

**DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS  
COMPETITION COMMITTEE**


**ROUNDTABLE ON COMPETITION AND SPORTS**

**Note by the delegation of Australia**

*This note is submitted by the delegation of Australia to the Competition Committee FOR DISCUSSION at its forthcoming meeting to be held on 16 - 17 June 2010*

**JT03284532**

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## ROUNDTABLE ON COMPETITION AND SPORTS

-- Note by Australia --

### 1. Introduction

1. This submission focuses on two areas of particular interest to Australia in relation to competition and professional sport: exclusive rights for broadcasting sports events; and the nature of cases involving professional sports. An exclusive dealing notification by Ice Hockey Australia and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) proceedings against Fila for alleged breaches of the misuse of market power (abuse of dominance) and exclusive dealing provisions of the *Trade Practices Act 1974* (TPA) will be used as case studies for the latter topic.

### 2. Exclusive Broadcasting Rights for Professional Sports

2. The granting of broadcasting rights for sports events on an exclusive basis is an established commercial practice. Exclusive contracts for single sporting events or for any specific season in a championship would not normally pose any competition problem, and indeed may have a neutral impact on competition. In some circumstances, such arrangements may even be pro-competitive; for example, by promoting consumer choice by allowing operators to differentiate their services through content provision.

3. However, in some cases exclusivity of content rights might limit competition, particularly if a broadcaster holding exclusive rights is in a dominant position or if the market is oligopolistic in nature. For example, concerns may arise where one broadcaster in a market obtains all the valuable broadcasting rights to the exclusion of all others. In such a situation, it may not be feasible for the broadcaster to fully exploit these rights, which may limit consumer choice in sports-related services and broadcasts. Conversely, granting exclusive rights for key sporting events to a subscription television provider may allow it to exert greater influence over the price of content, which would reduce overall consumer welfare.

#### 2.1 Access to Sports Broadcasting Rights

4. Like many other countries, Australia has arrangements to ensure that all Australians have free access to sporting events of national importance and cultural significance. Known as the 'anti-siphoning' list, in Australia this scheme operates via a licence condition on subscription television broadcasters, which prevents them from buying the rights to televise listed sporting events before free-to-air television broadcasters have had an opportunity to purchase these rights. Australia's current anti-siphoning list is attached at [Appendix A](#).

5. As penetration of subscription television in Australia is relatively low (at 34 per cent of households),<sup>1</sup> albeit steadily increasing, there is an argument for the anti-siphoning list to continue in some form. However, among the criticisms of the list are that it:

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<sup>1</sup> Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association (n.d.). *Facts and Figures*, accessed at <http://astra.org.au/pages/facts-figures>.

- Unduly restricts competition in the market for sport broadcasting rights;
- May limit the number of events that are ultimately aired, thus restricting a consumer's access to events; and
- May reduce revenue for owners of sports broadcasting rights.

6. The anti-siphoning regime is currently under review by the Australian Government, and the outcome of that review is expected to be made known in coming months.<sup>2</sup>

## 2.2 *Convergence and Exclusive Sports Broadcasting Rights*

7. Convergence poses challenges for policy frameworks, such as the anti-siphoning list, that were designed for traditional communications platforms (such as TV, telephone and radio) but not modern communication platforms (such as the internet and mobile devices).<sup>3</sup>

8. The potential for non-broadcasting internet-based platforms to obtain exclusive rights to sporting events hinges on the technical capability of the relevant platforms, and also on the capacity of those platforms to deliver audience reach. The latter issue is likely to be of key concern to sports rights holders, as they generally derive significant non-broadcasting revenue from sports merchandise and other related products.

9. The impact of new media platforms is likely to be enhanced by the Australian Government's decision to build and operate a new high speed National Broadband Network (NBN), with the objective of providing 90 per cent of homes, schools and workplaces with optical fibre-to-the-premise delivering speeds of up to 100 megabits per second and connecting all other premises with next generation wireless and satellite technologies, offering speeds of up to 12 megabits per second.<sup>4</sup> The NBN is expected to provide a ubiquitous platform that would increase the viability and uptake of new media technologies such as Internet Protocol television (IPTV) and internet video.

10. In order to be commercially viable, however, potential IPTV and internet video providers will still need to be able to access sufficient content to provide a compelling service. There have been several recent Australian examples of sports rights holders selling coverage rights to operators of new media platforms. While there is little evidence to suggest that sporting content is being 'siphoned' to these new technologies, there is some concern that premium content may begin to be exclusively acquired by operators of these technologies.

