, including partner countries and multilateral agencies themselves. Also, joint approaches can help ensure that organisations are assessed against collective objectives and that collective efforts are undertaken to make tough decisions within the broader governance setting of the institution and incite reform.

80. The following conclusions can be a basis for further discussion and reflection towards increased donor collaboration on multilateral assessments:

- Continue to work within the DAC membership and with multilateral partners to develop more coherent approaches to assess multilateral effectiveness and build on existing frameworks;.

- Place greater emphasis on partner country perspectives in assessing the effectiveness of multilateral organisations' delivery on the ground, where possible. For organisations without country operations, agree on a framework that can measure its effectiveness;

- Funding members use the results of multilateral assessments systematically as part of their formal and informal decision-making processes.

---

1 . The DAC Evaluation Research Centre (DEReC)

2 . The UK completed its "Multilateral Aid Review" in 2011, as highlighted in the *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*.

3 . Winckler Andersen and Broegaard (2012): 52-56.

4 . Isenman (2012).

5 . Weiss (1979).

6 . This includes all voluntary contributions to UN Funds and Programmes (UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, UNFPA, UNRWA), replenishments of large concessional funds (IDA, EDF, AfDF, AsDF), and to global funds (Global Fund, GEF, GAVI).

## CHAPTER 4. TOWARDS GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR MULTILATERAL AID

81. Donor governments jointly govern and fund multilateral organisations, and therefore have a responsibility to ensure its effectiveness for the benefit of partner countries. They can bring about reforms if they act together. The returns to such joint action on multilateral aid are great. The DAC has underscored at several of its meetings in the past that it wishes to take collective action to rationalise the architecture of multilateral aid.

82. At the Fourth High-Level Forum in Busan (2011), the international community agreed on collective action to make the multilateral system more effective (Box 6):

**Box 6. Busan commitment to reduce the proliferation of channels**

We welcome the diversity of development co-operation actors. Developing countries will lead consultation and co-ordination efforts to manage this diversity at the country level, while providers of development assistance have a responsibility to reduce fragmentation and curb the proliferation of aid channels. We will ensure that our efforts to reduce fragmentation do not lead to a reduction in the volume and quality of resources available to support development. To this end: [...]

b) We will improve the coherence of our policies on multilateral institutions, global funds and programmes. We will make effective use of existing multilateral channels, focusing on those that are performing well. We will work to reduce the proliferation of these channels and will, by the end of 2012, agree on principles and guidelines to guide our joint efforts. As they continue to implement their respective commitments on aid effectiveness, multilateral organisations, global funds and programmes will strengthen their participation in co-ordination and mutual accountability mechanisms at the country, regional and global levels."

*Source* : Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011), Paragraph 25(b)

83. This commitment builds on a decade of efforts facilitated by many actors, among them the UN, the OECD/DAC, and the Health Sector.[1] Over this period, suggestions and good practice have emerged to guide the effective funding, allocation and delivery of the multilateral development system. This has taken place at a number of different junctures:

(1) Funding and governance of multilateral organisations;

(2) Effectiveness of multilateral organisations;


(3) Effective delivery of multilateral aid at the country level; and

(4) Harmonisation and alignment among development partners at the country-level (partner countries and donors).

84. Chapter 3 focused on existing efforts to assess multilateral organisations' effectiveness related to (2). This chapter focuses on levels (1) and (4) – which are in DAC members' direct sphere of influence - as well as level (3), which DAC members influence indirectly through their funding decisions.

85. Figure 10 illustrates the conceptual framework around which the efforts undertaken so far can be classified.

**Figure 10. Conceptual framework and key initiatives to date**




86. The following section traces the discussion on good practice at these three levels, and highlights key recommendations that have emerged from them.

**Managing Multilateral Organisations: Global Level**

87. Governments shape multilateral institutions in two ways: political and financial. They establish them, and through representation on their boards, influence and steer their strategies and operations. The funding of multilateral agencies' core budgets strengthens their activity related to their primary mandate. On the other hand, governments at times shape activities of multilateral agencies beyond their core mandate, by concluding specific framework agreements with them, providing heavily earmarked funding for thematic or country-specific programmes, and, sometimes, by setting up single-donor trust funds within agencies. This is sometimes referred to as the "bilateralisation" or "privatisation" of multilateral aid. While some non-core funding clearly adds value, the previous chapter also illustrated how some of these activities contribute to the fragmentation of multilateral aid. Accordingly, efforts over the last years to define good behaviour by donors to the multilateral system at headquarters level have focused on how to limit fragmentation. Three guiding principles have emerged:

- Use and strengthen existing channels, and think twice before establishing new ones;
- Pursue coherence in taking decisions within government on what multilateral activities to fund; and
- Use existing co-ordination mechanisms rather than creating sector-specific global co-ordination mechanisms.

***Use and strengthen existing channels, and think twice before creating new ones.***

88. At the Fourth High-Level Forum in Busan, supporters of the Building Block on Managing Diversity and Reducing Fragmentation reconfirmed paragraph 19c of the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), which urges donors to "think twice" before creating new (separate) aid delivery channels: *[…] As new global challenges emerge, donors will ensure that existing channels for aid delivery are used and, if necessary, strengthened before creating separate new channels that risk further fragmentation and complicate co-ordination at country level.*[2]They called on donors to use evidence to work towards a more coherent and less fragmented multilateral (and bilateral) system for development co-operation. While innovative finance could address financing or aid problems, it should not be channelled through new, single-purpose institutions.

89. This call had several precursors. In December 2006, at a pre-meeting of the Global Forum on Development Activities, which focused on global programmes in the health sector, the World Bank tabled a *Draft Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programmes at the Country Level*[3]. The Note, going beyond the health sector, contained recommendations for global programmes on selectivity, governance of global programmes, ownership, alignment, harmonisation, and results and accountability. On selectivity, it put forward a checklist and introduced the notion of "thinking twice" as presented in Box 7 below.

**Box 7. Selectivity –Draft Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programmes at the Country Level**

*Think twice*. Funders, in consultation with partner countries and other concerned stakeholders, give serious analytic and decision-making attention to the need for another global programme.

- Is there a compelling need for a new collective global or regional action?
- If so, does that global action require earmarked global financing for country programmes?
- If so, can the financing be channelled through an existing institution, or is a new global programme needed?
- If so, is there a clear rationale for the scale of financing proposed?

*Source:* World Bank (2006).

90. Five years later, the Task Team on Health as a Tracer Sector in June 2011 recommended, in its final report entitled *"Progress and challenges in aid effectiveness – what can we learn from the health sector?"*, to pursue this principle as illustrated in Box 8 below.

**Box 8. Think Twice: Recommendation from Health as a Tracer Sector**

[…] *Think twice*: Avoid establishing new global funds and programmes that potentially duplicate or compete with existing organisational mandates and programmes, leading to fragmentation. Recognise that global approaches to country problems must be based on a clear analysis of the existing global and national institutional context.

*Source* : OECD (2011a), p.11

91. Despite the call to "think twice" before setting up new programmes, the number of separate channels has continued to increase over the last years. Why is the problem getting worse, not better? One reasons is that there are a multitude of – often very legitimate – factors at the individual level that drive donors' decisions to provide earmarked funding to an increasing number of multilateral programmes, or establish new delivery channels. These include the need to respond quickly to pledges; leverage and channel more resources; innovate and take risks; overcome administrative and legal requirements; gain

greater political visibility; and, circumvent problems within existing organisations.[4] It is therefore important for donors to be clear about the rationale or incentive for setting up a new multilateral programme, and determine whether it can be satisfied through other means. Using existing channels as the default requires finding or creating incentives; it requires adjusting channels where necessary, and addressing any legal and administrative barriers (including through governing bodies) that may prevent their use. To harness the political appetite for new initiatives and the desire for visibility, it is important that donors innovate within the existing multilateral system, and support reform where needed.

92. Working towards a more coherent and less fragmented multilateral system also requires multilateral organisations themselves to find innovative ways to use existing structures. This report does not look at the efforts made by executive boards or management structures of multilateral agencies. However, several recent initiatives to consolidate multilateral channels – including those of the World Bank and the UN are mentioned in this chapter.

***Within government, pursue coherence in taking decisions on what multilateral activities to fund.***

93. A second set of efforts to define good donor behaviour at headquarters and reduce fragmentation has focused on decision processes within donor governments. Donors' individual policies in funding multilateral organisations have remained fragmented and contribute to the incoherence of the system as a whole. The *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* found that for the majority of DAC members, several ministries have a competence to provide multilateral aid; and make what are often appear to be very separate funding decisions in the provision of multilateral aid. Often they lack a structured opportunity make a joint decision on this in national governments' budget arbitration and decision-making bodies. To improve the multilateral system, a better coordinated approach will be necessary to reach a common agreement for their allocations to become strategic investments. The *Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programs at the Country Level* mentioned earlier, suggests donors pursue coherence in selecting the programmes they fund: "*Donor governments establish internal processes in deciding on support for global programs among relevant ministries or agencies*."[5]

94. The *2011 Report on Multilateral Aid* evoked eight good practice lessons for bilateral donors that strive for more coherence within their governments, which are summarised in Box 9.

**Box 9. Eight Good Practice Lessons for Good Multilateral Donorship**

| | |
|---|---|
| **1** | Articulate, publicise and regularly revisit your specific national case for multilateral contributions.<br>*Stating and publicising the national case for multilateralism is important: the general public, legislators, and civil society should know what they are getting in exchange for less direct control.* |
| **2** | Review the balance between your multilateral and bilateral programmes.<br>*Explicitly reviewing and revisiting the balance between multilateral and bilateral aid allocations helps inform public debate.* |
| **3** | If fixed shares guide spending decisions, ensure they have broad coverage and are evidence-based.<br>*While they may be used as a tool to focus aid, caps, or ceilings, on multilateral aid, can also generate disproportionate transaction costs, or distort budgets. Where they exist, they should have a clear rationale and be amended when new evidence becomes available.* |
| **4** | Make maximum use of joint assessments, independent evaluation findings and third-party analyses.<br>*Before considering additional analytical work it makes sense to use common assessments, databases and evaluations so as to minimise transaction cost and duplication.* |
| **5** | State clearly and publicly the indicators and ratings that influence your future multilateral allocations.<br>*This is important for transparency vis-à-vis taxpayers, and allows other donors to repeat or upgrade the exercise.* |

| | |
|---|---|
| 6 | Assess multilateral performance against collective international, as well as national, priorities.<br>*Performance of multilateral agencies is best measured against its mandate; but individual donors' spending decisions also depend on the extent to which the programmes of the multilateral agency dovetail with the donor's national priorities.* |
| 7 | Periodically scrutinise allocations to all parts of the multilateral spectrum, even if they are semi-automatic.<br>*Assess allocations to multilateral organisations rather than taking preceding funding levels from past arrangements (including replenishments) as a default.* |
| 8 | Have a dedicated body periodically review all public spending through multilaterals.<br>*It is important for cross-government discussions to take place in a single manageable (and, ideally, existing) body at sub-ministerial level to regularly review all contributions to multilateral agencies, to as to ensure an overview of all – core and earmarked – contributions made to each agency.* |

Adapted from OECD (2011b).

***Group multilateral organisations and use existing co-ordination mechanisms within the multilateral systems***

95. A third component at this level relates to grouping and co-ordination within the multilateral sector. Over the last years, new agencies or umbrella facilities have grouped together agencies and funds. In November 2010, for example, UN Women was created to merge the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI), and the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW). In the same way, merging single-donor trust funds into multi-donor trust funds, can create stronger organisations and at the same time reduce fragmentation. In this context, the World Bank's efforts to consolidate existing trust funds, group funds under umbrella arrangements, transform several single-donor trust funds into multi-donor trust funds, and close empty trust funds, are noteworthy initiatives in the right direction.

96. Furthermore, co-ordination among multilateral organisations within the same sector must be improved. The final report of the Task Team on Health as a Tracer Sector, quoted earlier, advised against creating separate, sector-specific global co-ordination initiatives. It did so based on with the experience of the Health Systems Funding Platform. Rather, it called for a stronger mandate for existing co-ordination mechanisms, emphasising that those mechanisms should be sufficiently flexible to take account of new actors (Box 10).

**Box 10. Recommendations from the initiative 'Health as a Tracer Sector'**

[…] *Improve coordination of the global aid architecture* - There is an urgent need for more efficient coordination of the global aid architecture for health and for more effective collaboration on policy and decision-making concerning global initiatives […]. This requires high-level leadership, greater alignment of accountabilities and incentives, and a stronger mandate for existing mechanisms such as the OECD-DAC, rather than the creation of a separate global coordination initiative. Measures to ensure that countries are in the lead and their perspectives are taken into account, need to be more consistent […]. Greater efforts are also needed to capitalise on the experience and comparative advantage of the diversity of actors in the health sector. […]

*Source*: OECD (2011a), p.11.

97. Of course, efforts to reduce fragmentation at the government-to-multilaterals level inevitably face limitations. At a seminar on multilateral aid effectiveness held in October 2011 in Paris, stakeholder cautioned that gaps and overlaps, fragmentation and inequality cannot be reduced by information alone

(including mapping). Much hinges on political will and realistic expectations for change when both inclusiveness and strategic management are highly sought after.

**Effective Delivery of Multilateral Aid**

98. Significant efforts to improve the multilateral system have also been made at the level where multilateral aid is implemented. While DAC donors do not have a direct say in the implementation of these efforts, they design them through an inter-governmental process of governing boards, as well as through their support and funding for specific initiatives.

***Efforts led by the OECD-DAC: calls to implement the Aid Effectiveness agenda in the field***

99. The past decade has seen much work that aimed at bringing multilateral co-operation in line with the principles of aid effectiveness. At the High-Level Forum in Rome in 2003 participants committed to promote "harmonised approaches in global and regional programmes". The Statement of Resolve of the Paris Declaration two years later included a commitment to address the "insufficient integration of global programmes and initiatives into partner countries' broader development agendas", and the Accra Agenda of Action in 2008 reiterated similar concerns (Box 11).

**Box 11. Accra Agenda for Action, Paragraph 19c**

The contributions of all development actors are more effective when developing countries are in a position to manage and co-ordinate them. We welcome the role of new contributors and will improve the way all development actors work together by taking the following actions: […]

c) Global funds and programmes make an important contribution to development. The programmes they fund are most effective in conjunction with complementary efforts to improve the policy environment and to strengthen the institutions in the sectors in which they operate. We call upon all global funds to support country ownership, to align and harmonise their assistance proactively, and to make good use of mutual accountability frameworks, while continuing their emphasis on achieving results. As new global challenges emerge, donors will ensure that existing channels for aid delivery are used and, if necessary, strengthened before creating separate new channels that risk further fragmentation and complicate co-ordination at country level.

100. In support of the Paris Declaration, Global Health Partnerships adopted *"Best Practice Principles for Engagement of Global Health Partnerships at Country Level"* at their High-Level Forum on Health MDGs in Paris in 2005. These are health-specific guidelines based on the Paris Declaration, and outline how Global Health Partnerships should implement the five principles of effective aid at the country level. These principles outlined in Box 12 segue towards another global initiative: the International Health Partnership, (IHP+) established in 2007 to bring together public and private entities to improve aid effectiveness. The purpose of this effort was to achieve the health-related MDGs, guided by country ownership and using existing planning, coordination, delivery and management mechanisms at the country-level. The responsibilities of international organisations and bilateral donors, governments and other funders are spelled out in the IHP global "compact" was endorsed by 26 signatories.

**Box 12. Best Practice Principles for Engagement of Global Health Partnerships at Country Level**

Best Practice Principles have been derived from a Global Health Partnership-specific adaptation of the five key areas of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness:

- **Ownership**: Global Health Partnerships respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it.
- **Alignment**: Global Health Partnerships base their overall support on partner countries' national

development strategies, institutions and procedures.

- **Harmonisation**: Global Health Partnerships' actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective; Global Health Partnerships collaborate at the global level with other partners to address cross-cutting challenges such as health system strengthening.
- **Managing for results**: Global Health Partnerships work with countries to adopt and strengthen national results-based management.
- **Accountability**: Global Health Partnerships provide timely, clear and comprehensive information.

*Source*: Working Group on Global Health Partnerships (2005)

***Towards more effective UN operations: One UN and Delivering as One***

101. The most prominent efforts in improving the delivery of multilateral aid have been made by the UN, where operational activities for development are implemented by 36 UN organisations, including funds, programmes, specialized agencies and entities of the UN Secretariat. In the General Assembly's triennial comprehensive policy reviews (TCPR) on operational activities for development of the UN system in 2001, 2004, and 2007, and in the Outcome Statement of the 2005 World Summit (A/RES/60/1), UN member states called for reforms aiming at a more effective, coherent and better performing United Nations. In response, the Secretary-General appointed the High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment. In its report "Delivering as One" the Panel put forward a series of recommendations to overcome the fragmentation of the UN and develop approaches that would enhance the coherence, efficiency and effectiveness of the UN at country level and reduce transaction costs for host countries.

102. The One-UN approach was initially piloted in eight countries, starting in 2006, and was soon followed by other countries that indicated voluntary adoption of "Delivering as One". It implied adopting "Four Ones", namely One Leader, One Programme, One Budget and, where appropriate, One Office. Though never adopted, the DaO report triggered an "intense debate among Member States on system-wide coherence between 2007 and 2010"[6] , and catalysed the adoption of resolutions on system-wide coherence in 2008, 2009 and 2010. The independent evaluation of UN "Delivering as One" pilots in 2011 concluded that there had been moderate success. Reforms had enhanced national ownership; moderately reduced competition for funds and enhanced capacity for strategic approaches, but achieved little progress towards reducing fragmentation and duplication or towards reducing transaction costs for countries, the UN system and other partners[7]. To some extent, the evaluation saw the reason for limited impact of the reforms at Country Office level in a lack of accompanying reform "higher" up the UN system. The 5th High-Level Forum on "Delivering as One" held in June 2012 concluded that an appropriate framework at headquarters was needed to enable UN country teams to successfully implement the Delivering as One approach[8]. To this end, UN member states are engaged in the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and impact of UN operational activities for development and to establish system-wide policy orientations for the development cooperation and country-level modalities of the UN system.

103. The example of One-UN is a good reminder for the DAC in its discussion around guiding principles that bilateral donors have an important role to play in mandating (and funding) multilateral organisations to co-ordinate at the field level. But it also demonstrates that efforts to reduce fragmentation in the field cannot make up for the lack of coordination at headquarter-level.

**Country-level Harmonisation among Multilateral and Bilateral Donors**

104. The third level for which donors will be looking for guidance is in their interaction with multilateral agencies in the field. Only when donors – both bi- and multilaterals – create coherence and work together can they bring about effective change. The co-operation between bilateral and multilateral

aid at the country level is an area where little "good practice" has been put forward, but where the DAC could discuss what has worked best. The following examples are inputs for such a discussion.

105. Broadly speaking, these efforts should of course be in line with suggestions for "building more effective partnerships" in the Accra Agenda for Action (paragraph 16), endorsed by both donor countries and heads of multilateral agencies.

**Box 13. Building partnerships**

Aid is about building partnerships for development. Such partnerships are most effective when they fully harness the energy, skills and experience of all development actors - bilateral and multilateral donors, global funds, CSOs, and the private sector. To support developing countries' efforts to build for the future, we resolve to create partnerships that will include all these actors.

*Source*: Paris Declaration (2005)

106. The Draft Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programmes at the Country Level, mentioned above, has spelled out what some of these commitments mean in practice.

**Box 14. Harmonisation - Excerpts from Draft Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programmes at the Country Level**

*Harmonise pro-actively.*

- Join with other donors in simplified and common arrangements to support and strengthen government-led processes and systems. These include joint reporting, analyses, strategies, missions, and capacity development.
- Participate actively in multi-donor coordination mechanisms. This may include delegation to a relevant donor with adequate field presence.

*Take global programmes seriously.* Donor agencies (bilateral and multilateral) take account of global programmes in country support strategies and work closely with them for better integrated support of national development programmes.

*Source*: World Bank (2006).

107. The DAC could look into practical examples of in-country co-ordination efforts of harmonisation among development partners. In this regard, recent efforts to ensure a better division of labour between various United Nations and World Bank thematic funds and financing instruments in fragile states are a step in the right direction. In addition, countries such as Rwanda, Bangladesh, Ghana, Bolivia, or Mozambique could serve to extract lessons on harmonisation among donors. The following aspects could be helpful to consider:

- What are donors' experiences with obligatory platforms for programming, where every donor must verify that his programme does not contradict, overlap with, or duplicate, another programme?
- How can bilateral staff in the field be incentivised to co-ordinate with multilateral agencies, and how might funds better co-ordinate on the ground? How can such co-ordination be rewarded?

**Emerging Guiding Principles**

108. Stakeholders of the different multilateral agencies, funds and programmes have a collective responsibility to address the most important challenges of the multilateral architecture they fund and govern, to ensure effective funding, delivery and results at country level. In response to the commitment made in paragraph 25(b) of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation to "agree on principles and guidelines to guide our joint efforts to reduce the proliferation of multilateral channels," the DAC has, based on a first draft of this report (DCD/DAC(2012)33), held a workshop to discuss how to reduce the proliferation of multilateral channels. These seven emerging principles are set in the context of the commitments made in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development (paragraph 25)

*In line with the commitment set out in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (paragraph 25), we welcome the diversity of development co-operation actors, and agree to work to reduce the proliferation of multilateral channels by using existing channels and frameworks for programme design, delivery and assessments, drawing on the following principles:*

8. **Use existing channels as the default**, adjusting them where necessary, and address any legal and administrative barriers that may prevent their use.
9. Use the international community's appetite for new initiatives to **innovate and reform the existing multilateral system**, allowing for donor visibility.
10. **Regularly review the number** of multilateral organisations, funds and programmes with the aim of reducing their number through consolidation without decreasing the overall volume of resources.
11. **Provide core or un-earmarked contributions** to multilateral organisations, where relevant and possible.
12. **Ensure that new multilateral programmes and channels are multi-donor arrangements; are time-bound, and should contain provisions for a mid-term review; and do not impose excessive reporting requirements** if the creation of multilateral programmes and channels is unavoidable.
13. **Support country-level harmonisation** among all providers of development co-operation, including through representation on governing boards of multilateral organisations, funds and programmes.
14. **Monitor trends and progress** to curb the proliferation of channels at the global level; inform monitoring in partner countries.

---

1. Several other initiatives could be listed here. They include the *New Deal for engagement in fragile states*, concluded in 2011, which requires players involved in post-conflict support to harmonise their goals and processes; the *Learning Group of Global Programs*, a forum established in 2006 to share best practice in improving the effectiveness of global programs, and the *Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG)*, a in existence since 1995, which seeks to harmonise evaluation work among its member institutions.
2. Accra Agenda for Action (2008), para. 19c.
3. World Bank (2006).
4. These factors were identified by participants at the workshop on multilateral aid, organised by the OECD/DAC on 4 October 2012.
5. World Bank (2006).
6. United Nations (2012b).
7. Ibid.
8. United Nations (2012c).

## REFERENCES

Accra Agenda for Action (2008), *www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf*

AusAID (2012), *Australian Multilateral Assessment*, Government of Australia, Canberra, *www.ausaid.gov.au/Publications/Pages/693_6999_8205_7111_6531.aspx*

"Best practice principles for global health partnership activities at country level". Report of the Working Group on Global Health Partnerships, High-level Forum on the Health Millennium Development Goals (Paris, 14–15 November 2005)

*Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation* (2011), *www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/images/stories/hlf4/OUTCOME_DOCUMENT_-_FINAL_EN.pdf*

DFID (2011), *Multilateral Aid Review*, Government of the United Kingdom, London, *www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/mar/multilateral_aid_review.pdf*

Isenman, P (2012). *Learning from Assessments of Overall Effectiveness of Multilateral Organisations*, Paper submitted to the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV)

OECD-DAC (2011a), WP-EFF, Task Team on Health as a Tracer Sector, Final Report, *Aid Effectiveness in the Health Sector: Progress and challenges, www.oecd-ilibrary.org/fr/development/progress-and-challenges-in-aid-effectiveness_9789264178014-en;jsessionid=2p662y9x7kbdm.delta*

OECD-DAC (2011b), *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid*, Paris, DCD/DAC(2011)21/FINAL, *www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/61/49014277.pdf*

OECD-DAC (2011c), *2011 OECD-DAC Report on Division of Labour*, Paris.

OECD (2012a), *Creditor Reporting System Database*, OECD, Paris.

OECD (2012b), *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris.

