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Competition and Corruption in Public Procurement – Summaries of contributions

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Austria

Competition is both the foundation and a goal of public procurement. Central objectives in the Austrian Public Procurement Act, include transparency, non-discrimination and equal treatment, together with open and performance-based competition. With approximately 18% of Austria's GDP dedicated to public procurement, it represents a central component of public expenditure. Thus, when competition is distorted, e.g. due to bid-rigging agreements, this can result in significant economic harm. Beyond competition risks, public procurement has repeatedly been identified as one of the areas particularly susceptible to corruption. In Austrian enforcement practice, bid-rigging investigations have frequently uncovered parallel elements of corruption. The concurrent applicability of competition and criminal law has created both enforcement challenges and opportunities for inter-institutional coordination.

Anti-competitive agreements in procurement processes lead to a distortion of competition and are addressed under § 1 of the Austrian Cartel Act (Section 3). Since 2002, bid-rigging in public procurement also constitutes a criminal offense pursuant to § 168b of the Austrian Criminal Code, with the illegality stemming from a violation of competition law (Section 4). Corruption and collusion in public procurement may in practice trigger the concurrent application of competition law sanctions and criminal liability under §168b of the Criminal Code or other corruption-related provisions. In such cases, multiple criminal provisions apply alongside competition law sanctions, requiring close coordination between the AFCA, the Public Prosecutor's Office for Economic Affairs and Corruption (WKStA), and the Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAK).

As this paper furthermore illustrates, criminal liability of undertakings gives rise to the question of double jeopardy in the context of competition law and criminal law (Section 5). AFCA's view which has been confirmed by the Austrian Supreme Cartel Court is that the parallel legal responses are complementary and protect different legal interests.

Leniency and other reporting mechanisms are crucial in detecting unlawful behaviour in procurement procedures. Leniency programmes are available both under competition and criminal law and are described in Section 6.1. Close cooperation between competition authorities, procurement bodies, and other stakeholders is key to identifying risks and responding effectively (Section 6.2). The paper presents an example of joint investigations in the construction cartel, which led to parallel competition law and criminal law proceedings.

Lastly, the paper highlights the important role of advocacy in reducing risks at an early stage (Section 7). It gives an overview of several advocacy measures that the AFCA has implemented in recent years.

BIAC

Business at OECD (BIAC) submitted its views to the OECD Competition Committee on the relationship between competition law and corruption in public procurement. The submission emphasises that collusion and corruption are closely interconnected and mutually reinforcing, particularly in procurement markets where weak oversight and limited transparency create opportunities for misconduct. BIAC argues that corruption in public procurement undermines economic growth, competition, and public confidence, and therefore requires coordinated enforcement by competition authorities, anti-corruption agencies, and prosecutors.

A central theme of BIAC's submission is the need to balance transparency and competition. While transparent procurement systems are essential to accountability and the prevention of corruption, excessive transparency may inadvertently facilitate collusion by revealing competitors' pricing and commercial strategies. BIAC, therefore, supports procurement systems that maintain accountability while preserving competitive dynamics. BIAC recommends several measures in this regard, including: recording procurement decisions, using technology-driven monitoring systems, and implementing centralised online procurement portals.

Further, BIAC identifies that weak internal controls and excessive discretion by procurement officials as key drivers of corruption. To address these risks, BIAC suggests that stronger anti-corruption protocols, sanctions, and enforcement tools be implemented. To increase the detection and enforcement of corrupt and collusive practices, BIAC suggests that there be greater alignment between corporate leniency policies (CLPs) and non-trial resolutions (NTRs), which encourage firms to disclose cartel or corrupt conduct. BIAC notes that these tools are critical because cartel and corrupt activities are inherently secretive and difficult to detect. BIAC notes, however, that the effectiveness of CLPs has declined internationally due to concerns of criminal sanctions, inconsistent approaches across jurisdictions, and private enforcement risks. BIAC, therefore, recommends that there be greater harmonisation and certainty between competition and criminal enforcement regimes.

