

Unclassified

COM/AGR/DCD/PCDF(2006)4



Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

04-Apr-2006

English text only

**DIRECTORATE FOR FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES
DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION DIRECTORATE**

Workshop on Policy Coherence for Development in Fisheries

POLICY COHERENCE IN FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE: POSSIBILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

24-25 April 2006

IEA Headquarters, 9 rue de la Fédération, 75015 Paris

This paper has been prepared by Mr. Bjorn Hersoug of the Norwegian College of Fisheries Science, University of Tromsø, Norway.

It is submitted as a keynote address preceding Session 1 of the Workshop Programme.

For further information, please contact:

Carl-Christian SCHMIDT (E-mail: carl-christian.schmidt@oecd.org)

JT03206923

Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d'origine
Complete document available on OLIS in its original format

COM/AGR/DCD/PCDF(2006)4
Unclassified

English text only

POLICY COHERENCE IN FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE: POSSIBILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS¹

Abstract

This paper will identify and discuss various issues related to policy coherence in fisheries and aquaculture. It is written as a commentary on and in dialogue with OECD's earlier scoping paper on the same issue (OECD 2005). While accepting the importance of policy coherence, both as a study area and as an important part of national and international politics, the paper tries to demonstrate that the field is not quite as new as is often claimed and that earlier writings and debates dealing with *steering systems* may also be useful in this context. Other theoretical approaches such as *institutional theory* may also be useful, indicating that policy incoherence often results from complicated processes which have no simple solutions.

Also within the more limited field of policy coherence per se, the choice of definition matters, signaling different levels of ambition, with definitions ranging from policies that are "*mutually supporting*" to "*not contradicting*". While describing policy incoherence in four broad categories is useful, not all types of policy incoherence are self-evident. Some inconsistencies can be seen as the cost of social stability, while in other cases the cause and effect chain may be much more ambiguous than often claimed.

While it is easy to find examples of policy incoherence within all four categories identified by OECD, the reasons behind incoherence may be more complicated than suggested. Many decisions are due to neither a lack of information nor a weak institutional set-up, but rather due to institutional compromises between various sectors. What is considered *incoherent* may also vary according to sectoral interests.

The main challenge in the field is to obtain policy coherence between international development policies and national trade and sector policies, especially related to agricultural policies. With increased focus on poverty and an expectation that fisheries and aquaculture policies shall contribute to poverty reduction, there may be good reasons to reevaluate traditional sector policies. The connection between fish export and poverty alleviation is more complicated than often anticipated, and free trade does not guarantee poverty reduction. The usual claim for reduced participation in most fisheries as part of sustainable management may also turn out to be difficult, if the focus is on *poverty prevention and securing access for the poorest*.

¹ This paper has been prepared by Professor, Dr. philos. Bjørn Hersoug of the Norwegian College of Fishery Science, University of Tromsø, Norway, bjoernh@nfh.uit.no.

Possible gains to be obtained by better policy coherence can broadly be classified as *improved performance, better use of scarce economic resources*, and finally, *increased political legitimacy* for government authorities at various levels. However, achieving policy coherence also comes with costs, and in some instances these costs may outweigh the benefits. Problems of policy incoherence will probably increase in the future due to a larger degree of interdependency in the fisheries sector, while increased attention on policy incoherence by NGOs and consumers combined with easier access to information may imply greater political focus on the problems.

In terms of policy interventions it is generally recommended that OECD continue its established work of providing reviews and expert advice, but with a stronger effort in research and education. In terms of research strategy quantitative work on indexes, such as the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) may serve to raise attention to policy incoherence problems, while detailed case studies are recommended to understand how policy incoherence is created and maintained.

Introduction

1. This paper will identify and discuss various issues related to policy coherence in fisheries and aquaculture. It is written as a commentary on and in dialogue with OECD's earlier scoping paper on the same issue (OECD 2005), and tries to apply and validate some of the categories and recommended research strategies of that OECD paper. While it is easy to support the ideals of policy coherence on the theoretical level, the "realpolitik" of most OECD countries often dictates other solutions. This paper supports the merits of larger policy coherence while at the same time it warns against simplistic perceptions and solutions. As is so often the case in studies of fisheries management, the following account represents a compromise between what could be desirable in the ideal world of politics and what is possible in the real world, given a number of well-known constraints. It is a balancing act between TINA (*There Is No Alternative*) and TATIANYA (*There Are Truly Interesting Alternatives Not Yet Acknowledged*).

2. The paper is divided into ten sections, each trying to shed some light on the main theme of this conference: "Policy coherence: possibilities and constraints". After this brief introduction, the second section deals with the definitions of "policy coherence" put forward by various authors in this rapidly emerging field of scientific writing. The third looks more critically at the proclaimed need for more policy coherence. What is actually the problem (and for whom is it a problem)? The fourth tries to give some background, describing the *setting*, that is, fisheries and aquaculture in the developed as well as in the developing world. The fifth section focuses on the main problems. *Where* do we find them and *why* are they problematic? The sixth looks at some new challenges to policy coherence, arising from new approaches to poverty alleviation and the application of the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF). The seventh section looks at who is to blame for policy incoherence, while the eighth deals with benefits and costs resulting from greater policy coherence. The ninth focuses on what could be a *realistic approach to policy incoherence in the field of fisheries and aquaculture* given the large number of well-known constraints. Finally, the tenth section sums up the main arguments, warning against easy solutions to a problem that seems to be inherent in modern democracies, namely the need to coordinate an increasing number of disparate interests and policies. This section also offers some advice to OECD's future work within the field of fisheries.

What is meant by policy coherence?

3. According to OECD (1999:8), "In its broadest sense, coherence implies an overall state of mutual consistency among different policies". Forester and Stokke (1999:23) are more precise:

“Coherence may ... be defined as a policy whose objectives, within a given policy framework, are internally consistent and attuned to objectives pursued within other policy frameworks of the system – at a minimum, these objectives should not be conflicting; where strategies and mechanisms are attuned to the objectives, they should, at a minimum not conflict with the objectives or with the intentions and motives on which these are based; and where the outcome is corresponding to the intentions and objectives, it should, at a minimum not conflict with these.”

Most definitions are similar to theirs. However, we are dealing with policy coherence on at least three levels of ambition: On the first various policies should be supportive of each other; on the second they should not be conflicting; on the third and less ambitious level decisions regarding conflicting policies should be made in an open and transparent manner to mitigate possible negative effects. So right from the start the level of ambition is quite crucial; hence, definitions matter.