OECD (2012c), *Country Programmable Aid*, OECD, Paris.

OECD (2012d), *2012-2015 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans*, OECD, Paris, *www.oecd.org/development/aideffectiveness/50056866.pdf*

OECD (2012e), List of ODA-eligible international organisations, *www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/listofoda-eligibleorganisations.htm*, OECD, Paris, June 2012

United Nations (2006), *Delivering as One*, Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel, A/61/583, New York.

United Nations (2012a), *Analysis of Funding for Operational Activities for Development of the United Nations System for 2010*, Report of the Secretary General, General Assembly Economic and Social Council, New York, advance, unedited version *www.un.org/en/development/desa/oesc/pdf/2012_funding_report-figures_and_tables.pdf*

United Nations (2012b), International Evaluation Team, for the Evaluation Management Group, *Independent Evaluation of Lessons Learned from Delivering as One,* Draft Final Report *www.un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/pdf/draftreport.pdf*

United Nations (2012c), *The United Nations We Want - Our commitment to the way forward*, Outcome Document, Fifth High Level Intergovernmental Conference on Delivering as One, Tirana, June 2012. *http://dao5conference.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Outcome%20Document%20-%20Tirana%20Conference.pdf*

Weiss, Carol H. (1979). The Many Meanings of Research Utilization, in *Public Administration Review,* 39:5, pp. 426-431.

Winckler Andersen, Ole and Eva Broegaard (2012), The Political Economy of Joint-Donor Evaluations, in *Evaluation* 18(1): 47-59.


World Bank (2006), *Draft Good Practice Guidance for Integration and Effectiveness of Global Programs at the Country Level – "Work in Progress",* contributed by: The World Bank, Policy Workshop on Global Programmes and the Paris Agenda, Paris, 5 December 2006, COM/DCD/DEV(2006)9 - *www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/51/37739410.pdf*

World Bank, World Health Organisation, *Aid Effectiveness in Health: Executive Summary,* Global Forum on Development: Pre-meeting on Aid Effectiveness in Health, Paris, 20 November 2006, COM/DCD/DEV(2006)5, *www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/8/37705611.pdf*

# ANNEX A. STATISTICAL FIGURES AND TABLES

**Figure A.1. Gross ODA disbursements from DAC countries to a selection of multilaterals, 2006-10**

(in constant 2010 prices)




*Source*: OECD DAC Aggregate Statistics, 2012

**Table A.1. Total use of the multilateral system, 2010**


(excluding debt relief)

| Donor | Bilateral ODA | of which, channelled through multilateral agencies (non-core) | Multilateral ODA (in USD m) | Total use of the multilateral system | Core multilateral ODA as % of gross ODA | Multilateral ODA and non-core as % of total ODA | Core as % of total use of the multilateral system |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (A) | (B) | (C) | (B+C) | (C/(A+C)) | (B+C)/(A+C) | (C/(B+C)) |
| **Australia** | 3,234 | 813 | 585 | 1,397 | 15% | 37% | 42% |
| **Austria** | 462 | 99 | 597 | 697 | 56% | 66% | 86% |
| **Belgium** | 1,543 | 234 | 953 | 1,187 | 38% | 48% | 80% |
| **Canada** | 3,912 | 1,367 | 1,282 | 2,650 | 25% | 51% | 48% |
| **Denmark** | 2,139 | 241 | 790 | 1,032 | 27% | 35% | 77% |
| **Finland** | 839 | 250 | 494 | 744 | 37% | 56% | 66% |
| **France** | 7,446 | 39 | 5,220 | 5,259 | 41% | 42% | 99% |
| **Germany** | 9,220 | 480 | 4,950 | 5,430 | 35% | 38% | 91% |
| **Greece** | 212 | 6 | 296 | 302 | 58% | 59% | 98% |
| **Ireland** | 585 | 103 | 310 | 413 | 35% | 46% | 75% |
| **Italy** | 694 | 92 | 2,237 | 2,329 | 76% | 79% | 96% |
| **Japan** | 14,954 | 1,251 | 3,684 | 4,935 | 20% | 26% | 75% |
| **Korea** | 931 | 45 | 273 | 318 | 23% | 26% | 86% |
| **Luxembourg** | 262 | 98 | 141 | 239 | 35% | 59% | 59% |
| **Netherlands** | 4,453 | 719 | 1,516 | 2,235 | 25% | 37% | 68% |
| **New Zealand** | 271 | 31 | 71 | 102 | 21% | 30% | 70% |
| **Norway** | 3,544 | 1,035 | 1,019 | 2,053 | 22% | 45% | 50% |
| **Portugal** | 428 | 51 | 253 | 304 | 37% | 45% | 83% |
| **Spain** | 3,933 | 1,349 | 1,951 | 3,300 | 33% | 56% | 59% |
| **Sweden** | 2,923 | 736 | 1,618 | 2,355 | 36% | 52% | 69% |
| **Switzerland** | 1,698 | 292 | 588 | 879 | 26% | 38% | 67% |
| **United Kingdom** | 8,200 | 2,961 | 5,037 | 7,997 | 38% | 60% | 63% |
| **United States** | 27,199 | 4,383 | 3,775 | 8,157 | 12% | 26% | 46% |
| **Total DAC donors** | **99,083** | **16,677** | **37,638** | **54,316** | **28%** | **40%** | **69%** |

*Source*: OECD DAC Aggregate Statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2012

**Figure A.2. Gross multilateral ODA provided by DAC member countries as share of total ODA, 1991-2010**

(in constant 2010 prices, excluding debt relief)




*Source*: OECD DAC Aggregate Statistics, 2012

**Table A.2. Core contributions provided by DAC member countries to the major multilateral agencies, 2008-10 annual average**


(in USD million, constant 2010 prices)

| DAC country | EU Institutions | The World Bank Group | UN Funds / Programmes | Other UN | Regional Dev. Banks | The Global Fund | Other mult. Agencies | Multilateral ODA, total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 0 | 202 | 59 | 67 | 63 | 28 | 79 | 497 |
| Austria | 306 | 140 | 16 | 26 | 55 | 0 | 12 | 554 |
| Belgium | 546 | 187 | 61 | 58 | 48 | 22 | 44 | 966 |
| Canada | 0 | 398 | 123 | 131 | 294 | 147 | 162 | 1256 |
| Denmark | 268 | 132 | 212 | 83 | 45 | 32 | 98 | 870 |
| Finland | 201 | 55 | 96 | 40 | 42 | 2 | 36 | 471 |
| France | 2598 | 662 | 80 | 173 | 215 | 400 | 753 | 4881 |
| Germany | 2774 | 937 | 96 | 234 | 273 | 269 | 190 | 4771 |
| Greece | 261 | 25 | 2 | 12 | 15 | 0 | 9 | 324 |
| Ireland | 149 | 30 | 63 | 27 | 12 | 17 | 15 | 314 |
| Italy | 1649 | 435 | 49 | 139 | 120 | 0 | 74 | 2465 |
| Japan | 0 | 1611 | 165 | 468 | 791 | 220 | 178 | 3433 |
| Korea | 0 | 99 | 10 | 53 | 92 | 3 | 13 | 271 |
| Luxembourg | 37 | 22 | 34 | 31 | 5 | 3 | 9 | 140 |
| Netherlands | 583 | 195 | 381 | 179 | 78 | 90 | 76 | 1582 |
| New Zealand | 0 | 13 | 23 | 19 | 5 | 0 | 22 | 82 |
| Norway | 0 | 148 | 365 | 175 | 95 | 64 | 127 | 973 |
| Portugal | 172 | 21 | 4 | 8 | 25 | 2 | 4 | 237 |
| Spain | 1049 | 297 | 151 | 147 | 153 | 89 | 72 | 1957 |
| Sweden | 356 | 327 | 423 | 203 | 99 | 85 | 105 | 1599 |
| Switzerland | 0 | 245 | 111 | 55 | 66 | 7 | 77 | 561 |
| United Kingdom | 1933 | 1110 | 217 | 274 | 293 | 240 | 173 | 4240 |
| United States | 0 | 1118 | 250 | 586 | 307 | 873 | 380 | 3514 |
| **Total DAC** | **12,883** | **8,410** | **2,989** | **3,187** | **3,189** | **2,592** | **2,708** | **35,958** |
| *Share of total multilateral ODA (%)* | *36* | *23* | *8* | *9* | *9* | *7* | *8* | *100* |

*Note:* * Korea made its first contribution to the Global Fund in 2009, so this amount is a 2-year average.

*Source*: OECD DAC Aggregate Statistics, 2012.


**Figure A.3. Total UN operational activities for development - 2010**




*Note:* These figures include total contributions to the UN agencies identified. This includes resources from non-DAC members and other multilateral organisations. For this reason, the figures differ from those reported to the OECD/DAC and published elsewhere in this report.

*Source*: United Nations (2012b).

**Figure A.4. Total use of the multilateral system as % gross ODA, 2010**




*Source*: OECD DAC Aggregate Statistics and Creditor Reporting System, 2012.

**Table A.3. DAC gross multilateral ODA disbursements over the five year period, 2006-10**

(in USD million, constant 2010 prices)

| | Total multilateral ODA 2006-2010 | Share of EU budget + EDF 2006-2010 | Donor's share of global multilateral ODA, excluding to the EC | Donor's share of global multilateral ODA | IDA | EU budget + EDF | UN Funds and Programmes* | Global Fund | AfDB | AsDB | % allocated to largest six multilateral clusters |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Number of DAC donors* | | | | | 24 | 15 | 24 | 23 | 21 | 23 | |
| **Non-EU members** | **51,359** | **-** | **47%** | **30%** | **34%** | | **11%** | **12%** | **6%** | **8%** | **71%** |
| **Australia** | 2,439 | - | 2% | 1% | 37% | | 10% | 5% | 0% | 16% | 68% |
| **Canada** | 6,157 | - | 6% | 4% | 31% | | 11% | 11% | 11% | 5% | 70% |
| **Japan** | 17,702 | - | 16% | 10% | 40% | | 6% | 6% | 5% | 14% | 71% |
| **Korea** | 1,099 | - | 1% | 1% | 28% | | 4% | 1% | 7% | 17% | 56% |
| **New Zealand** | 391 | - | 0% | 0% | 15% | | 29% | 0% | 0% | 7% | 51% |
| **Norway** | 4,766 | - | 4% | 3% | 15% | | 40% | 6% | 9% | 1% | 71% |
| **Switzerland** | 2,678 | - | 2% | 2% | 43% | | 21% | 1% | 10% | 2% | 77% |
| **United States** | 16,127 | - | 15% | 9% | 33% | | 8% | 23% | 5% | 3% | 72% |
| **EU members** | **119,625** | **60,702** | **53%** | **70%** | **16%** | **51%** | **8%** | **5%** | **4%** | **1%** | **85%** |
| **Austria** | 2,611 | 1,446 | 1% | 2% | 25% | 55% | 3% | 0% | 8% | 2% | 92% |
| **Belgium** | 4,330 | 2,456 | 2% | 3% | 18% | 57% | 6% | 2% | 4% | 1% | 88% |
| **Denmark** | 4,462 | 1,348 | 3% | 3% | 11% | 30% | 26% | 3% | 4% | 1% | 75% |
| **Finland** | 2,245 | 956 | 1% | 1% | 12% | 43% | 20% | 0% | 7% | 1% | 83% |
| **France** | 22,273 | 12,139 | 9% | 13% | 12% | 55% | 2% | 9% | 4% | 1% | 82% |
| **Germany** | 22,362 | 13,117 | 8% | 13% | 20% | 59% | 2% | 5% | 4% | 1% | 91% |
| **Greece** | 1,519 | 1,211 | 0% | 1% | 9% | 80% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 89% |
| **Ireland** | 1,647 | 649 | 1% | 1% | 15% | 39% | 20% | 5% | 0% | 4% | 82% |
| **Italy** | 12,000 | 7,946 | 4% | 7% | 10% | 66% | 3% | 5% | 2% | 1% | 86% |
| **Luxembourg** | 653 | 163 | 0% | 0% | 10% | 25% | 19% | 2% | 0% | 5% | 61% |
| **Netherlands** | 7,616 | 2,795 | 4% | 4% | 8% | 37% | 24% | 6% | 2% | 0% | 77% |
| **Portugal** | 1,118 | 781 | 0% | 1% | 8% | 70% | 2% | 1% | 7% | 3% | 92% |
| **Spain** | 9,594 | 5,015 | 4% | 6% | 14% | 52% | 7% | 5% | 4% | 2% | 84% |
| **Sweden** | 7,441 | 1,649 | 5% | 4% | 18% | 22% | 28% | 6% | 6% | 1% | 81% |
| **United Kingdom** | 19,753 | 9,030 | 10% | 12% | 25% | 46% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 2% | 88% |
| **DAC Total** | **170,984** | **60,702** | **100%** | **100%** | **22%** | **36%** | **9%** | **7%** | **5%** | **3%** | **81%** |

*Source*: OECD DAC Aggregate Statistics, 2012.

# ANNEX B. COUNTRY TABLES AND FIGURES

## Australia

**Table B.1: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Australia | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 200 | 25% |
| Country / region specific | 613 | 75% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 73 | *9%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 14 | 3% |
| South of Sahara | 68 | 13% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South America | 3 | 1% |
| North & Central America | 17 | 3% |
| Asia, unspecified | 5 | 1% |
| Far East Asia | 178 | 35% |
| Middle East | 45 | 9% |
| South & Central Asia | 189 | 38% |
| Europe | 0 | 0% |
| Oceania | 95 | 19% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 50 | 6% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 12 | 1% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 64 | 8% |
| Education | 65 | 8% |
| Environment | 26 | 3% |
| General Budget Support | 43 | 5% |
| Government and Civil Society | 92 | 11% |
| Health | 62 | 8% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 183 | 22% |
| Multi-sector | 41 | 5% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 34 | 4% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 37 | 5% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 26 | 3% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 77 | 9% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 0 | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 320 | 59% |
| Other | 220 | 41% |

*Source*: OECD (2012a)

**Figure: B.1: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**

(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.2: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **-** | **-** |
| **World Bank Group** | **202** | **303** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **103** | **267** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 17 | 49 |
| WFP | 32 | 53 |
| UNICEF | 23 | 103 |
| UNFPA | 8 | 10 |
| UNHCR | 13 | 29 |
| UNRWA | 9 | 9 |
| **Other UN** | **60** | **82** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 5 | 6 |
| IFAD | - | - |
| ILO | 3 | 21 |
| OHCHR | 2 | 0 |
| UNDPKO | - | - |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 4 | 1 |
| UN | 5 | - |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 7 |
| WHO | 24 | 18 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **94** | **71** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 5 | 10 |
| Asian Development Bank | 89 | 59 |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **126** | **89** |
| **Total** | **585** | **813** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Austria

**Table B.3: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Austria | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 18 | 18% |
| Country / region specific | 81 | 82% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 55 | *55%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 8 | 12% |
| South of Sahara | 15 | 20% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 3 | 4% |
| South America | 0 | 0% |
| North & Central America | 5 | 7% |
| Asia, unspecified | 1 | 1% |
| Far East Asia | 0 | 0% |
| Middle East | 2 | 3% |
| South & Central Asia | 11 | 15% |
| Europe | 36 | 50% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 3 | 3% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 0 | 0% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 38 | 39% |
| Education | 0 | 0% |
| Environment | 3 | 3% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 11 | 11% |
| Health | 0 | 0% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 10 | 10% |
| Multi-sector | 18 | 18% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 6 | 6% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 2 | 2% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 1 | 1% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 8 | 8% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 0 | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 16 | 59% |
| Other | 11 | 41% |

*Source*: OECD (2012a)

**Figure B.2: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.4: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **325** | **15** |
| **World Bank Group** | **151** | **39** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **16** | **12** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 10 | 4 |
| WFP | 0 | 1 |
| UNICEF | 2 | 3 |
| UNFPA | 2 | 1 |
| UNHCR | 1 | 2 |
| UNRWA | 1 | - |
| **Other UN** | **36** | **8** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 2 | 1 |
| IFAD | 15 | - |
| ILO | 2 | 1 |
| OHCHR | - | 1 |
| UNDPKO | 5 | - |
| UNECE | 0 | - |
| UNESCO | 2 | 0 |
| UN | 2 | - |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 2 |
| WHO | 3 | 0 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **58** | **14** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 44 | 6 |
| Asian Development Bank | 11 | 3 |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **12** | **12** |
| **Total** | **597** | **99** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Belgium

**Table B.5: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 58 | 25% |
| Country / region specific | 177 | 75% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 16 | *7%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 1 | 1% |
| South of Sahara | 120 | 69% |
| North of Sahara | 6 | 3% |
| Americas, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South America | 1 | 1% |
| North & Central America | 11 | 6% |
| Asia, unspecified | 3 | 2% |
| Far East Asia | 0 | 0% |
| Middle East | 16 | 9% |
| South & Central Asia | 17 | 10% |
| Europe | 1 | 1% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 12 | 5% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 4 | 2% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 6 | 2% |
| Education | 7 | 3% |
| Environment | 16 | 7% |
| General Budget Support | 12 | 5% |
| Government and Civil Society | 38 | 16% |
| Health | 4 | 2% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 91 | 39% |
| Multi-sector | 9 | 4% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 15 | 6% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 8 | 3% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 6 | 2% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 0 | 0% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 7 | 3% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 122 | 76% |
| Other | 38 | 24% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.3: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.6: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **546** | **20** |
| **World Bank Group** | **151** | **13** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **71** | **102** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 26 | 29 |
| WFP | - | 38 |
| UNICEF | 25 | 12 |
| UNFPA | 7 | - |
| UNHCR | 11 | 12 |
| UNRWA | 3 | 11 |
| **Other UN** | **75** | **43** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 6 | 22 |
| IFAD | 9 | 6 |
| ILO | 3 | 1 |
| OHCHR | 1 | 0 |
| UNDPKO | 5 | - |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 2 | 2 |
| UN | 3 | - |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 1 |
| WHO | 12 | 3 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **39** | **3** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 35 | - |
| Asian Development Bank | 2 | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **70** | **53** |
| **Total** | **952** | **234** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Canada

**Table B.7: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Canada | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 52 | 4% |
| Country / region specific | 1,316 | 96% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 289 | *21%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 15 | 1% |
| South of Sahara | 561 | 43% |
| North of Sahara | 3 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 38 | 3% |
| South America | 40 | 3% |
| North & Central America | 222 | 17% |
| Asia, unspecified | 54 | 4% |
| Far East Asia | 32 | 2% |
| Middle East | 52 | 4% |
| South & Central Asia | 285 | 22% |
| Europe | 13 | 1% |
| Oceania | 1 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 397 | 29% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 22 | 2% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 59 | 4% |
| Education | 119 | 9% |
| Environment | 6 | 0% |
| General Budget Support | 4 | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 192 | 14% |
| Health | 216 | 16% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 251 | 18% |
| Multi-sector | 33 | 2% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 31 | 2% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 4 | 0% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 11 | 1% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 21 | 2% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 0 | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 875 | 85% |
| Other | 152 | 15% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Table B.4: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.8: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **-** | **2** |
| **World Bank Group** | **423** | **477** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **115** | **551** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 49 | 108 |
| WFP | 18 | 254 |
| UNICEF | 17 | 122 |
| UNFPA | 17 | 6 |
| UNHCR | 14 | 34 |
| UNRWA | - | 15 |
| **Other UN** | **166** | **129** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 15 | 8 |
| IFAD | 61 | 0 |
| ILO | 2 | 6 |
| OHCHR | 3 | 0 |
| UNDPKO | 21 | 2 |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 5 | 0 |
| UN | 10 | 8 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 6 |
| WHO | - | 63 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **168** | **98** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 98 | 14 |
| Asian Development Bank | 46 | 35 |
| Inter-American Development Bank | 7 | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **411** | **110** |
| **Total** | **1,282** | **1,367** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Denmark

**Table B.9: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Denmark | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 92 | 38% |
| Country / region specific | 149 | 62% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 28 | *12%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 16 | 12% |
| South of Sahara | 50 | 38% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South America | 0 | 0% |
| North & Central America | 13 | 10% |
| Asia, unspecified | 1 | 1% |
| Far East Asia | 5 | 4% |
| Middle East | 23 | 17% |
| South & Central Asia | 38 | 29% |
| Europe | 2 | 1% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 1 | 0% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 3 | 1% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 1 | 1% |
| Education | 34 | 14% |
| Environment | 42 | 18% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 60 | 25% |
| Health | 2 | 1% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 53 | 22% |
| Multi-sector | 11 | 5% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 5 | 2% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 4 | 2% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 12 | 5% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 13 | 5% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | - | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 99 | 82% |
| Other | 22 | 18% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.5: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.10: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| **Total use of the multilateral system in 2010** | **Core** | **Non-Core** |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **279** | **2** |
| **World Bank Group** | **98** | **89** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **200** | **107** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 63 | 44 |
| WFP | 33 | 3 |
| UNICEF | 32 | 23 |
| UNFPA | 36 | 2 |
| UNHCR | 23 | 28 |
| UNRWA | 12 | 3 |
| **Other UN** | **77** | **27** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 2 | 0 |
| IFAD | 4 | - |
| ILO | 4 | 6 |
| OHCHR | 2 | 1 |
| UNDPKO | 4 | - |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 5 | 0 |
| UN | 2 | 0 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 11 |
| WHO | 10 | 2 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **47** | **1** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 31 | 1 |
| Asian Development Bank | 16 | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **89** | **16** |
| **Total** | **790** | **241** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## European Union Institutions

**Table B.11: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | EU Institutions | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 301 | 13% |
| Country / region specific | 1,976 | 87% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 455 | *20%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 51 | 3% |
| South of Sahara | 898 | 47% |
| North of Sahara | 49 | 3% |
| Americas, unspecified | 11 | 1% |
| South America | 30 | 2% |
| North & Central America | 96 | 5% |
| Asia, unspecified | 8 | 0% |
| Far East Asia | 76 | 4% |
| Middle East | 169 | 9% |
| South & Central Asia | 412 | 21% |
| Europe | 171 | 9% |
| Oceania | 5 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 170 | 7% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 231 | 10% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 126 | 6% |
| Education | 112 | 5% |
| Environment | 55 | 2% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 416 | 18% |
| Health | 81 | 4% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 623 | 27% |
| Multi-sector | 210 | 9% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 132 | 6% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 49 | 2% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 24 | 1% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 45 | 2% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 3 | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 1,181 | 78% |
| Other | 340 | 22% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.6: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.12: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **-** | **191** |
| **World Bank Group** | **-** | **334** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **113** | **1,020** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | - | 374 |
| WFP | - | 283 |
| UNICEF | - | 133 |
| UNFPA | - | 17 |
| UNHCR | - | 110 |
| UNRWA | 113 | 71 |
| **Other UN** | **9** | **436** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 0 | 179 |
| IFAD | - | 32 |
| ILO | - | 18 |
| OHCHR | 3 | 1 |
| UNDPKO | - | - |
| UNECE | 0 | - |
| UNESCO | - | 9 |
| UN | - | 20 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 20 |
| WHO | - | 46 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **55** | **107** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | - | - |
| Asian Development Bank | - | 32 |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **75** | **189** |
| **Total** | **251** | **2,277** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

# Finland

**Table B.13: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Finland | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 87 | 35% |
| Country / region specific | 163 | 65% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 34 | *13%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 6 | 4% |
| South of Sahara | 60 | 38% |
| North of Sahara | 1 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 1 | 1% |
| South America | 2 | 1% |
| North & Central America | 10 | 6% |
| Asia, unspecified | 7 | 4% |
| Far East Asia | 8 | 5% |
| Middle East | 12 | 8% |
| South & Central Asia | 44 | 28% |
| Europe | 13 | 8% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 8 | 3% |
| Developmental Food Aid | - | 0% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 19 | 8% |
| Education | 8 | 3% |
| Environment | 13 | 5% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 56 | 23% |
| Health | 7 | 3% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 91 | 36% |
| Multi-sector | 15 | 6% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 18 | 7% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 5 | 2% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 2 | 1% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 8 | 3% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 0 | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 107 | 83% |
| Other | 23 | 17% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.7: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.14: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **200** | **22** |
| **World Bank Group** | **74** | **51** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **102** | **81** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 25 | 15 |
| WFP | 8 | 19 |
| UNICEF | 21 | 16 |
| UNFPA | 33 | 2 |
| UNHCR | 9 | 17 |
| UNRWA | 5 | 2 |
| **Other UN** | **42** | **74** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 1 | 9 |
| IFAD | 4 | 1 |
| ILO | 1 | 2 |
| OHCHR | 0 | 2 |
| UNDPKO | 3 | 0 |
| UNECE | - | 0 |
| UNESCO | 1 | 2 |
| UN | 3 | - |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 3 |
| WHO | 2 | 15 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **35** | **4** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 26 | 0 |
| Asian Development Bank | 9 | 1 |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **40** | **17** |
| **Total** | **494** | **250** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## France