As additional tools to deter against corruption and collusion, BIAC discusses director disqualification and bidder exclusion as additional sanctions available to competition and corruption authorities.

BIAC emphasises the importance of preventative or "ex ante" measures. Procurement authorities should understand market dynamics before issuing tenders, systematically analyse bidding patterns, and use OECD bid-rigging detection tools to identify suspicious conduct.

Finally, BIAC stresses that effective inter-agency cooperation is essential to combat collusion and corruption. Examples from the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada demonstrate the value of formal cooperation frameworks, joint investigations, training, and information sharing. Civic organisations, whistleblowers, NGOs, and the media also play an important complementary role in exposing misconduct and increasing accountability, although BIAC warns that investigations must protect procedural fairness and avoid unjustified reputational harm.

Costa Rica

This contribution addresses the dynamics of competition and corruption within public procurement in Costa Rica's telecommunications sector, highlighting the role of the Superintendency of Telecommunications (SUTEL) as both the sector-specific competition authority and regulator. In Costa Rica, two competition authorities coexist: the national authority, which covers most markets, and SUTEL, which exclusively oversees the telecommunications sector. The latter has developed various instruments—including market studies, manuals, and guidelines—in coordination with the Commission for the Promotion of Competition (COPROCOM) and the Public Procurement Directorate, aiming to strengthen efficiency, transparency, and free competition in procurement processes related to telecommunications services.

Since 2010, significant regulatory reforms have been implemented, such as the Law on Strengthening Competition Authorities (Law 9736) and the General Law on Public Procurement (Law 9986) along with its regulations. These legal frameworks promote principles such as integrity, transparency, equality, and free competition, incorporating specific mechanisms to prevent corruption and collusive practices. These include anti-corruption commitments for bidders and the obligation to report irregularities to the competition authority. Furthermore, the Integrated Public Procurement System (known by its Spanish acronym, SICOP) has become a key tool for the supervision and early detection of irregular behavior.

Market analysis of public procurement in telecommunications services indicates limited participation from authorized operators and a significant use of exceptions to ordinary procedures—particularly in contracts between public law entities, which account for a large proportion of the total awarded amounts. Studies conducted by SUTEL reveal barriers and distortions that negatively impact competition.

To address these challenges, SUTEL has issued manuals and guides designed to promote competitive practices and prevent collusion. Additionally, it has developed technological tools for the automated analysis of public procurement in telecommunications, facilitating the identification of market dynamics and potential anti-competitive practices.

In conclusion, the Costa Rican experience reflects a comprehensive institutional commitment to strengthening regulations and supervisory capacity in public procurement. By combining legal frameworks, technology, and inter-institutional cooperation, the country aims to guarantee competitive processes free of corruption. Nevertheless, challenges persist regarding effective bidder participation, the reduction of procedural exceptions, and the strengthening of analytical tools—all of which remain priority areas for future development in accordance with international standards.

European Union

Fostering investigative cooperation with non-competition enforcers to support cartel *ex-officio* detection

Strong cartel enforcement requires both robust *ex officio* investigations and effective leniency programmes, as the combination of proactive enforcement and insider cooperation strengthens the ability of Authorities to detect, deter and sanction anti-competitive conduct.

While leniency remains essential, effective cartel detection can no longer rely predominantly on reactive methods alone and therefore requires a broader and more diversified enforcement approach.

In this context, *ex-officio* enforcement plays a central role in strengthening deterrence by increasing the perceived likelihood that anticompetitive conduct can be independently detected by competition authorities. In cartel enforcement, strong *ex-officio* capabilities reinforce the effectiveness of leniency programmes as companies are more likely to self-report when faced with a credible risk of detection.

