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SECURITY ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION:
A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence

(Note by the Secretariat)

Based on comments provided by Members through the written procedure, and during the regional consultation held in Bangkok on development co-operation and conflict, this note has been revised by the Secretariat. The original document was drafted by a team of consultants. These were Dylan Hendrickson (team leader), Alejandro Bendãna, Mark Bradbury, Laurie Nathan, Rachel Brett, Rachel Neild, Rocky Williams, Susan Woodward and Nicole Ball. It is for CONSIDERATION and APPROVAL at the meeting of the Informal DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on 14-15 December 2000.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

1.   Development co-operation aims to support and help create the conditions for dynamic and representative governing structures capable of managing change and resolving dispute through peaceful means. Simultaneous support to vigorous institutions of civil society and State is an essential part of these efforts.

2.   Over the last five years, in light of rising internecine conflicts and the multiple connections with endemic poverty, the donor community has been looking more closely at the impact of aid on conflict situations, conflict prevention, and security issues. The ways in which security issues and security systems overtake political and economic systems can result in severe distortions in the allocation of State resources. Actions by donor governments and other parts of OECD governments may indirectly compound rather than mitigate security problems, especially in 'failing' and war-torn countries in which the patterns of civil/military relations are extremely skewed.

3.   Consequently, there is growing concern over the developmental impact and role that security actors (military, paramilitary, police, intelligence, private security forces) play in shaping the lives of people in developing and transition countries and creating or destroying prospects for peace, and social and economic progress. The way in which security actors interrelate with political, judicial and penal systems, and the rule of law, or lack of it influences the overall security system of a country. This is of particular concern, as is civilian capacity within the government as well as in civil society broadly speaking, to oversee and control these "security" actors. The influence the business community may wield over security issues, security actors and the overall security framework is of growing concern as well.

4.   The traditional concept of security issues as fundamentally military has shifted to a new conceptualisation, albeit still burgeoning. This is moving away from a focus on the security of territory upheld by the strength of defence forces against outside attackers questioning sovereignty. It is moving towards a conceptualisation that includes the security and well-being of people within a country, and the strength and peace provided by predictable patterns of sustainable development. The conceptualisation of State security has been expanded therefore to include peoples' security (or "Human Security" as coined by the UNDP). Discussions of 'security systems' and security actors have broadened as a result.

5.   Over the past decades, recent complex political emergencies, whose victims are in majority civilians, have forced the development community to be involved not only in conflict prevention but also in the implementation of peace agreements and rehabilitation. The military and other security forces from OECD countries have become increasingly involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. Actions by the donor community and other actors have led to a convergence of conventional development and anti-poverty interventions along with peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts. Different actors from the same [OECD] government are now working more closely together. Traditionally, this was not the case since the strategic objectives of development and security practitioners from OECD governments were often parallel or in opposition with each other, partly because their focus tended to be uni-disciplinary.

6.   Capacity to address and carry out operational activities for what is becoming a "horizontal" or "cross-cutting" policy domain is often lacking across departments in OECD and partner governments. Ideally, sensitivity to security issues would be incorporated across all areas of development and across other relevant Ministries or government departments. The aim would be to arrive at a broadly agreed definition of the security issues and challenges in relation to and in co-operation with the partner country as well as a clear identification of appropriate roles for different government departments in the country and for the various external actors.

7.   However, although the DAC Guidelines provided a first road map on security related areas, alternative conceptions and newer avenues for encouraging functioning security systems have not yet been given much debate. Encouraging signs include the fact that security issues have been addressed at meetings held in 2000 by the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Secretary General and the G8. The present international system is only just learning how to readjust towards the new security concept(s) through which State security and human security are seen as mutually supportive and necessary. Consensus is lacking in the international community on what security issues are, how they should be addressed, who should address them externally and internally, what long-term objectives should be and how strategic objectives relate to developmental objectives.

8.   As a consequence, actions are rarely set in broader contexts, and real co-operation between government departments occurs sporadically. Development agencies have tended to focus in a piecemeal way on what is achievable in the short term. Even when the actions of development agencies' in OECD countries are set in a wider context, it is clear that intervention in areas touching on security issues can remain hostage to a whole slew of other concerns by other OECD government departments within the same country, such as strategic geopolitical, trade and business interests. There is a clear call for greater policy coherence.

9.   This report was commissioned by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in light of the above and in the context of its ongoing work to update and address gaps in its 1997 *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation*. The report provides a broad conceptual framework for examining the role development co-operation can play in supporting countries seeking to address and manage security issues by *inter alia* reforming governance systems, including judicial, penal and the security sectors. so that mechanisms are identified for establishing country-specific coherent approaches. These approaches would ensure that different actors' separate actions are constructive and contribute towards shared goals. Duplications, contradictory policies, virulent results and other destructive elements should in part be avoided in this way.

10.   The primary emphasis of the report is on the challenge of increasing policy coherence within and amongst OECD countries as a basis for achieving a more comprehensive and effective international response to security management by focussing on approaches to security and the challenges posed by the security sector, its problems and the reform processes that might be required to address both.

11.   The summary below provides an overview of the key messages of the report and the main policy recommendations for donors. Readers who do not have time to read the entire report may choose to focus on the Introduction and Section 2 (which provide a broad overview of the issues covered in the report) and Section 6 (which outlines in more detail the policy options and recommendations for donors[1]).

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1 .   Donors are defined broadly in this report and include: bilateral and multilateral donors; regional development banks, international financial institutions; humanirarian relief agencies; international NGOs.

Definitions

12.   The field of identifying and managing security issues, security sector reform (reliable and accountable systems of security) and the role of development co-operation and other external actors is evolving. With this evolution, definitions are also evolving. The terms "security sector" and "security sector reform" are interpreted in various manners and tend to cover what is in fact a broad field that is part of a governance system rather than a narrow part of external defence. A well-functioning security framework ensures that systemic sources of potentially violent conflict are identified and practical channels for arbitration and reconciliation are developed. Threats of violence and violent conflict can threaten security. The sources for these can be external, internal or both. Well-functioning security systems should help foster legitimacy of State institutions and their behaviour. Such systems should reinforce the role of the State as protector and provider, rather than predator. They should reinforce and build trust between people and their government, faith in their institutions and in the economic and other prospects of their country. Security is an essential component of good governance and initiatives to ensure peace. A multitude of actors plays a role in governing security management. These range from actors in the military and the police, to judicial and penal systems, to Government, to ministries of foreign affairs, trade and commerce, to the media, civil society organisations and the business community.

13.   The *security sector* is defined in the report as encompassing: a) state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police, paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies); and b) the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight of these institutions (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, defence ministry). The term *security systems* will be used with security sector to indicate the broader approach. Security sector *reform* is understood in terms of the transformation of security systems so that they are managed and operate in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and contribute to a well-functioning security framework.

Key messages of report

14.   Security management reform is an integral component of good governance in a broad sense, as well as poverty reduction and conflict prevention efforts. Efforts to enhance security and development are mutually reinforcing. Security from violence and security for their property constitute the top priority for the poor and are essential in order for productive economic and social activity to take place. Reforms that increase the capacity of security forces to protect both the State and the communities within it can help to create an enabling and safe environment for poverty reduction and social cohesion. The professionalisation of security forces in the context of broader efforts to strengthen democratic governance can serve as a deterrent to internal and external threats to civil law and order, and to the security of the State. A more efficient and well-managed approach to security and related budgetary expenditures will also help States to optimise the allocation of scarce public resources between priorities in pursuit of national development goals.

15.   *Security problems are systemic in nature, with closely-interlinked national, regional and international dimensions.* Security problems arise where security forces lack the capacity and expertise to perform their functions effectively and where there are ineffective mechanisms to ensure civil control over the security forces. These problems are exacerbated by the economic and institutional crises gripping many developing countries, by the low popular legitimacy of rulers, and by the persistence of armed conflicts in many countries. The easy availability of arms on international markets, the emergence of lucrative 'war economies' with its regional and international dimensions, and the intricate web of security and military relations that bind many developing countries and OECD countries are all issues that suggest a need for a multi-dimensional, multi-level approach to address the factors that sustain security related problems.

These factors emphasise the need to reform the way security forces are managed and how they function while also analysing the broader approaches to security issues.

16.	Reforms to the way security issues are handled are fundamentally a question of governance and are driven essentially by domestic social and political change. The long-term objective is to develop an appropriate institutional framework and the requisite human resource capacity required to manage security issues in a manner that conforms with democratic norms and sound principles of governance. This entails ensuring that the security services respect human rights and relevant international law, are subordinate to civilian authorities and remain subject to the rule of law. These changes will not be institutionalised in the practices of security actors without complementary changes in national legislation, civilian institutions and prevailing social values. Countries start from different points, and the pace and path of the reforms they pursue will be determined by their particular history, circumstances and priorities.

17.	*Working with security issues involves new challenges and risks for development actors that require careful consideration.* There are political sensitivities associated with security sector work, both in OECD countries and in the field, that may restrict the ability of donors to provide effective assistance. As of yet, few development actors have adequate internal expertise on security sector issues and how they are inter-linked with broader governance and security systems. A clear or comprehensive policy on assistance in this domain, or appropriate policy instruments would lend support as donors face these challenges and risks. Defining the legitimate parameters of development assistance in the security sector and clarifying their intentions in this domain will also help donors address the political sensitivities and work more effectively with their other departments.

18.	Security related assistance programmes should be conceptualised firmly in the overall context of the foreign policies of OECD governments. The security reform agenda should be not be defined exclusively in terms of what development actors can do. Achieving the desired policy outcomes will require that OECD countries make use of all available policy instruments, including those in the military, diplomatic, financial, trade and development co-operation domains. Because such sets of policies are often in conflict with each other, the policy frameworks of aid ministries need to be more conducive to integration with the policies of other government departments in view of encouraging a more coherent government-wide response to security related issues and reforms of security institutions. This will help to create an enabling environment for reform at the international level and to enhance the credibility of the new security sector reform agenda in the eyes of partner countries.

19.	*Security related assistance should be provided in ways that harness the vision, skills and capabilities of local actors.* In the absence of domestic ownership, local actors will resist reforms, regardless of their merit. The proactive involvement of all key actors affected by the reform processes offers one of the few ways to build a genuine "national consensus" around reform approaches and objectives. Where reform processes are overly reliant on an external vision, expertise and resources, this will have negative implications for their sustainability. This requires careful consideration by OECD actors.

Main recommendations for donors

20.   Development actors need to develop a strategic vision about where they fit within their own government's approach. This also needs to fit into the broader international approach that is required to address security sector problems. Development actors must address issues on building the capacity they need to work effectively. The report makes a series of detailed proposals (presented in Section 6) to help donors implement the following six broad policy recommendations:

- Recognise the developmental importance and legitimacy of security sector reform and the need for more coherent and comprehensive international responses to security systems and issues.

- Elaborate a comprehensive security reform policy so that approaches are coherent and clearly outline the appropriate roles for external and internal actors across all government departments: development co-operation, foreign affairs, financial, trade, and security policy.

- Work to develop an effective 'division of labour' amongst development and other relevant international actors that will allow each to pursue their comparative advantage without undermining common objectives.

- Identify what kinds of capacity and internal institutional reforms are required to provide security assistance effectively on a partnership basis within the context of a development co-operation agenda.

- Work towards the integration of security sector concerns in the overall foreign policies of OECD countries and encourage greater co-operation between OECD countries in this domain.