**Table B.15: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | France | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 1 | 4% |
| Country / region specific | 38 | 96% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 7 | *18%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 5 | 16% |
| South of Sahara | 19 | 59% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South America | 0 | 0% |
| North & Central America | 2 | 7% |
| Asia, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| Far East Asia | 0 | 0% |
| Middle East | 5 | 14% |
| South & Central Asia | 1 | 3% |
| Europe | 5 | 16% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | - | 0% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 22 | 56% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 5 | 13% |
| Education | - | 0% |
| Environment | 0 | 0% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 5 | 12% |
| Health | - | 0% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 0 | 1% |
| Multi-sector | 3 | 7% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 1 | 3% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 3 | 7% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | - | 0% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | - | 0% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 0 | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 21 | 69% |
| Other | 9 | 31% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B. 8: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.16: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **2,661** | **5** |
| **World Bank Group** | **872** | **-** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **66** | **26** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 24 | 3 |
| WFP | - | 17 |
| UNICEF | 13 | 2 |
| UNFPA | 3 | - |
| UNHCR | 20 | - |
| UNRWA | 7 | 3 |
| **Other UN** | **189** | **4** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 15 | - |
| IFAD | 15 | - |
| ILO | 14 | 3 |
| OHCHR | - | - |
| UNDPKO | 32 | - |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 14 | - |
| UN | 17 | - |
| UNOCHA | n/a | - |
| WHO | 30 | - |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **210** | **3** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 175 | 3 |
| Asian Development Bank | 32 | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | 2 | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **1,223** | **1** |
| **Total** | **5,220** | **39** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Germany

**Table B.17: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Germany | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 211 | 44% |
| Country / region specific | 269 | 56% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 32 | *7%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 8 | 3% |
| South of Sahara | 82 | 31% |
| North of Sahara | 11 | 4% |
| Americas, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South America | 2 | 1% |
| North & Central America | 7 | 3% |
| Asia, unspecified | 1 | 0% |
| Far East Asia | 6 | 2% |
| Middle East | 23 | 9% |
| South & Central Asia | 114 | 44% |
| Europe | 16 | 6% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 4 | 1% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 11 | 2% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 126 | 26% |
| Education | 5 | 1% |
| Environment | 45 | 9% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 145 | 30% |
| Health | 12 | 2% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 89 | 18% |
| Multi-sector | 16 | 3% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 8 | 2% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 9 | 2% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 7 | 1% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 1 | 0% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 0 | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 215 | 91% |
| Other | 22 | 9% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.9: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.18: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **2,926** | **18** |
| **World Bank Group** | **763** | **166** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **110** | **148** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 30 | 66 |
| WFP | 31 | 46 |
| UNICEF | 9 | 1 |
| UNFPA | 20 | 3 |
| UNHCR | 11 | 9 |
| UNRWA | 11 | 2 |
| **Other UN** | **261** | **42** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 21 | 10 |
| IFAD | 21 | - |
| ILO | 19 | 7 |
| OHCHR | 3 | 0 |
| UNDPKO | 44 | 0 |
| UNECE | 0 | 0 |
| UNESCO | 18 | 1 |
| UN | 19 | 1 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | - |
| WHO | 34 | 4 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **299** | **7** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 205 | - |
| Asian Development Bank | 75 | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **591** | **99** |
| **Total** | **4,950** | **480** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Greece

**Table B.19: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Greece | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 4 | 63% |
| Country / region specific | 2 | 37% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 2 | *33%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South America | 0 | 0% |
| North & Central America | 2 | 70% |
| Asia, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| Far East Asia | 0 | 0% |
| Middle East | 0 | 0% |
| South & Central Asia | 0 | 0% |
| Europe | 1 | 29% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | - | 0% |
| Developmental Food Aid | - | 0% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | - | 0% |
| Education | 0 | 0% |
| Environment | 4 | 65% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | - | 0% |
| Health | - | 0% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 1 | 12% |
| Multi-sector | 1 | 22% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | - | 0% |
| Other Social infrastructure | - | 0% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | - | 0% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | - | 0% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | - | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 0 | 97% |
| Other | 0 | 3% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.10: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.20: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **278** | **-** |
| **World Bank Group** | **-** | **-** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **1** | **0** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | - | - |
| WFP | - | 0 |
| UNICEF | 0 | - |
| UNFPA | 0 | - |
| UNHCR | 1 | - |
| UNRWA | 0 | - |
| **Other UN** | **12** | **2** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 1 | - |
| IFAD | - | - |
| ILO | - | - |
| OHCHR | - | - |
| UNDPKO | 2 | - |
| UNECE | 0 | - |
| UNESCO | 2 | - |
| UN | 2 | - |
| UNOCHA | n/a | - |
| WHO | 2 | - |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **1** | **1** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | - | - |
| Asian Development Bank | - | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **4** | **3** |
| **Total** | **296** | **6** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Ireland

**Table B.21: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Ireland | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 30 | 29% |
| Country / region specific | 73 | 71% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 1 | *1%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 1 | 1% |
| South of Sahara | 49 | 67% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South America | 0 | 0% |
| North & Central America | 3 | 5% |
| Asia, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| Far East Asia | 11 | 16% |
| Middle East | 2 | 3% |
| South & Central Asia | 6 | 8% |
| Europe | 1 | 1% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 14 | 14% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 1 | 1% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 1 | 1% |
| Education | 6 | 5% |
| Environment | 0 | 0% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 12 | 12% |
| Health | 8 | 8% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 37 | 36% |
| Multi-sector | 1 | 1% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 2 | 2% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 17 | 16% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 4 | 4% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | - | 0% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 0 | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 57 | 80% |
| Other | 15 | 20% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.11: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.22: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **164** | **2** |
| **World Bank Group** | **26** | **24** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **51** | **44** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 12 | 27 |
| WFP | 13 | 7 |
| UNICEF | 11 | 9 |
| UNFPA | 4 | - |
| UNHCR | 8 | 0 |
| UNRWA | 4 | 0 |
| **Other UN** | **36** | **21** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 2 | 1 |
| IFAD | 3 | 3 |
| ILO | 1 | 6 |
| OHCHR | - | 1 |
| UNDPKO | 3 | - |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 1 | 0 |
| UN | 1 | 0 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 6 |
| WHO | 2 | 1 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **12** | **-** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | - | - |
| Asian Development Bank | 12 | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **21** | **12** |
| **Total** | **310** | **103** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Italy

**Table B.23: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Italy | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 22 | 24% |
| Country / region specific | 70 | 76% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 2 | *3%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South of Sahara | 16 | 23% |
| North of Sahara | 2 | 2% |
| Americas, unspecified | 2 | 2% |
| South America | 3 | 4% |
| North & Central America | 2 | 3% |
| Asia, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| Far East Asia | 3 | 4% |
| Middle East | 16 | 23% |
| South & Central Asia | 26 | 37% |
| Europe | 1 | 2% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 7 | 8% |
| Developmental Food Aid | - | 0% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 4 | 4% |
| Education | 3 | 3% |
| Environment | - | 0% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 21 | 23% |
| Health | 2 | 2% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 30 | 32% |
| Multi-sector | 16 | 18% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 4 | 4% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 2 | 2% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 2 | 3% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 1 | 1% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 0 | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 51 | 75% |
| Other | 17 | 25% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.12: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.24: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **1,557** | **-** |
| **World Bank Group** | **439** | **19** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **43** | **35** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 4 | 14 |
| WFP | 13 | 8 |
| UNICEF | 11 | 6 |
| UNFPA | 3 | 1 |
| UNHCR | 6 | 2 |
| UNRWA | 6 | 3 |
| **Other UN** | **127** | **20** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 21 | 6 |
| IFAD | 45 | 0 |
| ILO | 3 | 0 |
| OHCHR | - | - |
| UNDPKO | - | - |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | - | 0 |
| UN | 0 | - |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 1 |
| WHO | 28 | 1 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **6** | **-** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 5 | - |
| Asian Development Bank | - | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **65** | **18** |
| **Total** | **2,237** | **92** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Japan

**Table B.25: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Japan | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 45 | 4% |
| Country / region specific | 1,206 | 96% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 70 | *6%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 46 | 4% |
| South of Sahara | 295 | 26% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South America | 0 | 0% |
| North & Central America | 49 | 4% |
| Asia, unspecified | 20 | 2% |
| Far East Asia | 8 | 1% |
| Middle East | 35 | 3% |
| South & Central Asia | 741 | 64% |
| Europe | 1 | 0% |
| Oceania | 11 | 1% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 49 | 4% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 215 | 17% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 27 | 2% |
| Education | 68 | 5% |
| Environment | 2 | 0% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 388 | 31% |
| Health | 90 | 7% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 346 | 28% |
| Multi-sector | 41 | 3% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 5 | 0% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 19 | 1% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 1 | 0% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 1 | 0% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | - | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 1,104 | 97% |
| Other | 32 | 3% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.13: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.26: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **-** | **-** |
| **World Bank Group** | **1,931** | **-** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **159** | **1,005** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 75 | 331 |
| WFP | 7 | 295 |
| UNICEF | 16 | 197 |
| UNFPA | 26 | 2 |
| UNHCR | 16 | 131 |
| UNRWA | 18 | 7 |
| **Other UN** | **359** | **125** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 42 | 37 |
| IFAD | - | - |
| ILO | 37 | - |
| OHCHR | 0 | - |
| UNDPKO | 67 | - |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 26 | 26 |
| UN | 35 | 7 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 3 |
| WHO | 59 | 7 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **924** | **24** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 182 | 24 |
| Asian Development Bank | 719 | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | 23 | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **311** | **98** |
| **Total** | **3,684** | **1,251** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Korea

**Table B.27: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Korea | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 11 | 25% |
| Country / region specific | 34 | 75% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 29 | *65%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 7 | 30% |
| South of Sahara | 12 | 49% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South America | 0 | 1% |
| North & Central America | 1 | 3% |
| Asia, unspecified | 5 | 22% |
| Far East Asia | 0 | 2% |
| Middle East | 0 | 1% |
| South & Central Asia | 2 | 7% |
| Europe | 4 | 16% |
| Oceania | 2 | 9% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 0 | 0% |
| Developmental Food Aid | - | 0% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | - | 0% |
| Education | 1 | 2% |
| Environment | 0 | 0% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 1 | 3% |
| Health | 4 | 8% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 5 | 12% |
| Multi-sector | 25 | 56% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | - | 0% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 1 | 3% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 0 | 1% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | - | 0% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 7 | 15% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 3 | 72% |
| Other | 1 | 28% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.14: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.28: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **-** | **-** |
| **World Bank Group** | **111** | **2** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **11** | **14** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 6 | 7 |
| WFP | 0 | 3 |
| UNICEF | 3 | 3 |
| UNFPA | 0 | - |
| UNHCR | 3 | 1 |
| UNRWA | 0 | 0 |
| **Other UN** | **66** | **12** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 7 | 1 |
| IFAD | 2 | 0 |
| ILO | 5 | 2 |
| OHCHR | - | 0 |
| UNDPKO | 10 | - |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 5 | 1 |
| UN | 6 | 0 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 0 |
| WHO | 11 | 5 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **67** | **11** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 14 | 7 |
| Asian Development Bank | 43 | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | 8 | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **18** | **7** |
| **Total** | **273** | **45** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

# Luxembourg

**Table B.29: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Luxembourg | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 41 | 47% |
| Country / region specific | 46 | 53% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 8 | *9%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 6 | 14% |
| South of Sahara | 19 | 47% |
| North of Sahara | 1 | 2% |
| Americas, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South America | 1 | 2% |
| North & Central America | 3 | 7% |
| Asia, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| Far East Asia | 6 | 16% |
| Middle East | 2 | 5% |
| South & Central Asia | 5 | 12% |
| Europe | 4 | 9% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 2 | 2% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 1 | 2% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 4 | 4% |
| Education | 5 | 6% |
| Environment | 2 | 2% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 4 | 5% |
| Health | 15 | 17% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 21 | 24% |
| Multi-sector | 14 | 16% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 3 | 3% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 1 | 1% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 14 | 16% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 1 | 1% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | - | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 20 | 54% |
| Other | 18 | 46% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.15: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.30: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **36** | **3** |
| **World Bank Group** | **27** | **4** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **33** | **53** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 11 | 16 |
| WFP | 5 | 12 |
| UNICEF | 7 | 5 |
| UNFPA | 8 | 8 |
| UNHCR | 2 | 8 |
| UNRWA | - | 2 |
| **Other UN** | **28** | **24** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 0 | 3 |
| IFAD | 1 | 1 |
| ILO | - | 2 |
| OHCHR | 0 | - |
| UNDPKO | - | - |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 0 | - |
| UN | - | 0 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 0 |
| WHO | 11 | 13 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **6** | **1** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 0 | - |
| Asian Development Bank | 3 | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **11** | **3** |
| **Total** | **141** | **88** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Netherlands

**Table B.31: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Netherlands | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 257 | 36% |
| Country / region specific | 461 | 64% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 20 | *3%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 4 | 1% |
| South of Sahara | 195 | 43% |
| North of Sahara | 2 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South America | 8 | 2% |
| North & Central America | 16 | 3% |
| Asia, unspecified | 1 | 0% |
| Far East Asia | 57 | 13% |
| Middle East | 23 | 5% |
| South & Central Asia | 137 | 30% |
| Europe | 17 | 4% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 12 | 2% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 18 | 2% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 30 | 4% |
| Education | 146 | 20% |
| Environment | 8 | 1% |
| General Budget Support | 15 | 2% |
| Government and Civil Society | 167 | 23% |
| Health | 23 | 3% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 100 | 14% |
| Multi-sector | 65 | 9% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 6 | 1% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 20 | 3% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 46 | 6% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 58 | 8% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 4 | 1% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 322 | 73% |
| Other | 119 | 27% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Table B.16: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.32: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **610** | **8** |
| **World Bank Group** | **82** | **243** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **369** | **312** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 122 | 141 |
| WFP | 53 | 13 |
| UNICEF | 46 | 102 |
| UNFPA | 72 | 44 |
| UNHCR | 56 | 2 |
| UNRWA | 20 | 7 |
| **Other UN** | **207** | **104** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 5 | 10 |
| IFAD | 24 | 2 |
| ILO | 17 | 8 |
| OHCHR | 10 | 1 |
| UNDPKO | - | - |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 4 | 16 |
| UN | 6 | 1 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 9 |
| WHO | 16 | 11 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **92** | **20** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 0 | 1 |
| Asian Development Bank | - | 17 |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **155** | **32** |
| **Total** | **1,516** | **719** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## New Zealand

**Table B.33: 2010 non-core multilateral aid by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | New Zealand | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 1 | 3% |
| Country / region specific | 30 | 97% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 12 | *38%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South of Sahara | 4 | 31% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South America | 1 | 4% |
| North & Central America | 1 | 5% |
| Asia, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| Far East Asia | 6 | 39% |
| Middle East | 0 | 1% |
| South & Central Asia | 3 | 20% |
| Europe | 0 | 0% |
| Oceania | 16 | 107% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 0 | 1% |
| Developmental Food Aid | - | 0% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 5 | 15% |
| Education | 2 | 8% |
| Environment | 0 | 0% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 10 | 31% |
| Health | 3 | 8% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 6 | 18% |
| Multi-sector | 1 | 3% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 3 | 8% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 0 | 1% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 2 | 7% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 0 | 1% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | - | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 9 | 50% |
| Other | 9 | 50% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.17: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.34: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **-** | **-** |
| **World Bank Group** | **12** | **6** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **20** | **14** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 6 | 8 |
| WFP | - | 2 |
| UNICEF | 4 | 4 |
| UNFPA | 4 | - |
| UNHCR | 4 | - |
| UNRWA | 1 | - |
| **Other UN** | **15** | **4** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 1 | 0 |
| IFAD | - | - |
| ILO | 0 | - |
| OHCHR | 2 | - |
| UNDPKO | 1 | - |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 1 | 0 |
| UN | 1 | - |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 1 |
| WHO | 1 | 2 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **-** | **2** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | - | - |
| Asian Development Bank | - | 2 |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **24** | **5** |
| **Total** | **71** | **31** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Norway

**Table B.35: 2010 non-core multilateral aid by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Norway | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 437 | 42% |
| Country / region specific | 598 | 58% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 74 | *7%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 48 | 9% |
| South of Sahara | 160 | 29% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 1 | 0% |
| South America | 35 | 6% |
| North & Central America | 58 | 11% |
| Asia, unspecified | 7 | 1% |
| Far East Asia | 40 | 7% |
| Middle East | 73 | 13% |
| South & Central Asia | 157 | 29% |
| Europe | 17 | 3% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 13 | 1% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 1 | 0% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 40 | 4% |
| Education | 126 | 12% |
| Environment | 77 | 7% |
| General Budget Support | 60 | 6% |
| Government and Civil Society | 189 | 18% |
| Health | 22 | 2% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 123 | 12% |
| Multi-sector | 144 | 14% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 180 | 17% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 16 | 2% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 17 | 2% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 28 | 3% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 0 | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 412 | 79% |
| Other | 112 | 21% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.18: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.36: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| **Total use of the multilateral system in 2010** | **Core** | **Non-Core** |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **-** | **0** |
| **World Bank Group** | **147** | **320** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **359** | **460** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 127 | 227 |
| WFP | 24 | 18 |
| UNICEF | 74 | 144 |
| UNFPA | 55 | 19 |
| UNHCR | 54 | 26 |
| UNRWA | 25 | 12 |
| **Other UN** | **218** | **149** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 2 | 20 |
| IFAD | 13 | 0 |
| ILO | 0 | 15 |
| OHCHR | 26 | 8 |
| UNDPKO | - | 1 |
| UNECE | - | 0 |
| UNESCO | 1 | 10 |
| UN | 2 | 2 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 20 |
| WHO | 42 | 13 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **95** | **45** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 83 | 40 |
| Asian Development Bank | 12 | 1 |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **200** | **61** |
| **Total** | **1,019** | **1,035** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Portugal

**Table B.37: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Portugal | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 3 | 5% |
| Country / region specific | 48 | 95% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 3 | *6%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South of Sahara | 3 | 7% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 1 | 2% |
| South America | 0 | 0% |
| North & Central America | 0 | 0% |
| Asia, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| Far East Asia | 12 | 26% |
| Middle East | 0 | 0% |
| South & Central Asia | 14 | 30% |
| Europe | 17 | 35% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 0 | 0% |
| Developmental Food Aid | - | 0% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 0 | 1% |
| Education | 0 | 0% |
| Environment | 0 | 0% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 46 | 91% |
| Health | - | 0% |
| Humanitarian Aid | - | 0% |
| Multi-sector | 2 | 4% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 0 | 1% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 2 | 3% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 0 | 0% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | - | 0% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | - | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 33 | 72% |
| Other | 12 | 28% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.19: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.38: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **185** | **5** |
| **World Bank Group** | **21** | **-** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **4** | **2** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 2 | 2 |
| WFP | - | - |
| UNICEF | 0 | - |
| UNFPA | - | 0 |
| UNHCR | 2 | - |
| UNRWA | 0 | - |
| **Other UN** | **10** | **42** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 1 | 0 |
| IFAD | - | - |
| ILO | 1 | 1 |
| OHCHR | 0 | - |
| UNDPKO | 1 | 38 |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 1 | - |
| UN | 1 | - |
| UNOCHA | n/a | - |
| WHO | 2 | - |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **28** | **-** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 16 | - |
| Asian Development Bank | 6 | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **5** | **2** |
| **Total** | **253** | **51** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Spain

**Table B.39: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Spain | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 549 | 41% |
| Country / region specific | 792 | 59% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 543 | *40%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 57 | 8% |
| South of Sahara | 188 | 26% |
| North of Sahara | 13 | 2% |
| Americas, unspecified | 278 | 38% |
| South America | 35 | 5% |
| North & Central America | 90 | 12% |
| Asia, unspecified | 3 | 0% |
| Far East Asia | 25 | 3% |
| Middle East | 24 | 3% |
| South & Central Asia | 67 | 9% |
| Europe | 6 | 1% |
| Oceania | 5 | 1% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 409 | 30% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 6 | 0% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 88 | 7% |
| Education | 114 | 9% |
| Environment | 92 | 7% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 135 | 10% |
| Health | 17 | 1% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 164 | 12% |
| Multi-sector | 124 | 9% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 34 | 3% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 29 | 2% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 25 | 2% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 101 | 8% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 2 | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 198 | 79% |
| Other | 52 | 21% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.20: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.40: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **1,012** | **18** |
| **World Bank Group** | **272** | **204** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **150** | **329** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 49 | 72 |
| WFP | 24 | 54 |
| UNICEF | 32 | 107 |
| UNFPA | 21 | 22 |
| UNHCR | 14 | 24 |
| UNRWA | 11 | 10 |
| **Other UN** | **137** | **463** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 0 | 37 |
| IFAD | - | 379 |
| ILO | 7 | 8 |
| OHCHR | 3 | 2 |
| UNDPKO | 2 | - |
| UNECE | - | 0 |
| UNESCO | 8 | 9 |
| UN | 9 | 0 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 5 |
| WHO | 27 | 1 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **165** | **212** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 57 | 13 |
| Asian Development Bank | 40 | 1 |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **214** | **115** |
| **Total** | **1,951** | **1,341** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Sweden

**Table B.41: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Sweden | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 198 | 27% |
| Country / region specific | 539 | 73% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 95 | *13%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 39 | 8% |
| South of Sahara | 194 | 39% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 1 | 0% |
| South America | 11 | 2% |
| North & Central America | 38 | 8% |
| Asia, unspecified | 10 | 2% |
| Far East Asia | 25 | 5% |
| Middle East | 32 | 6% |
| South & Central Asia | 108 | 22% |
| Europe | 80 | 16% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 5 | 1% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 6 | 1% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 50 | 7% |
| Education | 77 | 10% |
| Environment | 50 | 7% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 204 | 28% |
| Health | 28 | 4% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 180 | 24% |
| Multi-sector | 57 | 8% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 26 | 3% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 6 | 1% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 22 | 3% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 18 | 3% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 8 | 1% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 338 | 76% |
| Other | 106 | 24% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.21: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.42: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **394** | **13** |
| **World Bank Group** | **299** | **7** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **415** | **265** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 87 | 139 |
| WFP | 67 | 14 |
| UNICEF | 65 | 59 |
| UNFPA | 59 | 4 |
| UNHCR | 89 | 22 |
| UNRWA | 48 | 8 |
| **Other UN** | **251** | **91** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 3 | 22 |
| IFAD | 33 | - |
| ILO | 2 | 4 |
| OHCHR | - | - |
| UNDPKO | 6 | 7 |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 2 | 3 |
| UN | 3 | 1 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 20 |
| WHO | 9 | 17 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **25** | **4** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 6 | - |
| Asian Development Bank | 15 | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **234** | **356** |
| **Total** | **1,618** | **737** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## Switzerland

**Table B.43: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | Switzerland | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 70 | 24% |
| Country / region specific | 222 | 76% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 35 | *12%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 4 | 2% |
| South of Sahara | 50 | 23% |
| North of Sahara | 6 | 3% |
| Americas, unspecified | 2 | 1% |
| South America | 8 | 4% |
| North & Central America | 8 | 4% |
| Asia, unspecified | 3 | 1% |
| Far East Asia | 26 | 12% |
| Middle East | 17 | 8% |
| South & Central Asia | 42 | 19% |
| Europe | 54 | 25% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 17 | 6% |
| Developmental Food Aid | - | 0% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 37 | 13% |
| Education | 5 | 2% |
| Environment | 12 | 4% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 87 | 30% |
| Health | 1 | 0% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 71 | 24% |
| Multi-sector | 26 | 9% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 19 | 6% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 0 | 0% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 3 | 1% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 14 | 5% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 0 | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 116 | 62% |
| Other | 70 | 38% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.22: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.44: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **-** | **6** |
| **World Bank Group** | **271** | **66** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **108** | **86** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 52 | 21 |
| WFP | 2 | 39 |
| UNICEF | 19 | 5 |
| UNFPA | 13 | 0 |
| UNHCR | 11 | 12 |
| UNRWA | 11 | 6 |
| **Other UN** | **60** | **45** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 3 | 3 |
| IFAD | 7 | 3 |
| ILO | 3 | 3 |
| OHCHR | 0 | 1 |
| UNDPKO | 6 | 2 |
| UNECE | - | 0 |
| UNESCO | 3 | 2 |
| UN | 3 | 0 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 4 |
| WHO | 5 | 2 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **68** | **6** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 56 | 1 |
| Asian Development Bank | 13 | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **80** | **84** |
| **Total** | **588** | **292** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## United Kingdom

