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**Market Studies and other Market Analysis Tools for Competition Authorities – Note by
Hungary**

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1. Introduction

1. The Hungarian Competition Authority (Gazdasági Versenyhivatal, GVH) regularly conducts market analyses and sector inquiries to improve its understanding of market dynamics and evolution, and to provide information for its advocacy work. This contribution summarises our experiences over the past five years.

2. Legislation and available tools

2.1. Sector inquiries and accelerated sector inquiries

2. Based on Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices and Unfair Competition (Hungarian Competition Act), the GVH is authorised to initiate standard sector inquiries and, as of July 2021, accelerated sector inquiries as well.

3. The initiation of standard sector inquiries must be based on a situation where the movement of prices or other circumstances suggest that competition may be restricted or distorted within the market of any particular sector of the economy.

4. Accelerated sector inquiries are launched by the GVH if there is reasonable ground to believe on the basis of sectoral specificities, individual characteristics, or market structures that competition may be restricted or distorted, and urgent action is required to identify and address such market problems.

5. In both standard and accelerated sector inquiries the GVH has various methods and tools to collect data, examine market structures and detect potential failures. In case of standard sector inquiries, the GVH can issue questionnaires, i.e., RFIs, to which the parties (undertakings active on the market, professional organizations, trade unions and other stakeholders) concerned are required to respond within the specified time limit. The GVH can also issue RFIs to other ECN member agencies to understand the international trends of the markets in question. The GVH may also collect data from public sources or from other public bodies (e.g., Hungarian Central Statistical Office, National Tax and Customs Administration, Central Bank of Hungary) and voluntary responses of foreign companies. Additionally, the GVH sometimes commissions professional market research companies to conduct consumer research in order to understand consumer preferences. In case of accelerated sector inquiries in addition to the aforementioned ways, the GVH may also conduct dawn raids upon prior judicial authorization, as an additional power to ensure swift fact-finding.

6. At the conclusion of a sector inquiry, a report is drafted summarizing the findings of the investigation, including the analysis of market structures, corporate behaviour, and any competition concerns identified. The draft report undergoes an internal review process and then, it is published on the GVH's website for consultation with the relevant stakeholders. After the consultation period the report is finalized and the final report is published on the GVH's website, including the summary of the comments received during the consultation process to ensure transparency.

7. Deadlines for closing a standard sector inquiry is not set in the Hungarian Competition Act. These procedures typically last two or three years but the report on the

outcome of the sector inquiry must be prepared within a reasonable timeframe. Accelerated sector inquiries are designed to be quick and reliable means of addressing the emerging market issues. Accordingly, strict deadlines were stipulated under Article 43/E para. (2) of the Hungarian Competition Act, with draft reports due within 1 month of initiation, subject to two possible extensions of 1 month each if justified.

8. Based on the findings of each sector inquiry, the GVH may recommend legislative changes, issue public guidelines, or initiate further proceedings in case of detected potential infringements. If no violations are found, best practice recommendations may still be published to promote healthy competition.

2.2. Market analyses

9. Market analyses are designed to better understand a new or emerging market, market developments and trends, and practices by companies active on the market. When conducting a market analysis, the GVH may gather publicly available information and involve external experts, consultants or market research companies. The GVH can also send RFIs to companies, whose responses are voluntary. The GVH incorporates the conclusions of the market analysis in a study, covering the facts and findings and the issues addressed, any further actions that may be deemed necessary, as well as the applied methods, and publishes the study on its website.

3. Proposals aimed at fostering competition

10. In the past five years, the GVH executed several sector inquiries and market analyses and the majority of them resulted in some proposals to strengthen product market competition. In this contribution we categorise these proposals into three major groups: advocacy for the change of existing laws and regulations; advocacy calling for new legislation; and proposals made for private market actors. We also briefly discuss those sector inquiries and market analyses that prompted the GVH itself to initiate a competition procedure.

3.1. Advocacy in relation to existing law

11. Existing laws and regulations may have unintended negative consequences regarding competition. It is a vital role of a competition authority to point out these laws and regulations and advocate for a change.