4. However, it is also tempting to point out that policy coherence is just another version of a more classical problem, i.e. to determine how various steering systems can be used for articulating, transforming and weighing various interests, and transforming these into practical results. According to Hernes (1978), inspired by Dahl and Lindblom (1953), we can operate with four different steering systems:

1. 1. Markets, where steering takes place through autonomous self-regulation and individual adaptations
2. 2. Hierarchies, where responsibility for coordination of separate decisions rests with an administrative apparatus
3. 3. Polyarchies, where responsibility for steering decisions rests with democratic institutions, based on political representation
4. 4. Negotiations between organised interests, where distribution of scarce goods results from negotiated compromises between the interests involved.

5. As also pointed out by Hernes (ibid), in the “real” empirical world we will seldom face the need to choose between competing systems; instead, the choice to be made concerns what the optimal mix of steering systems is and what types of goods and services are best (and most legitimately) distributed through the various systems. There are for example market mechanisms that decide which vessel owners get the best skippers; furthermore, certificates to these skippers are not for sale but are rather allocated through a bureaucracy, where decisions are based on the skippers’ meeting certain prescribed qualifications. Resources are often (as in Norway) allocated through a complex process involving all four steering systems, whereby initial allocations are arranged by the bureaucracy, after formal decisions in the political system, and then implemented in close cooperation with organised interests while the daily trading of rights and quotas takes place through the market.

6. When Hernes and his colleagues examined Norwegian society 25 years ago they found several anomalies or steering problems which were to a large degree created by perversions of one or more of the steering systems. The same was found in the fishing sector, where Hersoug (1983) recognised capacity problems (for example, in the fisheries administration having problems handling the increasing number of administrative tasks), authority problems (as when some state institutions follow priorities other than those set by the Ministry), legitimacy problems (as when management decisions are not respected by fishers), representation problems (where it is unclear whether cooperating organisations are really speaking on behalf of fishers) and priority problems (where short-term crisis management seems to win out over long-term planning).

7. The similarity between the two perspectives is obvious; policy incoherence may be seen as a “perversion” of existing systems, bearing in mind that some policy interventions are more difficult than others. Determining how to obtain the best mix of steering systems may also include determining how one steering system can be used to circumscribe another, as when anti-monopoly laws are used to regulate markets. So perhaps the field of policy coherence is not quite as new as it is often portrayed in the OECD literature. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the *attention* on such problems has been rapidly increasing.

What’s the problem?

8. First we need to specify the problem with reference to the fisheries and aquaculture sector. OECD (2005) identifies several types of policy incoherence on various levels within the fisheries. The first type of policy incoherence is *within a given sector policy*, as when a main challenge is to obtain sustainable resource utilization while at the same time the state continues to subsidize fishing vessels or effort more generally.

9. The second type is also a “classic” in the sense that *one sector policy is counteracted by policy intervention implemented by another sector*. One famous example from Norwegian fisheries relates to the reduction of capacity in the purse seiner fleet by the late 1970s being completely overruled by the need to assist the shipbuilding industry, which introduced massive shipbuilding subsidies, including subsidies for purse seiners, thus severely affecting the original goal.

10. The third type refers to international politics where most countries (at least within OECD) are strong adherents of free trade (or freer trade) in order to assist developing countries entering the world markets, while at the same time they eagerly protect national industries or sectors such as agriculture. Whether we use agricultural policies in Norway, the EU or the US to illustrate this case, the problem is the same, i.e. *what is eagerly sought in the field of development assistance, is actively undermined by conflicting, protective sector policies at home*.

11. The fourth and last type is on the level of international treaties, as for example the Kyoto Protocol, aiming to reduce emissions into the atmosphere, where various countries continue to follow *national or sector policies that work against the primary goals of the agreement* (for example, increasing the number of polluting factories, lowering the price of gasoline, etc.).

12. Other scientists prefer to classify policy incoherence differently. Hoel et al. (2005) focus on *vertical* and *horizontal* coordination problems, where the vertical refers to different or conflicting policies on various levels (local, regional, national, supranational), whereas the horizontal refers to various other sectors, such as oil, environment, etc. having other priorities than the proper fisheries policy. Their particular case is the implementation of the LOSC policy from 1975 onwards. The implementation process triggered considerable conflicts and reorganizations on institutional levels in most nation states.² Later developments have shown that a *fisheries* framework is insufficient in meeting new demands from other sectors, thus necessitating policy interventions on meta level (such as *oceans policy*, which has been tried in Australia, Canada and New Zealand).

13. With specific reference to *policy coherence for development* (PCD) Picciotto (2005) suggests four categories to be used by OECD countries in analyzing their policies:

² Many nations, including Norway, started implementing 200 miles Exclusive Economic Zones from 1976 onwards, while the LOSC was formally approved in 1982 and made binding from 1994.

1. *Internal coherence*: consistency between goals and objectives in a specific policy or programme carried out by an OECD government
2. *Intra-country coherence*: consistency between aid and non-aid policies
3. *Inter-donor consistency*: consistency between aid and non-aid policies across OECD member countries in terms of contribution to development
4. *Donor-recipient coherence*: the consistency of policies adopted by rich and poor countries to achieve shared development objectives.

Hence, what is a functional categorization depends largely on the focus of the analysis?

14. However, even when it is easy to find examples of policy incoherence in developing as well as developed countries, it is often hard to see for whom this is a problem. Policy incoherence in the agricultural policy of the EU (the CAP) is definitely not a problem for the farmers and they are not going to rally behind a demand for greater policy coherence. Agricultural politicians and bureaucrats are also unlikely to protest (against lack of policy coherence). And in the famous case of the EU's Fisheries Agreements, the archetype of failure to impose policy coherence, national elites in developing countries are normally not protesting, precisely because the negative effects are met by other groups, not present at the negotiation table. What I am indicating is that all types of policy incoherence are not self-evident, even if economists may see them immediately. According to OECD's (2003) Policy Brief, the analysis is seemingly simple:

“OECD taxpayers and consumers, as well as the people in developing countries, bear the costs of policy incoherence, whereas the benefits may flow to special interest groups. And vested interests in certain areas have been shown to be considerably more powerful than developmental interests.”

However, as will be made very clear throughout the remaining part of this paper, a number of policy inconsistencies are due to different perceptions of “reality”. Some policy inconsistencies can thus be seen as “institutional compromises”. All Scandinavian welfare states were originally based on some form of “class compromise” between labour and capital. Private ownership of the means of production was accepted, in return for increased security of employment, health and education. In this process farmers had to be aligned, which in the case of Norway laid the foundations for a strong cooperative sector and a permanent subsidy regime. Whether this should be judged as the arch type of policy incoherence or as the cost of social stability depends again on the perspective of the viewer and not least on the time horizon.