**Table B.45: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status**
(in 2010 USD million)

| | United Kingdom | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 1,564 | 53% |
| Country / region specific | 1,397 | 47% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 251 | *8%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 101 | 8% |
| South of Sahara | 748 | 58% |
| North of Sahara | 0 | 0% |
| Americas, unspecified | 1 | 0% |
| South America | 1 | 0% |
| North & Central America | 31 | 2% |
| Asia, unspecified | 5 | 0% |
| Far East Asia | 65 | 5% |
| Middle East | 113 | 9% |
| South & Central Asia | 320 | 25% |
| Europe | 11 | 1% |
| Oceania | 0 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 43 | 1% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 2 | 0% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 165 | 6% |
| Education | 194 | 7% |
| Environment | 814 | 27% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 327 | 11% |
| Health | 274 | 9% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 338 | 11% |
| Multi-sector | 91 | 3% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 150 | 5% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 284 | 10% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 176 | 6% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 103 | 3% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | - | 0% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 978 | 85% |
| Other | 168 | 15% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

**Figure B.23 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)





**Table B.46: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA**
(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **2,009** | **55** |
| **World Bank Group** | **1,441** | **1,632** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **219** | **754** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 85 | 288 |
| WFP | - | 140 |
| UNICEF | 32 | 215 |
| UNFPA | 31 | 72 |
| UNHCR | 29 | 23 |
| UNRWA | 42 | 3 |
| **Other UN** | **354** | **261** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 33 | 20 |
| IFAD | 13 | - |
| ILO | 15 | - |
| OHCHR | 2 | 0 |
| UNDPKO | 33 | 5 |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 14 | 2 |
| UN | 17 | 0 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 23 |
| WHO | 44 | 156 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **324** | **162** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 225 | 27 |
| Asian Development Bank | 67 | 10 |
| Inter-American Development Bank | - | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **690** | **98** |
| **Total** | **5,037** | **2,961** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

## United States

### Table B.47: 2010 non-core multilateral ODA by region, sector and fragility status


(in 2010 USD million)

| | United States | |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral, unallocated / unspecified | 1,427 | 33% |
| Country / region specific | 2,956 | 67% |
| *- of which regional allocations* | 373 | *9%* |
| **REGIONS** | | |
| Africa, unspecified | 0 | 0% |
| South of Sahara | 1564 | 53% |
| North of Sahara | 17 | 1% |
| Americas, unspecified | 8 | 0% |
| South America | 87 | 3% |
| North & Central America | 173 | 6% |
| Asia, unspecified | 18 | 1% |
| Far East Asia | 116 | 4% |
| Middle East | 112 | 4% |
| South & Central Asia | 795 | 27% |
| Europe | 65 | 2% |
| Oceania | 1 | 0% |
| **SECTORS** | | |
| Agriculture | 173 | 4% |
| Developmental Food Aid | 108 | 2% |
| Economic Infrastructure and Services | 30 | 1% |
| Education | 55 | 1% |
| Environment | 408 | 9% |
| General Budget Support | - | 0% |
| Government and Civil Society | 282 | 6% |
| Health | 258 | 6% |
| Humanitarian Aid | 2,689 | 61% |
| Multi-sector | 10 | 0% |
| Other Production Sectors (forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade policy, tourism) | 7 | 0% |
| Other Social infrastructure | 144 | 3% |
| Population Policies and Reproductive Health | 99 | 2% |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 2 | 0% |
| Other (admin., promotion development awareness, refugeees in donor countries) | 118 | 3% |
| **FRAGILE / CONFLICT*** | | |
| Fragile | 2,254 | 87% |
| Other | 329 | 13% |

*Source: OECD (2012a)*

### Figure B.24: 2010 multilateral and non-multilateral ODA

(in 2010 USD million)




### Table B.48: 2010 multilateral and non-core multilateral ODA

(in 2010 USD million)

| Total use of the multilateral system in 2010 | Core | Non-Core |
|---|---|---|
| **EU** | **-** | **0** |
| **World Bank Group** | **1,263** | **687** |
| **UN Funds and Programmes*** | **288** | **2,818** |
| *of which:* | | |
| UNDP | 101 | 91 |
| WFP | - | 1,546 |
| UNICEF | 132 | 174 |
| UNFPA | 55 | 1 |
| UNHCR | - | 709 |
| UNRWA | - | 278 |
| **Other UN** | **660** | **429** |
| *of which:* | | |
| FAO | 57 | 101 |
| IFAD | 30 | - |
| ILO | 50 | 51 |
| OHCHR | 7 | 2 |
| UNDPKO | 144 | - |
| UNECE | - | - |
| UNESCO | 50 | 1 |
| UN | 72 | 1 |
| UNOCHA | n/a | 31 |
| WHO | 81 | 202 |
| **Regional Development Banks** | **389** | **7** |
| *of which:* | | |
| African Development Bank | 155 | 1 |
| Asian Development Bank | - | - |
| Inter-American Development Bank | 234 | - |
| **Other multilaterals** | **1,176** | **442** |
| **Total** | **3,775** | **4,383** |

*Source: OECD (2012a, 2012b)*

**ANNEX C**

# Table C.1: Global Bilateral Donor Fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2010 disbursements in current USD

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country)

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

| Row | Partner countries | Number of donors | Number of significant relations | Number of non-significant relations | *Fragmentation ratio (in %)* | CPA (USD million) | Australia | Austria | Belgium | Canada | Denmark | Finland | France | Germany | Greece | Ireland | Italy | Japan | Korea | Luxembourg | Netherlands | New Zealand | Norway | Portugal | Spain | Sweden | Switzerland | United Kingdom | United States | DAC countries | No. of DAC countries | Multilateral agencies | No. of multilateral agencies | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Column 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | Number of partner countries | | | | | | 67 | 28 | 37 | 57 | 71 | 79 | 120 | 112 | 24 | 38 | 86 | 140 | 79 | 56 | 65 | 35 | 87 | 13 | 77 | 91 | 90 | 89 | 129 | 1670 | | 1657 | | 3327 |
| 3 | Number of significant relations | | | | | | 30 | 21 | 18 | 20 | 27 | 27 | 63 | 85 | 17 | 17 | 39 | 111 | 30 | 24 | 25 | 18 | 32 | 8 | 43 | 41 | 42 | 33 | 113 | 884 | | 967 | | 1851 |
| 4 | Number of non-significant relations | | | | | | 37 | 7 | 19 | 37 | 44 | 52 | 57 | 27 | 7 | 21 | 47 | 29 | 49 | 32 | 40 | 17 | 55 | 5 | 34 | 50 | 48 | 56 | 16 | 786 | | 690 | | 1476 |
| 5 | *Concentration ratio (in %)* | | | | | | *45* | *75* | *49* | *35* | *38* | *34* | *53* | *76* | *71* | *45* | *45* | *79* | *38* | *43* | *38* | *51* | *37* | *62* | *56* | *45* | *47* | *37* | *88* | *53* | | *58* | | *56* |
| 6 | CPA (USD million) | | | | | | 1817 | 79 | 447 | 978 | 1145 | 319 | 4767 | 4369 | 48 | 286 | 496 | 12139 | 827 | 159 | 1002 | 162 | 1221 | 354 | 1614 | 1160 | 658 | 3336 | 17209 | 54592 | | 41556 | | 96148 |
| 7 | Average CPA (USD million) | | | | | | 27 | 3 | 12 | 17 | 16 | 4 | 40 | 39 | 2 | 8 | 6 | 87 | 10 | 3 | 15 | 5 | 14 | 27 | 21 | 13 | 7 | 37 | 133 | 33 | | 25 | | 633 |
| 8 | Donors' share of global CPA (in %) | | | | | | 1.9 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 12.6 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 0.4 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 0.7 | 3.5 | 17.9 | 56.8 | | 43.2 | | 100.0 |
| | | | | | | | % | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | % | No. | % | No. | |
| | **Europe** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Albania | 28 | 13 | 15 | *54* | 313 | - | 0.8 | - | - | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 11.6 | 3.1 | - | 19.4 | 2.0 | - | - | 0.5 | - | 0.5 | - | 1.4 | 3.5 | 4.4 | 0.3 | 9.6 | 58.0 | 15 | 42.0 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Belarus | 18 | 12 | 6 | *33* | 102 | - | - | - | - | 1.7 | 0.2 | - | 7.7 | - | - | - | 0.4 | - | - | - | - | 2.2 | - | - | 16.9 | 0.7 | - | 29.1 | 58.9 | 8 | 41.1 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Bosnia-Herzegovina | 28 | 16 | 12 | *43* | 445 | - | 1.2 | - | - | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 4.2 | 0.1 | - | 0.9 | 0.7 | 5.6 | - | 2.1 | - | 4.0 | - | 4.6 | 5.8 | 3.2 | 2.4 | 6.4 | 42.2 | 16 | 57.8 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | Croatia | 15 | 4 | 11 | *73* | 137 | - | - | - | - | 0.4 | 0.2 | 1.7 | 14.8 | - | - | - | 0.5 | - | - | - | - | 2.5 | - | 0.2 | - | - | 0.8 | 0.8 | 21.9 | 9 | 78.1 | 6 | 100.0 |
| | Kosovo | 22 | 10 | 12 | *55* | 544 | - | 0.3 | - | - | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 4.9 | - | - | 0.3 | 0.2 | - | 1.3 | 0.3 | - | 3.8 | - | - | 2.2 | 9.6 | 1.7 | 13.9 | 39.9 | 14 | 60.1 | 8 | 100.0 |
| | Macedonia, FYR | 21 | 11 | 10 | *48* | 150 | - | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | 1.1 | 6.6 | 0.3 | - | 2.1 | 17.1 | - | - | - | - | 4.0 | - | - | 4.4 | 6.5 | 0.8 | 13.8 | 56.9 | 11 | 43.1 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Moldova | 28 | 12 | 16 | *57* | 437 | - | 0.4 | - | - | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 1.5 | 0.1 | - | 0.2 | 0.2 | - | 0.1 | 0.8 | - | 0.7 | - | - | 2.8 | 1.9 | 3.1 | 4.9 | 17.5 | 15 | 82.5 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Montenegro | 21 | 16 | 5 | *24* | 66 | - | 2.6 | - | - | 1.1 | - | 0.6 | 24.5 | - | - | 0.6 | 1.0 | - | 9.2 | 0.7 | - | 4.7 | - | 6.9 | 2.0 | - | - | 10.3 | 64.1 | 12 | 35.9 | 9 | 100.0 |
| | Serbia | 27 | 12 | 15 | *56* | 640 | - | 0.7 | 0.1 | - | - | 0.1 | 2.0 | 21.3 | 1.8 | - | 0.3 | 0.8 | - | 0.1 | 0.4 | - | 2.9 | 1.8 | 0.3 | 2.7 | 1.7 | 0.7 | 9.0 | 46.9 | 17 | 53.1 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Turkey | 21 | 5 | 16 | *76* | 1310 | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | - | 8.5 | 3.8 | 0.4 | - | - | 56.5 | 0.8 | - | 0.0 | - | - | - | 4.4 | 0.5 | - | 0.3 | 1.1 | 76.5 | 11 | 23.5 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Ukraine | 24 | 11 | 13 | *54* | 519 | - | - | - | 2.9 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 9.0 | 0.2 | - | - | 10.1 | 0.3 | - | - | - | 0.7 | - | - | 5.9 | 1.3 | 0.2 | 28.0 | 60.4 | 13 | 39.6 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | **North of Sahara** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Algeria | 20 | 12 | 8 | *40* | 154 | - | - | 4.9 | 0.6 | - | - | 16.0 | 6.9 | - | - | 3.2 | 10.1 | 1.9 | - | - | - | 0.5 | - | 10.0 | 1.0 | - | 1.3 | 1.3 | 57.5 | 12 | 42.5 | 8 | 100.0 |
| | Egypt | 30 | 9 | 21 | *70* | 1108 | 0.4 | - | - | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 12.5 | 9.9 | 0.7 | - | 0.5 | 15.1 | 0.4 | - | 0.9 | - | 0.1 | - | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 25.1 | 68.5 | 17 | 31.5 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Libya | 10 | 9 | 1 | *10* | 35 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.8 | - | - | - | 1.5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.5 | 18.6 | 29.3 | 4 | 70.7 | 6 | 100.0 |
| | Morocco | 25 | 10 | 15 | *60* | 1214 | - | - | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 22.8 | 5.2 | - | - | 1.0 | 14.4 | 0.3 | - | 0.1 | - | - | - | 8.3 | - | 0.2 | 0.2 | 5.9 | 59.9 | 14 | 40.1 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Tunisia | 19 | 9 | 10 | *53* | 755 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 18.8 | 4.6 | - | - | 3.3 | 15.7 | 0.7 | - | - | - | - | - | 21.7 | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 65.1 | 9 | 34.9 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | **South of Sahara** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Angola | 29 | 20 | 9 | *31* | 251 | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 0.8 | 1.9 | 1.6 | - | - | 1.6 | 10.0 | 7.6 | - | 0.3 | - | 3.2 | 5.4 | 3.0 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 19.7 | 56.2 | 15 | 43.8 | 14 | 100.0 |

| Row | Partner countries | Number of donors | Number of significant relations | Number of non-significant relations | *Fragmentation ratio (in %)* | CPA (USD million) | Australia | Austria | Belgium | Canada | Denmark | Finland | France | Germany | Greece | Ireland | Italy | Japan | Korea | Luxembourg | Netherlands | New Zealand | Norway | Portugal | Spain | Sweden | Switzerland | United Kingdom | United States | DAC countries | No. of DAC countries | Multilateral agencies | No. of multilateral agencies | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Column 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | % | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | % | No. | % | No. | |
| | Benin | 28 | 19 | 9 | 32 | 673 | - | - | 2.9 | 0.4 | 5.7 | - | 5.6 | 4.5 | - | - | 0.2 | 4.3 | - | 0.2 | 4.3 | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 1.6 | - | 14.6 | 44.5 | 12 | 55.5 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Botswana | 19 | 11 | 8 | 42 | 162 | 0.4 | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | 3.9 | 0.9 | - | - | - | 9.6 | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | 2.9 | - | 0.4 | 46.0 | 64.7 | 9 | 35.3 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Burkina Faso | 32 | 20 | 12 | 38 | 1023 | - | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.5 | 3.1 | - | 5.8 | 4.5 | - | - | 0.3 | 3.8 | 0.0 | 1.4 | 4.3 | - | 0.0 | - | 0.7 | 3.1 | 2.4 | - | 5.4 | 37.7 | 16 | 62.3 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Burundi | 32 | 23 | 9 | 28 | 607 | - | 0.1 | 6.4 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 2.0 | 4.1 | - | - | 0.9 | 5.2 | - | 0.1 | 1.1 | - | 0.9 | - | - | 1.3 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 6.5 | 33.0 | 16 | 67.0 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Cameroon | 28 | 17 | 11 | 39 | 542 | - | - | 0.1 | 1.0 | - | 0.1 | 27.8 | 6.0 | - | - | 0.8 | 6.6 | 0.5 | - | - | - | - | - | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 2.2 | 46.5 | 13 | 53.5 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Cape Verde | 21 | 12 | 9 | 43 | 326 | - | 1.3 | - | - | - | - | 0.9 | 0.1 | - | - | - | 5.3 | - | 4.1 | 1.3 | - | - | 39.4 | 5.8 | - | 0.2 | - | 11.4 | 69.9 | 10 | 30.1 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Central African Rep. | 29 | 18 | 11 | 38 | 213 | - | - | 0.3 | 0.5 | - | 0.7 | 6.2 | 0.9 | - | 1.6 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | 0.9 | 1.6 | 0.3 | - | 2.6 | 17.1 | 14 | 82.9 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Chad | 33 | 18 | 15 | 45 | 522 | - | - | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 6.2 | 2.8 | - | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.2 | - | 0.1 | 0.9 | - | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 0.3 | 5.0 | 22.3 | 18 | 77.7 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Comoros | 15 | 11 | 4 | 27 | 45 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 27.9 | - | - | - | - | 0.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.7 | 29.3 | 3 | 70.7 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | Congo, Dem. Rep. | 35 | 18 | 17 | 49 | 1996 | 0.1 | - | 4.6 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 2.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 2.6 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.4 | - | 0.9 | - | 0.4 | 2.2 | 0.2 | 3.8 | 8.3 | 29.1 | 20 | 70.9 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Congo, Rep. | 20 | 13 | 7 | 35 | 132 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 8.5 | 1.5 | - | - | - | 0.4 | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | - | 2.0 | 12.7 | 5 | 87.3 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Cote d'Ivoire | 31 | 13 | 18 | 58 | 621 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 3.2 | 2.3 | - | 0.1 | 0.2 | 5.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | - | - | 0.3 | - | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 11.7 | 24.3 | 14 | 75.7 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Djibouti | 19 | 12 | 7 | 37 | 132 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 31.1 | - | - | - | 0.3 | 25.9 | 0.2 | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | - | 7.6 | 65.4 | 6 | 34.6 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Equatorial Guinea | 9 | 6 | 3 | 33 | 31 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7.5 | - | - | - | - | 1.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 59.6 | - | 1.7 | - | - | 69.9 | 4 | 30.1 | 5 | 100.0 |
| | Eritrea | 22 | 14 | 8 | 36 | 140 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.2 | - | 0.2 | 0.2 | 5.8 | - | - | - | - | 1.0 | - | - | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.7 | - | 10.9 | 10 | 89.1 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | Ethiopia | 38 | 16 | 22 | 58 | 3390 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 2.2 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.7 | - | 0.5 | - | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 8.5 | 16.9 | 36.0 | 21 | 64.0 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Gabon | 13 | 8 | 5 | 38 | 93 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 47.2 | - | - | - | - | 28.3 | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.6 | 77.4 | 4 | 22.6 | 9 | 100.0 |
| | Gambia | 21 | 15 | 6 | 29 | 124 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.4 | - | - | - | - | 13.7 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2.5 | 0.7 | - | 1.6 | 5.0 | 23.8 | 6 | 76.2 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Ghana | 33 | 17 | 16 | 48 | 1670 | 0.0 | - | 1.5 | 4.7 | 5.7 | 0.0 | 2.7 | 3.0 | - | - | 0.1 | 4.1 | 0.3 | - | 4.2 | - | 0.2 | - | 1.1 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 8.5 | 12.3 | 49.3 | 17 | 50.7 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Guinea | 24 | 15 | 9 | 38 | 224 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 8.5 | 5.1 | - | 0.3 | 0.1 | 1.7 | - | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.4 | - | 8.0 | 25.3 | 10 | 74.7 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Guinea-Bissau | 21 | 15 | 6 | 29 | 119 | - | - | - | - | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.4 | 0.3 | - | - | - | 2.5 | - | - | - | - | - | 11.4 | 4.2 | - | 0.4 | - | 5.3 | 26.8 | 9 | 73.2 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | Kenya | 36 | 19 | 17 | 47 | 1797 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 3.1 | 0.9 | 7.4 | 4.0 | - | 0.2 | 0.7 | 5.0 | 0.2 | - | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.4 | - | 0.4 | 2.1 | 0.1 | 4.4 | 25.2 | 54.9 | 20 | 45.1 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Lesotho | 23 | 12 | 11 | 48 | 272 | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.5 | - | 5.1 | - | 2.3 | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | - | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 21.1 | 31.7 | 9 | 68.3 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Liberia | 29 | 17 | 12 | 41 | 491 | - | - | - | - | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 2.1 | - | 1.5 | 0.4 | 0.9 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 4.0 | - | 0.1 | 3.9 | 0.7 | 2.8 | 25.4 | 43.5 | 14 | 56.5 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Madagascar | 25 | 19 | 6 | 24 | 453 | - | - | 0.1 | - | - | 0.1 | 15.8 | 2.1 | - | - | 0.7 | 2.1 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 1.4 | - | - | 0.2 | 1.5 | 0.2 | 15.8 | 40.0 | 12 | 60.0 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Malawi | 29 | 16 | 13 | 45 | 982 | 0.2 | - | - | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.2 | - | 4.1 | - | 1.1 | 0.2 | 6.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 | - | - | 5.5 | - | - | 0.3 | - | 14.9 | 12.5 | 46.7 | 14 | 53.3 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Mali | 32 | 19 | 13 | 41 | 1048 | - | - | 1.4 | 7.4 | 2.9 | 0.1 | 6.3 | 5.5 | - | - | 0.2 | 3.5 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 4.9 | - | 0.2 | - | 1.7 | 2.4 | 1.5 | - | 18.2 | 57.4 | 16 | 42.6 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Mauritania | 23 | 14 | 9 | 39 | 366 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 8.7 | 2.4 | - | - | 0.6 | 3.9 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 8.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | - | 2.7 | 26.6 | 8 | 73.4 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Mauritius | 13 | 5 | 8 | 62 | 128 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 41.0 | - | - | - | - | 0.4 | - | 0.3 | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.4 | 42.3 | 5 | 57.7 | 8 | 100.0 |
| | Mayotte | 2 | 1 | 1 | 50 | 611 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 99.8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 99.8 | 1 | 0.2 | 1 | 100.0 |
| | Mozambique | 37 | 24 | 13 | 35 | 1909 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 3.5 | 4.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 3.9 | - | 2.6 | 1.7 | 3.0 | 0.0 | - | 4.0 | - | 3.5 | 5.8 | 1.7 | 4.3 | 1.5 | 5.4 | 14.2 | 65.3 | 20 | 34.7 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Namibia | 22 | 13 | 9 | 41 | 259 | - | - | - | - | - | 1.2 | 0.5 | 9.0 | - | - | - | 15.6 | - | 4.0 | 0.6 | - | 0.3 | - | 3.3 | 1.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 45.2 | 81.4 | 12 | 18.6 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Niger | 32 | 21 | 11 | 34 | 689 | - | - | 3.9 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 0.1 | 5.7 | 2.7 | - | 0.2 | 0.4 | 3.4 | 0.2 | 0.6 | - | - | 0.1 | - | 2.3 | 0.8 | 2.2 | 0.5 | 8.0 | 32.9 | 17 | 67.1 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Nigeria | 31 | 9 | 22 | 71 | 2004 | 0.0 | - | - | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 1.4 | - | 0.0 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 0.2 | - | 0.5 | - | 0.7 | - | - | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.7 | 22.1 | 36.7 | 16 | 63.3 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Rwanda | 32 | 16 | 16 | 50 | 949 | - | 0.1 | 6.1 | 0.6 | 0.1 | - | 0.2 | 4.4 | - | 0.0 | 0.1 | 2.2 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 3.9 | - | - | 0.1 | - | 2.2 | 0.5 | 10.8 | 14.2 | 46.9 | 17 | 53.1 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Sao Tome & Principe | 16 | 10 | 6 | 38 | 46 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3.3 | - | - | - | - | 7.8 | - | - | - | - | - | 48.2 | 2.7 | - | - | - | - | 62.0 | 4 | 38.0 | 12 | 100.0 |

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country)

