

Unclassified

DAF/COMP(2007)14/28



Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

23-May-2007

English text only

**DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS
COMPETITION COMMITTEE**

Cancels & replaces the same document of 21 May 2007

ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND

-- 2006 --

This annual report is submitted by the Delegation of Poland to the Competition Committee FOR DISCUSSION at its forthcoming meeting to be held on 6-7 June 2007.

JT03227664

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1. Changes to competition laws and policies, proposed or adopted

1.1 Summary of new legal provisions of competition law and related legislation

1. In 2006 the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (“Office, OCCP”) prepared a draft of a new Act on competition and consumer protection (“the Act”), which was accepted by the Council of Ministers on 26 September 2006. On 7 December the first reading of the text took place in the Polish Parliament¹.

2. The Act adjusts the Polish regulations to the requirements of the Community law. Its provisions respond to the current needs, taking into account the OCCP’s several years of experience and the current market conditions. The changes provide an instrument of increasing the efficiency of the Polish competition and consumer protection system.

3. One fundamental change, comparing with the previous Act, is the elimination of the institution of proceedings launched upon a motion. This will allow the President of the OCCP to focus on the most important violations of the Act, which have the most significant impact on the market. Before, the President of the OCCP was bound with the motion and could not extend the scope of the proceedings to include other anticompetitive practices or practices violating collective consumer interests. The OCCP’s experience shows that ca. 80% of the motions filed terminated with the OCCP’s finding that no infringement of law had occurred. The new solution will, to a great extent, shorten the time of conducting proceedings. According to the new Act an undertaking will have the right to notify the President of the OCCP of any prohibited practices, which may be an impulse for initiating new proceedings.

4. The Act also increases the turnover thresholds over which the participants of a concentration – e.g. a merger or a takeover – are obliged to obtain the approval of the President of the OCCP. According to the previous Act, a transaction was due for notification if the total worldwide turnover of its participants in the year preceding the notification exceeded the equivalent of 50 mln EUR. In line with the new Act, the obligation of notification applies to transactions whose participants’ total turnover in the preceding year exceeds 1 bln EUR worldwide or 50 mln EUR in Poland. The introduced changes aim at enabling the President of the OCCP to focus on the biggest mergers, which may have an actual impact on the state of concentration on the market.

5. Moreover, there are a few modifications regarding consumer issues. The most important one, is a solution which proved to be useful in the area of competition protection and now is to be implemented in consumer protection cases. According to the new Act there will be a possibility for the President of the OCCP to impose fines upon undertakings applying practices violating collective consumer interests. The new provision results from the fact that violations of collective consumer interests are equally dangerous as competition infringements. The possibility of imposing fines should, most of all, serve as a deterrent. Therefore the maximum amount of fine that can be imposed is up to 10 per cent of the undertaking’s revenue in the year preceding the year in which the decision was issued. As a result, it will be possible to fight more effectively against undertakings violating the rights of weaker market participants.

1.2 Other relevant measures, including new guidelines

6. In the year 2006, the President of the OCCP did not issue any new guidelines. However, the OCCP’s Department of Legal Affairs and European Jurisprudence provides, on daily basis, explanations to the queries of the entrepreneurs concerning the interpretation of the provisions of competition law.

¹ The Act on competition and consumer protection came into force on 21st April 2007.

2. Enforcement of competition laws and policies

2.1 Action against anticompetitive practices, including agreements and abuses of dominant position

2.1.1 Summary of activities of

Office of Competition and Consumer Protection

7. In 2006 the OCCP launched **361** proceedings in cases concerning anti-competitive practices (including **11** on the basis of Art. 81 and 82 of the Treaty).

8. As of 31st December 2006:

- **94** proceedings were closed;
- **67** proceedings were still pending.

9. As a result of the aforementioned proceedings, in 2006 the President of the Office issued **203** decisions concerning anticompetitive conduct.

Structure of the decisions issued by the President of the OCCP in 2006

Type of decisions type of practice	Decisions finding the practice to be in breach with the competition law	Decisions finding the practice to be in compliance with the competition law	Decisions refusing the initiation of the competition proceedings	Decisions discontinuing the antimonopoly investigation	Decisions finding the practice to be desist	Decisions obligating to undertake or desist certain actions	Interim decisions
Horizontal agreements	5	1	2	0	2	0	0
Vertical agreements	5	4	7	3	2	1	0
Abuse of dominant position	62	26	26	20	26	7	3

Court of Competition and Consumer Protection (CCCCP):²

10. In 2006 the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection (CCCCP) issued a total of **74** judgments concerning appeals from the decisions of the President of the OCCP. The division as to the type of cases is the following:

- judgements with respect to competition restricting practices – **74**, out of which:
 - **56** concerning abuse of dominant position

² The Court of Competition and Consumer Protection hears the appeals from the decisions of the President of the OCCP, as well as those issued by sector regulators.