12. The GVH launched a standard sector inquiry into the market of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverage procurement of Hungarian hotels, restaurants, and catering providers (HORECA sector) in 2020.¹ The sector inquiry was prompted in a large part by longstanding concerns about potentially anticompetitive practices in sales of beer to HORECA units. The focus mostly laid on practices inhibiting the HORECA units' choice of its beer and beverage suppliers, notably in the form of contractual agreements between large producers/distributors and HORECA companies fixing the amount of beer and beverages the HORECA unit shall purchase from the given producer/distributor. In return,

¹ https://gvh.hu/dontesek/agazati_vizsgalatok_piacelemzesek/agazati_vizsgalatok/jelentes-az-alkoholos-es-alkoholmentes-italtermek-magyarorszag-i-vendeglatoipari-egysegekben-torteno-forgalmazasnak-piacan-lefolytatott-agazati-vizsgalatrol (in Hungarian only)

HORECA units received substantial and vital support from the producer/distributor in the form of subsidies, equipment, and/or various discounts.

13. In reaction to a call – mainly by small breweries – against these commercial practices, in late 2020 the legislator passed a new legislation by modifying the Act CLXIV of 2005 on Trade (Act on Trade) stating among others that HORECA units may not source more than 80 per cent of their annual draft beer purchases from the same producer. In addition, they were required to offer the products of at least two different producers for beer and soft-drink categories.

14. In its market inquiry the main goal of the GVH was to judge the net effect that exclusionary contracts have on consumer welfare, and how much it really curtails choice. The GVH recognised that consumer choice between beverages is limited by these agreements within a given HORECA unit. Nevertheless, the various forms of subsidies and discounts given in exchange for exclusivity or near-exclusivity by the producer/distributors to the HORECA units is essential to open and operate a HORECA unit. The prohibition of these subsidies would probably contribute to substantially higher barriers to entry into the HORECA market, would increase costs for incumbents, hence, increase concentration and in turn consumer prices and would lead to a lower selection of HORECA units. As a result, the GVH concluded that the overall effects of these procurement contracts are beneficial to the consumers through decreasing costs and barriers to entry at the HORECA level. At the same time, consumer research indicated that on the one hand consumers are generally satisfied with the available selection of beers and soft drinks at the HORECA units, on the other hand, however, one out of four respondents also expressed their desire to being offered draught craft beer. The new regulation most probably resulted in a substantial cost increase for HORECA units amid the pandemic and the cost-of-living crisis, but also enhanced consumer choice.

15. In line with these findings, the GVH advised the legislature to re-evaluate the 2020 amendment to the Act on Trade with regard to ongoing GVH enforcement and general industry standards. In 2024 the Constitution Court declared that regarding soft drinks and mineral waters the provisions of the Act on Trade prohibiting such exclusionary practices was unconstitutional because of the vagueness of the respective legal norms. As of late 2025 though, the Act on Trade still prohibits the mentioned exclusionary contracts regarding the procurement of beers.

16. Another example where the GVH had an impact on existing legislation was during its 2023 sector inquiry into the dairy industry.² This market inquiry was triggered by concerns whether the exceptionally high food price inflation in Hungary might have been caused by anticompetitive conducts. The GVH also examined extant laws that might have had detrimental effects on food supply chains. One such piece of legislation was a price cap imposed by a government in 2022, compelling retail firms to maximise the price of certain food items (such as the 2.8% fat UHT milk) on a 2021 price level (i.e., prices before the inflationary wave) without any compensation for retailers. This in effect meant that retailers were compelled to sell these products at a price below procurement price, generating losses.

17. The GVH demonstrated in its report some of these losses on the side of retailers and concluded that the retail industry on average became unprofitable partly as a result of this legislation. The GVH also indicated that the price cap was distorting market structures, but in its report did not explicitly recommend revising the law, since it was scheduled to be

² https://www.gvh.hu/en/resolutions/sectoral_inquiries_market_analyses/sectoral_inquiries/final-report-of-the-accelerated-sector-inquiry-into-the-hungarian-market-for-milk-and-dairy-products

repealed by mid-2023 and was in fact repealed. The GVH did indicate however that the legislation raised concerns about long-term welfare considerations and the disruption of markets, and as such, ought to remain a temporary welfare measure instead of permanent regulation.