11. The sale of sports rights for new media platforms is not currently covered by the anti-siphoning scheme. At present, IPTV and internet video content of sporting events are not considered a 'broadcasting service' under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 and as such are not regulated by the Act. Sporting content carried on mobile phones is also not specifically regulated by the Act. Further, the provision of sporting content via internet video hosted on international websites is not regulated by Australian

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<sup>2</sup> For a discussion paper on the review, see: Australian Government (The Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy) (2009). *Sport on television: A review of the anti-siphoning scheme in the contemporary digital environment*, accessed at [http://www.dbcde.gov.au/\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0010/118864/Sport\\_on\\_Television\\_Review\\_discussion\\_paper.pdf](http://www.dbcde.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0010/118864/Sport_on_Television_Review_discussion_paper.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> Some of these challenges are canvassed more fully in: OECD (2008). *OECD policy guidance on convergence and next generation networks*, accessed at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/52/40869934.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> Conroy, S et al (2009), *New National Broadband Network*. Joint media release on the National Broadband Network can be accessed at [http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media\\_releases/2009/022](http://www.minister.dbcde.gov.au/media/media_releases/2009/022).

broadcasting law. Australian free-to-air television broadcasters have suggested that the exclusion of new media platforms and services from the anti-siphoning list could result in the gradual migration of major sporting events exclusively onto internet-based subscription-only platforms, such as IPTV.<sup>5</sup>

12. A key policy question, therefore, is whether the anti-siphoning list should be extended to include new media platforms such as the internet and mobile phones. Those in favour of the extension of the list may suggest that this is necessary to ensure that regulation remains neutral across different technologies and platforms, so as to reduce market distortions that favour particular providers. Further, some have suggested that integrated communication companies, whose business interests include IPTV services, may have significant market power which could be used to obtain exclusive content rights.

13. Conversely, extending the coverage of the anti-siphoning list to new media platforms may restrict consumer choice by not allowing services that are conducive to sports viewership, such as the option of 'pay-per-view'. The extension of the list may also limit consumers' ability to access sports broadcasts. It may also reduce competition in the market for sports rights, and in turn reduce revenues for sports rights holders. In addition, making sports events available on a number of platforms enhances consumer welfare by increasing choice, both in terms of number of events that can be accessed, and in the mode of access (for example: free-to-air, pay-per-view IPTV, mobile TV or subscription television).

### 2.3 *Exclusive Broadcasting Rights – Future Directions*

14. The full impact of new media on sports broadcasting rights is yet to be fully felt in Australia. However, as the roll out of a high speed NBN to all Australians is likely to facilitate uptake of IPTV, access to sports content will become increasingly critical for the viability of these new media services, and for existing broadcasting services. Any consideration of extending existing policy frameworks for sports broadcasting rights to new media services, therefore, should take into account the impacts on competition and consumer welfare.

## 3. **Digital Media and Sports News Reporting**

15. The emergence of digital media has created new opportunities for content such as sporting scores to be transmitted over new technologies. As such, digital content has become a new and potentially lucrative commodity in the market place.

16. For example, sporting organisations such as Cricket Australia and the Australian Football League (AFL) recognise the value of sporting information and images and maximise this value by restricting access to a handful of media outlets who, in turn, trade on this exclusivity. Publishers face other issues, such as restrictions on the number of updates of match reports and how many photographs can be published or sold on.

17. In early 2009, the Australian Senate Standing committee on Environment, Communications and the Arts recommended that media outlets and key sporting organisations negotiate among themselves for access to sporting events for bona fide journalists and photographers, regardless of the technological platform they use to distribute information and images.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> FreeTV Australia. (2009). *Submission by Free TV Australia Limited: National Broadband Network – Regulatory Reform for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Discussion Paper*, accessed at [http://www.dbcde.gov.au/\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0013/115321/Free\\_TV\\_Australia.pdf](http://www.dbcde.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0013/115321/Free_TV_Australia.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> Australian Senate - Standing Committee on Environment, Communications and the Arts (2009). *The reporting of sports news and the emergence of digital media*, accessed at [http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/eca\\_ctte/sports\\_news/report/report.pdf](http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/eca_ctte/sports_news/report/report.pdf).

18. A further recommendation of the committee was that, failing a successful resolution between parties, a mandatory code of practice under the TPA be developed.