The EC may initiate *ex-officio* investigations on the basis of various sources, including market monitoring, open-source intelligence, data screening tools (including tender data), whistleblowers and cooperation with other competition authorities and institutions. National non-competition enforcers (such as economic and financial police, prosecutors and investigative judges, auditors, procurement and anti-fraud authorities) represent an invaluable source of leads. Indeed, in the course of their daily investigative work, such enforcers may come across information suggesting potential infringements of competition law.

Accordingly, raising awareness of competition infringements and establishing effective mechanisms for information exchange are both necessary ingredients to strengthening investigative cooperation with these enforcers and, in turn, enhancing *ex-officio* detection capabilities.

The EC Exotic Fruit Case confirms that such investigative cooperation is not only operationally beneficial but also legally viable.

This contribution describes the systematic activities carried out by the EC in recent years across Europe to widen its *ex-officio* reach by fostering investigative cooperation with non-competition enforcers.

Looking ahead, the promotion of practical guidelines, structured cooperation frameworks and future capacity-building initiatives may further strengthen *ex-officio* cartel detection and support more effective investigative cooperation between EC, national competition authorities and national non-competition enforcers.

France

Public procurement occupies a major place in the French economy, accounting for approximately 14% of French GDP in 2024. This significant economic weight exposes it to numerous risks, including corruption and collusion. These practices produce converging economic effects such as an artificial increase in prices, a decline in the quality of services, and the exclusion of the most economically efficient companies. To fight against these practices, France has developed a wide range of mechanisms aimed at addressing collusion and corruption in public procurement in a coordinated manner, even though these two concepts fall under distinct legal frameworks. Corruption is addressed through six criminal offences involving breaches of integrity under the criminal code, while collusion is sanctioned on the basis of the commercial code.

Several evolutions have strengthened the fight against both practices. In terms of transparency, the digitalisation of public procurement procedures since 2018 and the open data publication of essential contract data have been a first step forward. From a legislative perspective, the Sapin 2 law of 2016 required large companies to implement an anti-corruption system and established the Anti-Corruption Agency, in charge of monitoring its effectiveness. The law of 24 December 2020 extended the jurisdiction of the National Financial Prosecutor's Office to competition offences, enabling the joint prosecution of both types of infringement within a single set of proceedings, as illustrated by the judicial public interest agreement concluded in February 2025 in the Paprec case.

These legislative evolutions have been accompanied by enhanced cooperation between the competent authorities. Article 40 of the code of criminal procedure, for example, requires agents of the competition authorities to report to the Public Prosecutor any indication of a criminal offence detected in the course of their investigations. These mechanisms can furthermore be combined with joint investigations conducted under letters of request from a criminal judge pursuant to article L.450-1 of the commercial code, bringing together investigators from the DGCCRF and the ADLC alongside police units. At the operational level, the DGCCRF analysed more than 5,000 contracts in 2024, representing €34 billion, illustrating the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms put in place. With regard to corruption prevention, guides and training initiatives are also made available to public procurers to raise their awareness on these risks throughout the whole procurement cycle.

Indonesia

The relationship between competition and corruption in public procurement is mutually reinforcing, as corruption creates artificial barriers and rent-seeking incentives while anti-competitive markets concentrate economic power and undermine efficient resource allocation. In Indonesia, tender conspiracy under Article 22 of Law No. 5 of 1999 often overlaps with bribery and abuse of discretion prosecutable under the Anti-Corruption Law, enabling parallel enforcement by the Indonesia Competition (KPPU) and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The KPPU helps curb corruption by detecting bid rigging through economic and digital forensic evidence and by promoting preventive measures through competition assessments and policy advocacy to the National Public Procurement Agency (LKPP) and other procurement authorities. Strengthening coordination, integrating procurement data, and advancing digital procurement governance, alongside competitive and transparent tender design, are key to reducing collusion and corruption risks. Ultimately, fostering healthy competition and eradicating corruption are complementary objectives for achieving efficient, transparent, and accountable public procurement.