18. A third example of impact on existing legislation was the accelerated sector inquiry concerning COVID-19 rapid self-tests.³ Consumer prices of COVID-19 antigen rapid self-tests in Hungary had been higher than in most European and neighbouring countries, therefore the GVH launched an accelerated sector inquiry at the end of 2021 to assess the market characteristics and the price developments across the supply chain.

19. The inquiry revealed that the Hungarian supply chain of antigen rapid self-tests was particularly long in some cases. The products arrived from producers to consumers through several market participants, and thus additional margins were built into the product prices at each stage of the supply chain, which ultimately led to higher retail prices.

20. Based on the findings of the sector inquiry, the GVH recommended the government to allow drugstores, retail chains, and petrol stations to sell these products to increase competition at the retail level. Generally, these retailers purchase the products directly from the producers or Hungarian importers, thus the supply chain is much shorter, leading to lower prices. The government measure following the GVH's proposal ultimately led to a sharp increase in the number of outlets selling antigen rapid tests and a roughly 50% decrease in retail prices.

21. Based on the impact assessment carried out by the GVH,⁴ the direct consumer savings resulting from this market liberalization were found to be around HUF 2.3–4.9 billion.⁵ This amount is comparable to the expected consumer benefit in some recent significant competition enforcement cases of the GVH, showing that competition advocacy can be as important as competition enforcement. If the sale of rapid self-tests had always been liberalised, the corresponding consumer benefit would have been even higher, around HUF 6.0–12.5 billion.

22. These results highlight the benefits of new market entry and stronger competition, the losses generated by restricting competition, and the importance of competition advocacy and pro-competitive government measures aiming at consumer welfare.

3.2. Advocating for new regulation

23. Sometimes the competition authority's recommendations do not point towards revising or repealing existing laws and regulations, but towards establishing new ones. In this capacity the GVH can raise attention to legislative deficiency from a competition point of view and work together with legislators to formulate policies and laws to fill in these gaps.

³ https://gvh.hu/dontesek/agazati_vizsgalatok_piacelemzesek/agazati_vizsgalatok/vegleges-jelentes-a-covid-19-antigen-gyorstesztek-magyarorszag-piacan-lefolytatott-gyorsitott-agazati-vizsgalatrol (in Hungarian only)

⁴ https://gvh.hu/pfile/file?path=/en/gvh/analyses/ex_ante_impact_assessment/covidgyorsteszt-exante-impactass-2022-2024-11-28-eng_final---exchrates-updt&inline=true

⁵ 2024 value. Around EUR 6–13 million or USD 6–14 million, calculated at the average exchange rate published by the Central Bank of Hungary for 2024.

24. A notable instance of advocacy for new regulation can be found in the already mentioned 2023 accelerated sector inquiry into the Hungarian dairy market.⁶ Since the sector inquiry was launched in response to possible competition concerns that could exacerbate food price inflation, the GVH recommended to the Hungarian government to set up of a so-called price monitoring system. The purpose of such a system is to reduce the search costs on the side of consumers by making it easier to compare retail prices across stores. This can lead to a more intense price competition on the side of retailers that can affect the entire supply chain due to the large bargaining power of retailers. In practice this would mean setting up a website that would display up-to-date prices of selected food items at different retailers in an easily comparable manner. Retailers are obliged by the new law to supply price data to this system. The price monitoring system was launched on 1 July 2023, and is available at <https://arfigyelo.gvh.hu/> (only in Hungarian). The product coverage was constantly expanded with new amendments of the relevant government decree. In its 2025 sector inquiry into the dairy industry the GVH carried out a differences-in-differences analysis to estimate the effect that the price monitoring system had on retail margins on seven different dairy categories. The analysis concluded that the price monitoring system resulted in a decrease in retailer margins by an estimated 10–12 percentage points across dairy products by decreasing consumer search costs and increasing retail competition.