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

| Row | Partner countries | Number of donors | Number of significant relations | Number of non-significant relations | *Fragmentation ratio (in %)* | CPA (USD million) | Australia | Austria | Belgium | Canada | Denmark | Finland | France | Germany | Greece | Ireland | Italy | Japan | Korea | Luxembourg | Netherlands | New Zealand | Norway | Portugal | Spain | Sweden | Switzerland | United Kingdom | United States | DAC countries | No. of DAC countries | Multilateral agencies | No. of multilateral agencies | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Column 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | Number of partner countries | | | | | | 67 | 28 | 37 | 57 | 71 | 79 | 120 | 112 | 24 | 38 | 86 | 140 | 79 | 56 | 65 | 35 | 87 | 13 | 77 | 91 | 90 | 89 | 129 | 1670 | | 1657 | | 3327 |
| 3 | Number of significant relations | | | | | | 30 | 21 | 18 | 20 | 27 | 27 | 63 | 85 | 17 | 17 | 39 | 111 | 30 | 24 | 25 | 18 | 32 | 8 | 43 | 41 | 42 | 33 | 113 | 884 | | 967 | | 1851 |
| 4 | Number of non-significant relations | | | | | | 37 | 7 | 19 | 37 | 44 | 52 | 57 | 27 | 7 | 21 | 47 | 29 | 49 | 32 | 40 | 17 | 55 | 5 | 34 | 50 | 48 | 56 | 16 | 786 | | 690 | | 1476 |
| 5 | *Concentration ratio (in %)* | | | | | | *45* | *75* | *49* | *35* | *38* | *34* | *53* | *76* | *71* | *45* | *45* | *79* | *38* | *43* | *38* | *51* | *37* | *62* | *56* | *45* | *47* | *37* | *88* | *53* | | *58* | | *56* |
| 6 | CPA (USD million) | | | | | | 1817 | 79 | 447 | 978 | 1145 | 319 | 4767 | 4369 | 48 | 286 | 496 | 12139 | 827 | 159 | 1002 | 162 | 1221 | 354 | 1614 | 1160 | 658 | 3336 | 17209 | 54592 | | 41556 | | 96148 |
| 7 | Average CPA (USD million) | | | | | | 27 | 3 | 12 | 17 | 16 | 4 | 40 | 39 | 2 | 8 | 6 | 87 | 10 | 3 | 15 | 5 | 14 | 27 | 21 | 13 | 7 | 37 | 133 | 33 | | 25 | | 633 |
| 8 | Donors' share of global CPA (in %) | | | | | | 1.9 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 12.6 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 0.4 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 0.7 | 3.5 | 17.9 | 56.8 | | 43.2 | | 100.0 |
| | | | | | | | % | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | % | No. | % | No. | |
| | Senegal | 34 | 22 | 12 | *35* | 842 | - | 0.1 | 1.3 | 4.0 | - | 0.1 | 13.2 | 2.5 | - | - | 0.7 | 6.5 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.4 | - | - | 0.0 | 3.8 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 11.5 | 50.0 | 17 | 50.0 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Seychelles | 9 | 8 | 1 | *11* | 19 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10.6 | 2.7 | - | - | 1.8 | 23.7 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 38.7 | 4 | 61.3 | 5 | 100.0 |
| | Sierra Leone | 28 | 20 | 8 | *29* | 424 | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | 0.4 | 0.1 | 2.5 | - | 0.4 | - | 2.9 | - | - | 0.3 | - | 0.5 | - | - | 0.2 | - | 12.0 | 6.8 | 26.1 | 11 | 73.9 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Somalia | 28 | 19 | 9 | *32* | 477 | 0.7 | - | 1.2 | 0.8 | 2.8 | 1.6 | 0.7 | 1.4 | - | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.2 | - | 0.2 | 0.4 | - | 4.4 | - | 0.6 | 3.4 | 1.1 | 7.2 | 7.0 | 36.8 | 18 | 63.2 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | South Africa | 33 | 14 | 19 | *58* | 1016 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0.4 | 8.0 | 5.4 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.4 | - | 0.8 | - | 0.1 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 2.5 | 52.1 | 79.1 | 21 | 20.9 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | St. Helena | 1 | 1 | 0 | *0* | 54 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 100.0 | - | 100.0 | 1 | 0.0 | 0 | 100.0 |
| | Sudan | 35 | 19 | 16 | *46* | 1981 | 0.4 | - | 0.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 2.8 | 0.0 | 0.1 | - | - | 2.4 | - | 0.3 | 1.5 | 0.4 | 3.0 | 20.8 | 36.3 | 19 | 63.7 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Swaziland | 15 | 7 | 8 | *53* | 94 | 0.4 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | 0.4 | 4.5 | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | - | 25.4 | 31.3 | 6 | 68.7 | 9 | 100.0 |
| | Tanzania | 35 | 19 | 16 | *46* | 2879 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 3.1 | 4.3 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 4.4 | - | 1.5 | 0.2 | 3.5 | 0.7 | - | 2.0 | - | 3.5 | - | - | 2.9 | 0.5 | 7.5 | 15.2 | 52.3 | 18 | 47.7 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Togo | 24 | 15 | 9 | *38* | 214 | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 0.2 | 8.5 | 1.2 | - | - | 0.7 | 3.1 | - | 0.4 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 0.4 | - | 1.7 | 16.6 | 10 | 83.4 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Uganda | 37 | 23 | 14 | *38* | 1675 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 4.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 2.0 | - | 2.6 | 0.6 | 3.5 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 2.1 | - | 3.4 | - | 0.1 | 2.4 | 0.1 | 7.7 | 21.6 | 52.9 | 20 | 47.1 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Zambia | 33 | 21 | 12 | *36* | 884 | 0.2 | - | - | 0.4 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 0.1 | 3.6 | - | 2.9 | 0.2 | 5.1 | 0.1 | - | 3.9 | 0.1 | 5.0 | - | - | 1.6 | 0.1 | 8.6 | 25.5 | 62.1 | 17 | 37.9 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Zimbabwe | 35 | 18 | 17 | *49* | 701 | 3.8 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 3.0 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 3.1 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.3 | - | 0.7 | 0.2 | 1.0 | - | 0.2 | 3.1 | 0.8 | 7.3 | 19.3 | 45.2 | 21 | 54.8 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | **North and Central America** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Anguilla | 2 | 2 | 0 | *0* | 8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | 0 | 100.0 | 2 | 100.0 |
| | Antigua and Barbuda | 3 | 3 | 0 | *0* | 19 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 34.9 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 34.9 | 1 | 65.1 | 2 | 100.0 |
| | Barbados | 6 | 5 | 1 | *17* | 16 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7.4 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7.4 | 1 | 92.6 | 5 | 100.0 |
| | Belize | 12 | 11 | 1 | *8* | 28 | 1.9 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 26.7 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 11.0 | 39.6 | 3 | 60.4 | 9 | 100.0 |
| | Costa Rica | 16 | 11 | 5 | *31* | 132 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3.1 | 16.7 | - | - | - | 59.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.9 | 0.4 | 0.3 | - | 4.6 | 89.1 | 7 | 10.9 | 9 | 100.0 |
| | Cuba | 23 | 15 | 8 | *35* | 110 | - | - | 0.4 | 2.6 | - | - | 1.4 | 1.2 | - | - | 0.8 | 4.1 | - | 0.3 | - | - | 0.4 | - | 28.2 | - | 4.6 | 0.4 | 14.9 | 59.3 | 12 | 40.7 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Dominica | 7 | 3 | 4 | *57* | 35 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 9.7 | - | - | - | - | 7.4 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.8 | - | 18.0 | 3 | 82.0 | 4 | 100.0 |

| Row<br>1 Partner countries<br>Column 1 | Number of donors<br>2 | Number of significant relations<br>3 | Number of non-significant relations<br>4 | *Fragmentation ratio (in %)*<br>5 | CPA (USD million)<br>6 | Australia | Austria | Belgium | Canada | Denmark | Finland | France | Germany | Greece | Ireland | Italy | Japan | Korea | Luxembourg | Netherlands | New Zealand | Norway | Portugal | Spain | Sweden | Switzerland | United Kingdom | United States | DAC countries<br>% | No. of DAC countries<br>No. | Multilateral agencies<br>% | No. of multilateral agencies<br>No. | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | % | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dominican Republic | 17 | 11 | 6 | *35* | 227 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.9 | 1.7 | - | - | 0.7 | 4.6 | 1.2 | - | - | - | - | - | 17.0 | - | - | - | 25.0 | 52.1 | 7 | 47.9 | 10 | 100.0 |
| El Salvador | 23 | 13 | 10 | *43* | 353 | - | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | 0.8 | 4.3 | - | - | 0.3 | 8.3 | 1.2 | 1.8 | - | - | 0.1 | - | 15.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | - | 45.7 | 79.1 | 12 | 20.9 | 11 | 100.0 |
| Grenada | 7 | 5 | 2 | *29* | 38 | 1.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 15.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 16.4 | 2 | 83.6 | 5 | 100.0 |
| Guatemala | 29 | 18 | 11 | *38* | 383 | - | 0.3 | - | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 3.3 | - | - | 0.8 | 12.6 | 1.4 | - | 3.4 | 0.1 | 0.8 | - | 15.2 | 4.2 | 0.8 | - | 29.1 | 73.4 | 16 | 26.6 | 13 | 100.0 |
| Haiti | 37 | 14 | 23 | *62* | 2739 | 0.2 | - | 0.4 | 5.7 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 4.8 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 1.6 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.7 | - | 1.2 | 1.3 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 36.8 | 57.3 | 21 | 42.7 | 16 | 100.0 |
| Honduras | 27 | 16 | 11 | *41* | 530 | - | - | - | 1.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 2.2 | - | - | 0.2 | 2.6 | 1.2 | - | 0.1 | - | - | - | 11.4 | 1.2 | 0.9 | - | 19.4 | 40.9 | 13 | 59.1 | 14 | 100.0 |
| Jamaica | 17 | 11 | 6 | *35* | 177 | 0.2 | - | - | 1.5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10.5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | - | - | 2.0 | 11.0 | 25.3 | 6 | 74.7 | 11 | 100.0 |
| Mexico | 21 | 7 | 14 | *67* | 602 | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 43.2 | 4.1 | - | - | 0.2 | 2.4 | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | - | 6.4 | - | 0.0 | 0.6 | 34.2 | 91.3 | 11 | 8.7 | 10 | 100.0 |
| Montserrat | 4 | 3 | 1 | *25* | 29 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 67.9 | - | 67.9 | 1 | 32.1 | 3 | 100.0 |
| Nicaragua | 34 | 25 | 9 | *26* | 572 | - | 1.3 | - | 1.6 | 5.4 | 2.4 | 0.2 | 4.2 | - | 0.1 | 0.2 | 5.3 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 3.7 | - | 1.7 | - | 14.1 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 0.7 | 9.5 | 56.9 | 18 | 43.1 | 16 | 100.0 |
| Panama | 16 | 9 | 7 | *44* | 143 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | 0.4 | - | - | - | 76.2 | 0.5 | - | - | - | - | - | 5.1 | - | - | - | 10.0 | 92.4 | 6 | 7.6 | 10 | 100.0 |
| St. Kitts-Nevis | 3 | 2 | 1 | *33* | 15 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.1 | 1 | 95.9 | 2 | 100.0 |
| St. Lucia | 8 | 3 | 5 | *63* | 48 | 1.3 | - | - | - | - | - | 1.2 | - | - | - | - | 5.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7.8 | 3 | 92.2 | 5 | 100.0 |
| St.Vincent & Grenadines | 6 | 3 | 3 | *50* | 20 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.4 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.3 | 5.7 | 2 | 94.3 | 4 | 100.0 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 8 | 8 | 0 | *0* | 3 | 12.4 | - | - | - | - | - | 13.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 37.9 | 63.6 | 3 | 36.4 | 5 | 100.0 |
| **South America** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 19 | 15 | 4 | *21* | 132 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5.4 | 11.0 | 0.4 | - | 5.3 | 32.9 | - | - | 0.4 | - | - | - | 24.0 | - | - | 0.4 | 2.9 | 82.7 | 9 | 17.3 | 10 | 100.0 |
| Bolivia | 31 | 16 | 15 | *48* | 609 | - | - | 1.8 | 1.1 | 6.5 | 0.2 | 1.8 | 5.3 | - | 0.1 | 0.8 | 8.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 6.9 | - | 0.2 | - | 5.9 | 3.9 | 3.2 | - | 14.2 | 60.6 | 17 | 39.4 | 14 | 100.0 |
| Brazil | 30 | 15 | 15 | *50* | 622 | - | 0.1 | - | 0.7 | - | 0.1 | 4.5 | 24.1 | 0.1 | - | 1.5 | 5.3 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.0 | - | 38.5 | 1.3 | 3.2 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 5.2 | 86.9 | 18 | 13.1 | 12 | 100.0 |
| Chile | 25 | 19 | 6 | *24* | 184 | 3.3 | - | - | 1.1 | - | 0.4 | 4.5 | 43.4 | 0.2 | - | 1.5 | 8.0 | 1.3 | 0.3 | - | 0.4 | 0.9 | - | 4.5 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 7.2 | 79.1 | 17 | 20.9 | 8 | 100.0 |
| Colombia | 31 | 14 | 17 | *55* | 890 | - | - | - | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 16.6 | 3.5 | - | - | 0.7 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 2.8 | - | 1.1 | - | 4.1 | 2.5 | 1.3 | 0.3 | 45.2 | 81.0 | 16 | 19.0 | 15 | 100.0 |
| Ecuador | 25 | 20 | 5 | *20* | 201 | - | - | 2.2 | - | - | 0.4 | 3.0 | 11.7 | - | - | 0.7 | 9.5 | 2.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | - | - | 23.9 | - | 1.3 | - | 18.2 | 73.8 | 13 | 26.2 | 12 | 100.0 |
| Guyana | 16 | 9 | 7 | *44* | 157 | - | - | - | 1.1 | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | 4.1 | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | - | 13.6 | 19.3 | 5 | 80.7 | 11 | 100.0 |
| Paraguay | 17 | 11 | 6 | *35* | 165 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.4 | 3.7 | - | - | 0.2 | 26.6 | 7.0 | - | - | - | - | - | 11.0 | 0.9 | - | - | 16.9 | 66.8 | 8 | 33.2 | 9 | 100.0 |
| Peru | 28 | 16 | 12 | *43* | 637 | - | - | - | 1.3 | - | 0.4 | 1.7 | 6.5 | - | - | 0.7 | 40.4 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 0.2 | - | 0.1 | - | 10.3 | 0.2 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 21.5 | 87.5 | 15 | 12.5 | 13 | 100.0 |
| Suriname | 9 | 4 | 5 | *56* | 103 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 74.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.6 | 76.6 | 3 | 23.4 | 6 | 100.0 |
| Uruguay | 15 | 11 | 4 | *27* | 55 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3.5 | 5.4 | - | - | 18.5 | 23.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 19.0 | - | - | - | 2.1 | 71.8 | 6 | 28.2 | 9 | 100.0 |
| Venezuela | 17 | 13 | 4 | *24* | 37 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7.4 | 9.8 | - | - | 0.9 | 7.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 8.5 | - | - | 2.9 | 23.0 | 59.7 | 7 | 40.3 | 10 | 100.0 |
| **Middle East** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Iran | 19 | 13 | 6 | *32* | 67 | 0.4 | - | - | - | - | - | 4.0 | 8.9 | - | - | - | 19.7 | 0.5 | - | 4.9 | - | - | - | - | 0.7 | - | - | 2.3 | 41.4 | 8 | 58.6 | 11 | 100.0 |
| Iraq | 30 | 6 | 24 | *80* | 2075 | 0.7 | - | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 1.0 | - | 0.0 | 0.5 | 6.7 | 0.6 | 0.0 | - | 0.0 | 0.3 | - | - | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 77.2 | 89.8 | 18 | 10.2 | 12 | 100.0 |
| Jordan | 28 | 11 | 17 | *61* | 1015 | - | - | - | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 5.5 | 0.1 | - | 0.3 | 5.6 | 1.2 | - | 0.1 | - | 0.0 | - | 0.9 | - | 0.2 | 0.2 | 37.1 | 53.4 | 15 | 46.6 | 13 | 100.0 |
| Lebanon | 29 | 16 | 13 | *45* | 401 | 0.2 | - | - | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 10.4 | 3.5 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 5.5 | 2.6 | 0.5 | - | 0.2 | 0.2 | 2.1 | - | 5.6 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 20.8 | 54.9 | 19 | 45.1 | 10 | 100.0 |
| Oman | 9 | 9 | 0 | *0* | 8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5.8 | 9.4 | - | - | - | 18.8 | - | - | 3.5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 11.6 | 36.4 | 85.4 | 6 | 14.6 | 3 | 100.0 |

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country)

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

| Row | Partner countries | Number of donors | Number of significant relations | Number of non-significant relations | *Fragmentation ratio (in %)* | CPA (USD million) | Australia | Austria | Belgium | Canada | Denmark | Finland | France | Germany | Greece | Ireland | Italy | Japan | Korea | Luxembourg | Netherlands | New Zealand | Norway | Portugal | Spain | Sweden | Switzerland | United Kingdom | United States | DAC countries | No. of DAC countries | Multilateral agencies | No. of multilateral agencies | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Column 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | Number of partner countries | | | | | | 67 | 28 | 37 | 57 | 71 | 79 | 120 | 112 | 24 | 38 | 86 | 140 | 79 | 56 | 65 | 35 | 87 | 13 | 77 | 91 | 90 | 89 | 129 | 1670 | | 1657 | | 3327 |
| 3 | Number of significant relations | | | | | | 30 | 21 | 18 | 20 | 27 | 27 | 63 | 85 | 17 | 17 | 39 | 111 | 30 | 24 | 25 | 18 | 32 | 8 | 43 | 41 | 42 | 33 | 113 | 884 | | 967 | | 1851 |
| 4 | Number of non-significant relations | | | | | | 37 | 7 | 19 | 37 | 44 | 52 | 57 | 27 | 7 | 21 | 47 | 29 | 49 | 32 | 40 | 17 | 55 | 5 | 34 | 50 | 48 | 56 | 16 | 786 | | 690 | | 1476 |
| 5 | *Concentration ratio (in %)* | | | | | | *45* | *75* | *49* | *35* | *38* | *34* | *53* | *76* | *71* | *45* | *45* | *79* | *38* | *43* | *38* | *51* | *37* | *62* | *56* | *45* | *47* | *37* | *88* | *53* | | *58* | | *56* |
| 6 | CPA (USD million) | | | | | | 1817 | 79 | 447 | 978 | 1145 | 319 | 4767 | 4369 | 48 | 286 | 496 | 12139 | 827 | 159 | 1002 | 162 | 1221 | 354 | 1614 | 1160 | 658 | 3336 | 17209 | 54592 | | 41556 | | 96148 |
| 7 | Average CPA (USD million) | | | | | | 27 | 3 | 12 | 17 | 16 | 4 | 40 | 39 | 2 | 8 | 6 | 87 | 10 | 3 | 15 | 5 | 14 | 27 | 21 | 13 | 7 | 37 | 133 | 33 | | 25 | | 633 |
| 8 | Donors' share of global CPA (in %) | | | | | | 1.9 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 12.6 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 0.4 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 0.7 | 3.5 | 17.9 | 56.8 | | 43.2 | | 100.0 |
| | | | | | | | % | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | % | No. | % | No. | |
| | Syria | 23 | 14 | 9 | *39* | 288 | - | - | - | - | 1.0 | - | 3.3 | 8.0 | 0.3 | - | 1.7 | 9.3 | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | 1.6 | - | 0.2 | 0.7 | 2.4 | 28.8 | 11 | 71.2 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | Yemen | 33 | 16 | 17 | *52* | 692 | 0.1 | - | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 9.7 | - | - | 0.6 | 2.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 3.8 | 0.1 | - | - | 0.1 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 7.0 | 4.6 | 31.6 | 18 | 68.4 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | West Bank & Gaza Strip | 33 | 16 | 17 | *52* | 2266 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 2.8 | 4.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 1.4 | 2.9 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.8 | - | 1.9 | - | 3.0 | 2.0 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 29.2 | 52.5 | 21 | 47.5 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | **South and Central Asia** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Afghanistan | 36 | 15 | 21 | *58* | 5956 | 1.1 | - | 0.2 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 1.0 | 6.6 | - | 0.0 | 0.6 | 4.1 | 1.6 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 0.2 | 3.0 | 43.5 | 68.1 | 21 | 31.9 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Armenia | 27 | 12 | 15 | *56* | 370 | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | 0.6 | 3.8 | 0.1 | - | - | 21.7 | 0.2 | - | - | - | 0.9 | - | - | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 25.2 | 53.9 | 11 | 46.1 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Azerbaijan | 23 | 17 | 6 | *26* | 178 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | 1.8 | 12.5 | - | - | - | 1.5 | 2.3 | - | - | - | 1.5 | - | - | 0.5 | 1.6 | 0.5 | 20.1 | 42.6 | 10 | 57.4 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Bangladesh | 34 | 19 | 15 | *44* | 2018 | 1.2 | - | - | 0.9 | 4.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 2.6 | - | 0.0 | 0.3 | 6.6 | 2.8 | 0.0 | 2.3 | - | 0.2 | - | 0.3 | 1.7 | 0.9 | 7.5 | 7.2 | 38.5 | 18 | 61.5 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Bhutan | 21 | 12 | 9 | *43* | 136 | 4.3 | 3.1 | - | - | 9.7 | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | - | 31.5 | 0.3 | - | 2.0 | - | 1.3 | - | - | - | 1.7 | - | - | 53.9 | 9 | 46.1 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | Georgia | 26 | 11 | 15 | *58* | 619 | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 11.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | - | 1.1 | - | - | - | - | 1.6 | - | - | 2.8 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 31.3 | 49.9 | 12 | 50.1 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | India | 33 | 9 | 24 | *73* | 4336 | 0.3 | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.0 | 11.6 | - | 0.0 | 0.3 | 39.4 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 9.8 | 2.5 | 66.1 | 19 | 33.9 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Kazakhstan | 20 | 10 | 10 | *50* | 182 | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | 1.1 | 5.5 | - | - | - | 16.6 | 2.4 | - | 0.2 | - | 2.3 | - | - | 0.5 | - | 0.9 | 37.1 | 66.7 | 10 | 33.3 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Kyrgyz Republic | 28 | 16 | 12 | *43* | 334 | 0.3 | - | - | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 6.1 | - | - | - | 4.5 | 0.4 | - | - | - | 1.5 | - | - | 2.1 | 4.9 | 0.4 | 15.0 | 36.2 | 13 | 63.8 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Maldives | 19 | 11 | 8 | *42* | 113 | 3.4 | - | - | - | 9.3 | 0.2 | 0.8 | - | - | - | - | 32.9 | - | - | - | 0.5 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 0.8 | 48.3 | 8 | 51.7 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Myanmar | 28 | 18 | 10 | *36* | 368 | 7.9 | - | - | 0.1 | 2.4 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.3 | - | 0.2 | 0.2 | 9.7 | 1.5 | - | 0.7 | 0.1 | 4.6 | - | - | 2.5 | 1.2 | 11.2 | 8.3 | 51.4 | 17 | 48.6 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Nepal | 35 | 23 | 12 | *34* | 922 | 1.8 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 3.6 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 3.6 | - | - | 0.0 | 9.8 | 2.3 | 0.1 | - | 0.1 | 4.0 | - | - | 0.2 | 3.0 | 8.7 | 4.9 | 44.8 | 18 | 55.2 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Pakistan | 35 | 17 | 18 | *51* | 3463 | 2.0 | - | 0.1 | 1.5 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 2.5 | - | 0.1 | 0.2 | 4.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 1.4 | - | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 6.4 | 25.8 | 48.1 | 20 | 51.9 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Sri Lanka | 33 | 18 | 15 | *45* | 1045 | 3.5 | - | - | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 4.9 | 2.0 | - | - | 0.1 | 34.6 | 4.6 | 0.0 | 0.5 | - | 1.8 | - | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 2.7 | 59.5 | 17 | 40.5 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Tajikistan | 28 | 13 | 15 | *54* | 430 | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.2 | - | 7.4 | - | - | - | 9.2 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.1 | - | 0.7 | - | - | 1.2 | 2.4 | 1.1 | 10.2 | 33.3 | 12 | 66.7 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Turkmenistan | 13 | 12 | 1 | *8* | 29 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3.6 | - | - | - | 5.4 | 3.5 | - | - | - | 2.0 | - | - | - | - | - | 27.1 | 41.6 | 5 | 58.4 | 8 | 100.0 |
| | Uzbekistan | 22 | 13 | 9 | *41* | 213 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.4 | 9.9 | - | - | - | 15.1 | 16.2 | 0.2 | - | - | 0.1 | - | - | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 5.9 | 49.0 | 10 | 51.0 | 12 | 100.0 |