- Provide assistance in ways that enhance domestic ownership of reform processes and strengthen the institutional framework for managing the security sector in a manner consistent with sound governance practices.

Next steps

21.   In the conclusion, the paper identifies a number of immediate next steps that OECD members may want to consider in order to test the ideas and policy recommendations contained in this report. These include: soliciting feedback from other government departments; highlighting key issues to be included in an eventual OECD policy note on security sector reform; and reflecting on how the OECD can use this report, or a revised version, in its consultations with its partners, international, regional and national.

1. INTRODUCTION

A.   Terms of reference

1.   This report was commissioned by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to provide the basis for an integrated conceptual framework for agreement by DAC Members, as guidance for aid policy makers and practitioners in providing support to address security issues and for security sector reform in partner countries. It was commissioned in the context of the DAC's ongoing work to update and address gaps in its 1998 *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation*[2] These guidelines examine the links between security and development. They also outline a shared approach by DAC members to the challenge of supporting conflict prevention and poverty reduction efforts in poorer, war-torn and conflict-prone societies.

2.   The terms of reference requested the team of consultants to:

➢ Provide an analytical overview of current thinking on security and development issues through the security sector reform lens.

➢ Outline policy options/recommendations for the role development co-operation can play in helping bring about *sustainable security sector reform* in partner countries that will help maintain peace.

3.   The *security sector* is defined in this report as encompassing a) state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police, paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies); and b) the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight of these institutions (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, defence ministry). Security sector *reform* is understood in terms of the transformation of this sector so that it is managed and operates in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms, the rule of law including well functioning and just judicial and prison systems, and sound principles of governance.

3.   The focus on security sector reform is timely and appropriate. The mandate of development actors has expanded significantly since the end of the Cold War to encompass a range of conflict and security-related issues formerly seen as within the exclusive competence of military and political actors. While the security sector is only one arena amongst many where development assistance has a role to play, recognition is growing that what happens in this sector has a significant impact on both a country's overall prospects for development and the effectiveness of international assistance provided in other sectors. The new engagement with security sector problems is therefore consistent with a more holistic approach to development.

4.   The implications of a greater involvement with security problems none the less deserve careful consideration by development actors. The political sensitivities and risks are associated with security sector work. As of yet, few development actors have adequate internal expertise on security issues, a clear or comprehensive policy on assistance in this domain that is based on a wider and coherent government policy, nor appropriate policy instruments. There is thus a danger of development actors launching into this new area of work before they are adequately equipped.

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[2]   *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century*, DAC Development Co-operation Guidelines Series, Paris, 1998.

5.   Clarifying their intentions in the area of security work and defining the legitimate parameters of development assistance in this arena will help development actors to address some of the associated political sensitivities. Partner countries rightly seek reassurance that international assistance for security sector reform will be provided in line with their needs and priorities; the general public in industrialised countries which funds aid programmes is concerned that development assistance benefit those most in need. More importantly, clarification is the first step in enhancing policy coherence amongst development actors as a basis for encouraging and lobbying actors in the military, diplomatic, trade and financial domains whose support is ultimately necessary to achieve the desired policy outcomes.

6.   'Development actors', as understood in this report, include bilateral donors, multilateral development agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and the international financial institutions (IFIs). Despite the broad commitment of these actors to conflict prevention and poverty reduction goals, the agendas and motivations of each actor differs in the area of security related work. This is consistent with their different institutional mandates, political objectives and understandings of broad security issues and specific security sector problems. Weak policy coherence reduces the collective impact of international support for security reform and may also exacerbate security problems when actors work at cross-purposes in the field.

7.   The emphasis of this report is, therefore, placed predominantly on OECD governments and how they can contribute to a more coherent international response to security problems in developing countries. The vast bulk of development resources – including those disbursed by NGOs, the multilateral development agencies, and the IFIs - come from the OECD governments. These governments have a significant voice in determining how each of these development organisations uses their resources and can also influence the political context in which development (and other) assistance is delivered.

8.   The paper focuses primarily on conceptual and policy issues related to the security agenda, rather than providing a detailed 'check-list' of options or operational guidance for actors providing assistance in this domain. Development actors face three broad challenges that are recurring themes in the report:

   i)   To deepen their understanding of security issues and security sector problems and how to reform security frameworks.

   ii)   To develop an overarching policy framework consistent with poverty reduction and conflict prevention objectives.

   iii) To sustain debate with their partners on the difficult issues surrounding operationalisation of the new security sector reform agenda.

9.   It is the way that development actors discuss this issue *now* that will influence future outcomes. The report provides a framework for dialogue between DAC Members and their government ministry counterparts in trade, finance, foreign affairs, defence etc. It will also serve as the basis for a DAC policy note to be agreed by Members. The report may also provide the basis for informal consultations between relevant actors in OECD countries. The report builds upon past and ongoing work by DAC members on security reform issues[34]. In addition, it should be seen as complementing a recently completed study for the

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3   Earlier versions of this report benefited from comments by three outside reviewers - Nicole Ball, Rachel Brett and Susan Woodward – and a number of DAC delegates.

4   Other recent, relevant reports include: 'Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An EU Perspective', by Malcolm Chalmers for the Conflict Prevention Network, January 2000; 'A Review of Security-Sector Reform', Centre for Defence Studies *Working Paper* No. 1, by Dylan Hendrickson, September 1999, prepared for DFID; 'Security, Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development: Challenges for the New Millenium', World Bank, September 1999; 'Security-Sector Reform as a Development Issue', by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, for the OECD, May 1999; 'Spreading Good Practices in Security-Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government', by Nicole Ball for Saferworld, December 1998; 'Civil-Military

DAC on development assistance 'incentives and disincentives' for influencing conflict situations as well as an ongoing study on conflict prevention[5].

B.   Structure of report

10.   The report consists of five main sections:

> Section 2 examines the case for development actors to focus on security issues, the key features of the emerging security sector reform agenda, and the main challenges for development co-operation.

> Section 3 examines the context for reform in developing countries, highlighting the internal and external constraints they face as they seek to address their security problems.

> Section 4 examines three 'building blocks' for strengthening policy coherence: efforts to build consensus on strategic priorities, a general set of principles to guide reform processes, and mechanisms to provide assistance in ways that enhance domestic ownership.

> Section 5 identifies five broad areas where development assistance can support security sector reform objectives, highlighting the need for donors to be attentive to how their interventions contribute to overall security objectives.

> Section 6 makes various recommendations in view enhancing policy coherence within OECD governments and amongst OECD donors as well as in view of mainstreaming security sector reform into development policy and practice specifically.

11.   By way of conclusion, the report suggests some next steps that DAC members may want to consider in order to test the proposals contained in this report within their governments and with their regional partners.

2. SECURITY AS A DEVELOPMENT ISSUE

12.   The role of security forces and attitudes to them have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. As the rationale for addressing security sector problems in the context of development co-operation efforts becomes clearer, development actors are being forced to assess the relevance of existing policy frameworks and instruments to this task. Recognition is growing that security forces – despite the fact that they are often considered part of the security 'problem' – must be more actively engaged in the

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Relations: USAID's Role', by Claude Welch and Johanna Mendelson Forman, for USAID, July 1998. In addition, two major international symposiums on military expenditure and security-sector reform have taken place recently. The first was jointly sponsored by the DAC and CIDA in Ottawa in March 1997; the conference proceedings were entitled 'Military Expenditure in Developing Countries: Security and Development'. The second was organised by DFID in February 2000 in London; two discussion papers were prepared for the conference: 'Supporting Security-Sector Reform and the Management of Defence Expenditure: A Conceptual Framework'; 'Supporting Security-Sector Reform: Review of the Role of External Actors'. The conference proceedings will be available in May 2000.

[5]   'The influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict', Peter Uvin, September 1999. This study synthesises and comments on the results of case studies of Afghanistan, Bosnia, Rwanda and Sri Lanka. The (dis)incentives for peace refer to all purposeful uses of aid that strengthen the dynamics that favour peace and weaken and discourage the dynamics that favour violence.

search for solutions. This poses new and difficult challenges for development actors that need to be confronted directly and openly if they are serious about good governance, poverty reduction and conflict prevention.

A.   The case for focusing on security sector problems

13.   During the 1990s, armed conflict and protracted humanitarian crises have gripped a large number of countries across Africa, Asia, Latin America, Southeast Europe, and the former-Soviet Union. In many other countries that have enjoyed relative peace during this period, the lack of physical security has been a persistent feature of life at individual, community and national levels. Violent conflict and insecurity are a product of deep-seated economic, political and social inequalities within societies. While processes of social and political change are by definition conflictual, societies that have been unable to manage change in a non-violent manner have paid a particularly heavy social and economic price.

14.   A common element of the security problems facing poorer countries stems from the way in which security sectors are organised, regulated, resourced and operate. Where the security forces are organised essentially to keep unpopular rulers in power or to protect states from external threats, this makes it harder to provide for effective rule of civil law and order. Where the security forces lack the capacity and expertise to perform their functions properly, communal violence, crime, distrust, human rights abuse, political repression and vigilantism are more likely. In addition, the security sector may absorb scarce public resources better used in social and economic sectors or use allocations to the sector inefficiently or inappropriately. Socio-economic and democratic development is severely constrained and undermined, if not rendered impossible, in these circumstances.

15.   Development actors have faced real constraints in addressing these issues until recently and, to an extent, have resisted doing so. The Cold War militarised notions of security and made this the domain of military experts. Patterns of international assistance to the Third World – including military, development and humanitarian aid – were often more closely linked to the strategic and ideological interests of donor countries than with issues of public welfare in the poorer countries. Security became synonymous with the stability of the international system and the protection from external threats of Third World regimes friendly to one superpower or the other and their allies.

16.   Accordingly, Western security assistance programmes focused more on creating well-equipped and well-trained armed forces than on building state capacity to provide for internal law and order. Issues concerning the creation of democratic civil-military relations, effective legislative and executive oversight over the armed forces, and a military professional ethos consistent with the dictates of a modern democracy received little attention. No real attempt was made to include important civilian policy sectors (the foreign policy and finance sectors, for example) in the formulation of security policy. The management of security therefore became the exclusive preserve of a group of highly skilled military practitioners whose preparedness to divulge the workings of the security sector was virtually non-existent.

17.   The end of the Cold War set in motion a fundamental re-conceptualisation of notions of security. The political disengagement of the superpowers from the Third World brought to a close a number of long-running wars, in the process also triggering many new – mostly intra-state – conflicts. Aid workers became much more actively involved in the provision of relief assistance, in the implementation of peace agreements, and in post-war reconstruction. Their experiences in conflict situations, and the cross-fertilisation of ideas that resulted between them and their OECD military and police counter-parts, has led to a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding security, how it is achieved, and the different security challenges faced by developing and industrialised countries.

18.   The narrow stress on territorial security and security through armaments that underpinned Cold War military assistance programmes was largely influenced by Western experiences. In the context of

developing countries - where the legitimacy of states and regimes is constantly challenged, where demands for economic redistribution and political participation constantly outweigh state capacities and create major overloads on weak political systems – there is a need for a greater focus on political and state-building processes. The security of states and the security of people should be seen as mutually reinforcing, suggesting that unmet social, political and economic needs may provoke popular unrest and opposition to governments, ultimately making them more vulnerable to internal and external threats.