Italy

Italy's contribution addresses the intertwined challenges of collusion and corruption in public procurement, a nexus expressly acknowledged within the Italian legal and institutional framework. Italian law criminalises bid rigging under Articles 353 and 353-bis of the Criminal Code, creating a structural interface between administrative antitrust enforcement and criminal prosecution. Case law has confirmed that evidence lawfully acquired in a criminal file may be transferred to the competition Authority (AGCM) for use in its administrative proceedings. In parallel, Italy operates a dedicated national anti-corruption authority (ANAC), endowed with complementary powers that address the same procurement market from a different angle.

Building on this framework, the AGCM has progressively developed a multi-layer cooperation model with the Tax Police, the Public Prosecutors, Contracting Authorities and ANAC. These stakeholders have contributed to an active bid-rigging enforcement: approximately 21% of the 52 cases concluded by the AGCM between 1990 (its inception year) and 2025 display a documented criminal or anti-corruption nexus directly attributable to this cooperation model.

One significant feature of these cases is the role of intermediaries as the structural locus where corruption and collusion intersect. From such positions, they can coordinate bidders with relatively little additional effort, and the same intermediaries may simultaneously facilitate corrupt exchanges.

The value of the multi-tool, multi-authority approach progressively developed by the AGCM with ANAC and the other relevant actors is confirmed by empirical evidence showing that competition is not, in itself, a self-sufficient anti-corruption tool. The literature indicates that higher bidder numbers do not automatically reduce corruption, while discretionary procedures, project complexity and weak monitoring tend to amplify joint risks. COVID-19 emergency procurement and PNRR-driven integrated contracts have served as natural experiments confirming that derogatory regimes increase both corruption and collusion risk. Taken together, these findings suggest that the integrity gains from increased competition materialise reliably only when matched by strong institutions, ex-ante transparency, and credible monitoring of buyer-side discretion.

Japan

Bid rigging is an illegal act that prevents the procurement of goods and services at the prices and quality that should originally be realized through competitive bidding. Such conduct compromises the interests of the procuring entity and ultimately undermines the public interest of the citizens as taxpayers. Furthermore, any involvement in bid rigging by officials who are supposed to pursue the interests of the procuring entity is equivalent to a conflict of interest, as it actively damages those interests.

The Act on Elimination and Prevention of Involvement in Bid Rigging, etc. (the "Act") was enacted through lawmaker-initiated legislation in July 2002 and entered into force in January 2003. Its purpose is to prevent cases where officials of the government or local governments, etc. are involved in bid-rigging.

Even after the Act came into force, a significant number of cases of bid-rigging involving officials persisted at both the government and local governments, etc. Against this backdrop, it was amended in December 2006 to introduce criminal penalties for officials of procuring entities, expand the scope of "Involvement in Bid Rigging etc.," and increase the types of procuring entities subject to the Act. These amendments took effect in March 2007.

In addition to the strict application of the Antimonopoly Act (AMA) against bid rigging, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) issues demands for improvement measures to procuring entities involved in bid rigging, thereby encouraging self-cleansing efforts within those entities based on the Act.

Along with taking strict measures when bid-rigging cases are discovered, initiatives to prevent violations before they occur are of great importance. To this end, the JFTC hosts training sessions on the AMA and the Act for procurement officers of local governments and other entities. The JFTC also dispatches instructors to similar training sessions organized by the government and local government, etc. striving to raise awareness and promote understanding of these laws.

This paper includes an overview of the Act, as well as the introduction of cases where the Act was applied and an outline of the awareness-raising initiatives as follows.

Korea

Public procurement covers socioeconomically important sectors such as infrastructure, healthcare, and education. In Korea, the public procurement market reached KRW 225.1 trillion in 2024, accounting for 8.8% of GDP. Given the scale of the market, firms have incentives to collude in order to avoid competitive pressure, making effective monitoring and enforcement a key challenge.