| Row | Partner countries | Number of donors | Number of significant relations | Number of non-significant relations | *Fragmentation ratio (in %)* | CPA (USD million) | Australia | Austria | Belgium | Canada | Denmark | Finland | France | Germany | Greece | Ireland | Italy | Japan | Korea | Luxembourg | Netherlands | New Zealand | Norway | Portugal | Spain | Sweden | Switzerland | United Kingdom | United States | DAC countries | No. of DAC countries | Multilateral agencies | No. of multilateral agencies | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Column 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | % | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | % | No. | % | No. | |
| | **Far East Asia** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Cambodia | 35 | 18 | 17 | *49* | 727 | 5.0 | - | - | 0.5 | 2.1 | 0.2 | 3.2 | 5.1 | - | 0.1 | 0.0 | 20.1 | 5.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.1 | - | 3.1 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 1.7 | 11.3 | 59.0 | 19 | 41.0 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | China | 33 | 13 | 20 | *61* | 2057 | 1.5 | - | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 10.9 | 15.0 | 0.0 | - | 0.5 | 48.0 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.9 | - | 1.9 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 1.7 | 4.2 | 87.3 | 20 | 12.7 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Indonesia | 34 | 8 | 26 | *76* | 3379 | 8.8 | - | - | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 10.2 | 3.0 | - | - | 0.0 | 47.1 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | - | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 5.8 | 78.9 | 18 | 21.1 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Korea, Dem. Rep. | 16 | 12 | 4 | *25* | 73 | - | - | - | - | - | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.5 | - | - | 0.6 | - | - | - | - | - | 2.3 | - | - | 6.9 | 4.6 | 0.6 | 3.5 | 20.6 | 9 | 79.4 | 7 | 100.0 |
| | Laos | 27 | 23 | 4 | *15* | 440 | 4.6 | 0.1 | - | - | - | 0.7 | 3.2 | 5.3 | - | - | - | 27.3 | 6.2 | 2.0 | - | 0.4 | 0.2 | - | - | 1.2 | 3.1 | - | 1.9 | 56.3 | 13 | 43.7 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Malaysia | 20 | 8 | 12 | *60* | 192 | 1.2 | - | - | - | 1.2 | - | 0.6 | 1.3 | - | - | - | 74.5 | 0.9 | - | - | - | 0.2 | - | - | 0.3 | - | 1.3 | 9.6 | 91.0 | 10 | 9.0 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Mongolia | 29 | 17 | 12 | *41* | 308 | 1.8 | - | - | - | 0.2 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 6.6 | - | - | - | 22.4 | 12.7 | 0.3 | 1.6 | - | 0.2 | - | 0.2 | 0.4 | 3.4 | 0.1 | 15.3 | 67.1 | 15 | 32.9 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Philippines | 32 | 12 | 20 | *63* | 1420 | 6.3 | - | - | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 14.2 | 2.7 | - | - | 0.2 | 48.2 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | - | 2.2 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 9.3 | 87.0 | 18 | 13.0 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Thailand | 26 | 13 | 13 | *50* | 414 | 1.8 | - | - | - | 0.3 | 0.1 | 2.7 | 3.0 | - | - | 0.2 | 53.7 | 0.6 | - | 0.1 | - | 0.1 | - | 0.1 | 1.8 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 12.0 | 77.3 | 15 | 22.7 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Timor-Leste | 24 | 15 | 9 | *38* | 283 | 36.7 | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | - | 3.0 | - | 1.6 | 0.2 | 8.1 | 0.6 | - | - | 2.1 | 1.8 | 10.5 | 2.0 | 0.8 | - | - | 9.6 | 77.2 | 13 | 22.8 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Vietnam | 37 | 15 | 22 | *59* | 3362 | 2.6 | - | 0.3 | 0.4 | 2.0 | 0.7 | 7.8 | 1.8 | - | 0.4 | 0.3 | 33.1 | 3.0 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.4 | - | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 1.6 | 3.0 | 60.1 | 20 | 39.9 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | **Oceania** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Cook Islands | 5 | 3 | 2 | *40* | 14 | 24.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 69.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 93.4 | 2 | 6.6 | 3 | 100.0 |
| | Fiji | 14 | 9 | 5 | *36* | 74 | 42.6 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.9 | - | - | - | - | 26.6 | 2.9 | - | - | 2.5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2.3 | 77.8 | 6 | 22.2 | 8 | 100.0 |
| | Kiribati | 10 | 5 | 5 | *50* | 22 | 61.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 13.8 | - | - | - | 12.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 87.7 | 3 | 12.3 | 7 | 100.0 |
| | Marshall Islands | 6 | 3 | 3 | *50* | 92 | 1.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 13.2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 73.7 | 88.5 | 3 | 11.5 | 3 | 100.0 |
| | Micronesia, Fed. States | 6 | 2 | 4 | *67* | 126 | 1.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 12.8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 84.9 | 98.7 | 3 | 1.3 | 3 | 100.0 |
| | Nauru | 6 | 2 | 4 | *67* | 27 | 84.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5.3 | - | - | - | 6.2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 95.8 | 3 | 4.2 | 3 | 100.0 |
| | Niue | 4 | 2 | 2 | *50* | 15 | 9.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 83.2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 92.2 | 2 | 7.8 | 2 | 100.0 |
| | Palau | 5 | 3 | 2 | *40* | 26 | 2.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 36.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 58.6 | 97.0 | 3 | 3.0 | 2 | 100.0 |
| | Papua New Guinea | 18 | 8 | 10 | *56* | 502 | 66.9 | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | - | - | - | 8.2 | 0.1 | - | - | 4.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.5 | 80.0 | 7 | 20.0 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Samoa | 9 | 5 | 4 | *44* | 152 | 25.5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 17.2 | - | - | - | 11.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.9 | 54.6 | 4 | 45.4 | 5 | 100.0 |
| | Solomon Islands | 10 | 6 | 4 | *40* | 341 | 70.7 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.6 | - | - | - | 6.7 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 82.1 | 3 | 17.9 | 7 | 100.0 |
| | Tokelau | 3 | 2 | 1 | *33* | 14 | 8.9 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 90.2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 99.2 | 2 | 0.8 | 1 | 100.0 |
| | Tonga | 8 | 5 | 3 | *38* | 71 | 23.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 32.5 | - | - | - | 13.8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.7 | 71.2 | 4 | 28.8 | 4 | 100.0 |
| | Tuvalu | 6 | 5 | 1 | *17* | 13 | 47.7 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 32.8 | - | - | - | 12.8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 93.4 | 3 | 6.6 | 3 | 100.0 |
| | Vanuatu | 10 | 5 | 5 | *50* | 105 | 48.3 | - | - | - | - | - | 3.5 | - | - | - | - | 13.9 | - | - | - | 10.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 18.2 | 94.5 | 5 | 5.5 | 5 | 100.0 |
| | Wallis & Futuna | 2 | 1 | 1 | *50* | 128 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 96.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 96.6 | 1 | 3.4 | 1 | 100.0 |

# Table C.2: Global Multilateral Donor Fragmentation on the basis of CPA data: 2010 disbursements in current USD

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country)

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

| Row | Partner countries | Number of donors | Number of significant relations | Number of non-significant relations | *Fragmentation ratio (in %)* | CPA (USD million) | AfDF | Arab Agencies | AsDF | CarDB | EU institutions | GAVI | GEF | Global Fund | IADB | IAEA | IDA | IFAD | IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) | Montreal Protocol | Nordic Dev.Fund | UNAIDS | UNDP | UNFPA | UNHCR | UNICEF | UNPBF | UNRWA | WFP | DAC countries | No. of DAC countries | Multilateral agencies | No. of multilateral agencies | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Column 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | Number of partner countries | | | | | | 40 | 99 | 33 | 14 | 149 | 67 | 87 | 113 | 25 | 98 | 96 | 79 | 48 | 10 | 18 | 105 | 144 | 119 | 94 | 123 | 18 | 4 | 74 | 1670 | | 1657 | | 3327 |
| 3 | Number of significant relations | | | | | | 32 | 37 | 26 | 14 | 128 | 32 | 53 | 73 | 24 | 67 | 76 | 52 | 29 | 7 | 17 | 65 | 37 | 71 | 36 | 40 | 16 | 4 | 31 | 884 | | 967 | | 1851 |
| 4 | Number of non-significant relations | | | | | | 8 | 62 | 7 | 0 | 21 | 35 | 34 | 40 | 1 | 31 | 20 | 27 | 19 | 3 | 1 | 40 | 107 | 48 | 58 | 83 | 2 | 0 | 43 | 786 | | 690 | | 1476 |
| 5 | *Concentration ratio (in %)* | | | | | | *80* | *37* | *79* | *100* | *86* | *48* | *61* | *65* | *96* | *68* | *79* | *66* | *60* | *70* | *94* | *62* | *26* | *60* | *38* | *33* | *89* | *100* | *42* | *53* | | *58* | | *56* |
| 6 | CPA (USD million) | | | | | | 1544 | 1820 | 2038 | 69 | 9967 | 590 | 359 | 3004 | 692 | 51 | 11523 | 473 | 1362 | 21 | 52 | 57 | 1909 | 346 | 660 | 1764 | 52 | 595 | 2607 | 54592 | | 41556 | | 96148 |
| 7 | Average CPA (USD million) | | | | | | 39 | 18 | 62 | 5 | 67 | 9 | 4 | 27 | 28 | 1 | 120 | 6 | 28 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 13 | 3 | 7 | 14 | 3 | 149 | 35 | 33 | | 25 | | 633 |
| 8 | Donors' share of global CPA (in %) | | | | | | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 0.1 | 10.4 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 3.1 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 12.0 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 2.0 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1.8 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 2.7 | 56.8 | | 43.2 | | 100.0 |
| | | | | | | | ---------- % ---------- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | % | No. | % | No. | |
| | **Europe** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Albania | 28 | 13 | 15 | *54* | 313 | - | 5.9 | - | - | 23.9 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | - | 0.1 | 8.5 | 1.0 | - | - | - | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.5 | - | - | - | 58.0 | 15 | 42.0 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Belarus | 18 | 12 | 6 | *33* | 102 | - | - | - | - | 14.9 | - | 4.5 | 12.5 | - | 0.5 | 5.9 | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.8 | - | - | - | 58.9 | 8 | 41.1 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Bosnia-Herzegovina | 28 | 16 | 12 | *43* | 445 | - | 0.9 | - | - | 25.9 | 0.1 | - | 2.0 | - | 0.2 | 26.0 | 0.8 | - | - | - | 0.0 | 1.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | - | - | - | 42.2 | 16 | 57.8 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | Croatia | 15 | 4 | 11 | *73* | 137 | - | - | - | - | 76.6 | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.7 | - | 0.2 | 0.3 | - | - | - | 21.9 | 9 | 78.1 | 6 | 100.0 |
| | Kosovo | 22 | 10 | 12 | *55* | 544 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 53.3 | - | - | 0.4 | - | - | 4.6 | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.1 | - | 0.4 | - | - | - | 39.9 | 14 | 60.1 | 8 | 100.0 |
| | Macedonia, FYR | 21 | 11 | 10 | *48* | 150 | - | 0.4 | - | - | 36.8 | - | 0.3 | 1.3 | - | 0.1 | 1.6 | - | - | - | - | - | 1.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | - | - | - | 56.9 | 11 | 43.1 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Moldova | 28 | 12 | 16 | *57* | 437 | - | - | - | - | 31.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 4.2 | - | 0.2 | 15.7 | 1.4 | 27.9 | - | - | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | - | - | - | 17.5 | 15 | 82.5 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Montenegro | 21 | 16 | 5 | *24* | 66 | - | - | - | - | 20.9 | - | 2.3 | 2.3 | - | 0.4 | 4.7 | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 3.3 | - | 0.8 | 1.1 | - | - | - | 64.1 | 12 | 35.9 | 9 | 100.0 |
| | Serbia | 27 | 12 | 15 | *56* | 640 | - | 0.0 | - | - | 46.6 | - | - | 0.9 | - | 0.3 | 4.2 | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | - | - | - | 46.9 | 17 | 53.1 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Turkey | 21 | 5 | 16 | *76* | 1310 | - | 0.2 | - | - | 22.5 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 0.0 | 0.0 | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | - | - | - | 76.5 | 11 | 23.5 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Ukraine | 24 | 11 | 13 | *54* | 519 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 30.5 | - | - | 6.3 | - | 0.1 | 1.0 | - | 0.3 | - | - | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | - | - | - | 60.4 | 13 | 39.6 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | **North of Sahara** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Algeria | 20 | 12 | 8 | *40* | 154 | - | - | - | - | 33.6 | - | - | - | - | 0.7 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 1.0 | 0.7 | - | - | 5.5 | 57.5 | 12 | 42.5 | 8 | 100.0 |
| | Egypt | 30 | 9 | 21 | *70* | 1108 | - | 14.9 | - | - | 12.3 | - | - | 0.2 | - | 0.1 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | - | - | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.4 | - | - | 1.1 | 68.5 | 17 | 31.5 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Libya | 10 | 9 | 1 | *10* | 35 | - | 61.4 | - | - | 3.0 | - | 2.6 | - | - | 1.5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.8 | - | 1.4 | - | - | - | - | 29.3 | 4 | 70.7 | 6 | 100.0 |
| | Morocco | 25 | 10 | 15 | *60* | 1214 | - | 19.1 | - | - | 18.8 | - | 0.8 | 0.5 | - | 0.0 | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | - | - | - | 59.9 | 14 | 40.1 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Tunisia | 19 | 9 | 10 | *53* | 755 | - | 20.4 | - | - | 12.2 | - | 0.9 | 0.9 | - | 0.1 | - | - | - | 0.0 | - | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | - | - | - | 65.1 | 9 | 34.9 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | **South of Sahara** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Angola | 29 | 20 | 9 | *31* | 251 | 3.1 | 0.8 | - | - | 10.0 | 3.1 | 0.8 | 10.3 | - | 0.1 | 4.4 | 0.2 | - | - | - | 0.3 | 2.8 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 6.8 | - | - | - | 56.2 | 15 | 43.8 | 14 | 100.0 |

| Row | Partner countries | Number of donors | Number of significant relations | Number of non-significant relations | *Fragmentation ratio (in %)* | CPA (USD million) | AfDF | Arab Agencies | AsDF | CarDB | EU institutions | GAVI | GEF | Global Fund | IADB | IAEA | IDA | IFAD | IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) | Montreal Protocol | Nordic Dev.Fund | UNAIDS | UNDP | UNFPA | UNHCR | UNICEF | UNPBF | UNRWA | WFP | DAC countries | No. of DAC countries | Multilateral agencies | No. of multilateral agencies | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Column 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | % | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | % | No. | % | No. | |
| | Benin | 28 | 19 | 9 | *32* | 673 | 7.1 | 2.5 | - | - | 19.0 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 6.5 | - | 0.0 | 12.8 | 0.6 | 2.4 | - | - | 0.1 | 1.4 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 1.0 | - | - | 0.5 | 44.5 | 12 | 55.5 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Botswana | 19 | 11 | 8 | *42* | 162 | - | 4.3 | - | - | 24.2 | - | 0.8 | 1.3 | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.9 | 0.5 | - | - | - | 64.7 | 9 | 35.3 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Burkina Faso | 32 | 20 | 12 | *38* | 1023 | 8.0 | 4.0 | - | - | 16.0 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 6.1 | - | 0.1 | 18.8 | 0.4 | 2.1 | - | 0.3 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 0.3 | - | 2.8 | - | - | 1.4 | 37.7 | 16 | 62.3 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Burundi | 32 | 23 | 9 | *28* | 607 | 2.9 | 0.7 | - | - | 21.7 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 3.8 | - | - | 21.6 | 1.3 | 3.3 | - | - | 0.1 | 3.6 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 1.0 | - | 1.8 | 33.0 | 16 | 67.0 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Cameroon | 28 | 17 | 11 | *39* | 542 | 10.7 | 1.1 | - | - | 13.7 | 2.2 | 0.7 | 2.2 | - | 0.1 | 15.6 | 0.7 | - | - | - | 0.1 | 1.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1.5 | - | - | 1.8 | 46.5 | 13 | 53.5 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Cape Verde | 21 | 12 | 9 | *43* | 326 | 5.7 | 1.5 | - | - | 11.3 | - | 0.5 | 0.6 | - | - | 7.8 | 0.5 | - | - | - | - | 1.7 | 0.4 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 0.0 | 69.9 | 10 | 30.1 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Central African Rep. | 29 | 18 | 11 | *38* | 213 | 0.3 | 0.0 | - | - | 39.7 | 0.4 | - | 3.4 | - | 0.3 | 8.3 | - | 6.2 | - | - | 0.2 | 6.5 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 4.4 | 2.7 | - | 7.7 | 17.1 | 14 | 82.9 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Chad | 33 | 18 | 15 | *45* | 522 | 3.9 | 6.4 | - | - | 19.5 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 6.2 | - | 0.0 | 2.8 | 0.8 | - | - | - | 0.1 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 3.7 | 4.8 | - | - | 26.4 | 22.3 | 18 | 77.7 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Comoros | 15 | 11 | 4 | *27* | 45 | 0.8 | 1.7 | - | - | 23.9 | 0.7 | - | 10.4 | - | - | 11.0 | 2.5 | 5.3 | - | - | - | 3.5 | 1.8 | - | 2.5 | 6.6 | - | - | 29.3 | 3 | 70.7 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | Congo, Dem. Rep. | 35 | 18 | 17 | *49* | 1996 | 4.7 | 0.0 | - | - | 18.3 | 2.1 | - | 4.3 | - | 0.0 | 16.0 | 0.2 | 3.8 | - | - | - | 7.8 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 5.7 | 0.3 | - | 5.7 | 29.1 | 20 | 70.9 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Congo, Rep. | 20 | 13 | 7 | *35* | 132 | 3.5 | 0.8 | - | - | 24.6 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 15.4 | - | - | 16.2 | 2.2 | 1.4 | - | - | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 5.9 | - | - | 10.0 | 12.7 | 5 | 87.3 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Cote d'Ivoire | 31 | 13 | 18 | *58* | 621 | 1.8 | 1.1 | - | - | 10.8 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 10.2 | - | 0.1 | 36.3 | 0.4 | 8.8 | - | - | 0.1 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 2.3 | 0.1 | - | 0.7 | 24.3 | 14 | 75.7 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Djibouti | 19 | 12 | 7 | *37* | 132 | 5.0 | 9.0 | - | - | 7.6 | 0.2 | - | 1.4 | - | - | 1.6 | 0.6 | - | - | - | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 2.1 | - | - | 3.7 | 65.4 | 6 | 34.6 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Equatorial Guinea | 9 | 6 | 3 | *33* | 31 | - | - | - | - | 0.9 | - | - | 22.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2.1 | 3.5 | - | 1.5 | - | - | - | 69.9 | 4 | 30.1 | 5 | 100.0 |
| | Eritrea | 22 | 14 | 8 | *36* | 140 | 4.9 | - | - | - | 26.4 | 1.3 | - | 29.4 | - | 0.3 | 3.9 | 3.0 | - | - | - | 0.3 | 6.5 | 3.0 | 0.9 | 9.3 | - | - | - | 10.9 | 10 | 89.1 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | Ethiopia | 38 | 16 | 22 | *58* | 3390 | 4.4 | 0.5 | - | - | 7.0 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 7.6 | - | 0.0 | 25.1 | 0.5 | 3.6 | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 2.4 | - | - | 10.6 | 36.0 | 21 | 64.0 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Gabon | 13 | 8 | 5 | *38* | 93 | - | 2.0 | - | - | 14.1 | - | - | 2.3 | - | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 0.6 | 0.8 | - | - | - | 77.4 | 4 | 22.6 | 9 | 100.0 |
| | Gambia | 21 | 15 | 6 | *29* | 124 | 4.9 | 15.7 | - | - | 18.3 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 15.0 | - | - | 9.5 | 2.5 | 2.4 | - | - | 0.2 | 2.4 | 1.1 | 0.4 | 1.4 | - | - | 0.3 | 23.8 | 6 | 76.2 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Ghana | 33 | 17 | 16 | *48* | 1670 | 8.1 | 0.5 | - | - | 6.3 | 0.4 | - | 3.4 | - | 0.0 | 19.6 | 0.7 | 7.5 | - | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.7 | - | - | 1.2 | 49.3 | 17 | 50.7 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Guinea | 24 | 15 | 9 | *38* | 224 | 8.8 | 7.0 | - | - | 32.4 | 1.7 | - | 7.0 | - | - | 0.0 | 1.9 | - | - | - | 0.3 | 3.1 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 4.9 | 2.4 | - | 3.6 | 25.3 | 10 | 74.7 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Guinea-Bissau | 21 | 15 | 6 | *29* | 119 | 7.0 | - | - | - | 14.1 | 0.6 | - | 14.0 | - | - | 7.1 | 0.6 | 13.2 | - | - | - | 3.3 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 10.9 | 1.0 | - | - | 26.8 | 9 | 73.2 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | Kenya | 36 | 19 | 17 | *47* | 1797 | 5.6 | 0.8 | - | - | 5.6 | 1.9 | - | 3.7 | - | 0.0 | 13.0 | 0.6 | - | - | 0.1 | 0.0 | 1.8 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 0.0 | - | 7.8 | 54.9 | 20 | 45.1 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Lesotho | 23 | 12 | 11 | *48* | 272 | 5.2 | 1.5 | - | - | 27.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 9.2 | - | - | 15.2 | 1.0 | 4.4 | - | - | 0.3 | 1.1 | 0.6 | - | 0.5 | - | - | 1.5 | 31.7 | 9 | 68.3 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Liberia | 29 | 17 | 12 | *41* | 491 | 0.9 | 0.1 | - | - | 18.5 | 0.4 | - | 4.2 | - | - | 17.4 | 0.2 | 2.8 | - | - | 0.1 | 4.3 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 3.5 | 1.3 | - | 1.8 | 43.5 | 14 | 56.5 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Madagascar | 25 | 19 | 6 | *24* | 453 | 3.5 | 3.4 | - | - | 8.8 | 2.1 | - | 13.6 | - | 0.1 | 17.8 | 2.1 | - | - | - | 0.1 | 1.2 | 0.8 | - | 4.1 | - | - | 2.3 | 40.0 | 12 | 60.0 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Malawi | 29 | 16 | 13 | *45* | 982 | 4.3 | 1.1 | - | - | 21.2 | 0.8 | - | 5.1 | - | 0.0 | 13.4 | 0.6 | 2.2 | - | - | 0.1 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 2.2 | - | - | 0.5 | 46.7 | 14 | 53.3 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Mali | 32 | 19 | 13 | *41* | 1048 | 6.9 | 2.6 | - | - | 9.4 | 2.1 | 0.1 | 1.0 | - | 0.0 | 14.9 | 0.6 | 0.6 | - | - | 0.1 | 1.5 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.8 | - | - | 0.7 | 57.4 | 16 | 42.6 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Mauritania | 23 | 14 | 9 | *39* | 366 | 4.3 | 36.4 | - | - | 6.9 | 0.6 | - | 0.3 | - | 0.1 | 10.6 | 1.1 | 9.2 | - | - | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 1.0 | - | - | 1.3 | 26.6 | 8 | 73.4 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Mauritius | 13 | 5 | 8 | *62* | 128 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 53.0 | - | 1.6 | 1.6 | - | 0.3 | - | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | 0.8 | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | - | 42.3 | 5 | 57.7 | 8 | 100.0 |
| | Mayotte | 2 | 1 | 1 | *50* | 611 | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 99.8 | 1 | 0.2 | 1 | 100.0 |
| | Mozambique | 37 | 24 | 13 | *35* | 1909 | 4.0 | 1.2 | - | - | 10.7 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 4.1 | - | 0.0 | 9.9 | 0.2 | 1.1 | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.0 | - | - | 0.6 | 65.3 | 20 | 34.7 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Namibia | 22 | 13 | 9 | *41* | 259 | - | - | - | - | 4.2 | - | 0.7 | 11.4 | - | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.3 | - | - | 0.1 | 81.4 | 12 | 18.6 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Niger | 32 | 21 | 11 | *34* | 689 | 3.6 | 3.7 | - | - | 21.9 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 0.8 | - | 0.1 | 10.5 | 0.7 | 0.7 | - | - | 0.1 | 2.6 | 0.7 | - | 5.3 | - | - | 14.9 | 32.9 | 17 | 67.1 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Nigeria | 31 | 9 | 22 | *71* | 2004 | 1.2 | 0.2 | - | - | 3.0 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 2.4 | - | 0.0 | 49.9 | 0.2 | 0.1 | - | - | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 3.8 | - | - | - | 36.7 | 16 | 63.3 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Rwanda | 32 | 16 | 16 | *50* | 949 | 4.6 | 1.0 | - | - | 11.0 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 15.1 | - | - | 15.5 | 1.5 | - | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 1.3 | - | - | 0.8 | 46.9 | 17 | 53.1 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Sao Tome & Principe | 16 | 10 | 6 | *38* | 46 | 0.6 | 6.8 | - | - | 12.9 | 0.2 | - | 2.3 | - | - | 4.6 | 3.4 | 1.2 | - | - | - | 2.9 | 1.3 | - | 1.5 | - | - | 0.2 | 62.0 | 4 | 38.0 | 12 | 100.0 |