19.   In line with this, security is increasingly viewed today as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. This broader notion of security is encapsulated in the concept of 'structural stability' found in *the DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation* (page 6, paragraph 3) which embraces 'the mutually reinforcing objectives of social peace, respect for human rights, accountable military forces and broadly-shared social and economic development; supported by dynamic and representative political structures capable of managing change and resolving disputes through peaceful means'.

20.   It follows that a wide range of state institutions and political entities, including civil society and private sector groups, may be responsible for ensuring a well-functioning 'security system'; the breakdown of one component undermines the entire system of governance. The reform of weak or dysfunctional security sectors is one crucial element of a broader, long-term strategy to create an environment of structural stability, though security sector reform can also contribute to more immediate poverty reduction and conflict prevention goals.

21.   Evidence from international surveys indicates that security from violence and security for their property is the top priority for the poor themselves. A better managed security sector can contribute to an environment in which productive economic and social activity can take place; it can also help states to optimise the allocation of scarce public resources in pursuit of national development goals. The professionalisation of the security forces, along with the development of more effective civil monitoring and regulatory mechanisms, will help to strengthen civil law and order, particularly where security forces have been part of the security problem. In the context of broader efforts to strengthen democratic governance, such measures can also serve as mechanism to deter violent challenges to the peace emanating from both internal and external sources.

B.   The emerging security sector reform agenda

22.   The emerging 'development' approach to security sector reform is manifestly different from the ideologically-inclined, top-down and technocratic approaches that typified most military assistance programmes during the Cold War and still characterise some OECD programmes today. First, security sector reform is conceptualised squarely within the context of efforts to consolidate democracy and to promote human rights and good governance. Second, there is recognition of the need for a much higher degree of local ownership of the process than previous military aid programmes that were largely based on Western models, strategies and doctrines for organising and managing security forces.

23.   Security sector reform is fundamentally a question of governance. The long-term objective is to develop an appropriate institutional framework and the requisite human resource capacity required to manage the security sector in a manner that conforms with democratic norms and sound principles of governance. This entails ensuring that the security services respect human rights, including women's, and relevant international law, are subordinate to civil authorities and are subject to the rule of law. These kinds of changes will not come about or be institutionalised in the functioning of the security sector unless accompanied by complementary changes in national security policies, prevailing social values, and civil

capacity to manage and regulate the security forces. Security forces are often an extension of, and embedded in, prevailing power structures and social systems; the experience from countries like South Africa demonstrates that reforms will generally be driven by domestic processes of social and political change.

24.   To the extent that reforms can be crafted and guided, and that there is a role for outside assistance to play a supportive role, a comprehensive approach must be envisaged. This must address the need for an effective enabling environment in which the structural changes required in the way security sectors are organised and operate can occur. State capacity must be enhanced across the board in order for the security sector to function effectively. Reform processes will not be sustained unless equal attention is paid to the tasks of strengthening the rule of law, finding adequate resources to embed security sector reforms, building overall state administrative capacity to implement reforms, and generating the political momentum necessary to sustain reform processes.

25.   Recent donor experiences with security sector reform suggest that insufficient attention has been paid to the need for an effective enabling environment. In the area of public security, for instance, donors - fearing a prolonged engagement –often define police reform narrowly as a training issue. Overlooked has been the crucial need for a functioning judiciary, effective police leadership and organisational structures, and the sustained political backing necessary for police to perform their functions effectively[6]. The role of the judiciary is particularly important because the police provide protection not only through the use or threat of force but also through their support for criminal investigative and law enforcement systems. Security has both physical and psychological dimensions. Public confidence in the rule of law and penal systems is therefore essential if people (and businesses) are to feel safe and resist taking 'justice' and security into their own hands.

26.   This paper refers throughout to 'developing' countries. This is a broad category that covers a range of dissimilar circumstances: authoritarianism and military rule; emerging democracy; stable democracy; and countries in various stages of armed conflict or state collapse. In each of these scenarios, the nature of security sector problems may be quite different; in many cases, the role and competence of the state in providing security is changing in ways that are still poorly understood. As a result, the need and potential for reform, the appropriate strategies and solutions, and the appropriate external actors are quite different. The major implication for OECD government departments including donors is that they must adopt different approaches to different circumstances.

27.   Domestic ownership of reforms is both an ethical and a pragmatic issue. The democratic security sector reform model is of an 'ideal-type' nature. The outcomes it promises were only achieved, in the context of Western societies, through long and difficult social and political transitions. A 'rights-based' approach and internationally-accepted standards for how security forces should operate can serve as important reference points for guiding reforms, but this should not mask the fact that process is *as* important as outcomes. There are different ways to reach the same objectives. Experimentation and failure are both stages in the security sector reform process and will underlie the efforts of countries to develop a sustainable approach consistent with their needs and priorities.

28.   There is a wide and diverse set of stakeholders in the reform process, each of which will have a different understanding of what the process involves and requires. These stakeholders consist of two groups:

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[6]   It is partly in response to this problem that the security sector is defined more broadly in some reports to include the judiciary (see, for instance, the reports by Ball, Chalmers and NUPI listed in the Introduction). The key issue, however, regardless of how the security sector is defined, is to define the *reform* process itself broadly and to be attentive to the key linkages between the many relevant actors that have a role to play in ensuring that reform objectives are achieved.

> ➢ Those actors who often play a direct role in security decision-making and who – in many democracies – are explicitly mandated to do so on behalf of the electorate. This will include parliaments, finance, interior, trade, defence and foreign affairs ministries, heads of government, and units within the security forces that enjoy substantial decision-making autonomy.

> ➢ Those actors who play a less direct role in the decision-making process but nevertheless have an interest in the outcome of reforms. Included in this group are ministries responsible for justice, health and education; non-governmental actors; members of the public, particularly poor women and men; opposition political groups; neighbouring countries; donors; the IFIs, and major manufacturers, dealers and exporters of weapons.

29.   Understanding their interests is necessary in order to anticipate potential obstacles to reform, to elaborate strategies that will enable the process to be sustained, and to ensure that the benefits of reform reach the widest number of people. Unless an active effort is made to solicit the participation of women - who are affected by reforms in very different ways than men - reforms may not be consistent with the objectives of reducing poverty and enhancing public security. As well, the perspectives of ethnic minorities and marginalised populations should be included.

30.   Reconciling the conflicting interests of these different groups is difficult, particularly in the absence of a robust democratic framework and in the context of the extreme resource scarcity that faces many developing countries today, not to speak of possible social hostilities and festering resentments. Donors often adopt a narrow 'deficit reduction' approach to security sector reform without a full understanding of the implications this has for a country's ability to meet its security needs. A narrow focus on 'down-sizing' the security sector is not necessarily consistent with the need to enhance security, which is a pressing priority in some countries today, nor is such an approach synonymous with security sector reform. Looking at military and security spending as simply 'unproductive' is now accepted as *passé;* instead, the focus is on changing the *process* by which security-related decision-making occurs[7].

31.   The danger, then, is that some current donor approaches may serve as a disincentive for co-operation by the security forces who are the constituency whose privileges stand to be curtailed the most, and – hence – who have the greatest incentive to derail reforms. The new security sector reform agenda is based on recognition that security and development are mutually reinforcing; the key challenge is to strengthen this relationship. While donor policy towards the security sector should be seen in terms of the overall poverty reduction and conflict prevention aim, this calls for 'sub-policies' to help reduce the *need* for security and military expenditure. This requires a two-pronged approach in order to address, on the one hand, the threats to security and, on the other, the factors that undermine the ability of security forces to efficiently and effectively fulfil their legitimate protective role.

C.   Key challenges for development co-operation

32.   Embracing the new security sector reform agenda and engaging with security forces effectively presents a number of challenges for development actors:

33.   *Overcoming political sensitivities.* Involvement with the military is a politically-sensitive issue for virtually all development actors. Most have specific legal restrictions that prevent the use of

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7   This was the central theme of the DFID –organised symposium that took place in London in February 2000. See the conference discussion paper: 'Supporting Security-Sector Reform and the Management of Defence Expenditure: A Conceptual Framework'.

development assistance for security-related activities[8]. The OECD countries draw a clear distinction in their policies for financial and technical assistance between 'development' and 'military' assistance, with the two forms of assistance traditionally organised by different ministries. The latter is explicitly excluded from the OECD's agreed definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA). (These ODA eligibility criteria are under examination in order to adapt definitions and distinctions to the realistic use of resources towards security issues. Currently, some OECD governments still continue to provide security-related assistance through their defence ministries that does not meet development criteria.

34.   This has at times resulted in different departments in OECD working at cross-purposes in the field and has exacerbated security problems. This problem arises from the contradictions that exist between the foreign, trade, finance and defence policies and development co-operation policies of some OECD countries. Conflicting national interests and strategic visions of how security should be achieved undermine co-operation within some OECD countries and undermine their coherent commitment to reform objectives. Certain OECD governments are also wary of providing security sector assistance due to difficult past experiences in this domain and a lack of conviction that their efforts will make much of a difference.

35.   The political sensitivity of the security sector also creates resistance to external assistance by developing countries. National defence and the provision of internal security are the traditional cornerstones of state sovereignty. The concerns of developing countries relate to donors gathering intelligence about their security services and recruiting informants; donor countries pursuing strategic interests which are at odds with those of the host country; and the danger of becoming or remaining a client state, dependent on patrons for security and defence. But when security is seen in its wider sense, as integral to justice and prison systems, good governance and responsible security forces, this view opens the door to less tense dialogue.

36.   *Assessing risks and returns.* Providing security sector assistance involves various risks for development actors that are hard to calculate. Strengthening the security forces in authoritarian states, for instance, will in all likelihood be counter-productive; this reinforces illegitimate states, undermines popular struggles for democracy and contributes to human rights abuses. But there is no guarantee that democratically elected governments are more committed to reforms. They may simply serve as a shell behind which the military continues to play an active political role; human rights training for the military, for instance, may simply be used as a smokescreen for more fundamental changes in their relations with civilian governmental bodies. Obversely, OECD governments may use security sector reform programmes, or implicit evidence of change, to justify the sale of military equipment to regimes with recurrent and questionable human rights records, or to make these sales less controversial.

37.   Even when a government is strongly committed to a reform process, this may require donors to engage with security forces that have been involved in serious human rights abuses. Where the rule of law is weak and a culture of impunity exists, contact with the military may grant them legitimacy and undermine reform objectives. In such cases, donors may seek to mitigate the risks through tighter control of the reform process; however, this makes it harder to achieve a genuinely consultative approach. Restricting their involvement to countries where these kinds of dilemmas are not so acute may allow donors to avoid development funds being misused. But inaction also has an important impact on human welfare, the consequences of which need to be confronted more openly if the risks and returns associated with security sector work are to be comprehensively assessed.

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[8]   ODA eligibility is determined by the type of assistance and to whom it is given. Direct assistance to the military is not ODA-eligible. Assistance for certain aspects of peace-keeping, the disposal of weapons and demobilisation programmes is admissible. While funding human rights training for the military is not acceptable, many donors give money to the ICRC to undertake this kind of work, which is acceptable. Issues of ODA eligibility in relation to security and development are currently under examination within the DAC.