15. As pointed out by Picciotto (2005) in a most recent OECD publication on the theme, full policy coherence can only be achieved by a competent dictatorship operating in a stable environment. The limits of coherence have also been shown theoretically by Arrow (1963), pointing to the importance of agenda setting and the sequencing of votes. In many cases incoherence arises as a result of circumstances outside the control of policymakers. Hence the distinction between *intended* and *unintended incoherence* may seem useful.

16. In the case of fisheries rationalisation it is easy to see that certain policies may be rational and consistent from a strictly economic point of view, while clearly irrational from a social point of view (increasing the number of unemployed and the level of poverty). In other cases cause and effect chains are not self-evident. Consequently, not all types of policy incoherence are due to vested interests, negligence, lack of information or bad institutions to remain in the OECD parlance. Hence, remedies may also be

sought in other areas, a theme I will return to in a later section. But first a short review of the setting, fisheries and aquaculture in developed as well as developing countries.

The setting: fisheries and aquaculture in developed and developing countries


17. According to FAO (2002) there are globally an estimated 30 million fishers, of whom at least 22 million are engaged in small-scale fisheries. If activities such as marketing, processing and auxiliary industries (net making and boat-building) are included, some 88 million people are employed in small-scale fisheries. With family members, as many as 150 million people may be dependent on these fisheries, although it should be stressed that the figures represent *estimates*; they are seldom based on detailed statistics³.

18. Turning to the economic importance of fishing, according to the latest calculations by the World Bank (2004), very few countries can boast of a GDP contribution by the fisheries that is higher than 5%. Of the twelve countries on the World Bank list, six are small island developing states; Kiribati (13%), Maldives (13%), Salomon Islands (12.8 %); Marshall Islands (9 %), Samoa (6.6%) and Fiji (5 %), and the remaining six comprise Namibia (7.5%), Bangladesh (7%), Ghana (7%), Senegal (7%), Vietnam (6%) and Myanmar (5%). Hence, on a national level, fisheries, including aquaculture, are normally not considered among the most important economic sectors. If focus is on the regional or local level, the situation may be completely different, with a large number of provinces and communities being directly dependent on fishing and aquaculture, often with few or no other alternatives. Here the up-stream and down-stream activities may also be substantial (Delgado et al. 2003).

19. The greatest importance of small-scale fisheries is not the number of people involved or in their contribution to the GDP, but their share of the global catch and consequently of the trade in fish and fish products. It was estimated in 2002 that small-scale fisheries caught approximately 50% of the fish used for human consumption. Currently more than 1 billion people rely on fish for their main source of animal protein (Pomeroy and Williams, 1994). Hence, to the extent that food security is on the agenda, supplies are to a large degree dependent on the contributions of small-scale fishers.

³ The explanation for the different estimates is largely found in different concepts of *fisher* (full time or part-time, including aquaculture farmers or not), the multiplier effect used to derive employment in associated employment such as processing and marketing, and finally the multiplier used to derive the number of family dependents. Hence the estimates may vary by a factor of 1:10 as in the case of Southern Africa where FAO (2001) operates with 215 000 fishers in the small-scale marine fisheries, while SADC (2003) estimates the number to be 2.3 million people depending on these fisheries for their livelihood.

Figure 1. World fish production from capture fisheries, industrial and developing countries
(1950-2001)



Aid or trade?

20. In spite of more than 5500 fisheries and aquaculture projects based on *aid* since 1950 (www.onefish.org), *trade* is still by far the most important contributor in economic terms to development in and of the fishing sector and the fishing communities, even in the small-scale fisheries. In 1961, according to global statistics, total fish production was on the order of 40.5 million tonnes; by 1976 on the eve of the introduction of the LOS Convention it had increased to 72.6 million tonnes. During the next 25 years it nearly doubled, due to the enormous increase in aquaculture.

21. Three aspects that should be noted (Table 1). Firstly, the developing countries experienced an impressive growth in the period 1961–1976 (from 17 to 31.4 million tonnes), but their share of the total production increased only slightly (from 42% to 44%). In the next period (1976-2001), after the introduction of EEZs and in combination with intensive aquaculture, their share of total fish production increased to 77% in 2001, clearly indicating that most of the fish production in the world today takes place in developing countries, and in particular in Asia. Secondly, the poorest countries experienced a doubling of their total fish production 1961–1976, while in the next period they increased their production two and half times, showing a total increase of 857% for the whole period.

Table 1. Trends in Fish Production (FP) and Human Population (HP)

(production in million metric tonnes and population in billions)

	1961		1976		2001		% 1961/2001	
	FP	HP	FP	HP	FP	HP	FP	HP
World	40.5 [100]	3.1 [100]	72.6 [100]	4.1 [100]	142.1 [100]	6.1 [100]	250	97
Developed	23.6 [58]	1.0 [32]	40.7 [56]	1.1 [27]	33.2 [23]	1.3 [21]	40	30
Developing	17.0 [42]	2.1 [68]	31.4 [44]	3.0 [73]	108.9 [77]	4.8 [79]	540	128
LIFDC	8.0 [20]	1.7 [55]	15.9 [22]	2.4 [59]	76.2 [54]	3.9 [64]	857	129

Figures in [] are shares of world total in respective year).

Kurien 2004.

22. Thirdly, concerning the Malthusian perspective, the degree to which the population is increasing faster than food production, we see from Table 1 that while the population increase in developing countries was on average 128% for the whole period, the increase in fish production was 540%. Even for the LIFDCs⁴ the population increase was about similar (129%) while the increase in fish production was six times higher (857%).

23. Whatever way we look at it the developing world has experienced an enormous growth in fish production. Fish is therefore for many developing countries the most important cash crop (more important than a number of agricultural cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, rice, etc). Fish is not only considered as source of export income, but as a solution to poverty problems as well. Fish can be turned into cash within a very short time, and fishing, for example through the sale of licenses, does not involve the large development costs that agriculture or mining do.

Fisheries and poverty

24. What is the relationship between poverty and fisheries? (All decent fisheries projects nowadays start by defining the ultimate project goal as contributing to “poverty alleviation through sustainable resource management”). Therefore, we must start by asking: To what extent are the small-scale fishers poor, or part of “the poorest of the poor”?