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country)

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

| Row | Partner countries | Number of donors | Number of significant relations | Number of non-significant relations | *Fragmentation ratio (in %)* | CPA (USD million) | AfDF | Arab Agencies | AsDF | CarDB | EU institutions | GAVI | GEF | Global Fund | IADB | IAEA | IDA | IFAD | IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) | Montreal Protocol | Nordic Dev.Fund | UNAIDS | UNDP | UNFPA | UNHCR | UNICEF | UNPBF | UNRWA | WFP | DAC countries | No. of DAC countries | Multilateral agencies | No. of multilateral agencies | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Column 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | Number of partner countries | | | | | | 40 | 99 | 33 | 14 | 149 | 67 | 87 | 113 | 25 | 98 | 96 | 79 | 48 | 10 | 18 | 105 | 144 | 119 | 94 | 123 | 18 | 4 | 74 | 1670 | | 1657 | | 3327 |
| 3 | Number of significant relations | | | | | | 32 | 37 | 26 | 14 | 128 | 32 | 53 | 73 | 24 | 67 | 76 | 52 | 29 | 7 | 17 | 65 | 37 | 71 | 36 | 40 | 16 | 4 | 31 | 884 | | 967 | | 1851 |
| 4 | Number of non-significant relations | | | | | | 8 | 62 | 7 | 0 | 21 | 35 | 34 | 40 | 1 | 31 | 20 | 27 | 19 | 3 | 1 | 40 | 107 | 48 | 58 | 83 | 2 | 0 | 43 | 786 | | 690 | | 1476 |
| 5 | *Concentration ratio (in %)* | | | | | | *80* | *37* | *79* | *100* | *86* | *48* | *61* | *65* | *96* | *68* | *79* | *66* | *60* | *70* | *94* | *62* | *26* | *60* | *38* | *33* | *89* | *100* | *42* | *53* | | *58* | | *56* |
| 6 | CPA (USD million) | | | | | | 1544 | 1820 | 2038 | 69 | 9967 | 590 | 359 | 3004 | 692 | 51 | 11523 | 473 | 1362 | 21 | 52 | 57 | 1909 | 346 | 660 | 1764 | 52 | 595 | 2607 | 54592 | | 41556 | | 96148 |
| 7 | Average CPA (USD million) | | | | | | 39 | 18 | 62 | 5 | 67 | 9 | 4 | 27 | 28 | 1 | 120 | 6 | 28 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 13 | 3 | 7 | 14 | 3 | 149 | 35 | 33 | | 25 | | 633 |
| 8 | Donors' share of global CPA (in %) | | | | | | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 0.1 | 10.4 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 3.1 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 12.0 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 2.0 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1.8 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 2.7 | 56.8 | | 43.2 | | 100.0 |
| | | | | | | | % | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | % | No. | % | No. | |
| | Senegal | 34 | 22 | 12 | *35* | 842 | 7.7 | 3.6 | - | - | 10.0 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 2.2 | - | 0.1 | 14.4 | 0.6 | 5.9 | - | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 1.7 | - | - | 0.8 | 50.0 | 17 | 50.0 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Seychelles | 9 | 8 | 1 | *11* | 19 | - | 16.7 | - | - | 24.7 | - | 18.1 | - | - | 1.2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.6 | - | - | - | - | - | 38.7 | 4 | 61.3 | 5 | 100.0 |
| | Sierra Leone | 28 | 20 | 8 | *29* | 424 | 4.5 | 3.7 | - | - | 18.9 | 1.9 | 0.4 | 4.2 | - | 0.1 | 14.9 | 1.0 | 10.1 | - | - | 0.2 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 9.7 | 1.2 | - | 0.9 | 26.1 | 11 | 73.9 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Somalia | 28 | 19 | 9 | *32* | 477 | - | 0.3 | - | - | 26.6 | - | - | 5.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | 9.0 | 0.4 | 3.4 | 11.4 | 0.1 | - | 6.3 | 36.8 | 18 | 63.2 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | South Africa | 33 | 14 | 19 | *58* | 1016 | 0.0 | - | - | - | 15.1 | - | 0.1 | 4.3 | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.3 | - | - | - | 79.1 | 21 | 20.9 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | St. Helena | 1 | 1 | 0 | *0* | 54 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 100.0 | 1 | 0.0 | 0 | 100.0 |
| | Sudan | 35 | 19 | 16 | *46* | 1981 | 0.1 | 4.1 | - | - | 14.4 | 1.3 | 0.2 | 3.8 | - | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.6 | - | - | - | 0.0 | 10.2 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 5.5 | 0.1 | - | 20.4 | 36.3 | 19 | 63.7 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Swaziland | 15 | 7 | 8 | *53* | 94 | - | - | - | - | 22.8 | - | 0.8 | 38.8 | - | - | - | 0.4 | - | - | - | 0.7 | 1.3 | 1.4 | - | 1.1 | - | - | 1.4 | 31.3 | 6 | 68.7 | 9 | 100.0 |
| | Tanzania | 35 | 19 | 16 | *46* | 2879 | 4.9 | 0.5 | - | - | 6.7 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 5.0 | - | 0.0 | 24.4 | 0.6 | 1.1 | - | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.9 | - | - | 0.7 | 52.3 | 18 | 47.7 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Togo | 24 | 15 | 9 | *38* | 214 | 0.7 | 8.2 | - | - | 22.9 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 8.8 | - | - | 14.0 | - | 20.4 | - | - | 0.2 | 2.7 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 1.9 | - | - | 0.5 | 16.6 | 10 | 83.4 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Uganda | 37 | 23 | 14 | *38* | 1675 | 6.1 | 0.1 | - | - | 7.7 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 3.4 | - | 0.0 | 21.3 | 1.2 | - | - | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 1.5 | 0.0 | - | 2.6 | 52.9 | 20 | 47.1 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Zambia | 33 | 21 | 12 | *36* | 884 | 6.3 | 0.0 | - | - | 10.5 | 0.9 | - | 4.6 | - | 0.1 | 4.1 | 0.5 | 6.4 | - | 0.3 | 0.1 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 1.3 | - | - | 1.0 | 62.1 | 17 | 37.9 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Zimbabwe | 35 | 18 | 17 | *49* | 701 | 4.0 | 0.0 | - | - | 15.6 | 0.9 | - | 10.6 | - | 0.1 | 0.5 | - | 0.0 | - | - | 0.1 | 6.1 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 8.9 | - | - | 7.1 | 45.2 | 21 | 54.8 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | **North and Central America** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Anguilla | 2 | 2 | 0 | *0* | 8 | - | - | - | 0.7 | 99.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | 0 | 100.0 | 2 | 100.0 |
| | Antigua and Barbuda | 3 | 3 | 0 | *0* | 19 | - | - | - | 2.0 | 63.2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 34.9 | 1 | 65.1 | 2 | 100.0 |
| | Barbados | 6 | 5 | 1 | *17* | 16 | - | - | - | 0.7 | 76.0 | - | - | - | 11.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2.8 | 1.5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 7.4 | 1 | 92.6 | 5 | 100.0 |
| | Belize | 12 | 11 | 1 | *8* | 28 | - | 3.4 | - | 15.6 | 26.7 | - | - | 3.6 | 2.9 | 1.1 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | 2.2 | - | - | 4.8 | - | - | - | 39.6 | 3 | 60.4 | 9 | 100.0 |
| | Costa Rica | 16 | 11 | 5 | *31* | 132 | - | - | - | - | 3.2 | - | 2.5 | - | 2.3 | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.7 | - | - | - | 89.1 | 7 | 10.9 | 9 | 100.0 |
| | Cuba | 23 | 15 | 8 | *35* | 110 | - | 1.8 | - | - | 22.6 | - | 1.3 | 10.1 | - | 1.0 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.8 | - | - | 0.7 | 59.3 | 12 | 40.7 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Dominica | 7 | 3 | 4 | *57* | 35 | - | - | - | 14.2 | 66.1 | - | - | - | - | - | 1.4 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 18.0 | 3 | 82.0 | 4 | 100.0 |

| Row 1 Column 1 Partner countries | 2 Number of donors | 3 Number of significant relations | 4 Number of non-significant relations | 5 *Fragmentation ratio (in %)* | 6 CPA (USD million) | AfDF | Arab Agencies | AsDF | CarDB | EU institutions | GAVI | GEF | Global Fund | IADB | IAEA | IDA | IFAD | IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) | Montreal Protocol | Nordic Dev.Fund | UNAIDS | UNDP | UNFPA | UNHCR | UNICEF | UNPBF | UNRWA | WFP | DAC countries | No. of DAC countries | Multilateral agencies | No. of multilateral agencies | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | % | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | % | No. | % | No. | |
| Dominican Republic | 17 | 11 | 6 | *35* | 227 | - | 0.0 | - | - | 35.6 | - | - | 7.7 | 2.1 | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.7 | - | - | - | 52.1 | 7 | 47.9 | 10 | 100.0 |
| El Salvador | 23 | 13 | 10 | *43* | 353 | - | - | - | - | 14.9 | - | 0.3 | 2.7 | 1.0 | 0.1 | - | 0.8 | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | - | 0.3 | - | - | 0.2 | 79.1 | 12 | 20.9 | 11 | 100.0 |
| Grenada | 7 | 5 | 2 | *29* | 38 | - | - | - | 19.6 | 32.0 | - | - | - | - | - | 14.7 | - | 16.9 | - | - | - | 0.4 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 16.4 | 2 | 83.6 | 5 | 100.0 |
| Guatemala | 29 | 18 | 11 | *38* | 383 | - | 0.2 | - | - | 9.8 | - | 0.4 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 1.4 | - | - | - | 0.2 | 6.6 | 1.0 | - | 0.8 | - | - | 2.4 | 73.4 | 16 | 26.6 | 13 | 100.0 |
| Haiti | 37 | 14 | 23 | *62* | 2739 | - | 0.1 | - | 0.2 | 10.4 | - | 0.0 | 0.4 | 7.7 | 0.0 | 7.1 | 0.3 | 4.5 | - | - | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.5 | - | 2.7 | 0.1 | - | 7.4 | 57.3 | 21 | 42.7 | 16 | 100.0 |
| Honduras | 27 | 16 | 11 | *41* | 530 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 11.0 | 1.4 | 0.2 | 1.6 | 20.9 | 0.1 | 20.8 | - | - | - | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 0.4 | - | 0.7 | - | - | 0.7 | 40.9 | 13 | 59.1 | 14 | 100.0 |
| Jamaica | 17 | 11 | 6 | *35* | 177 | - | 6.8 | - | 9.4 | 47.4 | - | 1.3 | 6.6 | 1.5 | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.1 | - | 0.5 | - | - | - | 25.3 | 6 | 74.7 | 11 | 100.0 |
| Mexico | 21 | 7 | 14 | *67* | 602 | - | - | - | - | 1.2 | - | 4.4 | 0.6 | 1.8 | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | - | - | - | 91.3 | 11 | 8.7 | 10 | 100.0 |
| Montserrat | 4 | 3 | 1 | *25* | 29 | - | - | - | 2.2 | 29.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 67.9 | 1 | 32.1 | 3 | 100.0 |
| Nicaragua | 34 | 25 | 9 | *26* | 572 | - | 0.3 | - | - | 3.8 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.9 | 19.3 | 0.1 | 8.4 | 0.8 | 3.4 | - | 0.5 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.8 | - | 0.7 | - | - | 0.3 | 56.9 | 18 | 43.1 | 16 | 100.0 |
| Panama | 16 | 9 | 7 | *44* | 143 | - | - | - | - | 1.1 | - | 1.1 | - | 2.2 | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.7 | - | - | 0.3 | 92.4 | 6 | 7.6 | 10 | 100.0 |
| St. Kitts-Nevis | 3 | 2 | 1 | *33* | 15 | - | - | - | 38.2 | 57.7 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.1 | 1 | 95.9 | 2 | 100.0 |
| St. Lucia | 8 | 3 | 5 | *63* | 48 | - | - | - | 20.9 | 48.7 | - | - | - | - | - | 22.3 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | - | - | 0.1 | - | - | - | 7.8 | 3 | 92.2 | 5 | 100.0 |
| St. Vincent & Grenadines | 6 | 3 | 3 | *50* | 20 | - | - | - | 33.1 | 52.4 | - | - | - | - | - | 8.1 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5.7 | 2 | 94.3 | 4 | 100.0 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 8 | 8 | 0 | *0* | 3 | - | - | - | 2.0 | 13.9 | - | - | - | 11.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.0 | 4.9 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 63.6 | 3 | 36.4 | 5 | 100.0 |
| **South America** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 19 | 15 | 4 | *21* | 132 | - | - | - | - | 6.0 | - | 2.2 | - | 5.0 | 0.6 | - | - | - | 0.4 | - | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | - | - | - | 82.7 | 9 | 17.3 | 10 | 100.0 |
| Bolivia | 31 | 16 | 15 | *48* | 609 | - | 0.2 | - | - | 10.6 | 0.5 | - | 1.3 | 16.1 | 0.0 | 7.7 | 0.4 | - | - | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.3 | - | 1.4 | - | - | 0.2 | 60.6 | 17 | 39.4 | 14 | 100.0 |
| Brazil | 30 | 15 | 15 | *50* | 622 | - | - | - | - | 3.4 | - | 4.6 | 1.4 | 2.4 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | - | - | - | 86.9 | 18 | 13.1 | 12 | 100.0 |
| Chile | 25 | 19 | 6 | *24* | 184 | - | - | - | - | 8.8 | - | 6.4 | - | 3.6 | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.1 | - | 0.6 | - | - | - | 79.1 | 17 | 20.9 | 8 | 100.0 |
| Colombia | 31 | 14 | 17 | *55* | 890 | - | 3.4 | - | - | 6.0 | - | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 | - | - | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 2.6 | 0.7 | - | - | 1.1 | 81.0 | 16 | 19.0 | 15 | 100.0 |
| Ecuador | 25 | 20 | 5 | *20* | 201 | - | - | - | - | 12.3 | - | 0.5 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 0.2 | - | 1.0 | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 2.0 | 0.4 | - | - | 0.7 | 73.8 | 13 | 26.2 | 12 | 100.0 |
| Guyana | 16 | 9 | 7 | *44* | 157 | - | - | - | 3.8 | 18.6 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 3.4 | 31.0 | - | 20.3 | 0.3 | - | - | - | 0.4 | 1.5 | - | - | 0.8 | - | - | - | 19.3 | 5 | 80.7 | 11 | 100.0 |
| Paraguay | 17 | 11 | 6 | *35* | 165 | - | - | - | - | 18.1 | - | - | 5.3 | 4.9 | 0.1 | - | 2.8 | - | - | - | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.6 | - | 0.6 | - | - | - | 66.8 | 8 | 33.2 | 9 | 100.0 |
| Peru | 28 | 16 | 12 | *43* | 637 | - | 0.0 | - | - | 4.0 | - | 0.5 | 3.7 | 1.9 | 0.1 | 1.0 | - | 0.0 | - | - | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | - | 0.7 | - | - | 0.0 | 87.5 | 15 | 12.5 | 13 | 100.0 |
| Suriname | 9 | 4 | 5 | *56* | 103 | - | 0.0 | - | - | 16.8 | - | 1.0 | 3.0 | 2.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 76.6 | 3 | 23.4 | 6 | 100.0 |
| Uruguay | 15 | 11 | 4 | *27* | 55 | - | 0.3 | - | - | 12.9 | - | 1.8 | - | 7.4 | 0.7 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 1.9 | 1.5 | - | 1.5 | - | - | - | 71.8 | 6 | 28.2 | 9 | 100.0 |
| Venezuela | 17 | 13 | 4 | *24* | 37 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 15.8 | - | 10.0 | - | 0.6 | 0.6 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.9 | 1.7 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.7 | - | - | - | 59.7 | 7 | 40.3 | 10 | 100.0 |
| **Middle East** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Iran | 19 | 13 | 6 | *32* | 67 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 5.1 | - | 15.5 | 12.2 | - | 1.0 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 1.3 | 2.2 | 16.8 | 2.3 | - | - | 1.9 | 41.4 | 8 | 58.6 | 11 | 100.0 |
| Iraq | 30 | 6 | 24 | *80* | 2075 | - | 0.0 | - | - | 2.6 | - | - | 0.5 | - | 0.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | - | - | - | 0.5 | 0.2 | 1.5 | 1.4 | - | - | 0.4 | 89.8 | 18 | 10.2 | 12 | 100.0 |
| Jordan | 28 | 11 | 17 | *61* | 1015 | - | 20.4 | - | - | 12.8 | - | 0.3 | 0.1 | - | 0.1 | - | 0.1 | - | 0.0 | - | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 1.8 | 0.1 | - | 10.5 | - | 53.4 | 15 | 46.6 | 13 | 100.0 |
| Lebanon | 29 | 16 | 13 | *45* | 401 | - | 9.6 | - | - | 13.3 | - | 0.9 | - | - | 0.2 | - | 0.0 | - | - | - | - | 1.7 | 0.2 | 1.6 | 0.2 | - | 17.4 | - | 54.9 | 19 | 45.1 | 10 | 100.0 |
| Oman | 9 | 9 | 0 | *0* | 8 | - | 7.5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.0 | - | - | - | - | - | 85.4 | 6 | 14.6 | 3 | 100.0 |

Blue applies to significant aid relations (i.e. where the donor provides more than its global share of CPA and/or is among the top donors that cumulatively provide 90% of the CPA to that partner country)

Cells with data, but without highlighting, denote that the donor is in the last decile of donors to that country and the country is not an above-average partner for that donor.

| Row | Partner countries | Number of donors | Number of significant relations | Number of non-significant relations | *Fragmentation ratio (in %)* | CPA (USD million) | AfDF | Arab Agencies | AsDF | CarDB | EU institutions | GAVI | GEF | Global Fund | IADB | IAEA | IDA | IFAD | IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) | Montreal Protocol | Nordic Dev.Fund | UNAIDS | UNDP | UNFPA | UNHCR | UNICEF | UNPBF | UNRWA | WFP | DAC countries | No. of DAC countries | Multilateral agencies | No. of multilateral agencies | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Column 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | Number of partner countries | | | | | | 40 | 99 | 33 | 14 | 149 | 67 | 87 | 113 | 25 | 98 | 96 | 79 | 48 | 10 | 18 | 105 | 144 | 119 | 94 | 123 | 18 | 4 | 74 | 1670 | | 1657 | | 3327 |
| 3 | Number of significant relations | | | | | | 32 | 37 | 26 | 14 | 128 | 32 | 53 | 73 | 24 | 67 | 76 | 52 | 29 | 7 | 17 | 65 | 37 | 71 | 36 | 40 | 16 | 4 | 31 | 884 | | 967 | | 1851 |
| 4 | Number of non-significant relations | | | | | | 8 | 62 | 7 | 0 | 21 | 35 | 34 | 40 | 1 | 31 | 20 | 27 | 19 | 3 | 1 | 40 | 107 | 48 | 58 | 83 | 2 | 0 | 43 | 786 | | 690 | | 1476 |
| 5 | *Concentration ratio (in %)* | | | | | | *80* | *37* | *79* | *100* | *86* | *48* | *61* | *65* | *96* | *68* | *79* | *66* | *60* | *70* | *94* | *62* | *26* | *60* | *38* | *33* | *89* | *100* | *42* | *53* | | *58* | | *56* |
| 6 | CPA (USD million) | | | | | | 1544 | 1820 | 2038 | 69 | 9967 | 590 | 359 | 3004 | 692 | 51 | 11523 | 473 | 1362 | 21 | 52 | 57 | 1909 | 346 | 660 | 1764 | 52 | 595 | 2607 | 54592 | | 41556 | | 96148 |
| 7 | Average CPA (USD million) | | | | | | 39 | 18 | 62 | 5 | 67 | 9 | 4 | 27 | 28 | 1 | 120 | 6 | 28 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 13 | 3 | 7 | 14 | 3 | 149 | 35 | 33 | | 25 | | 633 |
| 8 | Donors' share of global CPA (in %) | | | | | | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 0.1 | 10.4 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 3.1 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 12.0 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 2.0 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1.8 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 2.7 | 56.8 | | 43.2 | | 100.0 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | % | No. | % | No. | |
| | Syria | 23 | 14 | 9 | *39* | 288 | - | 13.3 | - | - | 17.9 | - | 1.6 | 0.5 | - | 0.3 | - | 2.5 | - | - | - | - | 0.8 | 0.7 | 17.7 | 0.3 | - | 14.3 | 1.3 | 28.8 | 11 | 71.2 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | Yemen | 33 | 16 | 17 | *52* | 692 | - | 12.5 | - | - | 5.9 | 2.5 | 0.1 | 1.3 | - | 0.1 | 26.4 | 1.9 | 7.7 | - | - | 0.0 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 1.7 | 1.8 | - | - | 5.0 | 31.6 | 18 | 68.4 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | West Bank & Gaza Strip | 33 | 16 | 17 | *52* | 2266 | - | 0.6 | - | - | 20.1 | - | - | 0.1 | - | 0.0 | 7.3 | 0.0 | - | - | - | - | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.5 | - | 16.7 | 1.4 | 52.5 | 21 | 47.5 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | **South and Central Asia** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Afghanistan | 36 | 15 | 21 | *58* | 5956 | - | 0.1 | 4.0 | - | 4.9 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.1 | - | 0.0 | 7.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | - | - | - | 8.6 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 2.1 | - | - | 3.4 | 68.1 | 21 | 31.9 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Armenia | 27 | 12 | 15 | *56* | 370 | - | 1.1 | 6.0 | - | 9.0 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 1.1 | - | 0.2 | 10.0 | 0.9 | 15.4 | - | - | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | - | - | 0.3 | 53.9 | 11 | 46.1 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Azerbaijan | 23 | 17 | 6 | *26* | 178 | - | 5.5 | 2.8 | - | 11.6 | 0.9 | - | 5.3 | - | 0.1 | 26.3 | 1.9 | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.7 | - | - | - | 42.6 | 10 | 57.4 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Bangladesh | 34 | 19 | 15 | *44* | 2018 | - | 1.4 | 17.0 | - | 9.3 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 2.1 | - | 0.0 | 19.7 | 1.3 | - | - | 0.2 | 0.0 | 2.7 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 2.8 | - | - | 1.9 | 38.5 | 18 | 61.5 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Bhutan | 21 | 12 | 9 | *43* | 136 | - | - | 28.0 | - | 1.3 | 0.0 | 1.3 | 1.0 | - | - | 6.5 | 3.5 | - | - | - | 0.1 | 1.2 | 0.7 | - | 1.4 | - | - | 1.0 | 53.9 | 9 | 46.1 | 12 | 100.0 |
| | Georgia | 26 | 11 | 15 | *58* | 619 | - | - | 6.2 | - | 26.3 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 1.4 | - | 0.1 | 11.4 | 1.1 | - | - | - | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 2.0 | 0.2 | - | - | 0.1 | 49.9 | 12 | 50.1 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | India | 33 | 9 | 24 | *73* | 4336 | - | 0.1 | 0.0 | - | 2.2 | - | 0.4 | 3.6 | - | - | 24.7 | 0.4 | - | 0.1 | - | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 1.6 | - | - | 0.1 | 66.1 | 19 | 33.9 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Kazakhstan | 20 | 10 | 10 | *50* | 182 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 9.6 | - | 10.5 | 10.4 | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 1.0 | - | - | - | 66.7 | 10 | 33.3 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Kyrgyz Republic | 28 | 16 | 12 | *43* | 334 | - | 3.9 | 8.4 | - | 7.3 | 0.5 | - | 2.5 | - | 0.0 | 19.5 | 0.4 | 10.1 | - | - | - | 1.8 | 0.3 | 5.1 | 1.6 | 0.1 | - | 2.0 | 36.2 | 13 | 63.8 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Maldives | 19 | 11 | 8 | *42* | 113 | - | 1.6 | 23.0 | - | 5.0 | - | - | 0.5 | - | - | 15.6 | 1.3 | 1.4 | - | - | 0.1 | 1.8 | 0.4 | - | 1.0 | - | - | - | 48.3 | 8 | 51.7 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Myanmar | 28 | 18 | 10 | *36* | 368 | - | 1.7 | - | - | 15.2 | 0.0 | - | 10.0 | - | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 5.0 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 8.4 | - | - | 4.2 | 51.4 | 17 | 48.6 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Nepal | 35 | 23 | 12 | *34* | 922 | - | 0.2 | 12.6 | - | 5.3 | 1.5 | 0.4 | 2.2 | - | 0.0 | 19.6 | 0.6 | 4.7 | - | - | 0.1 | 3.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 0.5 | - | 1.5 | 44.8 | 18 | 55.2 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | Pakistan | 35 | 17 | 18 | *51* | 3463 | - | 0.2 | 10.1 | - | 5.0 | 2.8 | 0.1 | 0.7 | - | 0.0 | 12.3 | 0.6 | - | - | - | 0.0 | 1.8 | 0.4 | 4.8 | 4.2 | - | - | 8.9 | 48.1 | 20 | 51.9 | 15 | 100.0 |
| | Sri Lanka | 33 | 18 | 15 | *45* | 1045 | - | 0.1 | 10.9 | - | 4.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.9 | - | 0.1 | 15.9 | 1.0 | - | - | - | 0.1 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.2 | - | 2.9 | 59.5 | 17 | 40.5 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Tajikistan | 28 | 13 | 15 | *54* | 430 | - | 5.0 | 11.6 | - | 8.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 5.3 | - | 0.1 | 16.4 | 0.1 | 13.9 | - | - | 0.0 | 2.5 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 1.5 | - | - | 0.5 | 33.3 | 12 | 66.7 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Turkmenistan | 13 | 12 | 1 | *8* | 29 | - | 11.8 | - | - | 19.7 | - | 10.1 | 6.2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2.9 | 2.4 | 0.1 | 5.1 | - | - | - | 41.6 | 5 | 58.4 | 8 | 100.0 |
| | Uzbekistan | 22 | 13 | 9 | *41* | 213 | - | 3.3 | 17.3 | - | 2.9 | 3.4 | - | 1.9 | - | 0.2 | 15.1 | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | 3.2 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 2.9 | - | - | - | 49.0 | 10 | 51.0 | 12 | 100.0 |