19. There now exists a voluntary code supported by an administration committee on which sit the major players from sport – including the AFL, the National Rugby League, Cricket Australia, Tennis Australia and Australian Rugby Union – and the major players from the media – Fairfax, News Limited, APP, Getty Images and Agence-France Press.

20. The ACCC, which is responsible for enforcing Australia's competition law, the TPA, played a key role in mediating roundtable discussions on developing the code. The code requires sporting organisations to allow all bona fide news organisations, to be accredited to report sporting news subject to the principles of fair dealing and where syndication occurs, the recipients of the content should be bound by the same principles of fair dealing.

#### **4. The Nature of Cases Involving Professional Sports**

21. The ACCC is responsible for enforcing Australia's competition law, the TPA. The aim of the TPA is to promote competition; fair trading, as between competing businesses and as between businesses and consumers; and to ensure consumers are protected in their dealings with business.

22. The TPA generally prohibits corporations from engaging in anti-competitive conduct and unfair trading practices. Sporting associations, corporations that supply sporting goods or services and professional sporting teams are subject to the provisions of the TPA.

##### **4.1 Vertical Agreements**

23. The TPA contains prohibitions relating to vertical restraints. Restraints that are not related to price are referred to as "exclusive dealing" in Australia. Exclusive dealing conduct broadly involves one trader imposing restrictions on another's freedom to choose with whom, in what or where it deals. In Australia, exclusive dealing may take many forms including the bundling of products or agreeing to supply a good or service on condition that the acquiring party does not acquire goods or services from anyone else.

24. Exclusive dealing is prohibited under section 47 of the TPA. Specifically, section 47 prohibits a corporation from supplying or acquiring goods or services, or refusing to supply or acquire goods or services, if the acquisition or supply is on certain conditions. Most exclusive dealing practices only breach section 47 if they have the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition.

25. All forms of exclusive dealing may be authorised by the ACCC by way of a notification or authorisation, and therefore deemed immune from prosecution under the TPA, if they confer sufficient public benefits to outweigh the anti-competitive effects.<sup>7</sup> To determine this, the ACCC assesses the likely effect on competition that the anti-competitive conduct may have and weighs up the likely public benefits and public detriments arising from the proposed conduct. The ACCC can withdraw the immunity conferred by the authorisation or notification where it assesses that the detriments arising from the conduct outweigh the benefits.

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<sup>7</sup> The ACCC maintains a public register of all notifications, which contains all publicly available information concerning the consideration of a notification, including submissions by interested parties and decisions made by the ACCC. The notifications register can be located at: <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/776499>.

26. This paper notes court action taken by the ACCC regarding a vertical arrangement imposed by a sporting apparel company that restricted the acquisition of sporting apparel by retailers and prevented other apparel suppliers supplying goods to retailers and consumers. The main focus of the paper concerns a recent decision by the ACCC to revoke the immunity conferred by a notification lodged by a sporting association to sanction, through suspension or expulsion, any member of the association that participated in non-sanctioned sporting events.

#### **4.2 Licensed Apparel Legal Action**

27. The ACCC can take legal proceedings against corporations that have engaged in vertical agreements that restrict consumer choice and affect competition in the market for goods or services relating to sporting apparel. One such case is the 2002 proceedings the ACCC instituted against Fila Sports Oceania Pty Ltd (Fila) for alleged breaches of the misuse of market power (abuse of dominance) and exclusive dealing provisions of the TPA.<sup>8</sup>

28. Fila was the Australian subsidiary of Italian based clothing manufacturer Fila Holding Spa, which had operations in over 20 countries and a worldwide sales turnover at the time of approximately 1 billion Euro. In Australia, Fila operated as a wholesale supplier of both leisurewear and sportswear and also operated a number of Fila retail stores. Fila was also a sponsor and the official supplier of on-field and licensed supporter wear for 5 teams playing in the Australian Rules Football League (AFL). Fila's sales in Australia in 2001 were AUD\$42 million, of which around AUD\$2.5 to 3 million resulted from AFL apparel.

29. The ACCC alleged that Fila implemented a selective distribution policy in relation to the supply of Fila's AFL licensed apparel to retailers. The ACCC claimed Fila's distribution policy in late 1999 was to only supply clothing retailers with Fila AFL licensed apparel on condition that these retailers agreed not to stock AFL licensed apparel from Fila's competitors. The policy was alleged to have been in place on a national basis for approximately 19 months, during which time Fila withdrew its supply of Fila AFL licensed apparel from a number of major retailers who did not agree to embrace Fila's policy and decided to stock Fila's competitors' products.