- 16 concerning horizontal agreements
- 2 concerning vertical agreements
- judgements with respect to mergers – 0.

The CCCP overruled 9 decisions of the President of the OCCP, upheld 55 and changed 10 of them.

Appeal Court

11. In 2006 the Court of Appeal in Warsaw issued 25 judgments with respect to appeals from the decisions of the CCCP.

Supreme Court:

12. In 2006 the Supreme Court issued 5 judgments with respect to competition cases.

2.1.2 *Description of significant cases, including those with international implications*

Unlawful practices of banks

13. Following a complaint of the Polish Organisation of Trade and Distribution, since 2001 the OCCP has been examining agreements concerning setting of the *interchange* fees. As a result 20 banks were accused of resorting to anti-competitive practices. After the 5-year-long proceedings the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection declared unlawful the practices that have been applied for as long as 13 years.

14. The Polish citizens have 22 million payment cards in their wallets. Just in 2005 they spent over 30 billion PLN in this way. The banks collect a commission on each card transaction at a shop – the so-called *interchange* fee. In Poland this fee amounts to 1-2%. This money is an important source of revenue for the card-issuing banks (the annual revenue is over 400 million PLN).

15. The proceedings conducted by the OCCP showed that the level of the *interchange* fee was not based on objective criteria, such as costs borne by banks for the development and functioning of the payment system, but was determined by way of an agreement of entrepreneurs who communicated with each other in order to obtain additional revenue from each transaction made with Visa and MasterCard cards.

16. According to the OCCP, the fee calculated in this way constitutes a tax imposed on retailers offering goods and services who, on each card transaction, lose an amount of 1-2%, which is collected by the card-issuing banks. The jointly determined interchange fee also sets a minimum price for services provided to merchants by acquirers (i.e. entities which process card transactions). Artificially raised costs of transaction handling, borne by shops accepting cards may mean higher costs for consumers – also those who pay with cash (commercial outlets do not differentiate prices depending on the payment form). The costs associated with the use of cards are borne by all market participants, although they are not aware of these burdens.

17. To restore competition, the President of the Office ordered the banks – participants of Visa and MasterCard systems - to discontinue immediately the disputed practices. According to the OCCP, non-cash transactions can be settled at per value, without deducting the *interchange* fee.

Fines in the total amount of 164 million PLN were imposed on 20 banks which have entered into the unlawful agreement. To determine their amount the more favourable provisions of the competition and consumer protection law, applicable at the start of the proceedings, were applied. The decision of the OCCP is not final – the banks appealed to the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection.

Prohibited agreement in the market of paint producers and mega store owners

18. In 2006 the President of the OCCP imposed record penalties on the participants of a prohibited agreement. In 2005 the President of the OCCP initiated antitrust proceedings in connection with the suspected conclusion of an illegal agreement between paint producer Polifarb Cieszyn-Wrocław and the owners of seven mega stores offering DIY and home improvement products: Bricomarche, Castorama, Leroy Merlin, Nomi, Obi, Platforma and Praktiker.

19. The documentation collected by the Office, i.a. during the inspections and searches at the entrepreneurs' premises, showed that the stores received a special discount for maintaining the paints and varnishes prices at the level established by the supplier (or higher). The withdrawal from the agreement resulted in the loss of the discount by the seller and also, in many cases, the supplies were withheld by Polifarb.

20. During the proceedings, the OCCP established that Polifarb was the party which initiated the conclusion of the agreement (in a special letter to the abovementioned entrepreneurs it assured that the introduced solution will be beneficial for both sides) and that it set forth the time of its validity and became its main beneficiary. According to the OCCP, the aim of those practices was to end the "price war" among the stores and to introduce uniform prices for paints and varnishes produced by the company.