25. So far it has often uncritically been assumed that small-scale fishers are by definition poor. As pointed out by Béné (2004) we have very little knowledge about the degree of poverty among small-scale fishers. Their role in National Poverty Reduction Strategies (NPRSs) is nearly negligible (FAO-DFID 2002, Thorpes 2004); in the academic writing on poverty there is very little specifically on fishers. Globally it is estimated that 1.1 billion people are living on less than USD 1 per day (the World Bank’s global poverty line). If we assume that the directly fishery-dependent people represent the average in their respective countries, this would imply that some 23 million people are living on less than USD 1 per day (FAO 2002). To this figure should then be added that a much larger number of people are partly dependent on fisheries, often in combination with other occupations (agriculture, trading, construction, etc.) where fishing is an important part of their livelihoods. This means that at least 50 mill people depending on the

⁴ Low Income Food Deficit Countries (LIFDCs), comprising some 80 countries among the poorest in the world.

fisheries may belong to “the poorest of the poor”. Even if the more precise figures are missing, the rough estimates indicate that if the right development strategies are found, there is a considerable potential for assisting some of the “poorest of the poor”. This could contribute directly to Goal 1 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. This would in turn, through increased income, also contribute to other important MDGs such as improving education, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, etc. Hence, there is a connection between fisheries development and poverty alleviation, but quite often not as evident as proclaimed, and with a number of unanticipated side effects. This applies whether fisheries development is pursued through aid or trade. In either case a number of conditions have to be in place if development is to favour the poor, and especially the “poorest of the poor”.

26. Shortly summarized; fisheries and aquaculture represent a sector with considerable potential for policy incoherence, especially in a development perspective.

Where are the main problems?

27. Concerning the four types of policy incoherence, the first type may seem a strictly internal matter, to be left with the sovereign states. However, upon closer inspection, even sectoral internal inconsistencies may have important spillover effects, as when subsidies produce overcapacity, which in turn has to be exported to developing countries or applied to fishing in international waters. In some countries such inconsistencies are produced due to weak fisheries administrations’ being “captured” by influential user groups, in others inconsistencies are institutionalized compromises between industrial and artisanal or small-scale operators. More clearly formulated goals and accompanying strategies may assist in making such conflicts more visible and hence available for political discussions and deliberations outside the strictly defined fisheries segment. In most OECD countries such internal inconsistencies have produced massive overcapacity, thus representing a permanent pressure on the resources as well as continuous demands for support and subsidies. In developing countries such inconsistencies may have distorted the original comparative benefits of the small-scale fleet), with resources partly privatized by the industrial sector. In both situations the resource rent is squandered and the costs of fisheries administration and management have to be covered by state coffers.

28. The second type of policy incoherence, conflicts between various sector policies, is definitely more common in industrialized countries. Many fishing nations, such as Norway, the EU members and Japan, to mention but a few, find that fisheries policies are often overruled by stronger sectors such as industry, agriculture or energy. This may reflect that even in fishing nations, fisheries and aquaculture represent only a very small portion of the entire economy (for example, only 1% of GNP in Norway). With oil and gas export responsible for more than 50% of total exports and fish and fisheries products for 5-6%, chances of the fishing sector being overruled are high in the Norwegian case. In many developing countries fisheries and aquaculture interests may even more easily be overruled, because the sector has few explicit plans and demands. In addition the fisheries and aquaculture sector will usually have few spokespersons on government level, able to defend the sector interests and in particular the small-scale sub-sector.

29. The third type of policy incoherence is definitely of greatest public interest, having been intensely focused on by researchers and politicians interested in development issues over the last 30 years. Even if fish and fisheries products are considered to be industrial products within the WTO, trade barriers as well as non-tariff barriers still represent a major stumbling block for many developing countries intending to market their produce on the best paying international markets. The attempt of blocking Vietnamese catfish from entering the American market (and hence protect its national producers) may be an illustrative case, but such treatment is not reserved for developing countries alone; Norwegian salmon has been treated similarly on the EU market. In such cases the ideals of free trade are usurped by protective

policies, which protect (a few) national producers from strong and more efficient competitors, most often to the detriment of the consumers, which have to pay higher prices for the same product.


30. The fourth type of policy incoherence, involving international treaties proscribing certain policies that are difficult to implement on the national level, is also well known in the fisheries sector. But quite often the cause and effect chain is not quite as simple as suggested by OECD (2005). Let us use the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) as an example. In the World Summit for Sustainable Development's (WSSD) plan of implementation the establishment of MPAs, including representative networks, should be realized by 2012. MPAs have a role in biodiversity conservation and have been actively advocated by environmentalists also as a fisheries management tool. But as pointed out by Garcia and Doulman (2005) the matter is not as simple and straightforward as often anticipated. "It appears that that MPAs could be useful under certain conditions, but they are not a panacea for all the problems facing the fisheries sector" (ibid:185).

31. The usefulness of MPAs depends on the type of fisheries, the fleets involved, the administrative context, the monitoring, control and surveillance systems and not least, the fate of those fishers being excluded from the MPAs. Some countries, like New Zealand and Australia, have therefore been very active in implementing large MPAs while others, such as Norway and Iceland have been more skeptical, establishing smaller MPAs, mainly for scientific purposes. Again, what from an environmental point of view may seem like policy incoherence may be seen somewhat differently from the fisheries' point of view, not because MPAs have been "captured" by special influential fishing groups, but because the effects are at best ambiguous. Other issues of policy incoherence are more straightforward, such as Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing where nearly all fishing nations have pledged support to reduce such practices, while control on national level is often weak and with no effective sanctions vis-à-vis offenders.

New challenges: Sustainable Livelihoods and the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries

32. So far we have been dealing with policy coherence from a sectoral point of view, having in mind that fisheries and aquaculture are normally organized in sector agencies, either with their own ministry or as part of a larger ministry of agriculture, food etc. This has also been the dominant mode of development interventions. Although the mode of interventions has changed over the years, starting with supplies of fishing gear, boats and motors in the 1950s and 1960s, ending up with institutional development in the 1990s, the main idea has all the time been to strengthen the fisheries (and aquaculture) sector. If we accept that poverty in fishing is due not only to the resource situation, we have to extend our understanding of the role of small-scale fisheries. As pointed out by Béné (2004) small-scale fishers may often be no worse off than their rural neighbours in terms of income, living conditions or socio-economic status. However, their vulnerability is certainly greater, because they have to cope not only with a very risky natural environment, but with large resource fluctuations as well as market fluctuations. At any time they run a considerable risk of losing their entire production capital (boat and gear), for which reason most banks are reluctant to grant loans. Hence, many small-scale fishers with little or no collateral are dependent on middle-men, who normally charge considerably higher rents than ordinary banks. But vulnerability is different from poverty. Farmers and fishers may both be poor, but the fisher will most often be considerably more vulnerable than the farmer. Hence, when dealing with poverty alleviation it may make sense to make a distinction between poverty reduction and poverty prevention. The relationship can be illustrated as in figure 2 from Béné (2004).