25. Another advocacy proposal was formulated by the GVH as a result of its market analysis regarding environmental or green claims used by companies.⁷ The primary purpose of this analysis was to ascertain how companies communicate environmental claims towards consumers, how prevalent these claims are, and how do consumers react to such claims, in particular, how these claims influence consumption choices. The analysis focused on claims made by firms in the food, clothing, chemical products, and beauty products categories. In the report, the GVH made recommendations to the legislature to establish a unified and regulated system of environmental footprint calculation based on life-cycle analysis and display on relevant products. The GVH pointed out that similar regulation has been enacted in Hungary in relation to local origin and is also used by companies to communicate nutritional value (e.g., NutriScore). Other competition authorities have also advocated for such systems in the past.

26. A third example was when in August 2023, the GVH launched an accelerated sector inquiry into the online accommodation booking services market to examine the competitive conditions and the contractual practices of the online travel agents (OTAs).⁸ Particular attention was paid to parity clauses, commissions, ranking, and visibility conditions imposed by OTAs on accommodation providers. Due to the free-riding phenomenon – when consumers use online platforms primarily for search and comparison purposes but complete their bookings directly with accommodation providers or through alternative

⁶ https://www.gvh.hu/en/resolutions/sectoral_inquiries_market_analyses/sectoral_inquiries/final-report-of-the-accelerated-sector-inquiry-into-the-hungarian-market-for-milk-and-dairy-products

⁷ https://www.gvh.hu/en/resolutions/sectoral_inquiries_market_analyses/market_analyses/the-formation-and-use-of-environmental-claims-by-market-players-related-proposals-and-guidance

⁸ The draft report is available in English: https://gvh.hu/en/resolutions/sectoral_inquiries_market_analyses/sectoral_inquiries/Draft-report-of-the-accelerated-sector-inquiry-into-the-Hungarian-market-for-accommodation-booking-services-and-accommodation-providers; the final report only in Hungarian: https://gvh.hu/dontesek/agazati_vizsgalatok_piacelemzesek/agazati_vizsgalatok/vegleges-jelentes-az-online-szallashelyfoglalas-es-a-szallashely-szolgaltatas-hazai-piacan-lefolytatott-gyorsitott-agazati-vizsgalatrol. The final report only contains minor modifications compared to the draft one.

sales channels due to lower prices – OTAs often employ price parity clauses. Wide price parity clauses contractually prohibit accommodation providers from offering lower prices on all other sales channels, hence constraining their pricing behaviour, and potentially reducing interchannel competition. Narrow price parity clauses only prohibit lower prices at the own website of the accommodation provider, but lower prices might happen at other OTAs or sales channels.

27. In Hungary seven out of eight OTAs applied some form of price parity clause. Sanctions for violating parity clauses can be quite severe, ranging from warnings and price adjustments to reduced visibility and, in some cases, even suspension or termination of the contract.

28. Based on the findings of the sector inquiry, the online accommodation booking services market is highly concentrated, primarily due to its platform-based nature and indirect network effects. While this market characteristic contributes to lower search costs for consumers and reduced administrative burdens for accommodation providers, recent trends suggest that smaller OTAs exert only limited competitive pressure on the largest players. This weak competitive constraint has contributed to persistently high commission rates, which, in many cases, can reach up to 30% of the total amount paid by guests to accommodation providers.

29. As part of the investigation, an online questionnaire survey was conducted by the GVH to explore the experiences of domestic accommodation providers. The results indicated that, overall, accommodation providers are satisfied with the services offered by OTAs, considering them as essential for profitable operation, although several accommodation providers perceived their conditions one-sided to certain extent. This perception was also reflected in pricing behaviour: many of the accommodation providers use multiple distribution channels (including their own channels) but typically apply uniform room prices across them. This practice is partly due to the price parity clauses contained in their contracts, and partly to reduce the effort and time to set different prices across different sales channels. Accommodation providers primarily serving domestic travellers tend to regard price parity clauses as particularly restrictive. Nevertheless, overall exposure to OTAs is generally ranked low among the issues affecting accommodation providers.