21. Participation in an agreement, whose purpose or result is restriction of competition, is subject to severe financial sanctions, amounting to as much as 10 per cent of the previous year's revenue. The entrepreneur who decides to cooperate with the antitrust authority (i.a. provides the evidence for the existence of a cartel) may avoid the penalty or be penalised less severely. Such a possibility is provided by the leniency program, which was introduced to Polish legislation by the amendment to the antitrust legislation implemented after our accession to the European Union (2004). The issued decision was the first one which used those regulations.

22. During the proceedings one of the parties to the agreement supplied the President of the OCCP with a number of documents, which significantly contributed to the clarification of the matter. It also actively cooperated during the proceedings, immediately providing all the required information. In view of the above the President of the OCCP decided to reduce the fine imposed on this entrepreneur to 50 000 PLN.

23. The President of the Office imposed a fine of 32 860 000 PLN on Polifarb, which initiated the agreement and was its main beneficiary. Such a financial sanction is to fulfil a preventive and repressive function since the challenged practices belong to the most serious violations of the antitrust legislation, which are always detrimental both for the competition and the consumer interests. While differentiating the amount of the penalties for the remaining participants of the agreement, the President of the OCCP took into account the revenues of the entrepreneurs.

24. During the antitrust proceedings the President of the OCCP imposed a penalty of 80 000 PLN on Leroy Merlin for the failure to provide information and to observe the deadlines for providing the required replies.

Competition restricting agreement – PZPN and Canal+

25. In June 2006 the President of the OCCP imposed penalties of almost 8 million PLN on the Polish Football Association (PZPN) and Canal+. A privileged position of one TV station in respect of obtaining the license for broadcast of football league matches restricted the competition.

26. The Polish Football Association has an exclusive right to grant license for the broadcast of football matches. Any TV station which wants to broadcast the matches of the national 1st and 2nd league and the Polish Cup or their parts has to take part in a tender organised by the Association. What is important, the right for live broadcast of the league matches (which is the most attractive for the TV audience) is granted by the PZPN as an exclusive license. It is granted to the broadcaster, which submitted the best bid in terms of finance.

27. In 2000 PZPN signed a contract on the broadcast of football matches with Canal+ (then under the name *Polska Korporacja Telewizyjna*). The contract was effective until 2004/2005 season. The OCCP established that there was a clause in the contract which granted Canal+ the priority to obtain the exclusive license for broadcasting the matches from 2005/06 to 2008/09. Pursuant to this provision the Association was obliged to inform the station about the conditions of the bids submitted by its competitors. Canal+ obtained the license automatically if within 30 days it presented the conditions equal to the bid considered to be the most favourable by the Association.

28. The participants of the tender (announced in November 2004) were informed about the granted to Canal+ right of pre-emption of the exclusive license for the live broadcast of club matches. The right concerned the matches in 2005/2006 to 2007/2008 season. The relevant provisions which secured the interests of Canal+ were also included in the tender regulations. According to the OCCP information, at least one TV station resigned from the bid to obtain the license due to unequal competition. The tender (resolved in March 2005) was finally won by Canal+ whose offer received the highest rating.

29. In the opinion of the OCCP, the privileged position granted to Canal+ by PZPN which has the monopoly for granting the license for the broadcast of club matches in Poland had an anticompetitive nature. On the basis of the contract the company did not have to undertake the market competition on the same rules as other TV stations. Canal+ did not have to estimate the financial potential of its competitors and prepare its bid not knowing the conditions proposed by other competitors. In order to have a chance to obtain the license, other bidders had to offer the amounts which would be large enough to guarantee that Canal+ will not be able to pay them. In its initial bid Canal+ could offer the conditions much worse than other broadcasters, knowing that it may use the right of pre-emption and increase the amount it offered to the level determined by the competitor with the highest rating.

30. The President of the OCCP does not question the granting of the license to Canal+. However, the privileged position of this TV station deteriorated the situation of its competitors which could not enter the market on the same conditions. As a result not only the broadcasters but also the viewers lose, since they cannot obtain a wider access to the broadcast of the PZPN football matches.

31. According to the Polish law, the agreements which aim or the result at the restriction of the competition are prohibited. The OCCP President considered the privileged position granted to Canal+ by PZPN to be such a practice. Financial penalties were imposed on the participants of the agreement. Canal+ received a fine of almost 7.37 million PLN and the fine for PZPN amounted to over 440 000 PLN. The serious nature of the breach of antimonopoly law was taken into account during the establishment of the amount of the penalties.