33. Accepting this distinction may also imply a different view on policy interventions. So far most explicit policy interventions, whether in terms of national fisheries policies or in terms of development assistance have been geared towards sector development, and poverty reduction (on the left side of Figure 2).

Figure 2. Aspects of Poverty Alleviation

Source: Bené 2004.

34. If, as indicated above, the capacity of small-scale fisheries to generate considerable income and employment is severely circumscribed; the resources are limited and the small-scale fisheries, especially in Asia are already heavily oversubscribed. Consequently we may have to reconsider the role of small-scale fishing more from the point of view of poverty prevention, to see the fisheries as a safety net and a welfare function, able in many places to reduce the vulnerability of coastal and inland people that are only partly dependent on fishing. To simplify: if the vulnerability dimension is considered the most important aspect of alleviating poverty, some of the traditional management approaches, such as limiting access in order to improve catches, may turn out to be counterproductive. In the process of improving the situation for the bona fide fishers, one runs the risk of excluding the poorest of the poor, those resorting to fishing in times of crisis, or those participating only part-time in fishing, using the income from this activity to supplement their other income-generating activities. This argument is not meant as an unconditional plea for open access fisheries, which under the current circumstances may produce little or no fish for any of the fishers involved, whether they are full-time or part-time, but it can serve as an important reminder of the need to reconsider the role of the small-scale fisheries.

35. While rationalization of the fisheries in most industrialized nations has implied increased income (and reduced employment), these nations most often had alternative employment possibilities for the redundant fishers. This is most often not the case in many developing countries, and the cost of rationalizing the fisheries may imply increasing the vulnerability of the poor. What is important in this context is that a policy aiming at reducing vulnerability will also require much more in terms of coordinated policies between various sector-ministries and departments, including also the donor side in case of development policies. So while sustainable livelihoods (based on participation in many sectors) may be a desirable policy goal, this will in turn increase coordination problems and hence the risk of policy incoherence.

36. The same goes for the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF). While definitions of this concept vary considerably according to various stakeholder groups (see FAO 2003, Garcia et al. 2003 for authoritative definitions), the essence of the EAF approach is well described by Fluharthy (2005): “using what is known about the ecosystem to manage fisheries”. This approach acknowledges that fisheries decisions take place in an ecosystem context and that ecosystem knowledge can assist in managing fisheries production and identifying fishing’s effects on ecosystems. Moreover, this approach recognizes that our knowledge of ecosystems and of fishing’s effects on them is incomplete such that fisheries management policies must constantly be reviewed and adjusted in order to assure that they meet the broad goal of sustainability, that is, contributing to a sustainable development of all sub-systems. FAO (2005) describes the implications as follows:

- “fisheries should be managed to limit their impact on the ecosystem to an acceptable level;
- ecological relationships between species should be maintained;
- management measures should be compatible across the entire distribution of the resource;
- precaution in decision-making and action is needed because the knowledge on ecosystems is incomplete;
- governance should ensure both human and ecosystem well-being and equity”.

37. There is intensive debate about how EAF could be framed and about its merits and costs, but as policies are formulated there will undoubtedly be *increased risks of policy incoherence* because of the need to involve more stakeholders (e.g. fishers, environmentalists, tourism) and to strike compromises between them.

Who is to blame?

38. According to OECD’s (2005) scoping study there are four basic causes for policy incoherence:

- • Lack of policy coordination
- • Inadequate decision making
- • Political decisions
- • Lack of information and understanding.

I am not quite sure of how useful these categories are when we start analysing the fisheries’ reality. This lack of coordination could be seen as a result of inadequate decision making machinery, which is truly an institutional issue. That political decisions are causing policy incoherence is fairly obvious, but in this case we must anticipate that the incoherence is unanticipated, at least by the politicians. The final category; lack of information and understanding, indicates that with better information and improved understanding results could have been better.

39. Believing in the merits of rational thought, we should not rule out the scope for improvement by better institutional and informational set-up, but my guess in the field of fisheries is that in a large part of the cases of policy incoherence, information is available. In many cases even information on the negative aspects of such decisions is also fairly well known. Hence the decisions producing policy incoherence are made because some stronger stakeholder groups/alliances demand precisely this outcome.

40. Returning to my previous example from Norwegian agricultural policy, I find that the reasons for its obvious policy incoherence regarding the developing world are not either lack of information or bad institutions, but rather the influence and importance of agricultural parties and lobbies.

41. If OECD would like to influence such clearly political decisions, it is fairly obvious that it must do so through “mild pressure”, that is, through information and ultimately through international treaties. Indeed, OECD has followed this line for a number of years through its annual reviews of its member states’ policies; hence, in 2004, Norway received praise for its international cooperation policy, and in particular for its contribution to development funds, whereas it was heavily criticized for its protectionist agricultural policies.

42. And mild pressures and international treaties work. In the Norwegian case there is little doubt that the dramatic decline in fisheries subsidies largely resulted from the European Economic Space (EES) Agreement, which obliged all signatories to reduce direct price subsidies in the fisheries sector. At that time (1990) fisheries economists had demonstrated the irrationality of giving price subsidies in a situation with growing overcapacity for more than ten years, but to little avail. When the Main Agreement (between the State and the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association, acting on behalf of the entire industry) regulating subsidies was abolished in 2004, the fishing industry hardly protested because direct price subsidies no longer had legitimacy. In addition it realised that the main issues were now fought in another arena, namely resource allocation.

43. The argument presented above is not ruling out the possibility of improving policy coherence through better institutional design, better decision making systems and better information systems; but if root causes are political, they can best be defeated on the political level by a coalition of political forces on the local, national and international levels. This coalition will in turn depend on a combination of market forces, civil society and state powers.

44. For example, the banning of Mexican shrimp because shrimping vessels were not using dolphin-safe fishing gear was in the US considered a great triumph for the close cooperation of NGOs, consumers (“do not buy products without the dolphin safe label”) and trade authorities. However, the same policy was considered by Mexico to be a typical non-tariff trade barrier which harmed disproportionately Mexican fishermen. Rational politics is not always perceived as such by all parties.