30. According to the GVH, the prohibition of narrow price parity clauses could incentivise accommodation providers to offer more favourable prices through their own direct channels. In the longer term, this measure would likely exert downward pressure on the commission levels applied by online platforms, thus fostering more effective competition among the major market players. Based on the findings of the accelerated sector inquiry, the GVH recommended that the legislator prohibit the use of price parity clauses for OTAs. Shortly after the publication of the GVH report, the government announced plans for a new law prohibiting price parity clauses for OTAs.

31. A final example for advocacy by the GVH for new legislation was in the sector of wooden construction materials.⁹ Concerning the price increase of wooden construction materials in Hungary, an accelerated sector inquiry was launched in 2021. The investigation found that Hungary has high import dependency, and this exposure became evident when demand for European wood surged in the US and Chinese markets. As these countries offered higher prices, global trade flows shifted in their direction. Additionally, rising fuel

⁹ https://gvh.hu/dontesek/agazati_vizsgalatok_piacelemzesek/agazati_vizsgalatok/vegleges-jelentes-a-fa-epitoanyagok-magyarorszag-piacan-lefolyatatott-gyorsitott-agazati-vizsgalatrol (in Hungarian only)

and energy costs further contributed to the overall price increase. Furthermore, domestic demand also expanded due to state subsidies for home refurbishment and by the indirect effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (people spent more time at home and aimed to refurbish it).

32. As a result of short-term supply disruptions and substantial price increases, the dispersion of consumer prices and the differences across individual retailers rose significantly. In this context, the GVH found that the transparency of retail prices was insufficient (sometimes prices were only verbally indicated by the sales representatives and were liable to change within hours), significantly hindering consumers' ability to identify the most favourable offers. On this basis, the GVH recommended a new law that retailers of wooden construction materials should be required to publish their actual prices both on their website and at their physical points of sale.

3.3. Proposals for market actors

33. In addition to making suggestions regarding public policy and legislation, the GVH often addresses recommendations to market players as well. An example where the GVH had a pronounced effect on market actors was during the already mentioned 2023 accelerated sector inquiry into the Hungarian dairy market.¹⁰ Among other findings relating to the increase of dairy prices the GVH's report flagged the role of the so-called raw milk price forecast published by the Milk Interprofessional Organization and Product Board (Dairy Board). The Dairy Board is an interbranch organisation involving agricultural producers, processors, and retail firms that are involved in the production and distribution of milk and dairy products in Hungary. The Dairy Board published quarterly forecasts on the raw milk price developments, and though not mandatory for its members, farmers and producers could use this as a reference point in their price negotiations.

34. The GVH found that the methodology of this price forecast contained elements that made it almost inherently inflationary, and possibly led to higher raw milk prices, and, hence, to higher final consumer prices for milk and dairy products. The methodology included historical price changes of consumer products, and several completely subjective factors. The historical price data naturally served as a feedback mechanism that fed past inflationary pressure into current raw milk prices, while subjective factors were found to be used for further increasing the forecast prices in a quasi-arbitrary manner. The raw milk price forecast almost always projected a price increase compared to the current price level.

35. The GVH advised the Dairy Board to stop publishing the price forecast in its current form and to revise the methodology if they wish to continue publishing it. After the raw milk price forecast was discontinued, Hungarian raw milk prices fell below the EU average, demonstrating the positive impact on consumers of eliminating the price forecast. As of late 2025, the Dairy Board had not published a new price forecast or indicated a deadline for doing so. As such the GVH was able to discover a practice where the forecast of a market actor could have had exacerbating effects on an already severe food price inflation, notified the market actor through recommendations, and the market actor terminated the practice.

36. Another instance of the GVH addressing market actors' behaviour in its sector inquiries was in its report regarding single-bid public procurements of medical imaging

¹⁰ https://www.gvh.hu/en/resolutions/sectoral_inquiries_market_analyses/sectoral_inquiries/final-report-of-the-accelerated-sector-inquiry-into-the-hungarian-market-for-milk-and-dairy-products

equipment.¹¹ The GVH launched this accelerated sector inquiry after a call from the government to investigate markets where single-bid procurements – procurements where there is only a single bidder, thus no competition – are prevalent, and the healthcare procurement market of medical imaging machinery (MRI, CT, x-ray, etc.) was found to be relevant.