38.   *Finding appropriate entry-points.* The ideal pre-conditions for reform will rarely exist; critical awareness of the dilemmas and risks involved in providing security sector assistance is required on a case-by-case basis. Many development actors are nonetheless already involved in activities that have direct or indirect relevance to security sector reform objectives and thus offer entry-points for supporting reform objectives. Support for measures to strengthen overall public sector management and civilian capacity to monitor the security sector are areas that are well within the mandate of development assistance. Other institutional entry points include support to strengthen parliamentary capacity, reform constitutions, reform judicial and penal systems and bolster the 'watch-dog' role of civil society groups. Policy dialogue with governments and the security services themselves will likely provide other appropriate entry-points, particularly if donors can provide genuine incentives for reforms to be undertaken.

39.   Democratic elections and post-conflict situations, which often involve the formation of new governments that are keen for international legitimacy and support, offer two key entry-points for development actors. Peace agreements reached with international support that contain provisions for security sector reform will help legitimise donor activities in this area. It is therefore important to anticipate the future requirements and challenges of security sector reform in conflict situations, especially as peace processes gain momentum. Where countries remain in a 'no-war, no-peace' situation, donors will need to envisage working in a very different way. In such situations, aid may need to focus initially on helping to stabilise the political situation, contributing to peacebuilding efforts and otherwise laying the groundwork for more structurally-oriented reforms when conditions become more optimal.

40.   *Building capacity and partnerships.* The entry-points for supporting security sector reforms will differ for each actor depending on their capacity, institutional mandates and motivations. Where development actors do not have the requisite expertise or much political leeway to work, their role may be to facilitate and support the efforts undertaken by their military and police counterparts in OECD countries. These actors generally have much more experience in the area of security sector reform,

> **Box 1. Broadening the security sector reform debate**
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> The challenge of helping developing countries reform their security sector should be placed in an international context and would benefit from a more sophisticated public debate. There are very few industrialised countries that could not themselves benefit from security sector reform programmes, including most if not all of the major powers. As some of the OECD countries earmark more development assistance funds for security sector reform, they should become more sensitive to how their own defence management practices affect developing countries. It is argued strongly by some of the OECD countries that developing countries have a legitimate right to buy arms for their national defence, but it is disingenuous for these big arms exporters to aggressively market arms without considering whether the militaristic security model they promote is either affordable or appropriate for their developing country partners.

making their support essential. Conversely, it should be recognised that development actors are much more suited to addressing many of the civilian and institutional dimensions of reform process, particularly given their comparative advantage in understanding development processes.

41.   The goal should be to achieve an effective 'division of labour' that allows each actor to work within the confines of their institutional mandates and according to their comparative advantage without undermining common objectives. This will require increased sensitivity by all actors regarding how their activities either advance or impede security sector reform processes. Many of the macro-economic stabilisation activities of the World Bank and the IMF, for instance, are not generally considered security sector-related, but have massive implications for a country's ability to fund and reform its security services and ultimately affects the security of the country at large. This suggests that all actors require a basic level of expertise on security sector issues, regardless of whether they become directly involved in security sector reforms or not. Some actors may decide that they can accomplish more through advocacy work, for instance, to promote broad international alliances to address security sector problems.

42.   The security sector reform 'agenda' should not be defined exclusively in terms of what development actors can do. Efforts to achieve a more coherent international approach to security problems will be enhanced by constructing a broad policy framework that focuses on development-oriented policy outcomes rather than on the institutional mandates and political priorities of individual development actors, individual government departments or individual donor countries. Such a framework should help to increase understanding of security sector problems, stimulate a more sophisticated public debate on these issues, and point the way to more effective responses. The starting point is for OECD governments to become more finely attuned to the context in which they operate.

3. UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT FOR REFORM

43.   There is a strong impetus for reforming the security sector in developing countries today. In some of these countries, OECD governments and their development agencies insist that government should reduce military spending and force levels in order to release resources for development. The ending of the Cold War has also given rise to growing pressure for democratisation emanating from the United Nations, human rights organisations, and donor countries that have a democratic agenda. Most importantly, it stems from citizens and civic political organisations in the developing countries themselves. But many countries lack a robust political and administrative framework to manage complex reform processes effectively. These handicaps are accentuated by the destabilising effects of rapid societal change and external influences that may also limit the effectiveness of development assistance. Insecurity is often a very real result of these gaps and difficulties.

A.   Societies undergoing rapid transition

44.   The very nature of the state and civil-military relations are being redefined in developing countries in ways that are still poorly understood. Most countries are undergoing wide-reaching social, economic and political change driven by a complex interplay of domestic factors and global forces that have both hastened the pace of societal change and constrained the opportunity for locally defined evolution. This is the case not simply in states experiencing a severe breakdown in structures of governance - so-called 'failing' states - but also for those undergoing wide-ranging economic reforms, abrupt shifts to more participatory political systems, and transitions from war to peace.

45.   Three general trends are apparent in most countries:

> The first is the growing diffusion of political authority across society. The declining influence of the state is being off-set by the growing influence of non-state actors, including the business sector, civil society groups, individuals, armed opposition movements and trans-national organisations/multinationals.

> The second is a general decline in state capacity to provide public services essential for poverty alleviation, including health, education and security. This is a consequence both of declining levels of public resources and policies designed to reduce the role of the state.

> The third is continued economic and social polarisation between rich and poor, whereby large segments of populations are excluded from productive and stable employment. This process has contributed to a generalised increase in physical and social insecurity in many societies.

46.   Despite these commonalties, the specific security problems states face differ tremendously. Some 20 of the world's poorest countries are currently involved in violent armed conflicts. Other countries like Cambodia, El Salvador and South Africa, each of which endured protracted periods of political strife, experienced an upsurge in violent crime at the very time they entered a new era of 'peace' due to their weak capacity to provide for internal law and order. The protracted nature of many contemporary conflicts stems not simply from the breakdown of political institutions. In many cases, violence and social stability have become a modality of power and economic expansion effectively manipulated by both political the elite and economic entrepreneurs to achieve personal ends. This explains why many countries remain in a difficult stage between 'war' and 'peace' today.

47.   The frequent designation of these security problems as 'internal conflicts' masks their important regional political and economic dimensions. The sustainability of 'war economies' is closely related to changes in the international economy, growing illicit trade in drugs, commodities, minerals and money laundering, and the weakening of the capacity of states to regulate economic activity and police their borders. Armed opposition movements often receive support from governments in neighbouring countries; the flow of refugees and arms across porous borders is also destabilising. Regional instability contributes to the maintenance of large standing armies and to elevated levels of military spending, though these external threats often attain prominence because of the political conflicts that abound within developing countries.

48.   In other developing countries, relative stability has been achieved due to a strong monopoly of violence by the state, though this is often at the cost of enhanced military involvement in politics and authoritarian rule. These problems have long historical roots in the formation of security apparatuses that were organised to protect unpopular regimes rather than to provide public security. Colonial states did not provide the basis for democratic systems of governance and rarely included in their considerations the security and welfare of ordinary people, a heritage passed on to many post-colonial states. The weakness of democratic institutions and the absence of a clear security policy to limit the role of the military have resulted in an enhanced military involvement in internal security in many countries.

49.   In some cases, the military has been forced to make up for the lack of state capacity, for instance, to provide for internal law and order; in many other cases, the military has appropriated an expanded role for itself in economic and political matters. Developing country militaries also regularly fulfil activities of a developmental nature, including the construction of rural infrastructure, and are often at the forefront of national responses to humanitarian disasters. This reflects the fact that the military is often one of the most effective national institutions, but this developmental role is at times used to justify the maintenance of an army that is larger than is either affordable or necessary to meet security needs. It is important to promote transparent budgetary and accounting processes so that the ways in which the military and security forces are used is apparent.

50.   The dilemmas countries face in managing the security problems posed by rapid political and social change have been further exacerbated by the sharp budgetary cuts faced by the security forces, like most other government sectors, in recent years. In many cases, members of the security forces – taking advantage of their power and the lack of effective democratic control - turn to the private sector for survival, either by renting out their services to private security firms or by becoming engaged in commercial and/or criminal activity. The inability of states to pay and regulate their security forces has been accompanied by a general decline in the impartiality and effectiveness of law enforcement; the result has been a loss of confidence by both governments and the general population in the public security services and growing illicit trade.

51.   In response, elite groups, commercial interests and individuals alike have increasingly become reliant on 'private' sources of protection, including the services of private security firms, communal or kinship ties or personal weapons. A vicious circle often emerges: as the needs of those privileged classes that can afford security are met, governments face less pressure to invest in law enforcement measures that benefit the general public. This further erodes public confidence in the rule of law, often resulting in more popular forms of justice such as public lynching of criminals. The most disempowered and vulnerable segments of society, especially the poor, women and children, and those living in rural areas, disproportionately bear the consequences of increased insecurity and are the worst placed to do anything about it.

52.   The security arrangements emerging in many countries today represent dramatic changes in forms of wealth creation, employment, property rights and political legitimacy. These security arrangements sometimes represent innovative responses by societies to growing insecurity, though they often appear incongruent with the effective and accountable forms of statehood held in the West as the optimum means of ensuring public security. Clear distinctions between internal and external security functions, in line with Western models, often do not exist: the National Guard and *Gendarmeri*e in Mali, for instance, have a dual function, by design, to provide for national defence and internal security. It is therefore important to understand how these security institutions function and why they have come about before encouraging reform.

> **Box 2. Somalia's evolving security arrangements**
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> Somalia has been without an internationally-recognised government since 1991. When the Somali state collapsed, the judicial and law enforcement systems disappeared. In the vacuum left behind, individual and group security concerns have become more closely defined along kinship lines. This has proven to be a double-edged sword. Kinship affiliation can be a source of protection, but also a source of exclusion and insecurity. In Somalia's pastoral society, feuding and warfare were, in the past, rule bound, and thus limited in scope and impact. During the Somali civil war, these 'rules of war' were widely broken. In several areas of Somalia, traditional councils of elders have emerged to re-establish a basis for reconciliation, security and nascent administrations. The International Committee of the Red Cross, working with the Somali Red Crescent, has sought to strengthen these processes linking local 'rules of war' to internationally-accepted principles of international

B.   External influences and constraints

53.   The changes underway in developing countries are heavily shaped by local history, culture, and circumstances, though external influences also shape reform processes to a significant degree. In the context of an often adverse international context entailing deteriorating terms of trade, dependence on foreign markets and high levels of indebtedness, developing countries have faced severe fiscal limits on their capacity to address institutional weaknesses in the public sector and provide essential public services. During the 1980s, the 'down-sizing' of the state was vigorously promoted through development co-operation policies - in particular, World Bank and IMF-sponsored structural adjustment programmes. These policies sought to correct the over-extension of the state into inappropriate areas, but often failed to

take account of, or lacked sufficient flexibility to avoid, negative social outcomes. Perhaps they also failed to fully take into account the occasionally weak response capacity of non-State actors to fill the gap left behind.

54.   The security services, like other public services, were also affected in ways that were not conducive to being able to effectively fulfil their functions effectively. In the 1990s, the tide began to turn. There is now a growing awareness that states cannot fulfil their legitimate roles without adequate institutional structures and human resources. More attention is being paid to promoting growth with equity, to tailoring internationally-sponsored institutional reforms to the specific needs of individual countries, and to finding more appropriate regulatory roles for public institutions in the economic and financial domains. Yet there is still a poor understanding of how macroeconomic policies affect the capacity of states to modernise and restructure their security sector.