Competition restricting practices of the Chamber of Polish Architects

32. The Chamber infringed the law by amending the Code of Professional Conduct with a clause preventing its members from participation in tenders for design works where price was the sole selection criterion.

33. The President of the OCCP initiated antitrust proceedings upon the request of one of Poznań architects who accused the professional organisation of restricting competition on the market. The President of the OCCP found that the Code of Professional Conduct adopted by the Chamber includes a provision that prevents Chamber members from offering architectural services in tenders where price is the sole selection criterion. The clause establishes a barrier for free-market price competition.

34. The membership in the organisation associating representatives of this profession of public trust is obligatory and the public tender is the most common way to acquire a commission, plus, in the majority of cases, price is the sole criterion. The provision in question eliminates the possibility to sell the works both by independent architects and by design agencies according to the abovementioned procedure.

35. In the opinion of the OCCP, the Chamber cannot prohibit participation of its members in tenders where price is the sole section criterion. Introduction of such conditions for the sale of architectural services results in a substantial distortion of competition rules on this market and is against the interest of investors, as it infringes their right to determine the manner and criteria of purchase of design works.


36. Therefore, the President of the OCCP deemed the Chamber's action a restrictive practice and imposed upon it a fine of PLN 215,000. Such a financial sanction is to fulfil a preventive and repressive function since the challenged practices belong to the most serious violations of the antitrust legislation. However, the President of the OCCP took into account the fact that the Chamber abandoned the said practice in the course of the OCCP's antitrust proceedings, which constituted mitigating circumstances when the amount of the fine was determined.

37. The decision is not legally binding and may be appealed against to the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection.

2.2 Mergers and acquisitions

2.2.1 Statistics on number, size and type of mergers notified and/or controlled under competition laws;

- Number of cases in 2006 – **310**
- Number of cases which were transferred from 2005 – **47**
- Number of cases finished in 2006 – **265**, including:
 - clearances: **215**
 - conditional clearance: **1**
 - prohibition of merger: **1**
 - penalty for not notifying the intention of merger: **4**
 - intervention in the market structure (division of the entrepreneur): **0**
 - reversing the decision clearing the merger: **0**
 - remittance of proceedings in the case: **23**
 - return of the motion: **16**
 - other resolution: **7**



2.2.2 Summary of significant cases

Conditional approval to nitrogen plants takeover

38. The President of the OCCP decided that the German concern Petro Carbo Chem will be allowed to take over control of the Nitrogen Plants in Tarnów and Kędzierzyn-Koźle provided that it sells part of the assets by 31 October 2008.

39. In May this year the German PCC applied to the OCCP for approval to acquire 80% of the Tarnów and Kędzierzyn-Koźle Nitrogen Plants shares, thus taking over direct control of the companies. As the total turnover of the transaction participants exceeded 50 million euro, it required an approval from the President of the OCCP.

40. Petro Carbo Chem operates in the chemical and energy sectors. In the course of the proceedings it was concluded that PCC's taking control over the Tarnów plant may cause a serious competition restriction in the market of sodium oxochlorite, a compound used mainly in the chemical, paper and textile industries as a disinfectant and bleaching agent. For this reason, the President of the OCCP issued a conditional approval.

41. According to the decision, PCC must sell, by 31 October 2008 at the latest, the sodium electrolysis plant, now a part of the Tarnów Nitrogen Plant, to an operator independent of PCC. The President of the OCCP also obliged the concern to inform the OCCP on the requirement's completion within concrete deadlines.

Prohibition of merger – alcoholic drinks market

42. The President of the OCCP banned a merger between companies from the spirit branch. In the opinion of the Office, the takeover of the company Jablonna by Carey Agri would restrict the competition in the market. On 23 January 2006, Carey Agri International Poland, a part of the Central European Distribution Corporation capital group, issued a notification to the OCCP for approval to take over of Jablonna company, that already controls Polmos Lublin, the biggest Polish vodka producer and the owner of Zoladkowa Gorzka brand. The CEDC group owns several alcohol wholesale facilities and two producing companies, i.e. Bols and Polmos Bialystok (owners of such brands as: Bols, Sopllica, Absolwent and Zubrowka).