37. During the inquiry the GVH found several practices on the part of procuring entities which probably contributed to the prevalence of single-bid procurement. One such practice was the bundling of varying products and services into a single tender, very often ones which do not fall into the immediate field of expertise of medical imaging equipment producers. This appears as a disadvantage especially for smaller, single-product companies that may not find bidding for such a bundle profitable. Thus, the GVH recommended to procuring bodies dividing these bundled procurement tenders into separate lots, so that smaller companies can also bid profitably, increasing competition.

38. The GVH further found that in many of these tenders the technical requirements were not formulated in a uniform and clear way, and that professional medical needs ought to be more directly channelled into the tendering procedure. As such, the GVH recommended both bidders and procuring bodies to carry out preliminary market consultations regarding these technical requirements – while keeping the integrity of the bidding process intact.

39. Another set of recommendations made for market actors can be found in the above-mentioned market analysis investigating corporate green claims.¹² In its report the GVH outlined some suggestions to companies on how to formulate these green claims, detailing ways to improve the process of evaluating their claims, and to make their communication of these claims clearer and more reliable for consumers. Among these suggestions the GVH found it necessary for companies to clearly map out for themselves the entire life cycle of their products and identify those phases that raise the highest environmental concerns. In case firms find it beyond their capacity to carry out such a life-cycle assessment using their own data, the GVH pointed to generic databases that can substitute individual data. The GVH also suggested that firms devote their green investments to those areas that have been identified by the life-cycle assessment as those with the highest environmental concerns.

40. Regarding the communication of these green achievements, the GVH recommended showcasing those that have the highest impact within the entire life cycle, not necessarily those concerning the packaging, a very frequent example. The GVH further recommended that the green claims should be verifiable to the consumers. In case of external verification, the consumers must be able to easily research the organisation that verified the product, or if the verification was done by the company itself via internal life cycle assessments, to easily access information about the data used and the methodology applied. In general, the GVH also warned firms to avoid overly broad, unclear statements of environmental impacts. Based on market research carried out during the market analysis, the GVH cautioned against generalising green claims that affect only an aspect of the product, especially if this aspect is negligible in view of the entire life cycle. The GVH also advised against making green claims making a favourable comparison to the company's earlier conduct regarding environmental impact, since if in the past the company had a

¹¹ https://gvh.hu/dontesek/agazati_vizsgalatok_piacelemzesek/agazati_vizsgalatok/vegleges-jelentes-a-kepalkoto-diagnosztikai-eszkozok-piacan-lefolytatott-gyorsitott-agazati-vizsgalatrol (in Hungarian only)

¹² https://www.gvh.hu/en/resolutions/sectoral_inquiries_market_analyses/market_analyses/the-formation-and-use-of-environmental-claims-by-market-players-related-proposals-and-guidance

highly harmful effect on the environment then showcasing the degree of improvement might be misleading to the consumers.

41. The GVH also had a similar advocacy role in the telecommunications sector. The television broadcasting and broadcasting transmission services markets in Hungary had undergone several changes in the 2010s. Certain players in the sector reported to the GVH that broadcasting companies offered their services (pay tv) to larger broadcasting transmission companies (telecommunication companies) at lower rates than to smaller companies. As a result, smaller broadcasting transmission companies faced higher procurement costs than their larger rivals. Therefore, a sector inquiry has been initiated in 2021 to explore market dynamics and possible distortions of competition.¹³

42. The final report of the sector inquiry concluded that the observed pricing practices (the larger the subscriber base of a broadcasting transmission company, the more favourable the conditions for obtaining television broadcasting rights) did not raise competition concerns as they also generated consumer benefits, such as reduced consumer prices or increased corporate efficiency.