55.   Countries that are today being urged to undertake transitions to market democracies are often not afforded sufficient leeway in preparing themselves for market liberalisation. The externally imposed economic orthodoxy has traditionally placed a strong emphasis on achieving and maintaining macro-economic stability. While this is widely accepted as a key condition for development, inadequate attention has been paid to how attempts to achieve macro-economic stability affect security or indeed what non-economic factors are required to provide the environment for stability. This has particularly been the case in countries emerging from wars – for instance, El Salvador - where there has not always been adequate sensitivity to the need to carefully link peace processes and macro-economic stabilisation programmes.

56.   Finding an appropriate balance between short-term stabilisation and long-term stability in its wider sense is essential, and difficult to achieve. There is increasing recognition that strengthening institutions is necessary in order to achieve sustainable macro-economic balance. Neglecting the former in pursuit of the latter, or placing excessive pressure on countries to reduce public deficits quickly, may have destabilising political effects. This is particularly the case – as Cambodia demonstrated following its 1991 peace agreement - where political stability may require short-term government policies that run counter to the goal of limiting public expenditure or reducing the size of the civil service or army.

57.   These issues cannot be effectively addressed without the integration of economic policy into a broader development policy framework that is sensitive to the full range of variables that influence prospects for achieving political and economic stability in poor and conflict-prone societies.

> **Box 3. Conflicting reform objectives in El Salvador**
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> There is growing recognition that the activities of the World Bank and the IMF – less through their direct involvement in security-sector reform than by virtue of their involvement in macro-economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes – is critically important to the long-term outcome and viability of reforms. In El Salvador, the economic stabilisation programme and the peace process were largely conceived and implemented in isolation from one another. Poor communication between the United Nations and the IMF contributed to a situation where the government was severely limited in its ability to fund projects crucial to the peace process such as the establishment of a new police force and the strengthening of the judiciary. This may also have offered an avenue for the government to escape fulfilling commitments it made in the context of the peace settlement that related to providing land and credit for demobilised soldiers.

58.   The problem of conflicting development policy frameworks is exacerbated by inconsistencies in OECD government policies towards developing countries. A complex web of military relations binds certain OECD countries with developing countries in the areas of defence policy, military training and assistance, and arms sales. These ties include government-sponsored relations between the private sector in developing countries – mainly arms producers and private security firms – and developing country administrations. Among certain OECD countries, export promotion and strategic interests still weigh heavily in decisions regarding which countries are encouraged to buy arms or receive military assistance. Military assistance programmes continue to be used as a means to strengthen national spheres of influence,

with access to military bases or to privileged trade opportunities by OECD countries still given a high priority in certain cases.

59.   Developing country governments often willingly accept this assistance as they search for new donors to replace their former Cold War patrons in the military and intelligence domains. However, inappropriate arms sales and programmes of military assistance may result in confusing signals for states simultaneously being encouraged by the international community to undertake difficult security sector reforms and increase social spending.

60.   Perhaps the most glaring gap in policy coherence has been with regard to the role of the business community in developing countries that are experiencing security problems. The undisputed benefits of expanded economic activity at a global level have masked the fact that forces of economic globalisation can also intensify pre-existing security problems and trends. Elite groups in developing countries, often working closely in conjunction with powerful multi-national corporations and private international security companies, have seized the opportunity to extract tremendous commercial profit from the exploitation of valuable natural resources including illicit trade. These activities are one factor contributing to the prolongation of many armed conflicts, including those in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

C.   Weak national capacity to manage change

61.   In the fluid security environment of today, the division between internal and external security threats is increasingly blurred. Developing countries face a bewildering array of new and destabilising security challenges in addition to more traditional political threats, including terrorism, crime and cross-border trafficking in licit and illicit goods and trafficking in women and children. These threats are often hard to define and require diverse responses that go beyond the traditional instruments – often military in nature – available to developing countries. The comprehensive nature of security sector reforms required by these countries is stymied not simply by technical and institutional weaknesses but by much more enduring deficiencies in financial resources and political support.

62.   In some cases, state leaders lack the political legitimacy or the commitment to push through difficult reforms. In other cases, mounting calls by the public and opposition political groups for rapid solutions to public security problems may translate into a demand for tough measures that conflict with the objectives of democratically-oriented reforms. One consequence of this demand for increased security has been accusations that civilians are too 'soft' on crime and, in some cases, even calls for the return of the 'strong-men' — the military — to power. Security sector reforms are also often set back by political opposition, including from international donors, based on pretexts of budgetary constraints. Those opposed to reform often seek primarily to diminish the power and prerogatives of the security forces; this is not surprising, given their frequently poor human rights record.

63.   However, the failure to invest adequately in the security sector precludes structurally oriented reforms that are necessary if security is to be provided in an effective and accountable manner. These dilemmas are most acute in the context of peace processes and in post-war donor consultative processes where adequate emphasis is rarely placed on evaluating the long-term needs for restoring an environment of security. The short-term remedy to the security problem is often for international peace-keepers to ensure security while peace agreements are being implemented. In a context of limited resources, insufficient political backing by donor governments, and difficult working environments, less attention is paid to the task of rebuilding justice and law enforcement systems. Following the departure of international peacekeepers, these societies face a huge challenge in restoring sufficient security to launch the reconstruction process and attract foreign investors. The unstructured void left behind is often insufficient to do this. Alternatives fill the void including the Mafia and militia groups.

64.		Security sector reform and security issues are key transition dilemmas in many countries and events often move faster than aid policy-makers can respond to effectively. This increases the pressure on them to act before there is an adequate understanding of the problems and prevents the development of effective long-term responses. Achieving an effective balance between short-term stability requirements and longer-term measures to lay the groundwork for structural reforms is a difficult challenge for donors. Yet in the haste to be seen to be achieving results, there is often a large gap between the kinds of reforms proposed by donors and the national capacity to implement these reforms, a gap which international assistance does not adequately fill. Furthermore, countries are coming under pressure to reform on many fronts and there is a danger that the 'goal-posts' are being moved too often.

65.		Greater sensitivity to four key issues is the starting point for developing a more comprehensive, holistic and consistent policy framework for addressing security dilemmas in developing countries:

> *The limits of 'crisis' management approaches.* International support for security sector reform should engage more actively with the structural problems: which way the security actors are organised, resourced and regulated, are central issues. Donors should act with a long-term perspective, ground their activities in local initiatives and dynamics, associate local actors in both the analysis and the setting of priorities, and act themselves only after in-depth analysis.

> *The need for a greater focus on the external environment and policy coherence.* A narrow focus on finding 'internal' solutions to the problems facing developing countries is not consistent with the emerging discourse on globalisation. To have the outcomes desired, the international community must focus greater efforts on attending to the ways in which external actors undermine the security of people and states in developing countries. Critical issues in this regard include injudicious arms sales, indirect support to illegal trafficking, corruption, bribery and to money laundering, as well as the debt crisis and exploitative trade relations, political and economic support for authoritarian regimes.

> *Appropriate models of reform.* While based on universal values of human rights and democratic governance, international strategies to support security issues and security sector reforms must be dynamic and flexible. An uncritical reliance on broad-brushed, 'hands-off' approaches that are based on free-market solutions downplays the underlying social, economic and cultural differences between countries and the unique challenges they face. An over-emphasis on external models of reform may also mask what developing countries are, in many cases, already doing in an attempt to find durable solutions to their problems.

> *The dangers of exacerbating security problems.* All development interventions have the potential to fuel conflict and to intensify inequality and insecurity in societies. Placing excessive pressure on countries to reform rapidly before an appropriate institutional framework and adequate security guarantees are in place may exacerbate political conflicts. Donors must be carefully attuned to the social and political consequences of their activities and accept that security sector reform is a politically sensitive and long-term venture.

4. COMPONENTS OF A COHERENT POLICY AGENDA

66.		Security sector assistance programmes should be conceptualised firmly in the overall context of the foreign and trade policies of OECD governments. The security sector reform agenda should be not be defined exclusively in terms of what development actors can do. Achieving the desired policy outcomes of poverty reduction and conflict prevention will require OECD countries to make use of all available policy instruments, including those in the military, diplomatic, financial, trade, taxation and development co-operation domains. Because such sets of policies are often in conflict with each other, the policy

frameworks of aid ministries need to be more conducive to integration with the policies of other government departments in view of encouraging a more coherent government-wide and international response to security problems and security sector reforms.

67.	Effective co-ordination, even amongst development actors, is difficult to achieve. The same is true amongst government departments of the same country too. As the *Incentives* study notes, co-ordination is often most effective at the operational level but tends to break down at the strategic and political level (page 18, paragraph 72). Co-ordination fails for many reasons. Domestic politics and national interests in donor countries as well as the institutional interests of aid organisations play powerful roles in determining the goals and margins for manoeuvre of development and other actors. Furthermore, there is scope for 'legitimate differences in the assessment of strategy' and the 'likely effectiveness of various courses of action to achieve agreed goals'. Progress in overcoming these constraints cannot be forced but depends, as the *Guidelines* note, on the extent to which co-ordination is seen to add value to the operations of individual donors and agencies (page 29, paragraph 3), or individual government departments and their national interest.

68.	The development of an overarching policy framework will be of limited utility unless development and other actors adopt and institutionalise new ways of working that enhance co-ordination both in the field and at the strategic/political level. Building consensus on how to support general security and the security sector reform agenda will require a willingness to confront in a frank and open manner a number of difficult strategic issues that will influence the effectiveness of security sector assistance and other assistance that impacts on security issues.

## A.	Building consensus on strategic priorities

69.	*Security spending vs. social spending.* In the absence of a long-term approach and an over-arching policy framework, donors may see a potential conflict between efforts to 'reduce poverty' and efforts to 'enhance security'. However, there is no clear dichotomy between security and social spending; a more holistic assessment of how spending in the social and security sectors interact to promote desired policy outcomes is necessary. Most development policy frameworks still have a bias towards the provision of social spending. This is consistent with growing acceptance of the idea that security can be achieved in various ways, including through non-military means. Investment in employment and other social services, for instance, is an investment in long-term social security and will help to address the factors that give rise to violence and unrest.

70.	But restoring physical security is also a top priority in some countries today; achieving this objective may involve maintaining or even increasing levels of security spending. Given the enhanced role that military forces play in internal security in many countries, the implications of downsizing in the absence of complementary efforts to strengthen police forces require careful consideration. The top priority, for instance, may be to redistribute spending *within* the security sector – from the military to the police – in order to provide the minimal security needed for productive economic activity to take place. Sensitivity to such issues does not necessarily imply that development resources should be used for security sector reform, but these issues should be discussed more openly between donors and their partners.

71.	Recognition is needed that there are no easy trade-offs between security and social spending in the context of extreme resource scarcity. This is the case in pre-2000 Sierra Leone, for instance, whose government and people face a range of serious security threats emanating from the vicious interaction of poverty and political strife. In this case, or cases like it, the World Bank and the IMF may need to consider whether some degree of dispensation from classically applied macro-economic conditions is required in view of enhancing the capacity of the state to protect the peace. Making choices about priorities under conditions of resource scarcity imperatively requires mechanisms that associate local actors (including

government and civil society) from whom the solutions will fundamentally have to emerge. (*Incentives*, page 12, paragraph 48.)