30. The Court ordered Fila to pay AUD\$3 million in pecuniary penalties for breaching the TPA. Fila was found to have market power in the wholesale markets for licensed apparel and to have taken advantage of that power in contravention of s46 of the TPA by threatening to refuse supply to retailers who might otherwise have engaged in competitive conduct in other markets (being the retail markets for AFL licensed apparel for the teams that Fila sponsored). The Court also found that Fila breached s47 of the TPA where Fila supplied licensed apparel to retailers in the relevant wholesale markets on the condition that the retailers would not acquire apparel from suppliers which were competitors of Fila.<sup>9</sup>

#### **4.3 Overview of Sporting Notifications in Australia**

31. In Australia many sports are controlled by a peak sporting association which administers the rules for the competition, operates a disciplinary system and organises various events. Some sports associations might be internationally recognised or affiliated.

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<sup>8</sup> The ACCC also instituted proceedings against two individuals alleged to be knowingly concerned in the conduct of Fila. The proceedings against the individuals were dealt with separately by the Court and as such have not been discussed in this paper.

<sup>9</sup> *Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Fila Sport Oceania Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) & David Robert Carney & Craig James Reidy* [2004] FCA 376.

32. In the past few years, the ACCC has received a range of notifications for various types of exclusive dealing conduct relating to sport. For example, the ACCC has received notifications involving sporting associations seeking to make participation in their league conditional upon players not participating in competing leagues.

33. The ACCC has also received a number of third line forcing<sup>10</sup> notifications involving sporting associations allowing participants to play in a particular league only after they have purchased uniforms or sporting equipment from a nominated supplier or number of suppliers.

34. Below is an analysis of a recent case example in Australia regarding the issue of exclusivity in a sporting context.

#### *4.3.1 A Notification Case Study in Australia*

35. On 27 July 2009, Ice Hockey Australia (IHA) lodged an exclusive dealing (other than third line forcing) notification (N94049) to sanction, through suspension or expulsion, any member of IHA who participated, or was participating, in a non-sanctioned Australian or international ice hockey game or league. This sanction or expulsion applied to players and officials, including referees or coaches.

36. IHA is the peak governing body for ice hockey in Australia. It is recognised as the sole provider of the sport by the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) and the International and Australian Olympic Committees. IHA has six affiliated member state ice hockey associations and more than 3700 members. IHA and its member associations control and regulate all officially sanctioned ice hockey that is played in Australia. While IHA is the dominant provider of organised ice hockey competition services in Australia, there are some leagues that operate independently of it and are not affiliated with it or the IHA's state associations.

37. IHA-sanctioned leagues operate at three levels in Australia – national, state and local. IHA is the only provider of ice hockey administration and competition services at the national level. Services provided at the national level include providing eligibility for participation in State Championships, and eligibility for selection and participation in National Championships and World Championships.

38. Some leagues operate at a regional or local level which may or may not be sanctioned by IHA. Interested party submissions noted that there were cost differences in sanctioned compared to non-sanctioned leagues, with players paying higher costs to participate in sanctioned leagues. It was also noted that sanctioned leagues are generally scheduled on the weekend whereas the non-sanctioned leagues operate on weeknights. Submissions indicated that players who participated in non-sanctioned leagues during the week may also participate in IHA-sanctioned leagues on weekends. One company that operates an ice rink noted that although it derives income from sources other than ice time reserved for ice hockey leagues or training, it relies heavily on revenue from ice hockey activities.

#### *4.3.2 Competition Issues Arising in this Context*

39. For this type of conduct, the test the ACCC applies is whether the conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition and in all the circumstances will not grant notification if:

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<sup>10</sup> Third line forcing (s 47(6) and (7) of the TPA) has as its objective prohibiting the supplier of particular goods or services requiring consumers who want those goods or services having to take other (perhaps unwanted) goods or services from a third party in order to get the supplier's goods or services.

- The conduct has not resulted or is not likely to result in a benefit to the public, or
- The benefit will not outweigh the detriment to the public constituted by any lessening of competition resulting from the conduct.

40. On 4 December 2009, the ACCC issued a draft notice proposing to revoke the notification. A pre-decision conference was held and interested parties provided further oral and written submissions. Further submissions were taken into consideration prior to a final decision being made. On 2 March 2010 the ACCC decided to issue a notice revoking the notification.