The procurement authority(The Public Procurement Service, the PPS) is responsible for procedural transparency and ex ante control through measures based on the Act on Contracts to Which the State Is a Party, including the principle of open procedure, sanctions against inappropriate business entities, and the operation of electronic procurement systems. The competition authority, the KFTC, regulates bid rigging under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act(MRFTA) through investigations, remedies, penalty surcharges, criminal referrals, and the leniency program. Bid rigging is regarded as a typical hard-core cartel that undermines the purpose of competitive bidding, and cover bidders are also subject to strict enforcement.

To enhance the effectiveness of bid-rigging investigations, the KFTC operates the Bid-Rigging Indicator Analysis System(BRIAS) in cooperation with the PPS and awarding authorities, collecting and analyzing bidding data from public institutions to detect signs of collusion and link them to investigations. The system is currently connected to multiple electronic procurement systems and awarding authorities, and further upgrades are planned for 2026, including the collection of bid failure and re-bidding data, more sophisticated product-group analysis, and diversification of evaluation indicators.

To strengthen governance against corruption and bid rigging, the KFTC operates the Inter-Agency Consultative Body on Bid Rigging together with procurement authority and awarding authorities, through which participants continue to discuss information sharing related to BRIAS integration, the enhancement of investigative capacity, the prevention of corruption on the procuring entity side, and institutional improvement measures.

Going forward, Korea will continue strengthening fairness and transparency in public procurement through ex ante control by procurement authority, data-driven monitoring by the competition authority, cooperation with judicial authorities, and international cooperation.

Lithuania

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development highlights that public procurement is among the government activities most vulnerable to corruption and that corruption and collusion can reinforce one another. Bid-rigging is also regarded as one of the most serious infringements of competition law, causing significant harm to consumers and public finances.

Recognising the importance of transparent and pro-competitive public procurement mechanisms, the Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania (CC) has consistently paid particular attention to this area. For several years, bid-rigging investigations featured prominently among the CC's enforcement priorities and accounted for around half of all investigations into anticompetitive agreements. Even after the list of sectoral priorities was revised and new areas of focus were introduced, the CC has continued to allocate significant resources to the prevention and detection of bid-rigging. These efforts include educational activities[1] targeted at contracting authorities, as well as close cooperation with other public bodies responsible for preventing and uncovering wrongdoing in public procurement, such as the Special Investigation Service (SIS) and the Public Procurement Office (PPO).

Ensuring competitive and transparent public procurement requires a coherent set of interrelated factors. These include an appropriate legal and regulatory framework, transparent and accessible information, effective inter-institutional cooperation, and strong enforcement mechanisms to combat collusion, corruption, and other unlawful practices in public procurement.

[1] E.g., in 2026, the CC launched e-learning platform with various online training courses, including the course on bid-rigging. The e-learning platform is available online: https://emokymai.kt.gov.lt/#/.

Philippines

Public procurement in the Philippines accounts for 13%–20% of GDP and nearly 45% of the national budget, making transparency and competitiveness critical.

Public procurement in the Philippines is undergoing a period of reforms, testing, and scrutiny as not too long ago, the Philippines faced its biggest bout with corruption in public procurement. A sizeable portion of public funds has been spent on irregular, substandard, and even non-existent projects. Observers wonder how these projects were awarded in the first place.

This Note analyzes the existing regulatory framework surrounding public procurement in the Philippines, its recent reforms, as well as the PCC's role in safeguarding the competitive process which stands at the core of public procurement. It delves into the New Government Procurement Act (NGPA) of 2024 which introduced reforms requiring video-recorded and livestreamed procurement activities, disclosure of beneficial ownership, and administrative sanctions for violations.

This Note also discusses PCC's recent efforts in developing its own Bid Rigging Screening Tool (BiRST) and how it employs a whole-of-government approach to fighting corruption and promoting competition.