72.   *State capacity vs. human security.* Strengthening state capacity within a democratic framework is key to promoting human welfare. Such a focus is not fundamentally at odds with the growing emphasis on 'human' security, though careful consideration is needed of how development interventions contribute to this goal. The growing emphasis on human security has in large part been a reaction to the weaknesses of state capacity in the social domain as well as the growing reliance by many donor countries on NGOs to deliver aid. This has resulted in more targeted, short-term forms of assistance that often by-pass government structures. But there is a danger of avoiding the issue of exactly *who* will provide security in the absence of effective state capacity in the security domain. If security is a public good that is best provided by the state, then this may require a greater focus on strengthening state capacity in appropriate ways.

73.   This would also require a longer-term donor commitment and more effective co-ordination if the debilitating effects of *ad hoc* and narrowly focused institution-building initiatives were to be avoided. There is already recognition of these realities by development actors as evidenced by the increasing focus on 'programme'-oriented assistance. A long-term approach is also necessary because reductions in overall security spending – where this is warranted and can actually be brought about - will not automatically lead to an increase in social welfare. Achieving a genuine 'peace dividend' will require addressing the institutional impediments to effective resource use in poor countries as well as the need for enhanced commitment by political leaders to re-allocate public resources in favour of the social sectors.

74.   *Enforcement vs. incentive-based approaches.* Consistent with a focus on *process,* the long-term emphasis of donor assistance should be on helping countries develop the capacity to assess systematically their own security and development needs and to optimise resource allocation between different sectors. Development actors have at times favoured a shorter-term approach to security sector reform that relies excessively on the use of 'punitive' conditionalities to achieve

> **Box 4. Dilemmas of managing military spending in Cambodia**
>
> Early lessons from Cambodia's security-sector reform process highlight the challenges of bringing about changes in the way security-spending decisions are made. Cambodia's government has come under immense pressure from donors to reduce military spending since 1993. While official defence spending, as indicated in the national budget, has dropped from 46% of total public spending to 31% since 1994, defence spending in real terms remains much higher. Resources from health and education continue to be channelled to the security sector. The military has also turned to off-budget sources of financing, including logging, and on occasion has taken out loans from commercial banks, at high rates of interest, which the finance ministry has come under pressure to repay. Until very recently, measures promoted by the international community within the finance ministry to help strengthen the budgetary process have not been formally linked to the ongoing defence review or to efforts to engage Cambodia's military, which enjoys considerable autonomy, in a debate about its future role.

reductions in defence expenditure where this is deemed 'excessive'. There is general acceptance that conditionalities tend to work best when countries have already decided to embark on a reform process (*Incentives,* page 5, paragraph 10). Applying excessive pressure on countries to reduce military spending can be counter-productive in terms of achieving long-term objectives.

75.   Most government spending is fungible, meaning public funds can be used in different sectors. As Cambodia's case shows, encouraging governments to reduce military spending may actually result in reduced spending in the health and education sectors unless adequate safeguards are in place to protect the social sectors. By placing excessively strict conditionalities on the level of military spending, this may also increase the incentive for governments to hide military expenditure under other budget lines or to rely on off-budget sources of financing for the security sector. Moreover, because security institutions tend to be resistant to change, a blunt deficit-reduction approach may be institutionally traumatic for the security sector and indirectly increase political instability.

76.   Generating 'political will' to initiate and sustain reform processes is essentially about creating incentives for military and political leaders to implement difficult policies. Incentive-based approaches seek to influence actors' behaviours, modify actors' capacities, change the relations between actors and influence the social and economic environment in ways that are conducive to achieving desired policy outcomes (*Incentives,* page 5, paragraph 11). This may involve engaging with the military and ensuring them that reforms will not be conducted in such a way that undermines national security. Offers of assistance to help increase the efficiency of resources allocated to the defence sector might be an incentive for the military to initiate a reform process.

77.   There is a strong case for anchoring donor policy on an incentive-based approach to enhancing accountability, transparency and governance, instead of on conditionalities related to rigid expenditure norms. This seems to be the best long-term approach to bringing about structural reforms in the security sector that are consistent with long-term poverty reduction and conflict prevention goals. But such an approach will require a significant reform of the modalities of financing and functioning of aid agencies which are essentially geared to shorter-term operations (*Incentives,* page 20, paragraph 81).

B.   Guiding principles for reform

78.   There are general sets of principles that donors can use to support reforms, but to be of practical utility these principles must gain local acceptance. Unless they are seen as offering a basis for debate and a guiding framework for action, they may be interpreted as a backdoor to donor conditionality. Countries need to be encouraged in a consistent manner by *all* international actors to adopt a principle-based approach to reform if such an approach is to have its intended benefits. Donors themselves can set clear examples by working on the basis of transparency and consultation with their domestic and developing country partners.

79.   *Principles of good public sector management.* The components of good public sector management include:

➢ The availability of information required by policymakers.

➢ Decisions that are made by the appropriate actors in a transparent and accountable manner.

➢ A comprehensive and disciplined approach to public expenditure management.

➢ The adoption of a medium-term perspective for decision-making.

➢ The capacity and willingness to reprioritise and reallocate resources in order to achieve strategic objectives.

80.   *Principles of democratic security sector governance.* The following principles have broad applicability and offer a more specific framework for dialogue between donors and countries undertaking security sector reforms. To gain acceptance by all relevant actors, they need to reinforce the message that effective security sector governance is both a civilian and a military challenge. Clarity about the hierarchy of authority between civil authorities and the security forces is also critical.

➢ National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of a country's people and the activities of the security sector shall be subordinate to and supportive of these efforts.

> ➢ The security forces should refrain from involvement in politics other than through the constitutionally approved channels and the civil and political élite should refrain from interfering in operational matters and the military chain of command.

> ➢ The determination of the roles, responsibilities and organisational features of the security forces should be done in a manner that is appropriate with the country's needs and is affordable to the country in light of the demands on the budget from other public sectors.

> ➢ The roles and responsibilities of the security forces should be clearly and comprehensively enshrined in the constitution. The constitution should ensure that the security sector will respect human rights as reflected in domestic and international law.

> ➢ The conduct of security policy shall be managed in a consultative and transparent manner and shall encourage as high a level of parliamentary and public participation as possible without prejudicing the ability of the security forces to conduct legal and legitimate operations.

81.   The precise configuration of these principles and their corresponding reflection in roles, tasks and organisational cultures will depend on the country and security agency in question. A set of general principles can contribute to the development of a coherent national policy for security sector reform, though operationalising these principles is the key challenge. A starting point is to integrate them into education programmes for members of the security services and institutional mechanisms related to civil oversight and executive control of the security services.

C.   Mechanisms to enhance domestic ownership

82.   Where the inspiration for security sector reforms is largely external, as is the case in certain countries today, donors shoulder an immense responsibility to ensure that their assistance is effectively aligned with local needs, priorities and conditions. Local ownership of reform processes is necessary to avoid the discrediting of the security sector reform concept, most notably from political quarters that often resist change. In the absence of domestic ownership, local actors will resist reforms regardless of the merits of these reforms. They may be declared but not implemented, or they may be implemented in an incoherent, inconsistent and unsustainable manner.

83.   National ownership of reform processes will be enhanced as security sector reform is internalised within the political and institutional discourses of developing countries. This is a long-term challenge, but donors can strengthen this process by working in ways that harness the vision, skills and capabilities of local actors.

84.   *The role of consultations.* The pro-active involvement of all key actors involved in or affected by security sector reforms offers one of the few ways to build a genuine "national consensus" around reform approaches and objectives. Consultations should draw on existing expertise within government and strive to "sound board" the implementation process against credible non-governmental actors (including academics, civil society groups, and credible retired security force personnel). An effort should be made to include in this dialogue group that may not have an effective mechanism to express their views such as women or opposition political groups.

85.   *Management considerations.* Securing consensus on long-term reform objectives may require the development of a strategic framework by countries undertaking reforms to clarify how reform objectives can be achieved, what the measurable outcomes will be, and the kinds of resources required. The framework should be flexible and context-sensitive enough to factor in social and cultural variables that could affect the outcome of the reform process, including national sentiments, historical traditions and foreign-policy profiles. To ensure that the framework is compatible with levels of conceptual, linguistic, and doctrinal competence in the country concerned, it should be designed interactively utilising external, donor and indigenous expertise.

86.   *Sequencing and pace of reforms.* Development and other external actors should seek to conform to a local timetable for reforms. There is a tendency to get involved in promoting large-scale reforms before there is a clear national vision or reform strategy, appropriate expertise, or adequate political backing to carry them out. Development actors should first assess whether they are prepared to provide the kinds of assistance needed, when it is most needed. This means recognising that certain forms of assistance may not be practical until the minimum level of state capacity, economic growth, or rule of law needed for the achievement of the desired outcomes actually exists. Strengthening the professional ethos of the

> **Box 5. The challenge of sustaining police reforms in Haiti**
>
> The nature of international support for security-sector reform is often shaped by the fear of 'mission creep' as peace-keeping forces are called upon to engage in police functions that they are ill-equipped to perform or sustain. This was the experience of the United States military which became involved in Haiti despite political opposition back home. 5,000 Haitian policemen were rapidly trained and recruited to provide security. However, Haiti's judiciary faces severe weaknesses with the result that a culture of impunity has been institutionalised in the political system. Measures to strengthen the police leadership and the judicial capacity needed to ensure that the police perform their role effectively lagged behind the police training. These institutional shortcomings have taken a toll on police morale and have also resulted in serious human rights abuses by the police that have undermined public confidence in them.

military, for instance, may lead to frustration and even rebellion if not accompanied by adequate resources and political backing to allow them to fulfil their role effectively and to reinsert those that that may need to find other gainful employment.

87.   *Sustaining assistance and process.* Development and other external OECD country actors should also carefully consider how the eventual withdrawal of their support would affect the sustainability of the reform process. In situations where security sector reforms are over-reliant on an external vision for reform, external expertise, and external resources, then an abrupt halt in assistance may effectively discourage countries from pursuing the reform process. If development actors are genuinely committed to the goal of improving security sector governance, then they must accept that institutional change is a long-term undertaking. They should strive to provide forms of assistance that strengthen the institutional framework in which reforms occur so that the reform process can be relaunched when setbacks or delays occur.

5. AREAS FOR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

88.   The list below identifies broad challenges faced by countries undertaking security sector reforms where development assistance can play a supportive role. This list does not constitute a 'check-list' of options that will substitute for careful consultation by OECD governments with partner countries regarding their needs and priorities. Questions that need to be ask will include: How can OECD governments' assistance be provided in ways that contribute to overall security issues and security sector reform objectives? What are the appropriate roles for donor assistance? Does the proposed assistance meet the priorities of partner countries? Do the pre-conditions exist for donor assistance to have a positive long-term impact? Does the proposed assistance complement the activities of other governments working in the security sector? Are the objectives broadly consistent with each other? Are there possible conflicts of interest between external actors that might impede policy coherence?

89.   In many of these areas development actors are already well-equipped and able to work. In other areas, their role will be to facilitate the efforts of their military and police counter-parts. The assumption should be that development assistance will *not* be used for activities that involve direct support for the uniformed security or intelligence services. Activities in this category include strengthening the capacity of military forces to provide security through the use of force. These kinds of activities will be required in some countries and donors should be attentive to ensure that international assistance provided to promote these objectives is delivered in ways that are consistent with development criteria and encourage civil

oversight of security-linked policy-making. Efforts such as promoting techniques for transparent budgetary accountability, or human rights training would be acceptable development assistance activities.