45. Norwegian fisheries authorities still believe in the sustainable catching of minke whales, as part of a general policy of sustainable resource utilisation, but find that most of the world disagrees, at times violently. However, Norway has decided to continue whale hunting despite the anticipated costs, as a matter of principle, and not because it does not have the right institutions, an inferior decision-making system or lacks information. In fact, whale *research* has during the last 15 years cost more than the value of the entire catch.

46. The point is simple: not all decisions regarding “incoherence” are made misguided. And change, when it occurs, generally comes about because of the threat of adverse economic consequences. Precisely for this reason most small OECD countries, but also weak developing nations, are best served by international agreements, regulating economic sanctions, such as the WTO agreements and similar multilateral arrangements.

What are the benefits and possible costs?

47. On a general level the OECD scoping study (OECD 2005) outlines the possible benefits of policy coherence. They can broadly be classified as better performance (better results - results according to plans and projections), better use of scarce economic and manpower resources, and finally, increased political legitimacy for government authorities at various levels. These potential benefits are all possible in the fisheries sector, but obtaining them depends on building the right political coalitions, which in turn have to be backed by the public. Such policies may also have to provide compensation for the losers, as in the case of capacity reduction.

48. What about the possible costs? This is an issue hardly dealt with in the overwhelmingly pro-policy-coherence literature. Firstly, policy coherence comes at a cost, both politically and administratively. Anybody who has tried to align fisheries policies with agricultural policies can attest to the extremely time-consuming efforts necessary in the (frequently futile) pursuit of major policy change. Not all types of policy coherence are worthwhile pursuing. Sometimes administrative and political costs outweigh benefits.

49. Secondly, some would see greater political and administrative decision making as a cost in the sense that it would signify the predominance of central planning over market forces, contrary to the trend of the last 20 years in OECD countries which has been to leave these issues to market forces.

50. Thirdly, *some* degree of policy incoherence could, as already indicated, be seen as a cost in the sense that compromise involves costs for those in a position of strength and benefits for those in a position of weakness. A *greater* degree of policy coherence could easily imply a lesser degree of compromise, i.e. greater political costs to implement more coherent policies.

What is a realistic approach?

51. If we still believe in the old slogan, that “charity begins at home”, one of the best places to start improving policy inconsistency is *within the fisheries policies* of the respective OECD member countries, the ones, that according to the scoping study should have “the full complement of ‘capital’ – human or otherwise – required to cope with increasingly dynamic environmental, economic, social and political conditions” (OECD 2005:95).

52. Bringing the internal fisheries (and aquaculture) policies in order, is in itself a major task, securing that major goals and policies in one area are not sabotaged or weakened through partly diverging policies in other areas. The need for internal consistency in the field of subsidies and catching capacity has already been mentioned, but there are other important areas as well, such as resource allocation. In a country like Norway where the coastal fleet has been designated the role of being “the backbone of the industry”, resources are increasingly being transferred to the large-scale and industrial fleets. If economic efficiency was the only goal, this type of allocation may make sense, but most often fishing nations, whether developed or developing, have several conflicting goals and the solution is to make sensible compromises, between economic efficiency, biological sustainability and social equity.

53. What is for example considered a sensible compromise between economic, social and biological goals in one country may be less favourably evaluated in another. To take just one example, the weight and importance still attached to regional concerns in Norway (in terms of maintaining a certain settlement pattern), may seem odd in New Zealand, where similar concerns play a minor role in the fisheries policy. On the other hand, New Zealand has over the last 25 years demonstrated a willingness to accommodate the concerns of its aboriginal peoples that is unprecedented in most other countries.

54. In most developing countries the issue within the sector policy is how to strike a compromise between more fish (for food), higher export income, increased employment and increased incomes (for the fisher population). This may require what Bailey and Jentoft (1990) describe as “hard choices”, but as pointed out by Hersoug (2004a) most often the different goals are not even discussed, much less considered in an open and transparent policy process.

55. Regarding conflicts *between sectors*, the classical one in Norway has been between fisheries and agriculture, where the fisheries sector has opted for free trade, while the agricultural sector has claimed protection. In other OECD countries there may be other sectors interfering with fisheries, such as energy, industry or tourism. In this area it is not easy to see any quick solutions. In some cases the intruding sector

and its demands may be seen as unreasonable (as in the agricultural sector), while other conflicts are due to different user groups contending for the same (marine) space, thus necessitating compromises.

56. Regarding the third category, *policy inconsistency related to development policies*, tariff reductions (including non-tariff barriers) are among the most important issues as such reductions will facilitate trade in fish and fish products from developing countries. A continued focus on trade and trade issues is therefore warranted, even if most public attention still is connected to development aid. However, as demonstrated by Kurien (2004) free trade in fish and fishery products is neither a solution nor a threat to increased food security. In some countries the effects have been positive for the nation, the fishers, the fish workers and the consumers, while they have been negative in other countries. Generally, the effects of increased international trade with fish cannot be assessed on a global level. National or even local analysis is required to see how trade is affecting various groups of stakeholders and the resources. The point is simple; if poverty alleviation is the main focus, more tailor-made policies are required.

57. With regard to the fourth category, *related to international treaties*, much has been obtained during the 1990s, but often are the monitoring and controlling capacities severely underdeveloped. In the field of fisheries and aquaculture new instruments need to be developed to follow up on such obligations. This is also why OECD should continue its analytical work, where high profile advice is offered to member countries as well as cooperation countries, but probably extended to cover new policy areas, such as PCD in relation also to fisheries policy.

58. If additional activities should be mentioned, it would be a more intensive involvement with research and education in this field. Policy incoherence has attracted great interest among many students, researchers and universities, where strengthened efforts by OECD may pay important dividends. To the extent that free trade policies to day dominate most developing countries, if not in rhetoric so in practice, this is largely due to administrators and policymakers educated in OECD countries, bringing back new perspectives and insights. Hence, stronger focus on the next generation of leaders instead of only influencing the present leaders may give a good pay-off.

Conclusions

59. Policy coherence may, in its more moderate forms, eventually be perceived as are *sustainable development* and *resource management*, i.e. as something indisputably good and beyond politics. However, as demonstrated in the previous sections the arduous work of creating policy coherence most often involves hard political choices, even if the analytical work behind the decisions may be of more technical nature. Part of the problem is due to the fact that incoherencies are often seen from a sector point of view (in our case the fisheries and aquaculture sector), where intrusions from other sectors, whether deliberate or by accident (spill-over effects) are seen as policy incoherence.