43. Since the total turnover of the transaction participants exceeded the amount of 50 million EUR, the merger had to be reported to the President of the OCCP. In the course of the antimonopoly proceeding, the OCCP stated that CEDC, being the leading distributor and producer of alcoholic beverages in Poland, could, by taking over the next company from the sector, gain a too strong position on the market. The scrutiny of merger carried out by the Office showed, that the transaction would seriously restrict the competition in the national market of flavoured vodka. Taking over control by the CEDC group of the biggest producer of this beverage in Poland (i.e. Polmos Lublin that is a part of Jablonna Group) would lead to creation of the biggest entity on the flavoured vodka market.

44. Significant concentration would also take place on the national wholesale market for spirits. In the opinion of the Office, consolidation of the biggest high quality vodka producer and alcoholic beverage distributor could seriously threaten the competition. Furthermore, the merger would result in taking over the next brand (Zoladkowa Gorzka) by the CEDC. Consequently, the group would own five out of ten of the most popular vodka brands in Poland.

3. The role of competition authorities in the formulation and implementation of other policies, e.g. regulatory reform, trade and industrial policies

45. The activities carried out by the OCCP with an aim of influencing other policies, might be roughly divided into two categories i.e. Office's opining activities in regard of drafts of the legal acts prepared by other ministries and participation of the OCCP's employees in the activities of various governmental as well as parliamentary working groups and committees.

46. The procedural mechanisms for drafting legal acts by the Polish governmental institutions provide for an obligation to consult all drafts with any other governmental agency, which activities might be affected by the would-be law. In 2006 the OCCP continued its participation in works on Polish and EU drafts of legislative acts and other documents. Furthermore, a total of **2000** drafts of legal acts were opined by the OCCP. When making its comments the OCCP puts an emphasis on consistency of those acts with competition law, including the state aid law, as well as the issues related to protection of consumers' interests.

47. Protection of competition is closely linked to monitoring of State aid. Starting 2004 the President of the OCCP issues opinions on aid schemes and projects of individual aid before their formal notification to the European Commission – the sole competent authority to determine compliance of granted aid with the Community law. On the basis of reports submitted by entities granting assistance and its beneficiaries the President of the OCCP prepares annual reports on State aid, taking into consideration most of all its effectiveness as well as its impact on competition. In 2006 **77** opinions were issued on State aid granted to entrepreneurs, where **47** opinions concerned aid schemes and **30** – projects of individual aid. The issues most commonly dealt with concerned: restructuring of the iron and steel industry, restructuring of the Great Chemical Synthesis Sector, restructuring of the ship building industry, restructuring of coal mining

sector, restructuring of the operators within the framework of the act on commercialisation and privatisation of State Enterprises, restructuring of long-term contracts, financial support for projects, State aid granted to the operators who carry out their business in special economic areas, State aid granted to the sheltered workshops, State aid granted by the Poviats employment offices, State aid granted to the public radio and TV stations, State aid granted in the area of culture and national heritage protection (cinematography, cultural institutions, historical monuments), State aid granted by the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development, state legal partnership, State aid granted for environmental protection, State aid associated with structural fund expenditure.

48. In addition, the Office continued its work in enforcing of the national State aid monitoring system aiming at a greater transparency and better exchange of data for securing a reliable register of the aid granted. The OCCP also elaborated analysis concerning the state aid granted. The most important document was "Report on state aid granted to entrepreneurs in 2005", as well as an analysis "Results of monitoring of the State aid granted to automobile companies conducting economic activity within the Special Economic Zones (State as of 31st December and 30th June 2006).

4. Resources of competition authorities

4.1 Resources overall²

4.1.1 Annual budget

	2006		2005	
	PLN	USD**	PLN	USD
Total income:	1 mln 260	Approx. 432. 989.000	1 mln 380	474. 226.000
Total expenditure:	41 mln 400	Approx. 14 mln 226	42 mln 763	Approx. 14 mln 695
Expenditure structure:				
(a) OCCP	25 mln 595	Approx. 8 mln 795	25 mln 351	Approx. 8 mln 711
(b) TICI*	13 mln 705	Approx. 4 mln 709	15 mln 212	Approx. 5 mln 227
(c) funding for non-governmental associations carrying out governmental consumer protection tasks	2 mln 100	Approx. 721.649.000	2 mln 200	Approx. 756.013.000

* Trade Inspection Chief Inspectorate

** As of 31st December 2006: 1 USD = 2.91 PLN

³ Period covered by the above information: 1 January 2006 – 31 December 2006.