Romania

Romania's contribution, drafted by a team of experts from the National Anticorruption Directorate and the Romanian Competition Council, examines the interaction between collusion and corruption in public procurement from both a competition-law and a criminal-law perspective, highlighting how procurement distortions often arise through a combination of bidder coordination, misuse of confidential information and manipulation of procurement design.

The contribution draws on enforcement practice and recent institutional initiatives to show that, while co-operation between competition and criminal enforcement authorities has intensified, operational co-ordination remains a developing process requiring stronger practical guidance, earlier information sharing and continued institutional dialogue.

South Africa

Public procurement is central to service delivery, economic activity and socio-economic transformation in South Africa, but its governance remains vulnerable where oversight is fragmented across multiple institutions. This paper illustrates that institutional fragmentation is not merely an administrative challenge but rather it is a structural condition that can enable both corruption and collusion by dispersing information, weakening coordination and producing uneven enforcement across the procurement lifecycle. Drawing on the 2010 stadium construction cartel, COVID-19 PPE procurement and state capture, the paper shows how fragmented mandates, siloed data systems and sequential enforcement can delay detection and reduce deterrence. It further shows that coordination mechanisms, including inter-agency collaboration through the Fusion Centre, demonstrate the value of information sharing, joint situational awareness and aligned enforcement. The South African experience therefore suggests that strengthening procurement integrity requires not only stronger rules, but also better institutional coordination and more integrated oversight across the system.

Spain

Corruption and collusion in public procurement cause severe harm to society. They lead to higher prices and lower-quality goods, services, and works, deteriorating public finances and undermining value for money and the broader objectives of public procurement. Citizens—particularly those in vulnerable positions—are deprived of quality public services. Beyond these economic impacts, corruption and collusion generate wide-ranging social harm, ultimately eroding trust in government, democratic institutions, and competitive markets.

Governments and societies have made significant efforts to combat corruption, fraud, and other irregular practices, including collusion and competition-related offences. Despite these efforts, such practices remain persistent and difficult to eradicate, where Spain is no exception.

Evidence confirms that public **procurement remains a high-risk area for corruption**. A 25% of companies in the EU (40% in Spain) report that corruption has prevented them from winning a public tender in the past three years[2]. Corruption is the leading cause of complaints in public procurement (24.7% of cases), with service contracts being the most frequently reported (48.4%)[3].

A general **decline in competition levels** in EU public procurement markets has been recently highlighted, increasing the risk of collusion[4]. A similar trend is observed in Spain, with indicators as the average number of bidders deteriorating (which fell from 4.09 in 2019 to 2.9 bidders in 2024) or remaining at very high levels as the percentage of procedures with a single bidder (44% in 2023)[5].

This contribution shows how corruption and collusion in public procurement are distinct but often **interrelated risks that require an integrated response** combining criminal enforcement, competition law and procurement rules. Using the Spanish framework and the Firefighting Services Cartel as an illustration, it highlights the importance of coherent enforcement, active cooperation among authorities and strong preventive tools. The contribution argues for a three-pronged approach linking prevention, effective enforcement and institutional capacity-building.

[2] Flash Eurobarometer 557 Businesses' attitudes towards corruption in the EU and in selected enlargement countries (January- February 2025).

[3] Independent Office for the Regulation and Supervision of Public Procurement in Spain - OIRESCON- (2025). Annual Report on Public Procurement Supervision. Module IV. Prevention and combatting corruption in public procurement

[4] This is reflected in the increase in single-bid procedures, low SME participation, greater reliance on non-competitive procedures and limited cross-border awards. European Court of Auditors (2023) Public procurement in the EU – Less competition for contracts awarded for works, goods and services in the 10 years up to 2021. Special report 28/2023. Luxembourg: European Court of Auditors

[5] OIRESCON (2025)

Sweden

This contribution describes the Swedish Competition Authority's (SCA) work related to the intersection between corruption, competition and public procurement.