60. At government level or on supranational level (as in the EU) political decisions must, by their very nature, be characterized by compromise. For example, MPAs may be established which are considerably smaller than proposed by the environmental NGOs, while certain types of fishing may be allowed in parts of the MPAs or during a certain time of the year. This may seem like a sensible compromise; however, representatives of sectors opposed to the fisheries sector, and the fisheries sector itself, would most likely perceive the outcome as *policy incoherence*.

61. Much of the debate over policy incoherence seems to imply that goal hierarchies can be established, once and for all, and that political goals can be presented in clear and unambiguous language. In this regard our colleagues in the field of political science are considerably more pessimistic than the writers portrayed in the OECD literature. Politics seeks compromise; hence, most political goals are ambiguous and unclear. After all, the aim is to build support from various groups, which means that a

specific goal may imply different things for different people. (Only administrators and researchers would like to see clear, prioritized and unambiguous goals!).

62. Equally modest are the lessons of more than 50 years of policy implementation research. Whether we are discussing top-down or bottom-up approaches, the lessons are the same: *politics continue*. New entrants that did not participate in the original process are coming onboard while old participants are out to defend their established interests. New alliances are formed and new goals may be found in the process. The crux of the argument is that politics does not stop with authoritative decisions at a particular point in time. Also in the field of policy coherence, victories (as in the case of price subsidies on fish) are seldom won once and for all; battles must be fought continuously.

63. Also regarding our learning ability, there are good reasons to be somewhat sceptical. Already in the 1970s, March and Olsen (1976:59) pointed out that:

“The problems of ambiguity in organisations are conspicuous. Nevertheless, the literature on organisational learning is rarely uncoupled from the idea that learning is adaptive. Experience is viewed as producing wisdom and improved behaviour. For purposes of studying experimental learning under ambiguity it is necessary to relax on such an assumption. Modern organisations develop myths, fictions, legends, folklore, and illusions”.

Learning in organisations is a special case in point and depends to a large degree on how information is selected and distributed, and furthermore on the ability of the users to implement corrective actions in terms of institutional reforms. In our context, discussing whether national governments and administrations are able to learn from experience, the contributions of March and Olsen (1989) and Brunson and Olsen (1990) are highly relevant. They focus on the fact that institutional reforms may be seen from two perspectives. One of these is the familiar rational choice perspective, where organisations are established in order to obtain specific goals and where reforms are initiated when established practices are no longer seen as optimal. The other perspective is more concerned with institutional development as a spontaneous and natural process. Institutions develop through a historical and cultural process, which cannot be governed or controlled by any particular group of reformers (ibid:14). Certain ways of acting (routines) acquire the status of being generally accepted and they have their own intrinsic value (Selznick 1957). They become *institutionalized*.

64. Seen from this latter perspective reforms are partly the result of strong trends in the environment, and partly the result of more short-term fads and fashions. In this case the results of the reform(s) are not of primary importance; rather, of primary importance is the fact that the organisation shows an ability to reform, thus coping with the demands of the environment and not least, being able to portray itself as a modern and responsible organisation. In turn this can produce both ritual and hypocrisy, where the reforms have little impact on the actual working of the organisation, and in the next round bring about demands for new reforms.

65. Therefore, the million dollar question remains for the future: To what extent will policy coherence-related reforms be only ritual (and hypocrisy) or, more optimistically, real reforms leading to better outcomes, more efficient use of resources and higher political legitimacy? Looking at the agricultural policies in many OECD countries, we have ample reasons to be sceptical; on the other hand, OECD's and FAO's work on fisheries subsidies give us reasons to be optimistic.

66. Finally, a word on research strategy in the future: According to OECD (2005)

“The development of indicators of policy performance (and policy coherence) which can be quantified in a standardised manner over time, and fed back into the policy process, with particular reference to sustainable development will require significant research and development efforts in the future”.

It is of course possible to imagine that policy coherence, just like development and ecosystem management, can be described by means of sophisticated indicator systems, with scoring on various scales, combined and weighted indices and comparisons across sectors, countries or even regions. The case of the Human Development Index (HDI) may serve as an interesting illustration of how a seemingly simple index has managed to raise the attention and awareness related to development problems. More recently the Center for Global Development (CGD) has published a *Commitment to Development Index* (CDI) that aims to shift public attention from policies of the south to policies of the north (Picciotti 2005b:141). Here we find interesting results; for example, Norway scores among the best in the (industrialised) world in terms of giving development aid, while it is among the worst in terms of restrictions on trade. Therefore, Norway’s combined score is way behind the scores of most of its OECD neighbours.

67. The CDI and similar initiatives may certainly assist in increasing attention on policy coherence issues, but it would be an absolute dead end in terms of understanding *how policy incoherence is created, maintained and eventually overcome*. Politics is infinitely more complex than portrayed in the quote above, and what is needed are good case studies, showing how policy incoherence is created and maintained. If we still believe in the principle of the better argument, the next step is to make such (glaring) incoherencies public, in the end hoping that public pressure and/or initiatives from governments and politicians will start to rectify the situation.

68. The rapidly growing interest in policy coherence issues, especially those connected to development issues, will help. Particular attention should be paid to the NGO sector, also in the field of fisheries and aquaculture, using the internet to point out inconsistencies, which in the old days were “secrets” only known by politicians and administrators directly involved. In other instances NGOs will work in tandem with the market, as when certain environmental standards are implemented through the boycott of products produced under harmful circumstances.

69. Whereas greater amounts of information transmitted at ever increasing speeds will help in focusing on incoherence problems, the rapidly changing international agenda will complicate matters. This week’s dramatic crisis, produced by policy incoherence, may be completely overshadowed by next week’s dramatic crisis, most probably in another field, in another geographical area. Still there are good reasons to maintain that long-term, dedicated work on certain key issues may actually produce long-lasting results, especially if the policy incoherencies are highlighted and then rectified via improved policy secured by international treaties which force the compliance of all parties. But let us not fool ourselves: we will have to live with policy incoherence the rest of our lives, in fisheries as well as in all other sectors. Still, pursuing the goal of policy coherence can be worthwhile. Or as phrased by Pomfret (2005:47):

“Even if full policy coherence will be elusive, it is unacceptable to continue to ignore the need to align the commitment to development across OECD member country policies. Even without the perfect PCD, commitment to the MDGs requires, at a minimum, that an impact assessment of all policies’ implications for development should be included as part of the policy decision process.”