*Purpose or Effect of Substantially Lessening Competition*

41. The first step for the ACCC in carrying out its assessment is to determine the relevant markets. The following markets were considered relevant to the ACCC's assessment of the notified conduct:

- The organisation and administration of ice hockey competitions at a national level
- The organisation and administration of ice hockey competitions at a regional or local level, and
- The acquisition of ice time at ice rinks.

42. The ACCC was of the view that the conduct proposed by IHA was likely to substantially lessen competition for the provision of ice hockey competition and organisation and administration services by:

- Imposing a barrier to the establishment and expansion of rival ice hockey leagues, and
- Reducing the competitive viability of existing rival leagues.

43. In particular, the ACCC noted that:

- IHA held a substantial degree of market power in the organisation and administration of ice hockey competitions at the national level
- The notified conduct allowed IHA to leverage that power into the market for the organisation and administration of ice hockey competitions at a regional or local level, and
- By imposing barriers to the establishment and expansion of rival ice hockey leagues and reducing the competitive viability of existing rival leagues, the notified conduct had the effect, or was likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in the market for the provision of ice hockey competition organising services at a regional or local level.

44. The ACCC also considered that the conduct had the potential to lessen competition in the market for the acquisition of ice time at ice rinks.

*Assessment of Public Detriments*

45. The following public detriments were identified as likely to result from the notified conduct:

- Reduced consumer choice – the notified conduct limited the ability of existing and future members of IHA to participate in whichever ice hockey competitions they chose. Further, it



would have a particularly detrimental effect on players who wished to participate in more games than was offered by IHA, whether for leisure reasons or to improve their standard of play, and

- Participation in sports activities in general is beneficial for overall health and fitness and the reduced availability of opportunities to participate in ice hockey competitions would be likely to reduce overall participation in the sport.

46. Following the draft notice, IHA proposed an amendment to the notification to try to alleviate the ACCC's concerns.<sup>11</sup> The IHA submitted that its proposed amendment would result in the notified conduct being less restrictive by adding words to the end of the notified conduct, such that the conduct would be described as:

*Ice Hockey Australia proposes to sanction, through suspension or expulsion, any member of Ice Hockey Australia who has participated, or is participating, in a non-sanctioned Australian or international ice hockey game or league, unless the operation of that game, league or competition is limited solely to a region or portion of the year where no sanctioned league operates.*

47. The ACCC considered that while the amendment would enable players and officials to play in a non-sanctioned league where/when no IHA competition is offered, it remained concerned that the notified conduct would still create barriers to the establishment or expansion of rival leagues, restrict the ability of players and officials to switch between sanctioned and non-sanctioned competitions and reduce the frequency of playing time that would otherwise be available to ice hockey players.

#### *Assessment of Public Benefits*

48. IHA submitted that a number of public benefits would flow from the conduct. The ACCC considered in relation to each of the following:

- Economies of scale in the provision of ice hockey services
  - The ACCC accepted there may be some efficiencies achieved by having a single governing body administer a sport's health and safety guidelines.
- Adequate risk management practices and lower insurance premiums
  - The ACCC accepted the importance of having adequate risk management practices in place, particularly in relation to high contact sports such as ice hockey. However, the ACCC considered that preventing IHA members from participating in unsanctioned leagues was unlikely to result in improved safety or reduce the risk of injury when compared to ice hockey events run by alternate providers. There was no evidence to suggest that absent the notified conduct, IHA members would face higher insurance premiums.
- Ability to effectively discipline players

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<sup>11</sup> The *Trade Practices Act 1974* does not provide for an exclusive dealing notification to be amended after it is lodged, nor does it provide for the ACCC to impose conditions on the operation of the notified conduct. This means that neither an applicant, by amendment, nor the ACCC, by condition, can modify the conduct that is the subject of a notification after it is lodged.

- IHA submitted that the primary sanction it can use to deter players from engaging in conduct not within the rules of the game is suspension from competition. IHA submitted this sanction would not be an effective deterrent if players are able to play in rival leagues. The ACCC considered that the IHA's ability to prevent members from participating in Australian and international championships is likely to be an effective disciplinary measure on its own, without imposing a restriction on players as to which league they may be permitted to participate in.
- IHA's obligation as a member of the International Ice Hockey Federation
  - The IHA submitted that if it did not implement the notified conduct its membership of the International Ice Hockey Federation may be compromised. The ACCC considered that its decision to revoke IHA's notification did not affect IHA's ability to govern the sport of ice hockey in Australia at a national level. The ACCC did not consider there to be any legitimate basis for the IIHF to exclude IHA from its membership and remove any associated benefits as a result of the ACCC's decision.