| Row | Partner countries | Number of donors | Number of significant relations | Number of non-significant relations | *Fragmentation ratio (in %)* | CPA (USD million) | AfDF | Arab Agencies | AsDF | CarDB | EU institutions | GAVI | GEF | Global Fund | IADB | IAEA | IDA | IFAD | IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) | Montreal Protocol | Nordic Dev.Fund | UNAIDS | UNDP | UNFPA | UNHCR | UNICEF | UNPBF | UNRWA | WFP | DAC countries | No. of DAC countries | Multilateral agencies | No. of multilateral agencies | Grand Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Column 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | % | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | % | No. | % | No. | |
| | **Far East Asia** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Cambodia | 35 | 18 | 17 | *49* | 727 | - | 0.4 | 10.1 | - | 3.8 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 8.4 | - | 0.0 | 9.1 | 0.5 | - | - | 0.5 | 0.1 | 3.4 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 1.7 | - | - | 1.4 | 59.0 | 19 | 41.0 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | China | 33 | 13 | 20 | *61* | 2057 | - | - | 0.0 | - | 2.1 | - | 1.7 | 5.8 | - | 0.1 | - | 1.2 | - | 0.7 | - | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.6 | - | - | 0.1 | 87.3 | 20 | 12.7 | 13 | 100.0 |
| | Indonesia | 34 | 8 | 26 | *76* | 3379 | - | 0.4 | 3.6 | - | 3.1 | - | 0.2 | 2.5 | - | 0.0 | 8.7 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | - | 0.0 | 1.5 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.5 | - | - | 0.0 | 78.9 | 18 | 21.1 | 16 | 100.0 |
| | Korea, Dem. Rep. | 16 | 12 | 4 | *25* | 73 | - | - | - | - | 20.3 | 2.7 | - | 25.7 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.2 | 1.8 | - | 5.0 | - | - | 22.8 | 20.6 | 9 | 79.4 | 7 | 100.0 |
| | Laos | 27 | 23 | 4 | *15* | 440 | - | 1.4 | 14.1 | - | 3.6 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1.6 | - | - | 13.1 | 0.7 | - | - | 1.0 | 0.1 | 2.7 | 0.5 | - | 1.2 | - | - | 2.3 | 56.3 | 13 | 43.7 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Malaysia | 20 | 8 | 12 | *60* | 192 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 0.6 | - | 5.2 | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 1.6 | 0.3 | - | - | - | 91.0 | 10 | 9.0 | 10 | 100.0 |
| | Mongolia | 29 | 17 | 12 | *41* | 308 | - | 0.1 | 10.0 | - | 4.4 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 2.0 | - | 0.3 | 11.8 | 0.6 | - | - | 0.3 | - | 1.5 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.7 | - | - | - | 67.1 | 15 | 32.9 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Philippines | 32 | 12 | 20 | *63* | 1420 | - | 0.0 | 0.0 | - | 3.7 | - | - | 4.2 | - | 0.0 | 0.9 | 1.3 | - | 0.0 | - | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.7 | - | - | 1.3 | 87.0 | 18 | 13.0 | 14 | 100.0 |
| | Thailand | 26 | 13 | 13 | *50* | 414 | - | 0.1 | - | - | 5.8 | - | 2.9 | 10.3 | - | 0.2 | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 1.5 | 0.4 | - | - | - | 77.3 | 15 | 22.7 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Timor-Leste | 24 | 15 | 9 | *38* | 283 | - | - | 2.0 | - | 5.1 | - | - | 1.7 | - | - | 6.2 | - | 0.2 | - | - | - | 3.7 | 1.1 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 0.3 | - | 1.4 | 77.2 | 13 | 22.8 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Vietnam | 37 | 15 | 22 | *59* | 3362 | - | 0.4 | 7.7 | - | 1.2 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.4 | - | 0.0 | 28.0 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | - | - | - | 60.1 | 20 | 39.9 | 17 | 100.0 |
| | **Oceania** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Cook Islands | 5 | 3 | 2 | *40* | 14 | - | - | 4.3 | - | 0.8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 93.4 | 2 | 6.6 | 3 | 100.0 |
| | Fiji | 14 | 9 | 5 | *36* | 74 | - | - | 0.2 | - | 8.5 | - | 1.4 | 4.0 | - | - | 0.9 | - | - | - | - | 0.8 | 6.2 | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | 77.8 | 6 | 22.2 | 8 | 100.0 |
| | Kiribati | 10 | 5 | 5 | *50* | 22 | - | - | 1.3 | - | 3.6 | 0.1 | 4.6 | - | - | - | 0.5 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | 1.9 | - | - | - | 87.7 | 3 | 12.3 | 7 | 100.0 |
| | Marshall Islands | 6 | 3 | 3 | *50* | 92 | - | - | 10.8 | - | 0.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 88.5 | 3 | 11.5 | 3 | 100.0 |
| | Micronesia, Fed. States | 6 | 2 | 4 | *67* | 126 | - | - | 0.8 | - | 0.4 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 98.7 | 3 | 1.3 | 3 | 100.0 |
| | Nauru | 6 | 2 | 4 | *67* | 27 | - | - | - | - | 4.0 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.0 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 95.8 | 3 | 4.2 | 3 | 100.0 |
| | Niue | 4 | 2 | 2 | *50* | 15 | - | - | - | - | 7.5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 92.2 | 2 | 7.8 | 2 | 100.0 |
| | Palau | 5 | 3 | 2 | *40* | 26 | - | - | - | - | 2.7 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 97.0 | 3 | 3.0 | 2 | 100.0 |
| | Papua New Guinea | 18 | 8 | 10 | *56* | 502 | - | - | 2.9 | - | 10.0 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 1.4 | - | - | 2.0 | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | 1.9 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.6 | - | - | - | 80.0 | 7 | 20.0 | 11 | 100.0 |
| | Samoa | 9 | 5 | 4 | *44* | 152 | - | 0.2 | 20.7 | - | 7.5 | - | - | - | - | - | 16.4 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 54.6 | 4 | 45.4 | 5 | 100.0 |
| | Solomon Islands | 10 | 6 | 4 | *40* | 341 | - | - | 5.1 | - | 7.3 | 0.0 | - | 0.4 | - | - | 1.6 | - | 2.8 | - | - | - | 0.6 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 82.1 | 3 | 17.9 | 7 | 100.0 |
| | Tokelau | 3 | 2 | 1 | *33* | 14 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 99.2 | 2 | 0.8 | 1 | 100.0 |
| | Tonga | 8 | 5 | 3 | *38* | 71 | - | - | 8.7 | - | 2.3 | - | - | - | - | - | 17.7 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 71.2 | 4 | 28.8 | 4 | 100.0 |
| | Tuvalu | 6 | 5 | 1 | *17* | 13 | - | - | 2.5 | - | 1.8 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2.3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 93.4 | 3 | 6.6 | 3 | 100.0 |
| | Vanuatu | 10 | 5 | 5 | *50* | 105 | - | - | 0.4 | - | 1.9 | - | 0.9 | - | - | - | 2.1 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.2 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 94.5 | 5 | 5.5 | 5 | 100.0 |
| | Wallis & Futuna | 2 | 1 | 1 | *50* | 128 | - | - | - | - | 3.4 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 96.6 | 1 | 3.4 | 1 | 100.0 |

# ANNEX D

## Fragmentation on the basis of CPA

The following two tables considers country programmable aid (CPA) by looking at the concentration of core resource outflows of multilateral agencies (Table B.1), and the impact of re-allocating non-core resources from bilateral agencies to multilateral agencies in terms of fragmentation (Table B.2).

This data complement the analysis undertaken in the report (Chapter 2), where the same comparison is made on the basis of CPA+ (including humanitarian aid).

**Table D.1. Concentration of multilateral agencies (core resources)**

| | CPA* (USD 2010 million) | Share of Global CPA* (in %) | No. of relations | No. of significant relations | Concentration ratio (in %) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arab Agencies** | 1 812 | 2.1 | 98 | 38 | 39 |
| EU institutions*** | 8 113 | 9.5 | 149 | 123 | 83 |
| GAVI | 590 | 0.7 | 67 | 33 | 49 |
| GEF | 359 | 0.4 | 87 | 55 | 63 |
| Global Fund | 2 997 | 3.5 | 113 | 72 | 64 |
| IDA | 10 068 | 11.8 | 78 | 70 | 90 |
| IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) | 1 346 | 1.6 | 37 | 31 | 84 |
| Montreal Protocol | 21 | 0.02 | 10 | 7 | 70 |
| Nordic Dev. Fund | 52 | 0.1 | 18 | 16 | 89 |
| Regional Development Bank Funds: | 4 161 | 4.9 | 104 | 93 | 89 |
| *AfDF* | *1 515* | *1.8* | *38* | *31* | *82* |
| *AsDF* | *1 921* | *2.2* | *27* | *24* | *89* |
| *CarDB* | *69* | *0.1* | *14* | *14* | *100* |
| *IaDB* | *656* | *0.8* | *25* | *24* | *96* |
| UN agencies: | 1 909 | 2.2 | 377 | 205 | 54 |
| *UNDP* | *458* | *0.5* | *136* | *74* | *54* |
| *UNFPA* | *282* | *0.3* | *117* | *76* | *65* |
| *UNHCR* | *0* | *0.0* | *0* | *0* | |
| *UNICEF* | *740* | *0.9* | *120* | *51* | *43* |
| *UNRWA* | *429* | *0.5* | *4* | *4* | *100* |
| *WFP* | *0* | *0.0* | *0* | *0* | |
| Other UN: | 611 | 0.7 | 296 | 201 | 68 |
| *IAEA* | *51* | *0.06* | *98* | *67* | *68* |
| *IFAD* | *462* | *0.54* | *79* | *51* | *65* |
| *UNAIDS* | *51* | *0.06* | *103* | *68* | *66* |
| *UN Peacebuilding Fund* | *47* | *0.06* | *16* | *15* | *94* |
| **Total multilaterals** | **32 040** | **37.4** | **1 434** | **944** | **66** |
| *Total multilaterals excl. EU* | **23 926** | **27.9** | **1 285** | **821** | **64** |
| **Total DAC countries** | **53 469** | **62.5** | **1 605** | **865** | **54** |
| *Total DAC members incl. EU* | **61 582** | **71.9** | **1 754** | **988** | **56** |

* Note that this CPA analysis excludes regional allocations.

** Arab Agencies are BADEA, Isl. Dev Bank, OFID and Arab Fund (AFESD).

*** The EU is a member of the DAC and has its own development policy. It is presented in this report as a multilateral agency since contributions to the EU are considered multilateral ODA.

**Table D.2. Impact of non-core multilateral aid on fragmentation**

| | No. of relations | No. of additional relations due to earmarked funding | Donor's share of Global CPA* | Concentration ratio (in %) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arab Agencies** | 98 | 0 | 2.1% | 39 | ⇨ |
| EU institutions*** | 149 | 0 | 9.6% | 83 | ⇧ |
| GAVI | 67 | 0 | 0.7% | 49 | ⇨ |
| GEF | 87 | 0 | 0.4% | 63 | ⇨ |
| Global Fund | 113 | 0 | 3.5% | 63 | ⇩ |
| IDA | 96 | 18 | 13.3% | 79 | ⇩ |
| IMF (Concessional Trust Funds) | 48 | 11 | 1.6% | 65 | ⇩ |
| Montreal Protocol | 10 | 0 | 0.0% | 70 | ⇨ |
| Nordic Dev. Fund | 18 | 0 | 0.1% | 89 | ⇨ |
| Regional Development Bank Funds: | 112 | 8 | 5.0% | 86 | ⇩ |
| *AfDF* | *40* | *2* | *1.8%* | *80* | ⇩ |
| *AsDF* | *33* | *6* | *2.4%* | *79* | ⇩ |
| *CarDB* | *14* | *0* | *0.1%* | *100* | ⇨ |
| *IaDB* | *25* | *0* | *0.8%* | *96* | ⇨ |
| UN agencies: | 401 | 24 | 4.7% | 39 | ⇩ |
| *UNDP* | *144* | *8* | *1.9%* | *29* | ⇩ |
| *UNFPA* | *119* | *2* | *0.4%* | *56* | ⇩ |
| *UNHCR* | *8* | *8* | *0.3%* | *75* | ⇨ |
| *UNICEF* | *123* | *3* | *1.6%* | *33* | ⇩ |
| *UNRWA* | *4* | *0* | *0.5%* | *100* | ⇨ |
| *WFP* | *3* | *3* | *0.0%* | *100* | ⇨ |
| Other UN: | 298 | 2 | 0.7% | 67 | ⇩ |
| *IAEA* | *98* | *0* | *0.1%* | *68* | ⇨ |
| *IFAD* | *79* | *0* | *0.6%* | *66* | ⇧ |
| *UNAIDS* | *105* | *2* | *0.1%* | *64* | ⇩ |
| *UN Peacebuilding Fund* | *16* | *0* | *0.1%* | *94* | ⇨ |
| **Total multilaterals** | **1 497** | **63** | **41.8%** | **61** | ⇩ |
| *Total multilaterals excl. EU* | **1 348** | **63** | **32.2%** | **58** | ⇩ |
| **Total DAC countries** | **1 575** | **- 30** | **58.1%** | **54** | ⇨ |
| *Total DAC members incl. EU* | **1 724** | **- 30** | **67.7%** | **56** | ⇨ |

* Note that this CPA analysis excludes regional allocations.

** Arab Agencies are BADEA, Isl. Dev Bank, OFID and Arab Fund (AFESD).

*** The EU is a member of the DAC and has its own development policy. It is presented in this report as a multilateral agency since contributions to the EU are considered multilateral ODA.

**ANNEX E**

## The MOPAN Common Approach Methodology

The MOPAN Common Approach was designed to assess the organisational effectiveness of multilateral organisations (MOs). The objective of the approach is to generate relevant and credible information MOPAN members can use to meet their domestic accountability requirements and fulfil their responsibilities and obligations as bilateral donors, as well as to use the findings to support dialogue between donor countries, MOs, and their direct clients and partners to improve organisational effectiveness and learning over time.

MOPAN defines **organisational effectiveness** as the extent to which a multilateral organisation is organised to contribute to development results in the countries where it operates. It examines the organisation systems, practices and behaviours that MOPAN believes are important for aid effectiveness and that are likely to contribute to results at the country level.

In 2012, MOPAN has tested an expanded assessment framework which will provide an assessment of organisational effectiveness as well as the results achieved by multilateral organisations. The assessment of results is focusing on the degree to which progress is being made towards the organisations stated objectives and will analyse the relevance of its programming.

The MOPAN Common Approach is not meant as a formal evaluation. Instead, its aim is to respond to the information needs of a group of donors by collecting and producing information that would not otherwise be available about the organisational effectiveness of an MO. It does not compare multilateral organisations to one another since mandates and structures vary too much in scope and nature. Nonetheless, since MOPAN assessments are repeated at regular intervals, they can help determine the direction of a MO's performance over time.

The sections below cover the objective, survey structure, survey respondents, choice of MOs and partner countries, and finally, a brief description of the complementary document review.

### Objective

Findings of the MOPAN Common Approach are used to:

- Build a better understanding of the effectiveness of the multilateral organisation;
- Support discussions between partner country governments, bilateral donors and MOs as part of an ongoing dialogue process to strengthen mutual accountability, in particular at country-level;
- Inform the direction and discussion as well as to enhance participation in the governance of MOs (*e.g.* at an executive board or governing body meeting);
- Strengthen relationships between bilateral donors, MOs, and countries where they operate;
- Contribute to policy-making; and
- Contribute to wider debates about MO effectiveness

**Survey structure and organisation**

The instrument used to conduct the survey is a Computer-Aided Web Interviewing (CAWI) package administered through an online survey, which can be completed in English, French or Spanish. When it is not possible for respondents to complete the survey online, off-line methods are used. Intellectual service providers manage the survey process.

The main part of the survey consists of a series of closed questions based on the key performance indicators below. Respondents are asked to rate the performance of the multilateral organisation on a scale from 1 (very weak) to 6 (very strong). In addition, respondents are invited to respond to open-ended questions on what they consider to be the particular strengths and areas for improvement for the organisation.

The Common Approach framework examines four quadrants of performance, which includes the following key performance indicators. In addition, it complements respondents' survey data with a review of documents published by the multilateral organisations assessed. From 2012 it also includes consultation with the relevant staff at the multilateral organisations. The key performance indicators (KPIs) listed in each category below are tailored to adapt to both the type of respondent and the type of multilateral organisation assessed.

**Strategic management**

- The MO executive management provides direction for the achievement of external result.
- The MO's corporate strategies and plans are focused on the achievement of result.
- The MO maintains focus on the cross-cutting priorities identified in its strategic framework, and/or based on its mandate and international commitments.
- The MO's work in countries and regions is focused on results.

**Operational management**

- The MO makes transparent and predictable resource allocations.
- The MO's financial management is linked to performance management.
- The MO has policies and processes for financial accountability (audit, risk management, anti-corruption).
- Performance information on results is used by the MO to (a) revise and adjust policies and strategies: (b) plan new interventions; (c) manage poorly performing programmes, projects or initiatives; (d) report to the executive committee and acted upon by responsible units.
- The MO manages HR using methods to improve organisational performance.
- The MO's programming processes are performance-oriented.
- The MO delegates decision-making authority (to the regional- or country-level).

**Relationship management**

- The MO coordinates and directs its programming (including capacity building) at the country-level in support of agreed national plans or partner plans.
- The MO's procedures take into account local conditions and capacities.
- The MO adds value to policy dialogue with its partners.
- The MO harmonises arrangements and procedures with other programming partners.

**Knowledge management**

- The MO consistently evaluates its delivery and external results.
- The MO presents performance information on its effectiveness.

- The MO encourages identification, documentation and dissemination of lessons learned.

**Demonstrating progress towards results**

- Extent of MO progress towards its institutional / organisation-wide outcomes [identified in strategic plans].
- Extent of MO contributions to country-level goals and priorities [identified in country strategy].
- Extent of MO contributions to relevant MDGs.

**Relevance to an organisation's stakeholders**

- MO objectives and programme of work are relevant to major stakeholders.

**Survey respondents**

Depending on the indicator, different respondents or groups of respondents are targeted. Respondents include:

- **Donors in headquarters:** Professional staff working for a MOPAN (donor) government with responsibility for overseeing and observing a multilateral organisation at the institutional level (in the donor capital or permanent mission of the MO).

- **Donors in country offices:** Professional staff working for a MOPAN (donor) government in a partner country who work closely with the multilateral organisation at the country level; and

- **Direct partners / clients:** partner country government, civil society, other relevant stakeholders.

Respondents are identified either by MOPAN members or the multilateral organisations themselves on the basis of familiarity of the organisation assessed. This is confirmed by a "screener" question at the start of the survey asking respondents to identify their level of familiarity with the assessed MO.

**Selection of organisations and partner countries**

MOPAN selects multilateral organisations for the Common Approach assessment on the basis of three criteria:

1. Perceived importance and interest to all MOPAN members;

2. Medium-term strategic planning and replenishment cycles so that organisations are assessed before the beginning of the planning process, or prior to the start of the replenishment negotiations.

3. MOs should be selected on the basis of the criteria above and re-assessed on a 3-5 year cycle.

Partner countries cannot be surveyed two years in a row and must be representative of a wide geographical spread. They also must have a significant number of MOPAN donors and selected multilateral organisations present in that country.

**Document review**

Included in the MOPAN Common Approach is a review of documents to complement the survey data. The MOPAN document review explores evidence that the multilateral organisations have the necessary systems in place for an organisation to be effective. The review examines publicly-available documents, including those that the organisations provide.

Three types of documents are reviewed: (1) documents from the multilateral organisation relevant to the indicators above; (2) organisational reviews or assessments – both external and internal – about the organisation's performance on the dimensions of the MOPAN framework; and (3) external assessments such as the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration (2008), the Common Performance Assessment (COMPAS) report (2008), and previous MOPAN surveys. In effect, the document review serves to triangulate the survey data with other sources of available information.

**Interviews**

In 2012, MOPAN will complement the survey data and document review with selected consultations and interviews at the Headquarters and country offices of the multilateral organisations being assessed.

**Finalisation and Dissemination of the Reports**

The findings from the survey; the document review; and from the interviews, are triangulated to prepare the draft reports which are shared with the multilateral organisations. The response from the multilateral organisations constitutes the final stage of the data validation process. The MOPAN Steering Committee approves the final version of the reports which are published on the MOPAN website together with the associated management responses from the multilateral organisation.

The final reports provide the basis for consultations with the multilateral organisation at their Headquarters and at country level to discuss the findings and identify how the recommendations can best be implemented. Representatives from partner country Governments which have participated in the survey are included in these consultation meetings.

# ANNEX F

The list of fragile states used for the purpose of this report is reproduced below. However, this list does not constitute an official list of "fragile states"; it is merely a compilation of two recent lists: the 2012 Harmonised List of Fragile Situations by the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and the 2011 Failed States Index by the Fund for Peace. The resulting list is also used for the DAC's 2012 Fragile States Outlook.

In the past, the DAC used the Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World; and the Carleton University Country Indicators for Foreign Policy index. However, those two sources no longer exist.

**Table F.1. List of Fragile States used in this report**Error! Bookmark not defined.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | AFGHANISTAN | 25 | KYRGYZ REPUBLIC |
| 2 | ANGOLA | 26 | LIBERIA |
| 3 | BANGLADESH | 27 | MALAWI |
| 4 | BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA | 28 | MARSHALL ISLANDS |
| 5 | BURUNDI | 29 | MICRONESIA |
| 6 | CAMEROON | 30 | MYANMAR |
| 7 | CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC | 31 | NEPAL |
| 8 | CHAD | 32 | NIGER |
| 9 | COMOROS | 33 | NIGERIA |
| 10 | CONGO, Dem. Rep. | 34 | PAKISTAN |
| 11 | CONGO, Rep. | 35 | RWANDA |
| 12 | COTE D'IVOIRE | 36 | SIERRA LEONE |
| 13 | ERITREA | 37 | SOLOMON ISLANDS |
| 14 | ETHIOPIA | 38 | SOMALIA |
| 15 | GEORGIA | 39 | SOUTH SUDAN |
| 16 | GUINEA | 40 | SRI LANKA |
| 17 | GUINEA BISSAU | 41 | SUDAN |
| 18 | HAITI | 42 | TIMOR-LESTE |
| 19 | IRAN | 43 | TOGO |
| 20 | IRAQ | 44 | UGANDA |
| 21 | KENYA | 45 | WEST BANK & GAZA |
| 22 | KIRIBATI | 46 | YEMEN |
| 23 | KOREA, Dem. Rep. | 47 | ZIMBABWE |
| 24 | KOSOVO | | |

*Source*: combination of 2012 WB-AfDB-ADB Harmonised List of Fragile Situations, and 2011 Failed State Index (Fund for Peace)