A. Enhancing state capacity and policy coherence

90. Well functioning security systems and security sector reforms require effective institutional and legislative frameworks as well as a clear vision by policy-makers concerning how the reform process will impact upon other sectoral policies and public finances. The strengthening of state capacity for effective planning and policy development, including sound financial management, is an important component of improving security sector governance. Effective state capacity is also necessary to ensure that countries can develop strategies for reform that are consistent with available resources and national priorities.

> **Box 6. South Africa's defence review process**
>
> As a rule, security sector reviews are complex undertakings. They must involve a broad spectrum of local actors, including civil society and parliament, if the final product is to enjoy public legitimacy. By way of example, six drafts of the South African White Paper on Defence were prepared for comment by military officers, parliamentarians and members of the public. The finalisation of the White Paper took eighteen months. It was followed by a consultative Defence Review of similar duration. The transformation of South Africa's defence sector has been underway for eight years and is not yet complete.

91. *Security sector reviews.* National security reviews can help to elaborate an overarching policy on national security set in the context of overall national development goals. A key objective is to clarify the distinctions between the internal and external security functions of the state. The formulation of a national security policy framework (often reflected in the form of a White Paper) details the roles and tasks, institutional arrangements, force design options, resource requirements and oversight mechanisms over the security function concerned. Donors can support this process by encouraging a commitment to adhere to the international law on armed conflict and human rights (including the Convention on All forms of Discrimination and Violence Against Women) and key principles of civil-military relations, including transparency and budgetary accountability. Appropriate forms of development and military assistance can help address weaknesses in organisational, managerial and policy expertise.

92. *Management of security expenditure.* Efforts to improve the management of security expenditure should be set in the broader context of public expenditure management. OECD governments and their donor agencies as well as the IFIs should shift their focus from a narrow preoccupation with *levels* of spending towards an emphasis on strengthening the *process* by which spending decisions are made and resources are managed. This implies a much longer-term focus on the institutional framework in which public spending and security-decision-making processes occur. A key priority is to strengthen systems of financial management so that finance ministries can apply the same standards of public sector management to the defence sector and security related sectors/activities as to other sectors. Helping countries to conduct more effective threat assessments may also encourage more appropriate procurement policies, greater transparency. This requires appropriate military expertise.

93. *Civilian expertise on security issues.* Efforts to enhance state policy coherence must go hand in hand with the development of the requisite civilian skills to manage and monitor the security sector. This is key to gaining acceptance among the security forces themselves on the principle of civil supremacy. Donor assistance can help strengthen defence/security policy management and analysis skills as well as public policy management skills amongst senior managers within defence, interior and finance ministries and relevant civil society groups. These policy management skills include the ability to use gender analysis and incorporate relevant gender perspectives into policy decisions. Because of the mutual suspicion that often exists between civil authorities and the security forces, all technical assistance should be complemented by the opening of channels of communication that can reduce mutual suspicion.

94.   *Regional confidence-building and peace-keeping capacity.* Security sector reform programmes are both shaped and constrained by broader regional dynamics. Effective regional mechanisms for enhancing security and co-operation, along with internationally-supported confidence-building measures that include the disclosure of information by countries on military strategy, force size, and plans for procurement, can help to reduce tensions that lead to militarisation or conflict and facilitate the role of military and police actors from OECD countries. International assistance can be provided in many areas that will contribute to these objectives.

95.   *Invisible destructive elements.* OECD donors themselves are in a good position to bring to the attention of their own governments the role different government departments should play in influencing international corruption and money laundering, perpetuation of militia-linked private security forces through MNEs support, bribery, trade in diamonds and other illicit goods. These play an increasingly large role in fuelling and sustaining violent conflict and the "economy" of war. They pose serious policy coherence issues that the OECD and its Member countries should address.

> **Box 7. The United Kingdom's support for reform in Sierra Leone**
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> The United Kingdom's support for security-sector reform in Sierra Leone has effectively combined military training, development and diplomatic activities designed to both create an enabling environment for reform and address technical and financial needs. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has taken the lead in funding the reform component that comes under the heading of Civilian control, including the development of an over-arching national security policy. The Ministry of Defence is providing support for the restructuring and training of the new army. Co-ordination between the two departments has been enhanced by the secondment of Ministry of Defence staff to DFID. The Foreign Office has provided funding for a Military Advisory Training Team and has been active in supporting Sierra Leone's peace process.

B.   Reform and training of security forces

96.   *Military and police reforms.* Military and police reforms should always proceed in tandem with judicial and prison-system reforms and the strengthening of civilian oversight mechanisms. Where reductions in the size of the military are called for, this will usually require major investments in the organisational restructuring of both the military and police to bring them into line with national needs. The strengthening of judicial and prison systems reinforces efforts to strengthen police leadership and the development of crime prevention policies. These are areas that usually require special attention, particularly where the military have formerly played a major role in providing internal security. These are areas where development actors can provide direct assistance or facilitate the role of external military and police actors. The latter should include female military and police actors who are better able to address certain sensitive issues of gender-based violence and crimes during hostilities and continued insecurity.

97.   *Training assistance.* 'Professionalising' security forces involves increasing their technical proficiency to fulfil a legitimate protective function and their acceptance of the principle of civil supremacy. Education on ideas of democratic accountability, human rights, international humanitarian law, and gender issues (including issues of violence against women), can support these objectives. But training assistance alone will not change ingrained institutional practices that run counter to democratic security practices unless it is provided with sensitivity to the local context and needs. Donors should place greater emphasis on supporting measures that strengthen the legal framework in which the security sector operates so that democratic practices can be institutionalised.

C. Demilitarisation and peacebuilding

98. Demilitarisation and the conversion of security resources to civilian use are challenges facing most societies irrespective of their level of development, though particularly those emerging from protracted armed conflicts. Demilitarisation should not simply be seen as a question of down-sizing armies or destroying arms stockpiles, but should be understood as a process culminating in improved security sector governance and enhanced communication between divided communities. People-based mediation and peacebuilding strategies have an essential role to play in this regard by reducing social tensions and promoting reconciliation processes.

99. *Gender perspectives in peace support operations.* During war and armed conflicts, particularly internal ones, civil society is usually in majority represented by women and women's organisations. These are largely responsible for holding the societies and the economies together, and caring for the children, the elderly and those men not in combat. As a result women feel the immediate consequences of war on civil society and the way its fabric has been torn and ripped. They are well placed, especially at the grass-roots level, to work for peace and reconciliation and to set standards for the reconstruction of war-torn society. But negotiators around the table at all levels are predominantly male, representing fighting parties. Yet, ensuring women's participation enhances the legitimacy of the process by making it more democratic and responsive to all sectors of the affected population. Gender issues must be properly addressed through all the peace-process linked issues, especially the operational and institutional frameworks. These have been recognised in the "Windhoek Declaration" (May 2000, Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations) and discussed by the Security Council (2000).

100. *Conversion of security resources to civilian use*. When countries are seeking to reduce the size of armies, military inventories and security budgets are carried out. Governments can benefit from international assistance to convert security resources to civilian purposes. The objective of this process is to

> **Box 8. Gender and peace support operations. A training package for military and civilian participants in PSOs**.
>
> A Joint Canada-United Kingdom Initiative Modern Peace support operations (PSOs) consist of a wide range of activities including conflict prevention, peace making and building, and humanitarian assistance. Their objective is to assist a State or States in crisis to prevent, mitigate, terminate or recover from violent conflict. Actors in PSOs are now required to deal with a range of humanitarian and conflict related situations in difference cultural, social and political contexts. Women, men, boys and girls experience conflict and recovery in different ways. PSOs can achieve improved operational effectiveness and provide greater assistance to affected populations if they have the capacity to analyse and approach situations with a greater understanding of their different needs and priorities. Canada and the United Kingdom have produced a training programme to enhance the capacity of PSOs to approach in their work on PSOs, conflict and recovery from a gender perspective. The development phase was carried out in collaboration with a number of UN bodies and agencies (DPKO, UNIFEM, UNICEF), the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Operations Centre, the national militaries of Canada and the UK, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and international experts. It covers gender in relation to culture, PSOs, human rights and humanitarian law, conflict, post conflict. It will be launched in Autumn 2000.

ensure that the diverse material and human resources within the security sector are converted in a manner that is consistent with the goal of enhancing development and political stability. Conversion processes cover the reallocation of financial resources to other public sectors, the restructuring of defence industries, base closure and redevelopment, the de-mining of land, and the tasks of demobilising, disarming and reintegrating combatants, including any female combatants.

101. *Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants.* The formal disbanding of military formations is the start of a process that only concludes successfully when ex-combatants have been effectively reinserted into civilian society. Demobilisation and reintegration are fundamentally about changes in the status of ex-combatants and the need for new forms of livelihood that ultimately require the

creation of new jobs. An overly-technical approach to demobilisation and reintegration underplays the critical economic, social, political and psychological barriers to effective re-insertion. Reintegration objectives cannot be achieved in the absence of a stable and secure environment in which ex-combatants feel secure and safe from reprisal. Justice and reconciliation are also key factors to reintegration of ex-combatants.

102.   Development assistance of a technical nature has an important role to play but must be complemented by support in various forms of training for ex-combatants. Special attention should be paid to broader aspects of social reintegration, including the economic regeneration of communities touched by war, and to groups with special needs. Female ex-combatants, for instance, may be ostracised by their communities because the dual functions of women as keepers of the social fabric and as combatants are often perceived as incongruent. International assistance can support psychosocial rehabilitation, the development of appropriate vocational skills among ex-combatants, and the establishment of veteran's organisations. The development community would benefit from a systematic collection of lessons learned in the area of demobilisation, reintegration, justice and reconciliation.

103.   *Regulation of small arms.* Efforts to address the problems associated with the destabilising accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms should be situated squarely in the context of efforts to defuse the tensions that make a reliance on these weapons seem a necessity. In this regard, international efforts to address 'supply-side' issues must go hand in hand with 'demand-side' responses to the small arms problem[9]. In a security sector reform context, the restoration of effective mechanisms to maintain public security and regulate gun ownership represents the best long-term response. Much can also be done in the partner country to increase state capacity to monitor, check and prevent illegal arms transfers and to collect and destroy surplus weapons. OECD governments specifically have a policy coherence role to play in the regulation of exports of small arms towards third party countries.

104.   International support for disarmament processes often does not achieve the expected success due to the absence of a climate of security following the termination of armed conflicts. Given persisting tensions between groups, as the case of Northern Ireland illustrates, disarmament is a long-term challenge that cannot be separated from broader confidence-building measures. Development assistance of a technical nature can be complemented with efforts to enhance political dialogue between divided groups.

105.   *Child soldiers.* Significant advances have been made in addressing the child soldier problem in the international legal arena that are consistent with security sector reform objectives. The proliferation of non-state security forces that are virtually immune to outside influence poses a particular challenge that can only be effectively addressed in the context of efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts. Long-term solutions to the child soldier problem lay in a dual strategy of strengthening state capacity to regulate the recruitment of child soldiers and addressing the problems related to the lack of jobs and educational opportunities that make the child soldier profession an economic necessity in many cases. Development assistance can contribute to these specific objectives, facilitate the social reintegration of child soldiers following wars, and support programmes to sensitise security forces concerning international laws pertaining to child soldiers.