Acronyms and Abbreviations:

CAP	Common Agricultural Policy (EU)
CFP	Common Fisheries Policy (EU)
CGD	Center for Global Development
CDI	Commitment to Development Index
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
EAF	Ecosystem approach to Fisheries
EC	European Commission
EES	European Economic Space
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
GDP	Gross Development Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IUU	Illegal Unreported Unregulated (fishing)
LIFDC	Low Income Food Deficit Countries
MCS	Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NPRS	National Poverty Reduction Strategies
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
UNCLOS	UN Conference on the Law of the Sea
WSSD	World Summit for Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Arrow, K. J. (1963): *Social Choice and Individual Values*. Wiley, New York.
- Bailey, C. and S. Jentoft (1990): "Hard choices in fisheries development". *Marine Policy*. July, pp. 333-344.
- Béné, C. (2003): "When Fishery Rhymes with Poverty: A First step Beyond the Old Paradigm on poverty in Small-scale Fisheries". *World Development*. Vol.31, No.6, pp. 949-975.
- Béné, C. (2004): "Small-scale fisheries: assessing their contribution to rural livelihoods in developing countries". A report commissioned by FAO for the Advisory Committee on Fisheries Research. WorldFish Center, Cairo.
- Brunsson, N. and J. P. Olsen (1990): *Makten att reformera*. Carlssons, Stockholm.
- Dahl, R. A. and C. E. Lindblom (1953): *Politics, Economics and Welfare*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Delgado C., N. Wada, M. Rosegrant, S. Meijer and M. Ahmed (2003): "Fish to 2020: Supply and demand in changing global markets". International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC.
- FAO (2000): "Poverty in coastal fishing communities". In Advisory Committee on fishery research third session December 5-8, 2000. FAO, Rome.
- FAO (2002): "The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture - Fisheries resources: trends in production, utilization and trade". FAO, Rome.
- FAO (2003): "FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries" No 4, Suppl. 2. Fisheries management: 2. The Ecosystem approach to fisheries. FAO, Rome.
- FAO (2003): "Strategies for increasing the sustainable contribution of small-scale fisheries to food security and poverty alleviation". Committee on Fisheries, 25th Session, FAO, Rome.
- FAO (2005): "Putting into practice the ecosystem to fisheries". FAO, Rome.
- FAO-DFID (2003): "Report of the Consultation on Integrating Small-Scale Fisheries in Poverty Reduction Planning in West Africa". GCP/INT/735/UK, Cotonou, 12-4 November 2002.
- FAO-SOFI (2003): "The state of food insecurity in the World". FAO, Rome.
- Flewharty, D. (2005): "Evolving ecosystems approaches to management of fisheries in the USA". *Marine Ecology Progress series*. Vol 1 300:248-253.

- Forester, J. and O. Stokke (1999): *Policy Coherence in Development Co-operation*. EADI Book Series No.22. Frank Cass, London.
- Hernes, G. (1978): Makt, blandingsøkonomi og blandingsadministrasjon, in Hernes, G. (ed.): *Forhandlingsøkonomi og blandingsadministrasjon*. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo.
- Garcia, S. and D.J. Douman (2003): FAO's Fisheries Programme and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, in Ebbin, S.A., A.H. Hoel, and A.K. Sydnes (eds.) 2005: *A Sea change: the exclusive economic zone and governance institutions for living marine sources*. Springer, Dordrecht.
- Hersoug, B. (1983): Fiskeriplanlegging – offentlig styring eller politisk pliktøvelse, in Hersoug, B. (ed.): *Kan fiskerinæringa styres?* Novus Forlag, Oslo.
- Hersoug, B. (2002a): *Unfinished business. New Zealand's experiences with rights-based fisheries management*. Eburon, Delft, the Netherlands.
- Hersoug, B. (2002b): *Fishing in a sea of sharks. 2002: Reconstruction and development in the South African fishing industry*. Eburon, Delft, the Netherlands.
- Hersoug, B. (2004a): "Exporting fish, importing institutions – fisheries development in the Third World". In Hersoug, B., S. Jentoft and P. Degnbol: *Fisheries development: The institutional challenge*. Eburon, Delft, the Netherlands.
- Hersoug, B. (2004b): "To be a Norwegian means you are an expert" Norwegian development assistance in fisheries 1952-2002. In Hersoug, B., S. Jentoft and P. Degnbol: *Fisheries development: The institutional challenge*. Eburon, Delft, the Netherlands.
- Ebbin, S.A., A.H. Hoel, and A.K. Sydnes (eds.) (2005): *A Sea change: the exclusive economic zone and governance institutions for living marine sources*. Springer, Dordrecht.
- Kurien, J. (2004): "Fish Trade for the People. Toward Understanding the Relationship between International Fish Trade and Food Security". Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum, Kerala, India.
- March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen (1976): "Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations". Universitetsforlaget, Oslo.
- March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen (1989): *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics*. The Free Press, New York.
- OECD (1999): "Trade, Investment and Development: Policy Coherence Matters". Report. OECD, Paris.
- OECD (2003): "Policy Brief. Policy coherence: Vital for global development". OECD, Paris.
- OECD (2005): *Fishing for Coherence: Fisheries and Development Policies*. Special Chapter on Policy Coherence for Development in Fisheries. OECD, Paris.
- Picciotti, R. (2005a): Key concepts and central issues, in OECD: *The Development Dimension. Fostering Development in a Global Economy. A Whole of Government Perspective*. OECD, Paris.

- Picciotti, R. (2005b): Policy coherence and development evaluation: Issues and possible approaches, in OECD: *The Development Dimension. Fostering Development in a Global Economy. A Whole of Government Perspective*. OECD, Paris.
- Pomeroy, R. and M. Williams (1994): "Fisheries co-management and small-scale fisheries: A policy brief". ICLARM, Philippines.
- Pomfret, R. (2005): The shifting balance in the global economy, in OECD: *The Development Dimension. Fostering Development in a Global Economy. A Whole of Government Perspective*. OECD, Paris.
- SADC (2003): Report on the importance of marine fisheries to coastal community livelihoods in SADC countries. Southern Africa Development Community. Selznik, P. 1957: *Leadership in administration: a sociological interpretation*. Harper& Row, New York.
- Thorpe, A. (2004): "Fishery sector incorporation in National Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies, policies and programmes: current situation and opportunities". Draft report. FAO, Rome.
- World Bank (2004). "One World, one ocean. It's time to save it". Media Center 4 June 2004 release, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DevNews>.