43. In addition, for the sake of the long-term survival of small broadcasting transmission companies the GVH recommended developing a joint procurement association which would strengthen their bargaining power in negotiations with broadcasting companies. The GVH pointed out that this would also be beneficial for broadcasters, as it would reduce their transaction costs and administrative burdens.

44. However joint procurement associations may raise competition concerns. If companies cover a significant part of their costs through joint purchasing, their incentive to engage in price competition may also decrease. But based on the result of the investigation this did not appear to be a serious concern, as in those settlements where at least two small broadcasting transmission companies were available, at least one large market player was also present, thus preserving the competitive pressure from larger players.

45. A similar recommendation was made by the GVH in 2021 as part of its accelerated sector inquiry into the ceramic masonry product market.¹⁴ The investigation revealed that the Hungarian market for ceramic masonry products was highly concentrated, namely apart from the two local producers with a significant market share, there were only a few fringe competitors.

46. The market concentration at the production level resulted in a situation where on the downstream level, retail outlets had little bargaining power in negotiations with the producers. The GVH recommended establishing joint procurement association in compliance with the relevant competition rules could help retailers achieving more favourable terms and lower purchase prices from the producer level. The price advantages resulting from this increased bargaining power should then be passed on to consumers. However, this was likely to happen due to the fragmented nature of the retail outlets.

¹³ https://www.gvh.hu/dontesek/agazati_vizsgalatok_piacelemzesek/agazati_vizsgalatok/jelentes-a-magyarorszagi-musorterjesztesi-es-mediaszolgalatasi-piacon-lefolytatott-agazati-vizsgalatrol (in Hungarian only)

¹⁴ https://www.gvh.hu/dontesek/agazati_vizsgalatok_piacelemzesek/agazati_vizsgalatok/A-magyarorszagi-keramia-falazoelemek-piacan-lefolytatott-gyorsitott-agazati-vizsgalat (in Hungarian only)

47. Lastly, the GVH's recommendation in its report on the accelerated sector inquiry into rapid self-tests for COVID-19¹⁵ to shorten the supply chain for these tests can also be considered a form of advocacy for domestic market players. Allowing retail chains and petrol stations to enter the market naturally incentivises pharmacies to reduce their procurement costs and thus their supply chains.

3.4. Enforcements based on the findings of sector inquiries

48. During the sector inquiry into the market of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverage procurement of HORECA units carried out between 2020 and 2023,¹⁶ the GVH paid special attention to the relationship between beverage producers/distributors and wholesalers, especially the competition law implications of price fixing and information flow between the parties. Based on evidence revealed during the sector inquiry, the GVH is currently investigating the potentially unlawful resale price maintenance (RPM) practice of a soft drink manufacturer in a competition supervision proceeding (case number: VJ/50/2022). Furthermore, during the same sector inquiry, the GVH also discovered another potentially anti-competitive conduct, which affects the aforementioned soft drink manufacturer and the retail sector. Therefore, in May 2023, the GVH initiated another competition supervision procedure (case number: VJ/9/2023) against the very same company and several of its grocery retail partners. These competition cases are currently ongoing.

4. Conclusions

49. As it is evident from the above, the GVH aims to be active in its advocacy role and to execute several (accelerated) sector inquiries and market analyses in order to provide reliable and well-reasoned inputs for its advocacy work. As a result of our activities the overall competitive environment has improved in Hungary, which is also showcased by some of our impact assessment studies that we have carried out.

¹⁵ https://www.gvh.hu/dontesek/agazati_vizsgalatok_piacelemzesek/agazati_vizsgalatok/vegleges-jelentes-a-covid-19-antigen-gyorstesztekek-magyarorszag-piacan-lefolytatott-gyorsított-agazati-vizsgalatrol (in Hungarian only)

¹⁶ https://www.gvh.hu/dontesek/agazati_vizsgalatok_piacelemzesek/agazati_vizsgalatok/jelentes-az-alkoholos-es-alkoholmentes-italtermek-magyarorszag-vendeglatopari-egysegekben-tortenoforgalmazasanak-piacan-lefolytatott-agazati-vizsgalatrol (in Hungarian only)