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[9]   A recent report prepared for the European Union offers an extensive list of measures on both the 'demand' and 'supply' side to address the light weapons problem: 'Development Activities Relevant to Small Arms and Light Weapons', by Samil Faltas in co-operation with Holger Anders, for the Conflict Prevention Network, Brussels, September 1999. OECD countries produce the majority of small arms.

D.   Strengthening democratic governance and rule of law

106.   The key issue with regard to the long-term sustainability of security sector reforms is the degree to which defence and security issues become accepted as legitimate areas for public and political debate within societies. A key challenge is to broaden the public knowledge base about security issues, building an environment with more transparency and participation in the determination of priorities and policies. Civil society groups, women's associations, the media, the general public and legislatures have a potentially important role to play in monitoring the conduct of security forces. For their actions to be effective, a broader enabling framework based on the rule of law, well functioning judicial and penal systems, and democratic governance is key.

107.   *Justice systems.* Mechanisms for judicial oversight of security institutions vary widely and are necessary in order to ensure that the police function effectively and the penal systems function as they should. Training and assistance for police investigators, judges and prosecutors may include legal reforms to strengthen human rights and due process guarantees, including code reform to incorporate international human rights standards into national legislation. Programmes to improve access to justice, especially for the poor, are also necessary if vulnerable groups are to enjoy the concrete benefits of peace and enhanced security. There is growing interest in human rights ombudsmen's offices as an additional mechanism that can offer recourse to victims of abuse. The penal system represents another crucial component of a functioning justice system, but is generally low on the list of priorities for both governments and donors. This low priority does not improve feelings of security and trust.

108.   *Civil oversight mechanisms.* Increasing legislative capacity to conduct effective oversight of security forces is a priority area for development assistance. Parliaments are formally responsible for ensuring that the security sector meets the needs of the broader public, though the relevant defence and security committees typically lack required expertise on security issues and budgetary matters. The building of professional staff and research capabilities may also require legislative and procedural changes to ensure that parliament has the requisite powers to fulfil its role. Various countries are now also seeking assistance to create specialised civilian review boards to strengthen civilian oversight over, and inspire confidence, in the police.

109.   *Civil society.* A strong civil society policy and 'watchdog' role is important in terms of creating the needed checks and balances of democratic governance and ensuring that security sector reform meets the needs of the broader public. Civil society groups should not be simply seen as alternative service providers or channels for donor assistance. Support for civil society should place greater emphasis on encouraging the development of independent policy interlocutors who can interrogate security decision-making. Given the weaknesses of state capacity in many countries, it is particularly important that civil society groups develop the capacity to go beyond denouncing governments for their failings and make practical suggestions that will help to sustain the reform process. It is equally important to provide support to a wide range of groups including women's associations.

E.   Building research capacity

110.   If local ownership of security sector reform processes is to be taken seriously, international support should be broadly conceived in terms of how it increases the capacity of developing country policy-makers and researchers to analyse, understand and debate their own security problems. The strengthening of analytical and research capacity is the basis for generating the local vision and political momentum necessary to initiate and sustain security sector reforms. This has important implications for the timeframe and nature of development assistance programmes, in particularly the kinds of partnerships that are forged with local research institutions in countries undertaking reforms. International support can be provided for local think tanks, universities and South-South learning initiatives. A priority is to include

local authorities and government policymakers in the research processes that are funded through international assistance.

6. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DONORS

111.   This section makes policy recommendations in six broad areas in view of mainstreaming security issues into development policy and practice and enhancing policy coherence between government departments, amongst OECD countries and other development actors.

i.   *Recognise the developmental importance and legitimacy of addressing security issues and security sector reform and the need for more coherent and comprehensive international responses to security problems.*

> ➢ Security issues and sector reform should be conceptualised as integral components of the economic, social, and political development of a country, not as separate military or security issues.

> ➢ There should be greater effort amongst development actors to demystify issues related to the military and security, and to weave thinking on these issues across all development programme areas.

ii.   *Elaborate a comprehensive security sector reform policy that outlines the appropriate roles for actors across all areas of foreign affairs, financial, trade, security-defence and development co-operation.*

> ➢ Such a framework should:

- Situate security sector assistance programmes in terms of overall efforts to enhance stability and security frameworks within a system of democratic governance - including gender equality-, poverty reduction and conflict prevention goals.

- Focus attention on the full range of national actors that may require assistance, including the military, police, judiciary, parliaments, etc. if reforms are to be effective.

- Clarify how 'sub-policies' in the development co-operation, foreign affairs, financial, trade and security domains can contribute to overall security issues and security sector reform objectives.

- Specify the general principles underlying the delivery of international assistance, broad objectives shared by all actors, and how strategic priorities should be determined.

- Each development actor should clarify its own policy toward security issues and the security sector and develop an approach to providing assistance that is embedded in this comprehensive perspective.

iii.   *Identify what kinds of capacity and internal institutional reforms are required to provide security sector assistance effectively on a partnership basis within the context of a development co-operation agenda.*

➢ Start by working to integrate a security perspective across all existing programme activities so that they are conducted in a manner that is consistent with promoting security reform objectives.

➢ Give careful consideration to the implications of a more active engagement with security sector work, and invest in the human resources and organisational structures needed to work effectively.

➢ Learn from other donors that have already adopted formal policies for providing security sector assistance10 or who have addressed in systematic ways how to apply a security lens.

➢ Broaden understanding of security sector problems, drawing on relevant military/security expertise and soliciting the views and perspectives of relevant actors from countries undertaking reforms.

➢ Address proactively, through awareness-raising and better communication, the problems that may arise within aid departments if the new security sector reform agenda is perceived to conflict with other aid priorities or the agendas of country desks.

➢ Educate the media, the general public, other government departments, and politicians on the rationale for security sector reform in view of generating the political and public support needed to work effectively.

➢ Clarify areas of comparative advantage in security sector work and anticipate the forms of partnership required, both within and outside the development field, to fill the gaps where capacity is lacking.

iv. *Work to develop an effective 'division of labour' amongst development and other relevant international actors that will allow each to pursue their comparative advantage without undermining common objectives.*

➢ Discuss the problems of co-ordination in a frank and open manner and make good faith efforts to co-ordinate policies and programmes and develop mechanisms that enhance policy coherence.

➢ Consider joint consultation of country strategy papers, develop inter-organisational processes to oversee security sector assistance programmes, and second staff from one department or organisation to another.

➢ Reach agreement on a specific 'code of conduct' that clarifies general principles for delivering security-related assistance, and work to ensure adherence by all relevant international actors.

➢ Address security issues including specifically sector reform issues in existing development assistance co-ordination forums and mechanisms, such as the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the World Bank-led Consultative Group and the UNDP-led Round Table; the United Nations Development assistance Framework (UNDAF); the Common Country Assessments (CCAs) - formulated by UN country teams in partnership with government concerned - and the UN Resident Co-ordinator System.

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10   The UK Department for International Development (DFID) launched is security-sector assistance policy in March 1999. Its policy statement on 'Poverty and the Security Sector' can be found on the DFID website: www.dfid.gov.uk.

➢ Recognise the negative impact on state capacity of ad hoc and uncoordinated donor activities, and place greater emphasis on joint programmes that allow aid to be centralised and harmonised.

v.   *Work towards the integration of security sector concerns in the overall foreign and trade policies of OECD countries and encourage greater co-operation between OECD countries in this domain.*

➢ Encourage greater debate on security sector concerns amongst government departments dealing with foreign affairs, trade, defence and finance, and push for a more coherent government-wide approach to countries experiencing security problems. Specifically:

• Push for joint consultation of country strategy papers, the development of inter-departmental processes to oversee security sector assistance programmes, and the seconding of staff from one department to another.

• Encourage the strict adherence of military assistance programmes, including training for foreign security personnel that is provided in OECD countries, to the principles that underlie the democratic security sector reform agenda.

• Lobby for clearer and firmer guidelines on arms export promotion policies to ensure that sales to poorer countries are consistent with their security needs and conform with sustainable development criteria.

➢ OECD governments should promote a more coherent international response to security sector problems by actively using their voice and influence in international organisations, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation.

➢ Special attention should be paid to:

• Promoting regional and international confidence-building initiatives in unstable regions in view of reducing political tensions that lead to militarist policies.

• Taking steps to enforce collective adherence by both OECD and non-OECD countries to international embargoes on the transfer of arms to countries engaged in war.

• Promoting greater scrutiny of the role and impact of transnational companies and private security firms working in countries engaged in war.

• Adopting a more consistent position on the international trade in security and arms in view of promoting good governance amongst non-OECD nations in this domain.

vi.   *Provide assistance in ways that enhance domestic ownership of reform processes and strengthen the institutional framework for managing the security sector in a manner consistent with sound governance practices.*

➢ Make a review of existing capacity the first step when contemplating any intervention; act only after a careful analysis of the problems; build on local initiatives, and associate local actors with the determination of priorities.

➢ While recognising that the primary impetus for security sector reform should be primarily internal in nature, be willing to table the issue and offer a 'window' and incentives for countries to address the issue.

• Include security sector reform issues in country reviews and strategy documents and make these issues a regular component of policy dialogue with client governments; specifically:

• Donors including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund should more fully incorporate security sector issues in Country Assistance Strategies, public expenditure reviews and the Comprehensive Development Framework and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP).

➢ Recognise the political sensitivity of security sector reforms, clarify intentions in this area for the benefit of partner countries, and prioritise ways of working that help to build mutual confidence and trust.

➢ Encourage countries to develop their own approaches to security issues and security sector reform on the basis of broad-based processes of national consultation, and provide forms of assistance that support this.

➢ Be constantly mindful of the dangers both of overloading the reform agenda, particularly in post-war societies, and of the ways in which development assistance and other external assistance can exacerbate security problems.

➢ Engage with the security forces themselves, where possible, devising incentive-based assistance programmes that imbue them with an understanding of democratic accountability and increase their internal management capacity to implement and sustain reforms.

➢ Recognise that achieving effective security sector governance requires strong civilian capacity as well, both among governmental and non-governmental actors, and address needs in this domain.

➢ Act more pro-actively; place earlier emphasis on the requirements for security sector reform in the context of donor consultative processes linked to peace processes and post-war reconstruction.

➢ To maintain momentum and ensure the commitment of all partners to the security sector reform agenda, establish clear and realistic benchmarks to jointly assess progress.

➢ Adopt a long view; recognise that security sector reforms are largely driven by processes of social and political change and adopt longer-term planning cycles for assistance that reflect this.

7. NEXT STEPS

112.   The ideas and proposals presented in this paper are intended to help build consensus on the need for a more coherent international approach to security issues and security sector reform. Members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee may want to consider a number of immediate next steps to facilitate the kinds of changes that will be needed both within development organisations and their OECD governments in order to advance this objective:

> ➤ Reflect on how this paper can be used internally within the Member's development agencies and foreign affairs ministries to raise awareness of security sector reform issues, and consider the implications for current programme activities.

> ➤ Share this paper with other government departments and the business community, and explore ways in which the security sector reform agenda can be situated more firmly in the overall context of foreign and other policies, so that they are coherent.

> ➤ Outline the Member's approach to security sector reform in partner countries and provide details on the nature of their support for security sector reform where this is currently being provided.

> ➤ Highlight key issues and recommendations outlined in this report to be included in an eventual OECD policy that Members can collectively agree to take forward.

> ➤ Reflect on the optimum use of this report, or a revised version, in regional consultations with OECD partners in view of testing the ideas and policy recommendations proposed here.