It describes the SCA's dual mandate as competition authority and supervisory authority for public procurement, and the close relationship between its remit and corruption. It explores the broad definition of corruption used within public administration in Sweden, and how corruption distorts competition.

The contribution furthermore explains how corruption is taken into account in the SCA's prioritisation of cases within the fields of competition and public procurement law, and describes the types of indications of corruption that have arisen through tip-offs and complaints to the authority.

The contribution describes cooperation with law enforcement authorities and other bodies in the course of supervisory work and in initiatives to raise awareness of and combat corruption in public procurement. Finally, it looks specifically at the importance of procurement data for the detection of competition law infringements and corruption.

Ukraine

Ukraine has undertaken significant reforms in the field of public procurement aimed at increasing transparency, competition, and accountability in the use of public funds. A central element of these reforms has been the development of the Prozorro electronic procurement system, which is based on the principles of openness, equal access to information, and digitalisation. Prozorro has substantially improved public access to procurement data and strengthened transparency in procurement procedures.

At the same time, enforcement practice demonstrates that transparency mechanisms alone are insufficient to eliminate corruption risks or anticompetitive conduct in procurement procedures. In practice, bid-rigging schemes may coexist with corrupt conduct involving contracting authorities or public officials, creating complex forms of procurement-related misconduct that require coordinated responses from competition, anticorruption, and law enforcement authorities. These challenges have become particularly relevant in the context of wartime public spending and future reconstruction-related procurement.

Ukraine's institutional framework combines specialised anticorruption institutions – including the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, and the High Anti-Corruption Court – with the competition enforcement powers of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (hereinafter – AMCU). The AMCU plays a central role in detecting and sanctioning anticompetitive concerted actions in public procurement, including bid rigging and other forms of collusive conduct.

The paper highlights the growing importance of cooperation between the AMCU and law enforcement authorities. In many procurement-related competition cases, evidence obtained during criminal investigations has played an important role in identifying coordinated conduct between bidders and uncovering sophisticated collusive schemes. The illustrative enforcement cases discussed in the contribution demonstrate the practical value of institutional cooperation and information exchange in addressing procurement-related violations.

The contribution also demonstrates that the Ukrainian enforcement framework is based on the parallel application of competition law and anticorruption legislation. While these regimes pursue different objectives and apply different forms of liability, their interaction has become increasingly important in complex procurement-related cases involving both collusion and corruption risks.

Overall, Ukraine's experience demonstrates that effective prevention of procurement-related corruption and collusion requires not only transparency and digitalisation, but also strong institutional coordination, effective competition enforcement, and modern analytical tools for detecting complex procurement irregularities. Further strengthening interagency cooperation and data-driven enforcement mechanisms will remain important priorities for ensuring the integrity and competitiveness of public procurement in Ukraine.

United States

Combatting collusion and corruption in government procurement remains a top priority for the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (DOJ). The U.S. submission details recent efforts in the United States to prevent and detect this conduct. Domestically, for example, DOJ launched the Procurement Collusion Strike Force and the Whistleblower Rewards Program. The success of these initiatives, including expanding the case generation pipeline, relies on strong partnerships with other U.S. government agencies. Similarly, DOJ has strengthened its partnerships internationally through efforts such as the joint 2026 FIFA World Cup initiative with the competition agencies in Canada and Mexico. This initiative focused on deterring, detecting, and prosecuting collusive schemes related to the provision of goods and services in connection with this tournament. The U.S. submission also details three case studies, which demonstrate the essential cooperation between the DOJ and other parts of DOJ and/or the federal government to detect this conduct, 2) the importance of holding individuals accountable through both jail sentences and fines, and 3) how these schemes continue to evolve. Finally, the U.S. submission discusses the training efforts DOJ undertakes both domestically and internationally to combat this conduct. Such training strives to be interactive and reach individuals involved in all levels of conducting or investigating government procurement processes.