4.1.2 *Number of employees*

Employment

	No. of employees
As of 1 Jan 2006	280
As of 31 Dec 2006	285
On average in the course of the year	281.58

Employment structure as of 31 December 2006

	Lawyers	Economists	Other professions	Total:
2006	137	64	84	285

5. **Summaries of or references to new reports and studies on competition policy issues**

5.1 *Market analysis*

49. In December 2006 the OCCP Market Analysis Department elaborated a complex report on restrictions of competition in the sector of pharmaceutical products. Increase of market concentration, limitations in the distribution of medicines, development of parallel import and on-line pharmacies constitute the most important phenomena in the sector. The conclusions of the report were reflected in the OCCP's comments to the draft amendment to the Polish act on Pharmaceutical Law. The Office expressed its doubts as to the provisions introducing limitations to the number of pharmacy points and pharmacies that can operate within a given area. In the Office's opinion, the planned solutions lead to the limitation of free competition which can result in smaller number of pharmacies and inferior degree of satisfaction of public needs.

50. Another interesting report concerned market of sale of cement. It was conducted as a result of numerous inflowing signals indicating the possibility of competition law infringement by the producers of cement. In the course of the analysis a lot of evidence was gathered indicating that the national cement producers may have entered into an agreement restricting competition. In April 2006 the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection initiated explanatory proceedings in this sector. In order to confirm the collected information, offices and other premises belonging to entrepreneurs have been searched and controlled. As a result of the largest operation in the history of the Polish antimonopoly office, organised in co-operation with the Polish National Police, an immense amount of evidence was gathered. The proceedings are still in course.

51. Other reports prepared by the OCCP (or with cooperation of other institutions) involved: broadband Internet connections, distribution and production of spices, metallurgic products, mining coal, sale of cement, electric energy market, chemical products, pharmaceuticals.

5.2 *Information and education activities*

52. In 2006 the OCCP conducted intense information and educational activities, which were focused mainly on raising the consumer awareness as to the binding law regulations both in the area of competition and consumer protection. Furthermore, numerous projects were undertaken with the purpose of increasing the awareness of the entrepreneurs with reference to competition provisions.

53. The following publications referred to competition issues⁴:

- „ *Current problems of the Polish and European competition law*” – edited by Cezary Banasiński, President of the OCCP and Mariana Keipiński, Bożena Popowska, Teresa Rabska;
- „ *Competition law – current state and predicted changes*” - edited by Cezary Banasiński, President of the OCCP;
- „ *Consumer protection and Competition policy – working together?*;
- „ *Community competition law. Its implications for Poland (as of 1.05.2004)*” by Małgorzata Krasnodębska-Tomkiel.

TV Programme „Consumer”

54. The third edition of the TV Programme commissioned by the OCCP was devoted in its great part to competition issues. The Office initiated the project, accepted the script books of the episodes as well as co-financed its realisation. 6 episodes of the “Consumer in the world of competition” series were broadcast from January till September 2006. Their main aim was to raise the awareness of the weaker market participants as to their rights and their enforcement. Some examples of the topics include: the importance of competition protection to the consumers, liberalisation of hitherto monopolised sectors on the example of energy and telecommunication sector, negative implications for the consumer of the illegal agreements between entrepreneurs, direct or indirect fixing prices, effects of mergers on the position of the consumer in the market.

Educational Radio Programme „I have the right to competition”

55. Programme comprised ten 3-minutes broadcasts and constituted the continuation of the edition from 2005. Its aim was to popularise among all market participants the knowledge on the Polish and European antimonopoly regulations and advantages brought to consumers by competition. Some of the topics were the following: competition protection in telecommunication sector, control of mergers (the role of OCCP and sector regulators), competence of the OCCP and European Commission in the scope of control of mergers, legal professions, competition and the media, state aid.

Bulletin “competition law in every day life”

56. In 2006 the OCCP also initiated works on a new information project: a bulletin “competition law in every day life” edited on a monthly basis. Its publication started in 2007. It is completely free of charge and available both in electronic and paper version. Its main aim is to raise the awareness of the society with regard to competition issues. The subsequent bulletins will contain, among others, such information as: adverse effects of unlawful agreements concluded by entrepreneurs for the consumers, indirect and direct imposing of unfair practices, impact of mergers on the position of the consumers on the market.

⁴ The OCCP’s publications are available at:
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/pl/informacja_i_educacja/educacja/publikacje/ochrona_konkurencji/

Reports of activities of the OCCP are available at:
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/en/information_about_the_occp/general_information/reports_of_activities/