#### *Balance of Public Benefits and Detriments*

49. Based on the information available to it, the ACCC considered that the notified conduct had the effect, or was likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition for the provision of ice hockey competition organisation and administration services at the regional or local level. The ACCC also considered that the notified conduct had the potential to substantially lessen competition in the market for the acquisition of ice time at ice rinks and result in reduced choice for consumers. Further, the ACCC did not consider that the notified conduct was likely to deliver the public benefits claimed by the IHA.

50. On balance, the ACCC considered that the substantial anti-competitive detriments outweighed any public benefits resulting from the notified conduct. The ACCC noted in its decision of 2 March 2010 that the notified conduct was not required for IHA to be able to continue with the effective governance of the sport of ice hockey at the national level.

#### **4.4 Summary**

51. A wide variety of vertical restraints in the supply of goods and services associated with professional sport come to the attention of the ACCC in Australia, particularly supply arrangements relating to insurance, apparel, licensing, ticketing systems and sponsorship.

52. The ACCC will consider court action against corporations seeking to implement vertical arrangements that restrict or hinder competition and limit consumer choice.

53. Parties proposing to enter into such arrangements may seek immunity from prosecution under the TPA for conduct that might otherwise breach the competition provisions, only where the arrangements result in benefits to the public that outweigh the anti-competitive effects of the conduct. For further information on these decisions, see <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/776499>

**APPENDIX A**  
**AUSTRALIA'S ANTI-SIPHONING LIST**

**The events listed below conducted during the period commencing on 1 January 2006 and ending on 31 December 2010 are specified.**

**1. Olympic Games**

1.1 Each event held as part of the Olympic Games.

**2. Commonwealth Games**

2.1 Each event held as part of the Commonwealth Games.

**3. Horse Racing**

3.1 Each running of the Melbourne Cup organised by the Victoria Racing Club.

**4. Australian Rules Football**

4.1 Each match in the Australian Football League Premiership competition, including the Finals Series.

**5. Rugby League Football**

5.1 Each match in the National Rugby League Premiership competition, including the Finals Series.

5.2 Each match in the National Rugby League State of Origin Series.

5.3 Each international rugby league "test" match involving the senior Australian representative team selected by the Australian Rugby League, whether played in Australia or overseas.

**6. Rugby Union Football**

6.1 Each international "test" match involving the senior Australian representative team selected by the Australian Rugby Union, whether played in Australia or overseas.

6.2 Each match in the Rugby World Cup tournament.

**7. Cricket**

7.1 Each "test" match involving the senior Australian representative team selected by Cricket Australia played in either Australia or the United Kingdom.

7.2 Each one day cricket match involving the senior Australian representative team selected by Cricket Australia played in Australia or the United Kingdom.

7.3 Each one day cricket match involving the senior Australian representative team selected by Cricket Australia played as part of a series in which at least one match of the series is played in Australia.

7.4 Each World Cup one day cricket match.

## **8. Soccer**

8.1 The English Football Association Cup final.

8.2 Each match in the Fédération Internationale de Football Association World Cup tournament held in 2006.

8.3 Each match in the Fédération Internationale de Football Association World Cup tournament held in 2010.

## **9. Tennis**

9.1 Each match in the Australian Open tennis tournament.

9.2 Each match in the Wimbledon (the Lawn Tennis Championships) tournament.

9.3 Each match in the men's and women's singles quarter-finals, semi-finals and finals of the French Open tennis tournament.

9.4 Each match in the men's and women's singles quarter-finals, semi-finals and finals of the United States Open tennis tournament.

9.5 Each match in each tie in the Davis Cup tennis tournament when an Australian representative team is involved.

## **10. Netball**

10.1 Each international netball match involving the senior Australian representative team selected by the All Australian Netball Association, whether played in Australia or overseas.

## **11. Golf**

11.1 Each round of the Australian Masters tournament.

11.2 Each round of the Australian Open tournament.

11.3 Each round of the United States Masters tournament.

11.4 Each round of the British Open tournament.

## **12. Motor Sports**

12.1 Each race in the Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile Formula 1 World Championship (Grand Prix) held in Australia.

12.2 Each race in the Moto GP held in Australia.

12.3 Each race in the V8 Supercar Championship Series (including the Bathurst 1000).

12.4 Each race in the Champ Car World Series (IndyCar) held in Australia.